Gas Chamber
Controversy

Bomb Shelters in Birkenau: A Reappraisal

by Samuel Crowell

6/5/2000

Introduction

A few years ago the argument began to emerge that the various gastight fixtures of the Birkenau crematoria were best explained in terms of protection against chemical warfare. The first exploration in this area was by Arthur R. Butz of Northwestern University, whose "Vergasungskeller" article of July 1996 argued that the basement spaces of Crematoria II and III at Birkenau were equipped in a manner consistent with an anti-chemical warfare "gas shelter." In the spring of 1997, our own research led to the article "Technique and Operation of German Anti-Gas Shelters in World War Two" (hereinafter, Technique), which approached the issue of chemical warfare defense from an air raid protection point of view, supporting the argument with many references to contemporary German civil air defense literature.

Technique expanded the argument for gas protection considerably, but also created a link between chemical warfare protection and air raid protection because it showed that chemical warfare protection was intrinsic to German bomb shelter design: that is, all bomb shelters were meant to provide gas protection, and gas shelters were essentially a subset of bomb shelters.

It should be said that the argument in Technique was not meant to be comprehensive but merely to alert interested students to the possibilities of German civil air defense literature in explaining the origin and purpose of the gastight fixtures of the Birkenau crematoria. Hence, the article consisted of a simple comparison of only two data sets: the German civil air defense literature on the one hand, and the so-called Criminal Traces of J. C. Pressac on the other.

Of course, the idea that the crematoria of Birkenau would be equipped to protect against bombs or poison gas is unusual, but it was a conclusion that seemed to us inevitable, given the essential identity of all of the gastight fixtures noted by Pressac and ordinary civil air defense paraphernalia found in the German literature. For this reason, we thought it important to put the matter before the public. At the same time, however, the idea was unusual enough that it seemed to call for further investigation, and hence a sister article, "Defending Against the Allied Bombing Campaign" (Defending) followed in July of 1997.

The primary aim of Defending was simply to investigate whether the gastight fixtures common in the German civil air defense literature were also common in Germany during the war. The secondary aim of Defending was to see if there was any other evidence of bomb shelters or gas shelters in the concentration camps, and particularly in Auschwitz. The main limitation of Defending was that at the time we had no documents proving the existence of gastight bomb shelters in either the concentration camps, or at Auschwitz, and in the meantime we were constantly being assured from all sides that there had never been any.

Technique and Defending, along with Professor Butz' prior article, became the basis for what was essentially a new model for explaining the gastight fixtures at Auschwitz. For many years, the existence of gastight fixtures at Auschwitz had been assumed as references to homicidal gas chambers, while since the late 1970's the standard antithesis was that these gastight references were all references to delousing or disinfection gas chambers. We may call these the "gas chamber thesis" and the "disinfection thesis" respectively. (See NOTE) The new emphasis on protection against poison gas in an air raid context, however, provided a third model, what we have called the "bomb shelter thesis."

We would define the bomb shelter thesis in this way: there are a number of objects, fixtures, and names applied to spaces in the Birkenau crematoria and other buildings at Auschwitz, and most of these terms, although not all, include reference to gastightness. The bomb shelter thesis simply states that some, or many, or most, or all, of these are best explained in a civil air defense context, which includes gas protection. Like any thesis, the bomb shelter thesis has a maximum and a minimum. It may be that the thesis explains some of these gastight fixtures, but not others. It may be that it explains all of them, in which case it would seem to follow that the gastight fixtures of the Birkenau crematoria were applied to those buildings with the intent of following civil air defense or gas protection guidelines, and not for purposes of mass gassing or disinfection. The only way to test the thesis would be for the various experts in this field to apply the civil air defense model to the existing evidence, and for that reason our writings on the subject have sometimes challenged these experts.

In the event, however the experts have been disinclined to pursue the thesis at all. In early 1998, we received copies of three documents from the Auschwitz Central Construction Office, which are today archived in Moscow, and these proved that the camp was involved in air raid protection measures a full year earlier than had previously been believed (Auschwitz Central Construction Office = Zentralbauleitung der Waffen-SS und Polizei Auschwitz = ZBL). These documents, along with a brief letter which outlined our proposed interpretation of them, with, it must be admitted, a certain challenging and unguarded tone, were published on the Internet website of the British historian David Irving (see Documents). Shortly before, Technique was published by the German scientist Germar Rudolf in his revisionist journal, Viertelsjahrhefte für freie Geschichtsforschung. A year later, in early 1999, Herr Rudolf's translation of Technique was subjected to a critique by the Italian revisionist Carlo Mattogno, himself an apostle of the disinfection thesis. This called forth a rather brief rebuttal from us, (see Comments), which a few months later led to a further critique by Mattogno. Finally, in early 2000, the bomb shelter thesis was discussed in some detail by Professor Robert Jan van Pelt in his expert report for the David Irving v. Deborah Lipstadt/Penguin libel trial. This came shortly after the Journal of Historical Review had published another adaptation of Technique, this time in Mark Weber's version.

In the meantime, during the Irving v. Lipstadt trial, David Irving adopted a limited acceptance of the bomb shelter thesis with regard to the gastight fixtures of Crematoria II and III, and the thesis was the subject of testimony by Irving and van Pelt, was referred to in the closing speeches of both Irving and Richard Rampton QC, and was discussed in the judgment of Justice Charles Gray. It may be fairly said that the thesis is beginning to be discussed more widely, and therefore is deserving of review.

The purpose of the present study is to review the evidence for bomb shelters and the application of civil air defense procedures in the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex, based primarily on documents from the Auschwitz Central Construction Office. We do not mean to rewrite or rehash the content of either Technique or Defending, but simply to supplement these articles with other information that has come to our attention over the past three years. In the course of doing so, we will have an opportunity to reappraise our interpretation of the Criminal Traces and answer the critical objections of Mattogno and van Pelt.

In Part One we will describe the background to the argument, which essentially turns on the presentation of documentary evidence that the Birkenau crematoria were adapted for the purposes of mass murder with poison gas. Here we will briefly cover the documentary situation from the time of the Nuremberg trials through the writing of our own articles in 1997.

In Part Two, preceded by a brief survey of documents for occupied Poland, we will present several documents, many of them from the Central Construction Office of Auschwitz, which will show that Auschwitz was in receipt of civil air defense directives from the beginning of the camp's existence. We will also see that certain evidence for the implementation of civil air defense procedures comes from the summer of 1943.

In Part Three, we will review the Criminal Traces of J. C. Pressac, and make some expansions and some concessions as to the proper interpretation of some of these documentary references. In addition, we will offer a few new documents.

In Part Four, we will array a few dozen documents, nearly all of them from the archives of the Central Construction Office, and nearly all of them unearthed by revisionist researchers in the past few years. We will attempt to arrange these documents into a coherent narrative that supports the disinfection thesis, and after, to point up the deficiencies of the gas chamber thesis in explaining these documents.

In Part Five, we will review the criticisms of Mattogno and van Pelt and provide our responses to them.

Our overall conclusion is that the crematoria in Birkenau ended up fulfilling three functions. First, they were built to implement the special measures dictated by General Kammler of the SS Construction Office in Berlin with respect to improving the hygienic conditions in the camp by providing crematoria that would allow for the rapid disposal of the dead. Second, the showers, washing facilities, and other facilities with which the crematoria were equipped were to be used temporarily for the showering of the prisoners, and the disinfection of their garments, prior to the completion of the Central Sauna at the end of 1943 and the main Reception Center in the main camp in 1944. Finally, like all new constructions and particularly those equipped with showers or other washing facilities, the crematoria were also equipped with various gastight equipment in order to fulfill civil air defense requirements, including those for chemical warfare decontamination, in accordance with a further set of directives from General Kammler. The evidence suggests that the early adherence to civil air defense guidelines was something of a formality, but that by early 1944 the matter of adequate civil air protection in the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp became a pressing concern, and continued on until the liberation of the camp in early 1945.

In short, we will see that the documentary and material evidence, at all levels, indicates concern over civil air defense and gas protection in the Auschwitz camp that increases probably from the fall of 1942 until the end of the camp's operation. This involved, by early 1944, the proliferation of gastight fixtures, and other fixtures, identical to the gastight fixtures with which the Birkenau crematoria were equipped the previous spring. The deficiencies of the alternative explanations will be noted, and the bomb shelter thesis will be argued as the most plausible explanation for the gastight fixtures of the crematoria.

At the end of World War Two it was widely assumed that the Nazis running the concentration camps had gassed millions of prisoners in them. At the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, which ran from late 1945 until early fall 1946, it was stated in the judgment that millions of people had been gassed and cremated at the Auschwitz camp, which actually comprised a base camp of that name, and numerous satellite camps, the largest of which was at Birkenau, about two miles away. The evidence upon which the International Military Tribunal's judges made their judgment about gassings at Auschwitz consisted of some testimony and a special report prepared by the Soviet Union.

The decision of the International Military Tribunal to endorse the claim of gassing at Auschwitz had far-reaching repercussions, because it was stipulated at the time that the judgments arrived at by that tribunal would be binding for all subsequent legal proceedings. Hence, all later trials in Germany on the subject of Auschwitz, whether conducted by the occupying powers or by the Germans themselves, have never contested the gassings since their occurrence was not something that could be disputed. This is something the student should always keep in mind.

In March, 1947, the former commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höß, was tried before the Polish People's Tribunal in Warsaw. At this trial protocol lists of evidence were presented, derived from earlier hearings in Krakow (hereinafter Krakow Protocols) in late 1946, and these became part of the court record. Also during 1947 the United States conducted a trial of the various heads of the concentration camp system, known as Case #4 of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, the main defendant being Oswald Pohl, who was head of the WVHA, the division of the SS involved in the exploitation of forced labor in the camps (WVHA = Wirtschafts-Verwaltunghauptamt = SS Economic Administration Main Office). At that trial two documents were introduced as evidence of gas chambers at Auschwitz and they were, for more than 30 years, the only documentary evidence available in the West.

The two documents consisted of a letter from the Auschwitz Central Construction Office, which uses the word "Vergasungskeller", and another, also from the Construction Office, which used the term "gasdichte Türme." Both terms were translated as "gas chambers" by the American prosecution, but these are incorrect translations. We will discuss both of these documents later in detail, but the point is that the broad acceptance of the gassing claim was achieved based on testimonies, to which these two documents provided only some supplementary detail. This is important, because the bomb shelter thesis is about the documents, not the testimony, and that means that the issue of a civil air defense explanation for documents is not synonymous with the issue of gassing as such.

In the early 1970's, a handful of Germans who had been to Auschwitz during the war began to make claims that they had never heard of any gassings there. This stimulated a French professor of literature, Robert Faurisson, to go directly to the camp sites in communist Poland. Faurisson conducted critical examinations of the Auschwitz camp, and its architectural drawings, and many other camps, and came to the conclusion that no one was gassed at any of them, and that the only gassings that occurred in German camps were the delousing and disinfection gassings that were repeatedly done to barracks and clothing in order to combat disease.

When Faurisson began to publish the results of his studies in the late 1970's, a great controversy erupted in France. There were several legal proceedings against Faurisson. His accusers had only the two documents we have discussed at their disposal to contradict him. This is the background to the Criminal Traces of J. C. Pressac.

Jean Claude Pressac is a pharmacist by trade but has studied the Auschwitz camp since the 1950's. He made several trips to Auschwitz, and studied the ruins and the documents in the Auschwitz State Museum. By 1986 he had compiled a massive amount of documents, including architectural drawings, most of these culled from the Auschwitz archives, and these formed the backbone for his book, "Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers" which appeared in 1989. The book was published in a limited edition of only 1,000 copies by the Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, a French organization of anti-Nazis. It has a certain legendary quality not only because of its scarcity, but because of the amount of the documentation contained within it. Nevertheless, as any reader can see, it does not prove the existence of homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz.

Pressac framed his argument in terms of a response to Faurisson. Faurisson had compared the alleged gas chambers with known gas chambers in the United States, and had found the sites at Auschwitz and elsewhere to be totally lacking in the safeguards and design found in the American gas chambers. Faurisson also interpreted every site with a gastight door as a delousing or "disinfestation" gas chamber for killing lice. Hence, Pressac, in rejoinder, devoted quite a bit of space to the discussion of delousing and disinfection facilities at Auschwitz. Pressac generally sought to make two points: first, that the Germans made all kinds of ad hoc arrangements for the use of the poison cyanide gas contained in the pesticide trade-named Zyklon B, so that they would be expected to take no special precautions in using Zyklon B for homicidal purposes. Second, Pressac wished to show that because of such casual standards any space could be a gas chamber, and that the morgues of the Birkenau crematoria were not specially designed for gassing, but were merely convenient to that purpose.

There was a certain necessity to Pressac's argument, because when he turned to the Birkenau crematoria he had to agree that the structural differences between these crematoria and any other crematoria were minor. At the same time, Pressac conceded that no architectural drawing described these spaces as anything other than morgues.

In response to Faurisson's request for a proof, "one single proof" of a gas chamber designed to kill human beings, Pressac came up with a famous juxtaposition: he was able to show that one of the basements of Crematorium III was equipped with 14 showers and a gastight door. According to Pressac, these two things could not be explained in any other way except by saying that this space functioned as a gas chamber, in which people were murdered with poison gas while thinking they were going to take a shower. The balance of Pressac's evidence consisted of "39 criminal traces", that is, thirty-nine instances of words or objects found in various records which, in Pressac's view, could only have a homicidal explanation.

The Criminal Traces have been subjected to many critical analyses, of which our own Technique was just one. Therefore, we do not plan to go over the Traces comprehensively here, although we will discuss them again in selective detail later. Still, a few minor points are work making.

The first is that, in terms of the types of traces Pressac found, the vast majority of them had to do with relatively innocuous terms, such as showers, heaters, and the like, and about two dozen that had to do with doors or windows that were specified as "gastight" (gasdicht). For the most part, Pressac based his argument for gas chambers on the presence of these gastight fixtures. The question then was whether these gastight fixtures had to do with gassing people, or gassing things.

Revisionist responses to the gastight traces usually followed Faurisson's tradition of interpreting gastightness in terms of delousing or disinfection. There were some problems with this interpretative model. For example, some of the gastight doors were specified as having peepholes, and it was further assumed that most of them were so equipped. But disinfection with Zyklon B did not require a peepholed door. Even so, there was some evidence that peepholed doors had been used for delousing and disinfection elsewhere. Another problem with the disinfection model is that small windows, or gastight coverings for such windows, was not a typical part of the disinfection literature. Therefore, while the disinfection explanation was certainly a counter-explanation, it was not a particularly satisfying one, and it failed to satisfy us.

Before proceeding farther, we should orient ourselves to the crematoria in Birkenau to make the subsequent discussion easier to follow. Figure 1 is an aerial photograph taken by Allied air forces in August of 1944. It has been oriented to the North. Above and below are two large buildings, each one has a stubby "T" shape, the leg of the "T" indicating the location of the chimney and the incinerator. Extending to the west of each structure one can discern the outline of a long low semi-subterranean room, which for both buildings is called "Morgue #2" (Leichenkeller 2) on all architectural drawings. These are supposed to have been the undressing rooms where people undressed before they were gassed. At right angles to Morgue #2, also mostly underground, and on the opposite side from the chimney, one can see two other basements, smaller than Morgue #2. These basements are designated as "Morgue #1" (Leichenkeller 1) on all known architectural drawings, and these are supposed to have been the gas chambers. Note further that both Morgues #1 have markings on their roofs. For the Morgue #1 on the top of the photo, we note that the four marks or smudges are in a kind of zigzag pattern. In the case of Morgue #1 at the bottom, the markings run down the center of the structure. These markings are supposed to be the "holes in the roof" through which the poison was introduced into the gas chamber.

The building on the bottom of the photo is usually known as "Crematorium II", it being the second crematorium put into operation, the first one being at the Stammlager at Auschwitz. Sometimes it is referred to as "BW 30", meaning it was the 30th building project for the Construction Office, sometimes as Krema II, etc. The building at the top of the photo is "Crematorium III", also known as or Krema III, or "BW 30a".

Figure 1: Aerial photo of Krema II and III. Click on the image to see a larger version.

Today both of the crematoria are in ruins, they were taken apart by the Germans before abandoning the camp. The various basements survive also in ruins as large pits in the ground. The sole exception to this is the Morgue #1 of Crematorium II, whose reinforced concrete ceiling did not shatter into pieces, as was the case with the other basement ceiling slabs. The ceiling has largely collapsed towards the ground, but the explosion that knocked out its supporting pillars left some of these standing, and did not break the inner web of reinforcing steel rods. Therefore, it is possible to inspect this site in detail, both from the top, which is covered with a layer of rubble, and from below, because one can actually enter into the southernmost quarter of the basement and inspect the ceiling, take samples from the concrete, and so on.

There are two significant things to remember about this basement, Morgue #1 of Crematorium II. The first is that inspection of the roof from either the top or the bottom has shown no trace of the four holes through which the gas was supposedly introduced into the space. In this respect, a very important concession was made by the defense witness van Pelt who agreed that there are presently no holes visible. True, two holes in the roof are present today, but these are off-center, do not match up to the markings in the photos, and, in light of Professor van Pelt's concession, it appears there is agreement that these two holes have nothing to do with the four holes through which the poison gas was said to be induced.

The second point to remember about Morgue #1 of Crematorium II is that about half a million people are supposed to have been fatally gassed within it.

Figure 2: Crematoria IV. Click on the image to see a larger version.

Our next photograph, Figure 2, is of Crematoria IV, located about a quarter-mile north of Crematoria II and III. This is a much less complicated structure than the other two crematoria, and has its own mirror image in Crematoria V, just on the other side of this photo. What we see on the left of the structure is the lower west wing of Crematorium IV, and here there were supposed to be two or three gas chambers. Note the small windows barely visible in this wing: these are supposed to have been the windows through which the poison gas was thrown into the rooms. Like Crematoria II and III, IV and V have alternate names, i.e., BW 30b and BW 30c. These structures were blown up and are present now merely as the cement foundation slabs of the structures, with some low reconstruction of walls. These buildings had no basements.

In early 1997, we decided that it would be appropriate to attempt to restate some traditional revisionist arguments in a manner that would be non-confrontative and conciliatory. We felt it necessary to do so because of the oppressive climate of censorship that had come to surround the subject of the Holocaust. This taboo threatened the criminalization of revisionist writings -- already in force on the European continent -- in the English speaking world. We felt then, and we still feel, that to censor revisionism on the subject of the Holocaust would be very bad, and, rather than try to defend the point with philosophical abstractions, we thought it would be more effective to try to show the merits of the long-standing revisionist challenge. It was hoped in this way that the intellectual classes, who had chosen to remain mum on the issue of censorship, would at least have pause to reflect on the extent to which they had subordinated their social obligation to intellectual inquiry to the comforts of emotion and ideology.

Very early in our research we began to look for possible non-empirical sources for the gassing claims, because, we reasoned, if they were not true or were exaggerated, the stories still must have come from somewhere, and it was a task of historical reconstruction to determine their origin. We noted a few stray references to air raid shelter doors in some testimonies and found that all air raid shelter doors were equipped with peepholes, and furthermore were gastight, since the Germans were very concerned about the possibilities of aerial gas attack. Following up on the matter, we compared the Criminal Traces of Pressac with the German civil air defense literature, and found an almost perfect fit. Our main conclusion, therefore, was that the Criminal Traces were indistinguishable from the objects and nomenclature of German civil air defense.

If the main thrust of Technique hinged on the identity of the gastight fixtures described in the Criminal Traces and the fixtures found in the German civil defense literature, we should note that the critiques of Mattogno and van Pelt do not substantially challenge this claim. Hence, it would seem fair to claim these gastight fixtures as civil defense fixtures. However, due to the contentious nature of the subject and the lack of documentary proof, we ought to stress a distinction between the civil air defense origin of these fixtures, which has not been effectively challenged, and the civil air defense intent behind the placing of these fixtures, which is the actual point of controversy.

We should also note that there has been one minor claim about the gastight doors, which should be discussed briefly. This is the argument that the peepholes of the gastight doors allegedly used to gas people were covered on the inside -- ostensibly so that the people being gassed could not break the glass of the peephole -- rather than on the outside. The claim stems from the postwar deposition made for the Polish investigators by Henryk Tauber, a former inmate of Auschwitz. There is also a photograph of a door that has a wire mesh covering on the inside.

There are several problems with this proposed distinction. First, the doors are not identical. The door Tauber described was wooden parquet, the door in the photograph straight wooden boards. The second problem is that gastight doors for civil air defense or gas protection purposes could have the peephole covered either on the inside, or the outside, or even not at all, and such variation would be hardly surprising for makeshift doors made on site, which was the case with most of the gastight doors at Auschwitz. This was indeed already noted in the footnotes to Technique. The third problem is that none of the other makeshift gastight doors pictured in Pressac's book have a covering for the peephole on the outside, and none of these are claimed as doors to homicidal gas chambers. Therefore, we consider this distinction precious.

Figure 3, below, provides a view of a standard German air raid shelter door. This particular door is identical to one of the doors found at Majdanek in August, 1944, of which a casting is now on display at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. We note that the covering for the peephole is on the outside of the door, and that the locking latches can be worked from either the inside or the outside. We also note to the right a shutter or Blende for making a window gastight and behind it a wire mesh screen. Such doors as these were rather expensive, being made of steel, and they were designed to provide not only gas protection but also protection against bomb splinters (Gasschutz und Splitterschutz).

Figure 3: German air raid shelter door. Click on the image to see a larger version.

Figure 4, below, shows a view of the NW angle of the Stammlager crematoria, taken at about the time of the Polish investigatory commission, in May of 1945. We note that there is an air raid shelter door to the right, as one would expect, since this crematorium was converted to a bomb shelter in 1944. To the left, we can see the kind of parquet door to which Tauber referred, leading to a storeroom. In the middle, we can see a former prisoner, perhaps Tauber himself, who has donned his prisoner garb for the occasion, and who appears to be weeping. Apparently, this photo opportunity was staged in order to communicate something sinister about the bomb shelter door on the right.

Figure 4: Stammlager crematoria, May 1945. Click on the image to see a larger version.

Figure 5, below, shows a typical model for constructing a gastight door out of wood for air raid shelter purposes as found in the German civil air defense literature.

Figure 5: Gastight air raid shelter door drawing. Click on the image to see a larger version.

Such a makeshift bomb shelter door would provide gas protection but minimal protection against splinters. Such doors were usually made out of straight wooden boards, and gastightness was achieved in two ways: paper was glued along the cracks of the boards, and felt was nailed along the outside of the door. We note that, in this case, the peephole is not round, and appears to be completely unprotected. There were a number of doors similar to this found at Auschwitz at its liberation, see Figures 6 and 7. Some had round peepholes, some square, some protected, some not. As noted, none appear to have had the protection for the peephole on the outside. Only the heavy steel doors appear to have been so equipped.

Figure 6: Click on the image to see a larger version.

Figure 7: Click on the image to see a larger version.

Finally, Figure 8 presents a photograph of a makeshift window shutter, designed to provide a gastight seal for the windows, emergency exits, or other openings of a bomb shelter. We note that this is identical in appearance to the shutter shown in Figure 3, above. Figure 9 presents a shutter that Pressac claimed was one of the "gastight doors" meant to cover the gas chambers of Crematoria IV and V. We will express doubts about Pressac's argument later, but for now, we simply note the essential identity of this shutter and those shown in the civil air defense literature.

Figure 8: Click on the image to see a larger version.

Figure 9: Click on the image to see a larger version.

Figure 9a: Click on the image to see a larger version.

The response to Technique was not great, and, anyway, we were more concerned with returning to our original project which was writing a brief essay that, we hoped, would break a lance on behalf of free speech for revisionism. However Technique raised a number of questions, and curious about these, we attempted to research them to the extent that our limitations in time and resources allowed. Obviously, one of the main questions had to do with the issue of other bomb shelters: if the gastight fixtures found in the Birkenau crematoria really were of civil air defense origin, then we should be able to find similar fixtures elsewhere, and indeed, virtually everywhere.

Defending Against the Allied Bombing Campaign was meant to explore that question, but in the process that led us to the literature of the German civilian experience under the bombs, an experience that in itself was worthy of consideration. Therefore, while in Part 1 of that article we were able to establish the commonplace nature of gastight fixtures in German homes and apartment buildings, we also sought to provide a brief analysis of that experience. In Part 2, lacking documentary evidence, we sought to infer the commonplace nature of civil air defense, and thus gastight fixtures, in the concentration camps as well, based on photographs, architectural drawings, and by inference from postwar studies.

The one point in Defending worth stressing at this point is that the German authorities established a program in the fall of 1940, stipulating that all structures, and particularly all new structures in the armaments industry (which included the concentration camps) were to be equipped with air raid shelters. In addition, it was found that the concentration camps were also supposed to be equipped with air raid shelters for the prisoners, although usually these were of a rather primitive kind, the so-called "trench shelters" or Luftschutzdeckungsgräben.

The criticisms that have been made of the bomb shelter thesis to this point have been for the most part based on the limited comparative analysis found in Technique. On the other hand, the analysis of Defending concerns matters that are not really debatable, except the inferences concerning the concentration camps most of which will be recapitulated in the course of the present study.

Before setting forth our documents, we should acknowledge the precursors of the bomb shelter thesis. The first of these was Wilhelm Stäglich, a former judge, who suggested that the gastight door described in the gasdichte Türme letter was a bomb shelter door. Stäglich's comments were made in passing, for the reason that when he made them back in the early 1970's no one was really paying much attention to the documentary record, since, as we have seen, it was at that time essentially confined to two documents. Nevertheless, we consulted his book after writing Technique and Defending on a hunch that, as a former Luftwaffe officer, he might have some kind of intuitive reaction to the issue of gastight doors. Our guess was correct, at least as far as our thesis was concerned.

The next person who needs to be recognized is Friedrich Berg, who has accumulated over the years a vast archive of materials concerning conditions in wartime Germany. He also perceived that there was something to the issue of German civil defense and the camps, although, as an engineer, he was more interested in the performance of diesel engines relative to the gassing claims. Robert Faurisson also made a brief reference to the issue of gastight doors for bomb shelters in his critique of Pressac, but did not pursue the matter. There may have been others, and of course, there was the contribution of Arthur R. Butz, already described.

The point is that the general recognition of the importance of German civil air defense in explaining the gastight fixtures at Auschwitz has come solely from the non-traditional side. Not one traditional historian of the Holocaust has even noticed the significance of German civil air defense. What this means is that the bomb shelter thesis, even if only partly proved, would vindicate revisionism in general, just as it would vindicate intellectual inquiries grounded in skepticism and creativity as opposed to those based on adherence to orthodoxies and pre-determined outcomes.

In Technique and Defending we made the argument for the existence of bomb shelters primarily on the basis of primary and secondary literature concerning civil air defense, the Criminal Traces, and various photographic and other kinds of evidence such as we could locate. We were not able to present documents because these were unavailable. In the intervening years we have managed to accumulate some documents, and will present them here. First, however, we want to examine the wider context of German civil air defense measures in Eastern Europe during World War Two, not only because it supports the bomb shelter thesis for Auschwitz but also because it enables us to provide some explanation as to how we interpret documents. Therefore, we begin with a discussion of five documents, the term being used loosely here.

Document 1 -- Guidelines for Bomb Shelter Construction in the GG (Source: NA, T501, Roll 216, 1444-1447)

The first document we present is a set of directions dated August 6, 1942, entitled "Richtlinien für den Aufbau der Luftschutzes im Bereich des M.i.G." or "Guidelines for the Construction of Air Raid Shelters in the Area of the Military Authority in the Government General", meaning occupied Poland.

The document covers ground familiar to Defending: it stresses the need to build air raid shelters, these are to be constructed such that the entire occupancy of a building are accommodated, basements are to be used, and if there are no basements, ground floors are to be used, attention should be paid to anti-gas measures, and so on.

This is an example of what we would call a high-level document: it comes from an official source, it articulates policy, and it says something about intentions. Historians generally rely on such documents in order to establish when something "began". For example, it is customary to reference the beginning of euthanasia in Nazi Germany to a Hitler decree dated September 1, 1939, and we reference the "orderly and humane" transfer of some fourteen million Eastern Germans to the Potsdam Conference declaration of August 2, 1945.

The weakness of such documents is that while they describe general tendencies or attitudes, they do not tell us how, or even whether, the higher directive in question was implemented. For example, we know that the euthanasia decree was retroactive, and that it was actually signed in October 1939. Furthermore, the decree fails to tell us anything about the program. In the second case, we know that the Germans of Eastern Europe had been expelled under conditions that were neither orderly nor humane for some months even before the Potsdam announcement. So we can see that high level documents are high level in two senses: first, they come from high up in a hierarchy, and second, they frequently bear no relation to the actual historical reality on the ground. To get a sense of that historical reality, we need to go farther down.

Still, high level documents are useful and not only because they provide convenient starting dates. For example, if other information concerning air raid shelters surfaced in occupied Poland, an earlier high level document could explain the impetus behind these later activities. As it is, the document tells us only that civil air defense measures became a priority in occupied Poland at this time, and therefore the implementation of civil air defense measures can be inferred, but not proved.

Document 2 -- Entries from the Diaries of Hans Frank, (Source: Präg, Jacobmeyer, eds., Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen, 1939-1945, p. 565f)

The next document consists of two references from an abstract of the voluminous diaries of Hans Frank, who was the Governor of occupied Poland. Ideally, we would want the two entries themselves in front of us, but due to the difficulty in obtaining sources historians frequently rely on such abstracts. Even so, reliance on other people's abstracts has the drawback that the historian is bound to see the documents filtered through someone else's eyes: the preference for seeing the original documents cannot be over-stressed.

There are two entries of particular interest:

"September 22, 1942

[...] secret defensive measures -- gas mask distribution, gas rationing [...]

September 24, 1942

[...] Directions for the distribution of people's gas masks with "Chemical Weapons Use By the Enemy" -- code word "Cloud" or "Thunderstorm" --, provision of gas masks to "several categories" of the non-German population."

[22.9.1942

[...] geheime Verteidigungssachen -- Gasmaskenverteilung, Benzinsparmaßnahmen [...]

24.9.1942

[...] Anweisungen zur Verteilung von Volksgasmasken bei "Einsatz chemischer Kampstoffe durch den Feind" -- Stichwort "Wolke" bzw. "Gewitter" --, Versorgung "einzelnen Kategorien" der nichtdeutschen Bevölkerung mit Gasmasken.]

The document supports the contention that civil air defense was becoming a pressing issue in occupied Poland at this time, because of the connection of gas warfare with aerial attacks. We could reasonably hypothesize continuity between these entries and the high-level directive of almost two months before. The Frank diary entries also give us some proof that the civil air defense directive of August was being implemented.

For lack of a better term, we would classify this document as a mid-level source. By this we mean to convey the idea that it is a document that carries with it some of the authority, scope, and comprehension of a high level document but at the same time provides some low-level detail. But it is also important to note that mid-level documents are highly relative to the situation being researched. Frank's diary is a good source for information concerning the implementation of civil air defense measures in occupied Poland, but that is partly because he was the Governor of occupied Poland: he was part of the hierarchy in question. On the other hand, we could not use Frank's diary as a mid-level source for, say, military activity on the Western Front, because that would be outside his hierarchy and Frank's words would not carry any authority. Under such conditions, Frank's diary might be useful as a low-level anecdotal source, but no more.

This is an important distinction because we note that Frank makes a passing reference to atrocities. There are other diaries, written at the same time, which also describe atrocities and specifically, mass gassings: the diaries of Anne Frank, Victor Klemperer, and Emanuel Ringleblum. But all of these individuals wrote from outside the hierarchy that was carrying out these atrocities and hence their remarks cannot have any authority. At best, they can provide low level anecdotal evidence for what was actually happening on the ground, but at the same time they can provide good mid-level evidence for what people were actually talking about and hearing over the BBC.

Returning to the subject of civil air defense in Poland, we can conclude on the basis of the Frank diary entries that civil air defense measures were being implemented in Poland, and, together with the first document, we can begin to see a more connected structure of policy and implementation.

Document 3 -- Orders from Lublin (Majdanek) to Auert in Berlin, September 26, 1942 (Source: Kogon, E., others, eds. Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen durch Giftgas, p. 319)

Unfortunately, this is another document for which we lack the originals. It is referenced in Eugen Kogon's book, apparently from the part of the book written by Hans Marszalek, and the reference reads:

"Documents of the Central Construction Office of the Waffen-SS and Police on 26 September 1942, National State Archive Lublin ä Document #17, delivery numbers of the Firm 656, 657, and 659."

This is what we would call a classic low-level document, something which contains an explicit description but without any surrounding context. In this case, we are lucky to have some of the doors still in existence, where they can be found at the Majdanek concentration camp. Therefore, we know that these were air raid shelter doors.

Following on the documents we have already seen, it would be natural to conclude that the authorities in Majdanek decided to order some bomb shelter doors in accordance with the general civil air defense policy being implemented at that time. At least, that would be the common sense explanation. However, other explanations insist that these doors were used either for homicidal gassing or for disinfection purposes. However that may be, the fact is that the Majdanek camp ordered several bomb shelter doors at a time when occupied Poland was in the midst of implementing civil air defense measures. Therefore, it seems to us that the most reasonable explanation is that the doors were ordered with civil air defense in mind, regardless of how the doors may have been used.

Document 4 -- The Stroop Report, May, 1943 (Source: Nuremberg Document, PS-1061)

This famous report on the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto in May of 1943 contains two references relevant to our subject:

"While pretending to build air-raid shelters they had been erecting dug-outs within the former Ghetto ever since the autumn of 1942. These were intended to conceal every Jew during the new evacuation action, which they had expected for quite a time, and to enable them to resist the invaders in a concerted action.

[...]

According to depositions made yesterday and today, the Jews were asked during the second half of 1942 to erect air-raid shelters. At that time under the camouflage of erecting air-raid shelters, they began to build the dugouts, which they are now inhabiting, in order to use them for an anti-Jewish [sic!] operation."

We would consider the Stroop Report to be an excellent mid-level source on the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto. However, on the matter of civil defense, it lies outside the relevant hierarchy and becomes essentially an eyewitness account. Eyewitness accounts are extremely valuable to the historian in providing texture and color to historical descriptions, but just because they are limited to the eyewitness, they are very unreliable in terms of surrounding context. Hence, they have to be used cautiously, the historian's own judgment ultimately being the deciding factor.

In evaluating Stroop's remarks about civil air defense in the Warsaw ghetto we find him making claims about air raid protection for Jews in Poland that run up against our usual perceptions about the German treatment of Jews. Accordingly, if we were to encounter these references alone, we would be highly skeptical about them. However, since the remarks fit in well with the other documents we have seen, we feel justified in accepting their general validity -- but again we stress that we would not be inclined to do so without high and mid-level support.

Document 5 -- Nuremberg Testimony about the Warsaw Ghetto Revolt, April 23, 1946 (Source: International Military Tribunal, XII, p. 75)

Our fifth and final document is from the postwar testimony of Joseph Buehler, one of Hans Frank's aides. While being examined by Dr. Seidl, who was acting as defense attorney for Frank, the following exchange occurred:

"DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto in Warsaw in 1943?

BUEHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard, that an uprising had broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent resistance was encountered by the German troops."

This is another example of low-level evidence and it is of the least reliable kind. The evidence is not contemporaneous with what it describes. The person repeating the information is not an eyewitness. The information was given in a judicial setting where any desire for accuracy would be in contention with many other motives. Therefore, we would not be inclined to give the testimony much weight at all.

The fact that the testimony matches the claims of the Stroop Report is not impressive, because it could be that the witness was just repeating rumors or garbled reports that he had heard around the time of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt. In fact, precisely because such testimony comes after the fact the possibility of such influence cannot be discounted. Moreover, like the Stroop Report, it makes a claim about the German treatment of the Jewish people that is inconsistent with what we usually read. Nevertheless, precisely because the testimony matches up well with all of the other documents and is consistent with them we can accept this testimony as true.

The above traversal of five documents, or really, types of evidence, makes it clear that civil air defense measures were being implemented in occupied Poland beginning in 1942: to be exact, from August 6,1942. These measures were already advanced by late September of that year. The implementation of these measures extended to the remaining Jewish population of Poland in the city of Warsaw, as well as to the concentration camp in Lublin. These are all reasonable facts that emerge from the documents.

The problem is that, concerning the claim of mass gassing, and in particular, the claim of mass gassing at Auschwitz, we do not have such documents. There is no high-level document ordering the gassing of people at Auschwitz. There is no mid-level document ordering, or even discussing the gassing of people at Auschwitz. The low-level documents including work orders, requests for materials, and so forth comprise the Criminal Traces. None of these contains any reference to gassing people. There are no contemporaneous eyewitness reports except a purported one, the Franke-Gricksch report, a clumsily typed copy of which did not emerge until thirty years after the war, and which has never been authenticated. The evidence supporting the claim for mass gassings at Auschwitz comes almost entirely from postwar accounts generated at judicial hearings, and, as we noted earlier, all judicial proceedings including and subsequent to the International Military Tribunal operated under the assumption that the gassings took place. It is for these reasons that people are skeptical of the gassing claim.

The absence of any high or mid-level documents is usually explained by saying that the Nazis deliberately left none behind, in other words, there was a conspiracy not to create any documents. However, that claim itself comes from postwar accounts, and so this argument uses the least reliable kind of evidence to account for the absence of the most reliable kind of evidence. All conspiracy theories are similarly constructed.

Furthermore, the gaps in the documentation, given the scope of the alleged events, are huge. It is frequently said nowadays that historical events are "proved" by a "convergence of evidence" in which a multiplicity of sources "converge" on a fact. But no competent historian works that way. If the historian begins with a high level document, he or she then looks for mid- and low-level confirmation: for documents to cover every step of the way. If, on the other hand, the search begins at the bottom with an eyewitness account or a vague reference, the existence of higher orders of evidence is inferred, and these are searched for until they are found. Part of the historian's craft is knowing where to look to find the connecting documents.

There are two reasons why the above method is the proper procedure for any historian. First, because history is not only a matter of what happened, but also how it happened. This attitude presupposes laying out a hierarchy of documents that will provide a plausible causal chain. Second, and consequently, the historian will instantly recognize the difference between a large quantity of evidence, and the qualitative distribution of that evidence in a hierarchy. If the historian begins with, say, half a dozen eyewitness accounts, he or she will not see any value in a half dozen more: what is needed at that point is the evidence from higher levels that will explain how what the eyewitnesses described took place. In fact, the very first thing a historian should do, when confronted with two eyewitness accounts that describe something similar, is to make sure that there is no point of contact between the accounts, or that the two accounts do not come from a third narrative. Holocaust historians are particularly weak in this area.

The "convergence of evidence" model is borrowed from evolution, specifically, from evolutionary biology. For the historian, the absence of evidence for gassing in a continuous hierarchy is a serious problem; just as an evolutionary biologist would be dumbfounded if he or she found entire geological strata in which there was no evidence of life at all. That is the proper analogy for the magnitude of the problem faced here. It should be added that we have not constructed these levels of documents to suit our thesis: on the contrary, precisely because of a critical gap in our mid-level documentation, we will not be able to prove the bomb shelter thesis in its entirety.

Most of the documents that will be cited from here on come from the files of the Auschwitz Central Construction Office so it seems appropriate to say a few words about the layout of these files. The story goes that when Auschwitz was liberated on January 27, 1945, most of the files in the camp were destroyed but the files of the Central Construction Office were left intact. These files, in turn, were used by the Soviet Special Commission to write its report of May 6, 1945 (known by its Nuremberg designation of USSR-008.) The bulk of the files were then moved to Moscow where they were forgotten for many years, but some of the files (or carbon copies) were left behind for the Polish Commission on Auschwitz which sat in 1945 and 1946. These latter files form the backbone of the collections of the National Museum at Auschwitz (known as "PMO"), and these files were for many years the basis for most research on Auschwitz, conducted successively by Faurisson, Pressac, van Pelt, and Mattogno.

The Soviet Union announced the existence of the Central Construction Office holdings in 1989. Gerald Fleming and Pressac, both traditional Holocaust historians, consulted the collections shortly thereafter in order to obtain documents supporting their interpretations. Over the last five years, a number of revisionists have worked in the Central Construction Office archives slowly accumulating materials, including Michael Gärtner, Manfred Gerner, Hans Nowak, Werner Rademacher, and, above all, Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf, the latter two having made several highly publicized visits to the archives.

The holdings for the Central Construction Office comprise over 83,000 pages. They are assigned with an overall cache or archive number ("Fond") that references the collection in Moscow where they are located, in this case, "502". In addition, the files are divided into another five groupings, or inventories ("Opisi"). Almost all of the directly relevant materials from the Central Construction Office archives come from Fond 502, Opis 1. In addition, there is a folder number, of which there are about 450 in the 502-1 series. The folders comprise materials on specific topics, and can run from a single page, for example, 502-1-141, which is a 1943 document about central heating, up to 700 pages or more, as in the case of 502-1-92, which consists of correspondence with a number of firms about constructing workshops. The average for the 450 folders of the 502-1 set is about 125 pages apiece.

At some point, the individual folders were bound in cardboard covers, with an index card in Russian pasted to the front describing the contents. The subject of the folders is generally thematic: for example, Folders 327-340 comprise about 1,800 pages on disinfection and fumigation, Folders 305-318 comprise a like amount of material on the crematoria, and so forth. The pages within each folder are sometimes marked, and sometimes not. When they are marked, the notation has been made in pen or pencil in the upper right hand corner, and sometimes these numbers have been crossed out and replaced with another series. In the documents presented here, most of the page numbers have been rendered illegible by the copying process or else the pages were never numbered in the first place. In such cases as the page numbers are both legible and make any sense in terms of a series, we have given them. Otherwise, we have just listed the folder location, thus 502-1-141.

The individual folders and the larger groupings thereof indicate some coherent organization, therefore we are inclined to believe that the files exist more or less as they were found. In fact, the folders present the usual organization of files, usually being in reverse chronological order, and often containing carbon copies. However, there is enough disorder in the files and in the ordering of the files that it seems clear that they were rifled at some point. Occasional quirks in the ordering of documents suggest that some files were removed. However, given the overall coherence of the files we doubt if there was any large-scale interpolation of files.

One exception concerns the well-known document of June 28, 1943, which claims a capacity of the five Auschwitz crematoria at 4,756 bodies per day. Pressac gave two reference numbers for the document, 502-1-314, and 502-1-324. When the German historian Manfred Gerner attempted to obtain the document, he was told that it was marked "502-1-314a". Carlo Mattogno claims that the correct filing of the document is 502-1-314, page 14a.

None of these references make much sense. Folder 502-1-324 is one of a series of folders concerning the "Faulgasanlage" at Auschwitz, that is, the folder concerns an attempt to extract methane gas from the sewage plant in Birkenau. On the other hand, 502-1-314 is indeed a folder in the crematoria series, but it is a 36 page folder consisting of correspondence with Topf & Sons and other firms concerning the construction and equipment of the crematoria. Yet the June 28, 1943 document is supposed to be a letter from the Central Construction Office to General Kammler in Berlin and concerns the burning capacity of the crematoria. There is no logical reason why this letter would be in either one of these files.

When confronted with a document that is inconsistent with the surrounding documents there are a few possible explanations. The document may have been misfiled. But in that case, we would expect to find analogous documents in roughly adjacent folders. In this case, there are none. Or it is possible that the surrounding documents have been removed. In this case, the surrounding documents would only be incriminating, so it is unlikely that any surrounding documents were removed by the Soviets. Nor is it likely that the Germans pulled the surrounding documents because it would have been a lot simpler just to burn the slender file in its entirety. Finally, the possibility exists that the document was interpolated later. That appears to us to be the most likely explanation. We now turn to consider some other documents.

Document 6 -- Sofortmassnahmen bei Bomben- und Brandschäden, September 14, 1940 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-1 p. 8)

The first document is a two-page circular concerning emergency measures to repair damage from bombs and fire in air raids. It holds no particular interest, except that it is the first document in the Central Construction Office files on the subject of civil air defense. The document could satisfy a general requirement if we were looking for a high level document to set a starting date for a general awareness of air raids and civil air defense at Auschwitz.

Document 7 -- Memo on Fighting Phosphorous Fires December 21, 1940 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-1 np)

The document is a single page copy from the "Reichminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Inspektion des Luftschutzes" and is simply a cautionary note on the proper method of fighting phosphorous fires, which were the main component of allied incendiary raids. The document gives appropriate reference to various civil air defense directives.

There are a couple of points of interest. First, the document is dated December 21, 1940, but was not signed until January 2, 1941. Second, the evolving rubber stamp of the Central Construction Office (here in its second form) has the document stamped 12 Jan 1941, some ten days later.

The date of correspondence versus the date the correspondence is stamped in the Central Construction Office will later on become an issue, so we offer our thoughts on that here. Some documents are dated on a given day, and are stamped by the Central Construction Office two or three days later. On the other hand, with other documents the gap between the date of the document and its stamp date can be many days or even weeks. In general, we are going to conclude that the normal time for mail delivery is about two or three days. But we are going to further argue that the stamp date represents the date, not when the document was received in the Central Construction Office, but rather the date the document was routed through the office for signature just before being filed. In other words, for some documents we are going to argue that the gap between the document date and the stamp date indicates that the document was pending during the interim.

Document 8 -- Erweiterer Selbstschutz in Barackenlagern January 4, 1941 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-1 p. 8)

A further document, also from the Inspektion des Luftschutzes, concerning further "self-protection" measures for barracks and other buildings. There is no stamp on the document, which is a copy of a copy.

The four-page document contains the usual cautions and indications concerning the construction of bomb shelters, such as were discussed in Defending. Included is the stipulation that newly constructed works ("Werke") should be equipped with bomb shelters for the workers, that trench shelters (Luftschutzdeckungsgräben), should be constructed, that wooden barracks should be at least ten meters apart to prevent fires from spreading, that gas masks should be provided, and so on. The one point of interest concerns an apparent over-riding concern with fighting fires.

Document 9 -- Blaues Licht während der Verdunklung April 16, 1941 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-1 np)

This is another single page document, signed by Steffens, and coming from the office of Reichsminister Todt. It concerns the conviction of Adolf Hitler that blue light for blackout conditions is superior to red light, along with a recommendation to use blue lights for achieving blackouts. The document is not particularly interesting, except that it underlines the extent to which red light was the usual method of achieving blackouts, and it further indicates the extent to which Hitler would involve himself in minutiae.

The document is a copy of a copy, and is stamped May 15, 1941; this indicates, according to our analysis, that it took awhile to generate the copies of the document and further that it was pending for an indeterminate period of time.

Document 10 -- Heinemann Offer to Build Luftschutzdeckungsgräben, January 27, 1942 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-400)

The document consists of a cover letter from the firm Heinemann & Co. in Berlin, to the "SS-Neubauleitung" at Auschwitz, consisting of an offer to build trench shelters, with a four-page attachment providing details. It is the only document in this Central Construction Office folder, the first of eight folders comprising approximately 800 pages of bomb shelter documents.

Four pages of cost estimates accompany the letter. The letter is stamped January 29, 1942, that is, two days from the date sent, which gives us a benchmark for correspondence. The document appears to be a blind bid for services, making reference only to the Reichmarschall's (i.e., Goering's) regulations on civil air defense. The quick routing date, plus the absence of any further correspondence indicates that nothing came of this bid, but the document does demonstrate the extent to which civil air defense would be assumed in the concentration camps even at this early point in time.

Document 11 -- Building Regulations for 1942, March 6, 1942 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-95, p.121ff)

This is a three-page document that sets out building regulations for the third year of the war. On the second page, there is a paragraph that deals with the rationing of scarce materials, including iron, and which mentions in passing:

[Massivdecken eisensparend. Decken über Luftschutzräumen wölben, mindestens aber die Feldlängen durch Stützen und Unterzüge unterteilen. [...]

Ûfen und Herde sowie GasschutzTüren und Blenden in eisensparender Bauweise.]

What we find interesting in this document is that civil air defense measures are mentioned quite casually in the context of general building regulations. This goes to the point that the equipment of new buildings with bomb shelters was simply assumed, even by early 1942.

Document 12 -- Civil Defense Security Directive, Himmler to Glücks, February 8, 1943 (Source: Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, p. 584 n58)

This is a document already cited in Defending, referenced by Hilberg as Himmler Files, Folder no. 67. It has not been possible to locate the document because the Himmler records at the US National Archives are in a different format than they were when Hilberg used them, and they are in a highly disorganized state.

The document, sent to both Pohl and Glücks, consisted of instructions on establishing security in the concentration camps to ensure that there would be no mass escapes. The document, in our view, is significant in three ways. First, because it establishes an awareness of the need for civil air defense in the concentration camps at the highest level of the SS by early February, 1943. Second, because security needs would certainly justify the alternative use of the Birkenau crematoria in the case of air attack. Third, because an obvious antidote to prevent prisoner escapes would be to provide the prisoners with some measure of security so that they would have a stake in maintaining order in an air raid.

Document 13 -- Kammler Guidelines #39 for Civil Air Defense, March 6, 1943 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-8 np)

This is by far the longest document pertaining to civil air defense in the top level, consisting of a fifteen-page set of guidelines (Richtlinien) from General Kammler, the head of SS construction projects, in Berlin, followed by a three page supplement of no date. It has a wide distribution list, including the Central Construction Office at Auschwitz. The document is dated March 6, 1943, the routing stamp is dated June 19, 1943, and bears the usual initials. There are scribbles at the top of the page, including a large one that appears to be the name of Kirschneck, who was the overall building supervisor at Auschwitz and directly subordinate to Karl Bischoff, the head of the Central Construction Office at this time. (Kirschneck's name frequently is scribbled at the top of documents.) A further date and scribble indicates that it was initialed by other members of the office on June 29, 1943 as well as July 1, 1943. We conclude because of these dates and annotations as well as the time gap between the document date and the stamp date that it was given full consideration at the time.

The document, which copies a lot of information from Luftwaffe sources from 1942, stresses protection against splinters (Splitter), rubble (Gebäudetrummer) and incendiary bombs (Brandbomben), gives guidelines for constructing trench shelters (Luftschutzdecken), and gives specifications for providing splinter protection (Splitterschutz) for buildings.

In the general section of the guidelines, it is said that experience has shown that the greatest damage in air raids is caused by splinters from high explosive bombs (Sprengbomben). It goes on to say that this can be limited in many ways, for example, by angling the entrances to buildings or by diminishing the size of apertures through which light enters (i.e., Minderung des Tageslichtseintritts), which would mean windows among other things. It is also stated that new and existing buildings can be adapted to provide splinter and rubble protection.

In terms of specific measures, the Guidelines emphasize that windows or other ventilation openings are to be pitched high, to protect the contents of the facilities inside, and to the extent that the need for daylight allows. The size and number of doors or gates are to be limited. Doors and windows are to be protected against splinters either inside or outside, preferably with the use of splinter walls (Splitterschutzwände).

The document obviously has some importance concerning the implementation of civil air defense measures at Auschwitz, considering only its length and the attention paid to it. We are also reminded that both Kammler and Bischoff were relatively recent SS, having come over from the Luftwaffe in 1940, and we can surmise that both of them would have been well aware of these kinds of instructions even before these guidelines were issued. It is also relevant that the guidelines were issued at the beginning of March, 1943, and filed at the beginning of July, 1943, the same time frame for the completion and fitting out of the crematoria with gastight fixtures.

Document 14 -- Letter About Security, Pohl to Himmler, April 5, 1944 (Source: Nuremberg Document, NO-021)

This is a letter from Pohl to Himmler describing security precautions at the Auschwitz camp, and should be read with Himmler's analogous letter from February 8, 1943 in mind. We quote a few extracts:

"As to the security measures taken for case A, I report as follows:

1. Camp I includes the compact camp for men with a present strength of approximately 16,000 inmates.

It is surrounded with a fence and by barbed wire which, as in all concentration camps, is electrically charged. Besides there are watch towers mounted with machine guns.

Camp II is situated about 3 km. from camp I. It accommodates 15,000 male and 21,000 female inmates. Of a total of 36,000 inmates approximately 15,000 are unable to work. Camp II is also surrounded by an electrically charged wire fence; there are also watchtowers.

[...]

2. Of the total number of 67,000 inmates those in the subsidiary camps and those hospitalized have to be deducted if the question of a threatening revolt or escapes in Upper Silesia is to be considered.

Of the total number, 67,000 inmates; 15,000 are to be deducted, those in subsidiary camps (camp III), and the number of the hospitalized and disabled, 18,000; so that practically 34,000 inmates have to be reckoned with. In case A this would mean danger to Auschwitz if security measures were insufficient.

3. 2,300 SS men are available to guard the inmates of camp I and II, including the staff of camp headquarters who are to be detailed in case A. In addition there are 650 guards available for the subsidiary camps of camp III.

[...]

4. Apart from the direct security of camp I and II by manned watch towers and electrically chargeable wire fences, a line of bunkers has been constructed as an inner ring which will be manned by SS men. On the enclosed map, this line of bunkers is marked in red.

[...]

The Luftwaffe units stationed in Auschwitz in the strength of 1,000 men are available provided the alert does not coincide with an air raid. These Luftwaffe units can however not absolutely be counted upon. In drafting the plan of operation [Einsatzplan] this has been taken into consideration. "

The document essentially confirms that Himmler's decree of the previous year has been implemented. The use of the crematoria to facilitate the security on the western perimeter is, we believe, a highly probable inference. It is also worth noting, in passing, that some 27% of the inmate strength is non-working.

Document 15 -- Behelfsmässiges Bauen der Waffen-SS, August 30, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-1, p. 417)

This is a single page letter from General Kammler of the WVHA to the Building Inspectorate of the Waffen-SS in Silesia, to which Bischoff had been promoted, which stresses that all makeshift structures should be inspected. In context, we believe that this also refers to the civil air defense directives.

This completes a brief survey of high level documents pertaining to civil air defense found in the files of the Central Construction Office at Auschwitz. It is clear that the Central Construction Office was in receipt of various directives and orders concerning civil air defense from the early fall of 1940. By 1942, it was obvious, even to firms in Berlin that the concentration camp system would be in the market for dedicated civil air defense bunkers. By early 1943, there were two high level directives concerning civil air defense that were directed to Auschwitz: the Himmler Order of February 8, 1943, and the Kammler Guidelines of March 6, 1943. The Himmler Order stressed security, that is, the need to protect against mass breakouts. In this respect we should keep in mind that the crematoria, as well as the Central Sauna, were the only large fixed structures on the western periphery of the camp to provide potential protection and security. The Kammler Guidelines are probably even more important, bearing in mind the close relationship of Bischoff and Kammler.

From a purely documentary point of view, the interpretation of the disputed low-level documents in terms of civil air defense, that is, the Criminal Traces, could be justified at any point subsequent to the fall of 1940. This justification becomes more pronounced from the fall of 1942, due to the analogous developments in Occupied Poland, and even more pronounced in early 1943, due to the Himmler Order, the Kammler Guidelines, and not least the first bombing raid on the Auschwitz area on May 4, 1943. However, the justification for interpreting the low-level documents in this way is not the same thing as correctly interpreting these documents, so now we turn to see what else we can find.

2. 3 Mid-Level Documents About Bomb Shelters

Document 16 -- Pohl Itinerary, September 23, 1942 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-19, pp. 86-103 )

The first documents of this class consists of the materials having to do with General Oswald Pohl, who was the head of the Economic Administration of the SS (WVHA). Pohl visited Auschwitz on September 23, 1942, which we note is roughly the same time as the Frank diary entries and the Majdanek-Auert work orders cited earlier.

The documents begin with an itinerary, and then gives the records of some speeches and meetings. Overall, Pohl's speech is upbeat, with typical appeals to the inner sense of duty of his audience, who we must remember, were 1,000 miles behind the pre-Stalingrad front performing essentially thankless work. The meeting concerned for the most part all kinds of building projects that had to do with developing the area around the camp, only towards the end of the meeting was the necessity of building the sewage plant stressed, due to the danger of epidemics.

The itinerary makes no visits to possible bomb shelter sites but does list the following stops:

"German Armaments Factory Disinfection and Effects Barracks / Aktion Reinhard New Horse Barracks Camp Birkenau Station 2 of Aktion Reinhardt Military Barracks in Birkenau Airport at Harmense Reservoir Construction Dam Construction on the Vistula Economic Enterprise at Budy Raisko Sewer Gas Facility [in pen] Sewage Treatment Facility"

[DAW Entwesung -u. Effektenkammer /Aktion Reinhard/ Neuer Pferdestallhof Lager Birkenau Station 2 der Aktion Reinhardt Truppenlager Birkenau Geflügelhof Harmense Teichausbau Dammbau an der Weichsel Wirschaftshof Budy Raisko Faulgasanlage [in pen] Kläranlage]

There are numerous other pen notations that indicate that the camp capacity of Birkenau is foreseen as 12,000 men and 18,000 women, and suggests that there are only about 1,000 persons at Birkenau at this time. A later document in the series however (p. 90) indicates that there were 16,000 in Birkenau at the time, of which about 3,000, or 18% were incapable of work.

While these documents show that civil air defense was not a high priority at this time; the documents do provide some other information. It is interesting to note, for example, a reference to "Aktion Reinhardt" spelled in both the traditional and the revisionist manner, in the same document, and in a document that clearly has to do with plunder and which has nothing to do with the eastern camps, with which the name "Aktion Reinhardt" is supposed to be exclusively associated.

Document 17 -- Pohl Building Recommendations, June 16, 1944 (Source: Nuremberg Document, NO-259)

The document is a three-page memorandum (Aktenvermerk) recording a meeting on June 16, 1944, and covering mostly construction issues. The occasion was another visit by General Pohl. There were 10 participants, including many of the leading personalities at the camp, including Höß, Bischoff (now promoted to the building inspectorate of the Waffen-SS), Baer, Dr. Wirths, and Jothann (Bischoff's successor as head of the Central Construction Office).

This is a rather well known document; there are at least two copies in the Moscow Archives and in addition the document was introduced in the Concentration Camp Trial, #4, of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal as NO-259.

The document, after a brief introduction, lists some 35 building projects to be carried out, including several recommendations for civil air defense. However, the entries that seemed most important in 1947 were:

"10. Three barracks for the emergency measure 'Operation Jews'.

* * * * * * *

16. Camouflage of the crematories, and security measures by constructing a second fence (the camouflage has to be effected by rush-mats which have to be obtained by the SS Standortverwaltung [SS garrison administration] ).

17. Construction of six mortuaries in Ba I and II."

The three barracks being discussed are probably barracks in the Mexico section of the camp or else in the Kanada section, for the plunder taken from the deported Hungarians: the German word is "Judenaktion." The camouflage reference is usually taken in a sinister sense. However, given a number of civil air defense measures in the document, plus the reference to security measures requiring a second fence, we are not so sure if this reference does not follow in some way from Pohl's letter to Himmler in April.

The part that we find most curious is the reference to the construction of six mortuaries (Leichenkammern) in Ba I and II, that is, in the two main Birkenau camps. This strongly suggests that the morgues of the crematoria were no longer being used as morgues at this time. Otherwise, it would not be necessary to build more of them. Furthermore, this directive is frankly incomprehensible in terms of the alleged burn rates attained at this time, in which some ten thousand people could be incinerated per day in the crematoria and the associated burning pits. It needs to be said that there is no hint of this other activity in this document at all.

Document 18 -- Minutes of Meeting on Civil Air Defense Measures, June 28, 1944

The document is another four-page memorandum (Aktenvermerk), this time of a conference concerning air raid measures implemented at Auschwitz that took place on June 26, 1944. There were 15 participants, including Höß, Bischoff, Baer, Kramer, Dr. Wirths, Jothann, Hoessler, and Dr. Münch of the Hygiene Institute at Raisko.

The document itemizes all of the civil air defense measures that were to be implemented, including:

Construction of a civil air defense command post as well as telephone/telex and radio commands in the basements of the Commandant's house,

In Camp 1, the construction of fire fighting reservoirs and splinter protection for all of the basement windows of the prisoner barracks, and the construction of two rooms in the new reception center (Wäscherei) for the Block leaders,

In Camp 2 (Birkenau), the construction of four trench shelters of reinforced concrete for 50 men each, for the SS and the Block leaders,

At the "Wirtschaftshof Birkenau", the construction of two trench shelters for 240 prisoners apiece,

At the airport at Harmense, the conversion of a basement in the castle (Schloss) to a shelter for the prisoners,

At Budy, the construction of a trench shelter for 50 men, and two trench shelters for 420 prisoners (the use of the basements of existing structures is assumed),

At the Womens' Camp at Budy, trench shelters for 440 prisoners,

At Wirtschaftshof Babitz, three trench shelters for 30 men, 200 female prisoners and 200 male prisoners,

At the Pflanzensucht at Raisko, several trench shelters, including one for 550 prisoners,

At the German Armaments Factory (DAW), splinter walls for the basement windows of the main buildings.

Under the heading "General" (Allgemeines) we read:

"For fire watch twelve observation bunkers.

Protective measures for the prisoners of Camp I in the way of trench shelters are not possible because of the lack of available space. However, two to three thousand prisoners can be sheltered in the basements [of the existing buildings.]

In Camp II [Birkenau] in view of the high water table and the lack of space trench shelters can also not be provided for the prisoners.

The prisoners of the DAW can find protection at night in the basements. Open ditches cannot be provided in view of the available space."

[14.) Allgemeines:

für Feuer- und Brandwache 12 Stück Beobachtungsbunker

Als Schutzmassnahmen für Häftlinge des Lager I ist die Anlage von Splitterschutzgräben nicht möglich auf Grund der vorhandenen Freiflächen. Es können jedoch 2-3000 Häftlinge in den vorhandenen Kellerräumen untergebracht werden.

Im Lager II können ebenfalls Splitterschutzgräben für Häftlinge mit Rücksicht auf den Grundwasserstand und die vorhandenen Freiflächen nicht angelegt werden.

Die Häftlinge der DAW. finden in der Nacht in den Kellerräumen den entsprechenden Splitterschutz. Offene Gräben können mit Rücksicht auf den hier vorhandenen Mangel an Freiflächen auch nicht angelegt werden.]

Finally, the memorandum lists some completed structures, including some 20 fire fighting reservoirs, each of 400 cubic meters, and ten trench shelters in reinforced concrete.

The document makes it clear that, by midsummer of 1944, there were very ambitious plans in place for providing civil air defense throughout the Auschwitz camp complex. Furthermore, the document assumes the use of existing buildings for civil air defense purposes, although the individual buildings are not specified. Given the fact that Crematoria II and III as well as the Central Sauna were all equipped with basements, and given that they were among only a handful of fixed structures on the western side of the Birkenau, the use of these basements can certainly be inferred from this date. Finally, the document makes it clear that many of these shelters, using either existing buildings or dedicated trench shelters, are to be used to provide shelter for thousands of prisoners. In cases where there is a scarcity of shelters available, as at Birkenau, the shelters are to be provided on a preferential basis to the SS and the Block Leaders.

A further point is that attempts to construct even more shelters at both Auschwitz and Birkenau were frustrated by the lack of space and in the latter case by the high water table. Document 31, below, describes the construction of 10 trench shelters at Birkenau, each 60 meters at length, but these shelters do not appear to be referenced in the June 26 meeting, about two weeks later.

In our opinion, the document is strong evidence of a German intention to provide overall civil air defense protection, for both the SS and the prisoners. However, the indication that shelters cannot be built in Birkenau because of the high water table undercuts our interpretation, in Defending, that the mounds in front of the prisoner barracks were trench shelters. It may be that this interpretation was wrong, or it may be that, despite the high water table, further attempts were made to protect the prisoners later that summer. Particularly with regard to Document 31, it is hard to say if the attempt was made, but then set aside, or then resumed.

However one thing is certain: efforts were made to protect some prisoners with trench shelters, and, as will be shown below, all of these trench shelters were equipped with gastight doors.

Document 19 -- Civil Air Defense Inspection by von Mirbach, December 6, 1943 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-401)

The next document concerns a civil air defense inspection of Auschwitz that took place on December 6, 1943, conducted by Oberstleutnant von Mirbach of the Luftgaukommando VIII from Krakow, and involving Bischoff, Jothann, Josten (in charge of civil air defense), and Liebehentschel, the new commandant of the camp. The purpose of the inspection was to determine the extent to which the Auschwitz camp and its several satellites were prepared for air attacks. Von Mirbach's observations were made in point form:

"That blackout conditions in the several SS barracks in the camp area had been prepared and had been exactly observed for a long time.

All the measures for blackouts in the camp barracks as well as the several camp buildings had been carried out.

Trench shelters for all of the SS men and the workers living in the camp had already been planned and were, with the construction of concrete formworks already begun."

[dass die Verdunklungsbestimmungen in den einzelnen SS-Unterkünften im Lagerbereich bereits seit längerer Zeit genauestens beachtet werden.

für die Verdunkelung der Lagerunterkünfte und die einzelnen Verwaltungsdienstellen sind sämtliche Massnahmen getroffen.

für die Sicherung bei etwaigen Angriffen nicht in Einsatz stehender SS-Männer des Wachverbandes der Verwaltungsstellen sowie der im Lagerbereich wohnenden Arbeiter ist die Anlage von Splitterschutzgräben gemäss den geltenden Bestimmungen bereits geplant and wurde mit dem Herstellen sowie Einbau der BetonformsTücke die Zentralbauleitung bereits begonnen.]

Von Mirbach's report also contains the following:

"In view of the streets, the drainage, and the heavy overcrowding of the various parts of the camp, trench shelters cannot be provided for the prisoners of the base camp or the prisoner of war camp [i.e., Birkenau -SC]. Therefore for greater security a second cordon should be built.

[...]

The meeting followed a drive through the various camps. At this time, Oberstleutnant von Mirbach recommended that the basement windows of the fixed structures in the base camp should be equipped with splinter shutters."

[Die Anlage von Splitterschutzgräben für die Häftlinge des Stammlagers bzw. Des KGL. Is mit Rücksicht auf die vorhanden Strassen, Be- und Entwasserungsanlagen und der starken Belegung der einzelnen Bauabschnitte nicht durchführbar. Zur besonderen Sicherheit wurde daher bereits ein zweiter Sperrgürtel ausgebaut.

[...]

Der Besprechung folgte eine Fahrt durch die einzelnen Lager. Hierbei wird von Oberstleutnant von Mirbach das Anbringen von Splitterschutzblenden von der Kellerfenstern der unterkellerten Massivegebäude des Stammalgers angeregt.]

There are three main points of interest to this document. First, the inspection makes it clear that blackout conditions at least had been "exactly observed for a long time." This implies a long-standing awareness of civil air defense in the camp. Second, the inspection recommends already the equipment of the basements of the existing structures in the base camp with splinter shutters.

The third point is particularly interesting inasmuch as it was over-ridden later: this concerns von Mirbach's judgment that it would not be possible to build any shelters for the prisoners. Yet the minutes of the meeting from the following June, as well as Document 31, show that this recommendation was at least partly vacated. Further in this respect is the fact that von Mirbach's solution to this problem is to simply call for greater security, an attitude that follows in line with Himmler's February 8, 1943 directive and Pohl's letter to Himmler of April 5, 1944.

Documents 20/22 -- Documents from Fall, 1943 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-401, also 502-1-26)

These documents include two of the documents that are presented on the website of the British historian David Irving (www.fpp.co.uk/Auschwitz/documents/LSKeller/MoscowDocs.html). These consist of two memoranda and a letter by Walter Dejaco, who was an architect of the Central Construction Office. The dates are September 21, October 25, and November 5, all 1943. The letter of September 21 and the memo from October 25 both reference a telex from August 23, 1943. (See English translations)

All of the materials have to do with the production and delivery of concrete shells to be used for trench shelter construction at Auschwitz. The October 25, 1943 memorandum mentions 176 of these shells, while the November 5, 1943 memorandum mentions the "first 500 meters of concrete." Consequently, we concluded originally that this document referenced the construction of hundreds of air raid shelters in the camp.

However, this conclusion was wrong, first, because the construction of the shells was not understood (they are practically oval) and second because the problem with the high water table at Birkenau was not evident. In addition, whatever the problem with the water table, it seemed to be contradicted by the photographic evidence of what appeared to be trench shelters in Birkenau. Still, the minutes of the June 26, 1944 civil air defense meeting, the von Mirbach inspection of December 6, 1943, and some low-level documents below will make clear that these shells were indeed to be used to construct trench shelters for both the SS and the prisoners, including at Birkenau: if not hundreds, then as many as possible.

The overall picture that emerges from these mid-level documents is that the attempt to build dedicated trench shelters did not begin until the summer of 1943. In fact, we can reasonably carry the attempt backwards to the telex of August 23, 1943, mentioned in some of the fall 1943 documents.

From that point on, it appears that the plan to build dedicated shelters was frustrated by various breakdowns and shortages. However, from the point of view of our thesis the number of actual shelters built is not relevant, the intention is what counts, because that enables us to infer a similar intention for the equipment of the crematoria.

The official record of the June 26, 1944 meeting is very relevant, although it comes late in the chronological scheme. It certainly is of decisive importance in supporting our prior assertions in Documents concerning the intent to build shelters for the inmates as well as to use existing basements for civil air defense purposes. However, the von Mirbach inspection of the previous December does not enable us to extend the implementation of civil air defense measures back indefinitely. To be sure, the document says that blackout conditions have been "exactly observed for a long time", from which we can reasonably infer several months at least. In this respect, we are reminded of the "30 fittings for red lamps" for Crematoria IV and V and the fence surrounding Kanada that was referenced in Technique, a work order dated August 11, 1943. Since this is just a few weeks after the last of the gastight fixtures were sent to the crematoria, it seems reasonable to us that the various gastight fixtures were fitted with a civil air defense end in view. But again, while that may be a reasonable interpretation it may not be the correct one.

Overall then we have to concede that while we have top level documents covering the entire history of the camp, the mid-level documents only take us back to the summer of 1943, and do not carry us back explicitly to the gastight fixtures of the Birkenau crematoria.

2.4 Low Level Documents Concerning Bomb Shelters

Document 23 -- Request for 12 "Trockenklosette" for LS-Bunkers, October 4, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-401, p. 114)

A half-page memo to Jostens, the civil air defense leader in the camp, that requests twelve toilets as follows:

"the air raid shelters by the Waffen-SS house, the Record house, Caesar's house, Professor Clauberg's house, as well as for the two trench shelters at the agricultural center at Raisko."

[Um Abgabe von 12 Stück Trockenklosette für die LS-Bunker beim Haus d. Waffen-SS, Haus Rekord, Haus Caesar, Haus Prof. Clauberg sowie für 2 LS-Deckungsgräben für die Landwirtschaft in Raisko wird gebeten.]

The document simply points up the fact that trench shelters were constructed and that "bunkers" were set up either in or by existing buildings.

Document 24 -- Building Construction Form, October 18, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-95, np)

This is a single page form describing a work project, listed as "2 Luftschutzbunker, BW: 98 E, L". Under #6, "Baubeschreibung", or project description, there is a brief listing of work to be done, and includes "Eisenbetondecke, gasdichte Türe", that is, reinforced concrete roof, gastight doors. The document is not particularly remarkable, but it is included here to show that the plural "Türen" can be occasionally misspelled, however, but not as "Türme".

Document 25 -- Construction of a Gastight Operating Room, October 17, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-402 p. 39)

A half-page memo from Bischoff, now with the Waffen-SS building inspectorate, referencing "Ausbau eines gasdicht Behandlungsraumes und Splitterschutzraumes in ehemaligen Crematorium", that is, "Construction of a gastight operating room and splinter-proof shelters in the former crematorium."

The document supports the contention that makeshift adaptations and conversions would be gastight, there is also a pen notation referencing the work as "BW 98 M", from which we make the inference that BW 98 was a catchall for bomb shelter adaptations while the letters designated specific locations.

Document 26 -- Concerning LS-Bunkers as Trench Shelters, September 20, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-402)

The document concerns the construction of four "LS-Bunker" and describes the equipment of these with emergency exits, the exits to be filled with gravel for security. The document also references the regulations for the construction of trench shelters, the version dated March, 1943. The document is useful mostly because it demonstrates that the use of the terminology was interchangeable: bunkers are not normally referred to as trench shelters, and vice versa.

Document 27 -- Concerning Construction of Shelters, September 18, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-402)

This is a half page memo from Jothann to the Commandant describing the detailing of work parties for the four bunkers described in Document 26, including prisoner laborers. The memo also contains a reference to a prisoner work party to repair bomb damage to "Haus 210". This is probably in response to one of the Allied bombing raids on the camp, several of which occurred in late August and early September 1944.

Document 28 -- Delivery of Ventilation Pipes for Shelters, September 11, 1944 (Source: ZBL 502-1-401, np)

This is a single page letter from Jothann, head of the Central Construction Office, to the BAKO firm in Berlin, concerning the delivery of 500 ventilation pipes for trench shelters (500 Stück Lüftungsrohren für LS-Deckungsgräben). Apparently, there was a misunderstanding and BAKO had sent ten times as many ventilation pipes as were needed. The letter indicates that there is no use for 400 of the ventilation pipes and asks what should be done with these. The letter concludes with a request for 100 bomb shelter doors (LS-Türen).

Document 29 -- Memo and Sketch of Ventilation Pipes, September 11, 1944 (Source: Ibid.)

This is an enclosure to Document 28, consisting of a cover memo about the ventilation pipes, here called "Luftschutzverschlüsse" amd a drawing of one, titled "Gasdichte Lüftungsrohrverschlüsse für LS-Deckungsgräben", which shows a typical cylindrical pipe, with a conical cap on top ("Regenhaube") and with a gastight seal at the base. The whole arrangement is strongly suggestive of a "tower" emerging from the roof of the shelter.

Document 30 -- Invoice for 45 RM for Prisoner Work on Crematorium II, June 2, 1943 (Source: Ibid.)

The very next two pages in this folder consists of an invoice and pay stub made out for 45 Marks for prisoner labor concerning work performed on Bauwerk 30, or Crematorium II. The invoice is dated June 2, 1943. There are several written indications that we cannot make out. Overall, the document is a curiosity, and it is not easy to explain why it is found in a folder devoted to civil air defense measures. It may have some relevance, but it would be hard to establish exactly what that would be, under present circumstances.

Document 31 -- Bauliche LS-Massnahmen, June 9, 1944 (Source: ZBL 502-1-401)

This is a two page document from early June, that is, prior to Pohl's visit on June 16 or the air raid shelter conference on June 26. It consists of a memo from Jothann, the head of the Central Construction Ofice, to Höß, who has returned to the camp to oversee the breakup of the camp into three parts. The memo informs Höß that there are currently plans to construct 20 firefighting reservoirs in Camp I (Auschwitz) and 12 in Camp II (Birkenau). In addition, the memo indicates plans to build 10 trench shelters, each 60 meters in length (sic!), in Camp I (Auschwitz) and 10 more in Camp II (Birkenau.) The memo goes on to say "Hiervon sind bereits 10 Gräben bis auf den Einbau der gasdichte Türen fertiggestellt", that is, "So far ten of the trench shelters have been built and equipped with gastight doors."

Document 32 -- BW 98 LS-Gräben Inventory, May 11, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-402, pp. 41-52)

The document consists of several pages giving inventories of the work to be done for the construction of trench shelters. There are two entries of particular interest.

First, #12 of the listings (page 42), reads as follows:

"Entry shaft to function as emergency exit 2.02 meters in length with 51 cm walls [...]. The shaft is to be covered with a sealant treated reinforced concrete plate of around 15 cm in thickness, if the entry covers are not delivered. Eight pieces of iron for entry steps are to be delivered and installed."

[Einsteigschacht als Notausgang 2,02 m gross mit 51 cm strk. Mauern und Fundamenten samt 1 Unterzug gemauert herzustellen. Schacht wird mit einer Eisenbetonplatte u. Estrich cca. 15 cm stark abgedeckt, ohne Lieferung des Einsteigdeckels. 8 Stück Einsteigeisen sind zu liefern und zu verzetzen.]

The relevance is that this description matches the two concrete tubes that lie in the center of the western walls of Morgue #1 of both Crematoria II and III. These were already identified as emergency exits in Defending. Pressac claimed that these had something to do with drainage, but there is no documentary basis for this view. (Pressac referenced Drawing 1300, which shows the drains converging about six to eight feet away from the western wall, which is irrelevant.) Furthermore, these concrete tubes, which still exist today, do not appear on any architectural drawings. Nor do these concrete tubes have any relevance for either the disinfection of gas chamber thesis.

The conclusion, which we consider unavoidable, is that Morgue #1 of both Crematoria II and III were adapted by means of these emergency exits into auxiliary bomb shelters at some point. We do not have the documents that tell us exactly when these concrete tubes were put in place, but our guess is that it must have taken place prior to Pohl's inspection of June 16, 1944, because that puts his request for "six mortuaries" into a comprehensible context.

The second entry, from page 49 of this file, concerns a further draft of #8 of the inventories which reads:

"7 pieces inner and outer gastight doors .85 m x 1.75 m to be put in with the help of the locksmith."

[7 Stück äussere und innere gasdichte Türen 0,85 x 1,75 mit Hilfe des Tischlers einsetzen.]

Document 33 -- Felt Needed for Gastight Doors for Trench Shelters March 21, 1944 (Source: ZBL, 502-1-408)

A half page memo from the German Armaments Factory (DAW) at Auschwitz requesting felt. The memo reads as follows:

"For the trench shelters in the school garden we have prepared in accordance with the previous order four gastight doors, and therefore need 20 meters of felt stripping about five millimeters wide."

[für die Luftschutzdeckungsgräben (Schulgarten), fertigen wir laut obigem Auftrag 4 Stück gasdichte Türen, und benötigen hierzu, 20 lfdm. Filzstreifen ca, 5 mm breit.]

Document 34 -- More Felt for Gastight Doors, March 25, 1944 (Source: 502-1-95, p. 60)

Another half page memo, a follow up to the memo of March 21, 1944, requesting another 20 meters of felt for the gastight doors, because the 20 meters provided was only enough for two doors.

[Mit unserem Schreiben [ä.] forderten wir 20 lfdm. Filzstreifen 2,5 cm breit, 5 mm star für gasdichte Türen der Luftschutzdeckungsgräben an.]

The two documents show that the trench shelters were equipped with gastight doors, and that felt was used to achieve gastightness, and that such doors were made by the German Armaments Factory (DAW). We should keep in mind that the gastight fixtures of the Criminal Traces were also made by the German Armaments Factory, and used felt to achieve gastightness. It is also interesting to note that this follow up memo was found in a completely different folder than the associated Document 33. This suggests some corruption of the files.

Document 35 -- Ventilation Pipes and Gastight Doors for Shelters, March 24, 1944 (Source: 502-1-95, p. 61)

The document is headed "Zuweisung von Sicherheitsventilen und gassicheren Türen für LS-Deckungsräben", that is, allocation of gastight ventilators and doors for trench shelters."

This is a single page letter from Jothann to the construction suppliers in Kattowitz. The letter, which references a phone call between the architect Walter Dejaco and Engineer Andre, involves a request for 80 ventilation pipes and 40 gastight doors (80 Stück Sicherheitsventilen und 40 Stück gassicheren Türen) for the ten trench shelters to be constructed. It also requests 24 ventilation pipes and 12 gastight doors for the three shelters already completed.

Besides providing further evidence of the use of gastight doors and gastight ventilation pipes for trench shelters, the letter also indicates something about quantity: apparently, the shelters were rather large, each requiring four gastight doors.

Document 36 -- Conversion of the Old Crematorium, August 26, 1944 (Source: 502-1-401)

The single page document sets forth the tasks that need to be performed to convert the old Crematorium I to an operating room and air raid shelter. We quote it in full:

[Auschwitz O/S, den 26.August.1944.-

Der Luftschutzleiter

As. LS 217 - Jo/B

An den SS-Standortältesten als örtl. Luftschutzleiter Auschwitz O/S

Betrifft: Ausbau des alten Crematoriums für Luftschutzzwecke

Anlagen: 1 Plan.

In der Anlage überreiche ich einen Plan über den Ausbau des alten Crematoriums für Luftschutzzwecke mit der Bitte um Genehmigung dieses Ausbaues.

1. Arbeitsvorgänge:

Abbruch der alten Kammeröfen und reinigen der dabei anfallenden Ziegel zwecks Widerverwendung,

Auffüllen der Heizschächte und Heizkanäle mit dem beim Abbruch der Kammeröfen anfallendem Schutt und Altmaterial,

Durchbruch der Fenster- und Türöffnungen,

Einsetzen der GasschutzTüren, Fensterblenden, und Fenster,

Herstellung der für die Beheizungsöfen, sowie für die Ent- und Belüftung erforderlichen Mauerdurchbrüche und Schläuche,

Wasserinstallations- und Kanalisationsarbeiten,

Verlegen der vorhanden Lichtleitung entsprechend der Raumeinteilung,

Aussbesserung der Fußböden und Teilverlegung eines Holzfußbodens,

Ausbesserung des Daches and Anstrich desselben mit Gudron [Gudron is a kind of pitch - SC]

2. Materialbedarf

500 kg Zement, 400 kg Ziegel, 20 kg rundeisen, 50 m Eisenbahnschienen, 24 St Kanthölzer 10/15 cm, 4,80 m lang, 10 St Kanthölzer 10/15 cm, 3,90 m lang, 102 m^2 Bretter 25 mm stark, 13 St Fenster einflügelig 60 x 80 cm, 2 St Türen einflügelig 70 x 200 cm, 16 St Fensterblenden gas- und splittersicher, 7 St Türen gas- und splittersicher.

Der Luftschutzleiter:

Josten [pen signature]

SS-Obersturmführer

[some notations in pencil]

There are several points of interest to this document:

The doors and shutters described are identical to those described in the civil air defense literature.

The interior walls and roof are to be strengthened with wooden interior partitions and two by fours for roof support, no complicated rebuilding scheme is required, even for this full-scale conversion.

The plan makes specific reference to taking apart the old cremation ovens and using the leftover bricks to fill in the associated holes. Interestingly, there is nothing about filling in any other holes, although there is plenty about creating new ones.

The plan, in its request for gastight doors and shutters, a ventilation system, and heaters, strongly implies that none of these materials were on hand at the time of the morgue's conversion. This would in turn suggest that whatever previous use may have been made of the morgue of Crematorium I, it was used without gastight doors and shutters, a ventilation system, or heaters.

We note the identification of 16 Fensterblende (window shutters) to be constructed, and these are, apparently, to fill apertures of approximately 60 x 80 cm.

Turning now to Pressac, we find a series of photographs of shutters that Pressac found in the coke storeroom of Crematorium I in 1982. [ATO, 426f] The three shutters depicted show a height/width ratio of about 1:1.20 for the doors only, and Pressac confirms this when he gives the measurements for the door of one of the shutters as 52 x 43 cm. It would seem to be logical, given their approximate size, the location they were found, and the identity of these fixtures to ordinary civil air defense shutters, that these three shutters are in fact the remainder of the gastight shutters prepared for Crematorium I.

Yet Pressac claims that they were built for Crematoriums IV and V, and that these are remnants of the "12 gastight doors" fitted at those locations. If we consult the associated architectural drawings, however, we find that all of the relevant apertures at the western end of Crematoria IV and V are specified as dimensions 30 x 40 cm, and the work order for constructing the "little doors" specifies dimensions of 30 x 40 cm. Yet the shutters depicted by Pressac, at more than 40 x 50 cm, are too large for the apertures. It follows therefore that it is very unlikely that these shutters were ever meant for Crematoria IV and V.

On the other hand, in his description of Crematoria IV and V Pressac claimed that the openings to the windows of Crematoria IV and V were enlarged to 40 x 50 cm [ATO, 386]. If true, this would start to solve the problem, but there is no evidence supporting the assertion, except the window shutters that Pressac found. Hence we can reject Pressac's reasoning here as question begging. Therefore, we conclude that these shutters are in fact the remnants of the civil defense shutters prepared for Crematorium I.

There are a couple of serious implications of Pressac's misidentification. The first is that many observers waxed hysterical over the "discovery" of these shutters by Errol Morris during the shooting of his film on Fred Leuchter. The second is that the defense in the Irving v. Lipstadt trial offered a photo of one of these shutters -- to be specific, PMO II-5-64/2 -- as proof of homicidal gassings in Crematoriums IV and V. Meanwhile, witness van Pelt assured the court in his expert opinion and on the witness stand that this door was the "same size" as those used for Crematoriums IV and V although at 52 x 43 cm (the door only) it clearly could not have been. This indicates something less than precision on the part of the defense upon whose expert knowledge Justice Gray relied.

The final point about these shutters is that they essentially prove the bomb shelter thesis. When we first saw a photo of these shutters, shortly after writing Technique, we were amazed at their similarity to civil air defense Blende: and why wouldn't we be, because that is in fact what they were.

The high-level documents indicate that the Central Construction Office at Auschwitz was in receipt of memoranda and guidelines for the implementation of civil air defense measures, both for new shelters as well as for existing buildings, from September 1940. The Heinemann bid indicates that the idea of building dedicated civil air defense shelters even in the concentration camps was already generally assumed in Germany by the beginning of 1942. The building regulations of March, 1942, also assume the implementation of civil air defense measures in new buildings, and they also assume iron conserving (i.e., wood) construction.

The data from the wider context of occupied Poland, including the order of the Auert doors for Majdanek, make it reasonable to assume that Auschwitz would be at least sensitive to the implementation of civil air defense and gas protection measures from the late summer of 1942. However, it was not an issue of sufficient importance to be mentioned by Pohl in his September, 1942 visit.

The Himmler directive to Glücks presumes the implementation of civil air defense measures in the camps, from the beginning of February 1943. The detailed guidelines from General Kammler of March 6, 1943 reinforce the idea that civil air defense was becoming important in the camp. In fact, we would consider Kammler's involvement a virtual guarantee of the implementation of civil air defense measures, since Kammler was in close contact with Bischoff in the Central Construction Office. It should be possible to say that somewhere between the fall of 1942 and the spring of 1943 the Central Construction Office at Auschwitz became aware of the need to implement civil air defense measures and began implementing them.

However, the attempt to construct dedicated air raid shelters in the form of trench shelters (LS-Deckungsgräben) did not begin until the summer of 1943, which we can see from the telex that initiated discussions over the delivery of prefabricated concrete shells. There appears to have been quite a bit of dithering over this project, and it is not until March of 1944 that we begin to see actual references to the finishing of such shelters.

Concerning these trench shelters, we can infer from the various memoranda that a number were planned, and we know that they were to be equipped with gastight doors and ventilation pipes. We also know from the minutes of the June 26, 1944 conference that many of these were to be allocated to the prisoners, and that several were to be built in Birkenau. Both the June 26, 1944 conference and the von Mirbach inspection of the previous December make it clear that there were limits on how many dedicated shelters could be constructed, due to the high water table at Birkenau, the overcrowding, and the lack of avail