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I-THE AREA UNDER BRITISH OCCUPATION
(O. E. T. A. SOUTH)
1. Narrative.-Owing to changes of plan at a late date,
the commission arrived in Jaffa at a time when the British authorities
were not expecting it, and the program followed there was arranged
mainly without their help. The endeavor was made to ascertain
the opinions and desires of every important group, sect, and
organization, of a few well-informed representative individuals,
and of significant minorities or sub-divisions, especially in
cases where there seemed to be disposition, for any reason,
to suppress these. Because of the numerous sub-divisions of
the Christians and particularly of the Roman Catholics, it was
inevitable that from the beginning the commission would give
a disproportionate number of interviews and amount of time to
them. The commissioners had prepared a statement of their purposes,
to be found elsewhere in this report, which was read to important
groups, and given to the press in lieu of interviews. Care was
taken to make it clear, in response to frequent questioning,
that the policy of the United States in regard to accepting
a mandate anywhere was unformed and unpredictable, and that
the commission had no power of decision. Automobiles were secured
from the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, in
order to be as little as possible dependent upon others than
Americans. Word was given out that the commission would not
accept general social invitations or consent to demonstrations.
On leaving Jaffa the commission stopped at two Jewish schools
and took luncheon at the Hichon-le-Sion colony, where it met
the chief men of several Jewish colonies, as well as the members
of the central Zionist Commission.
A week was spent in Jerusalem, with two days out for visiting
Bethlehem, Hebron, and Beersheba. A limited amount of hospitality
was accepted in a quiet way from the British and French officials.
In order that none might be offended the heads of the various
religious groups were received, although some of them, as for
instance the Copts and Abyssinians had little to say along the
line of the inquiry
After leaving Jerusalem, a rapid journey was made through
northern Palestine, delegations being received at Ramallah,
Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, Haifa and Acre. At most of these places
groups came in, not only front the surrounding country, but
from other administrative centers which it was impossible to
visit.
2. THE ATTITUDE OF THE OCCUPYING GOVERNMENT.-The British
officials, from Major General Sir Arthur Money, who was in command
of O. E. T. A. South, down to the youngest officer, were courteous,
obliging, and helpful. Most of them had had Indian, Egyptian,
or Soudanese experience before the Great War. As a body they
gave an impression of ability, efficiency, and a serious effort
to administer the country for the good of the people.
It should be noted here that General Allenby detailed to
accompany the commission as aid Lt. Col. J. K. Watson, who had
served for years in a similar capacity with Lord Kitchener and
later with the Khedive of Egypt. His thoughtfulness, kindness,
and efficiency though the circumstances of travel were often
trying, were unfailing, and the comfort, good health, and success
in the investigation of the Commission were largely furthered
by him.
3. Wishes of the People.-The Moslems constitute about
four-fifths of the actual population of Palestine, according
to a recent British census. Except for certain official groups
they were practically unanimous for the independence of United
Syria, and were responsive to the current political influences.
The organizations met at Jaffa took the position that Syria
is capable of self-government without a mandatory power, but
if one should be insisted upon by the Peace Conference, they
preferred the United States.
At Jerusalem, however, and in all other places in Palestine,
the program of independence was affirmed. For the most part,
the question of a mandate was referred, either in writing, or
more often in response to questions, to the approaching Syrian
Congress at Damascus, at which they would have representation.
Some Moslems, especially in the South, maintained emphatically
that they could accept no mandate whatever. It is evident that
since the Damascus Congress later declared for American assistance,
with the British as second choice, and emphatic refusal of the
French,: this is the program to which the great majority of
the Moslems of Palestine are committed. Probably most of them
had it in mind when they declared for reference to Damascus.
The Christians of Palestine, who altogether constitute less
than ten per cent of the population, showed more difference
of opinion. Some groups in the north, as the Latin Catholics
of Tiberias and Haifa and most of the Christians of Nazareth,
were with the Moslems for independence and the reference to
Damascus. Maronites and Greek Catholics, and usually the Latin
Catholics, were for a French mandate. The Greek Orthodox everywhere,
according to an agreed program, were for a British mandate,
as were several scattering groups. None asked directly for the
United States, though the opinion was expressed that if there
were assurance that we would come if asked, most Christians
would favor this solution. The Christians were in general strongly
in favor of a mandatory power, which should exercise a real
control. The Jews, who constitute a little more than ten per
cent of the population, were all for Zionism, under a British
mandate. The Moslem and Christian population was practically
unanimous against Zionism, usually expressing themselves with
great emphasis. This question was closely connected with that
of the unity of all Syria under one Government.
4. Zionism.-The Jews of Palestine declared themselves
unanimously in favor of the Zionistic scheme in general, though
they showed difference of opinion in regard to the details and
the process of its realization. The elements of agreement may
be stated as follows:
(a) Palestine, with a fairly large area, to be set aside
at once as a "national home" for the Jews.
(b) Sooner or later the political rule of the land will become
organized as a "Jewish Commonwealth,"
(c) At the start authorization will be given for the free
immigration of Jews from any part of the world; for the unrestricted
purchase of land by the Jews, and for the recognition of Hebrew
as an official language.
(d) Great Britain will be the mandatory power over Palestine,
protecting the Jews and furthering the realization of the scheme.
(e) The Great Powers of the world have declared in favor
of the scheme, which merely awaits execution.
Differences exist especially along two lines:
(a) Whether the Jewish Commonwealth should be set up soon
or after a considerable lapse of time.
(b) Whether the chief emphasis should be upon a restoration
of the ancient mode of life, ritual, exclusiveness and particularism
of the Jews, or upon economic development in a thoroughly modern
fashion, with afforestation, electrification of water-power,
and general full utilization of resources.
5. The Custody of the Holy Places.-For four centuries
the Turk has served as guardian of the peace between Moslems,
Christians and Jews, and even between the different sects of
each, in the Holy Land. Nor has his function been merely nominal:
being really a foreigner and having upon himself the responsibility
of government, he has on the whole well maintained the status
quo, or policed slow and delicate changes in one direction or
another. Now that his authority is gone, a substitute must be
provided, whatever be the new regime. This might be the mandatory
power. If, however, any Roman Catholic power should receive
the mandate, trouble would arise from the fact than at present
the Catholics feel unfairly treated and claim increase of privilege
at the expense of the Greek Orthodox. A Catholic power would
be tempted promptly to disturb the equilibrium, especially during
the eclipse of the power of Russia.
There is already a "Custodian of the Holy Places" for the
Roman Catholics. Might not this idea be extended to the constitution
of a permanent Commission for the Holy Places, on which might
be placed this man, and representatives of Greek Orthodox Christianity,
Protestant Christianity, Sunnite Islam, Shiite Islam, and Judaism?
The Commission might be given authority and means to guard and
care for all the places in Palestine that are sacred to the
three religions, and to adjudicate all disputes about their
custody. Its composition should ensure conservatism and promote
harmony.
II-THE AREA UNDER FRENCH OCCUPATION
1. The Commission reached Beirut after having visited Palestine
and the southern half of the territory occupied by the Arab
forces. Two days were spent in interviews in the city, and visits
were paid by automobile to points from Tyre to Batrun. General
Allenby was kind enough to place his yacht the "Maid of Honor"
at the disposal of the Commission, and thus Tripoli, Alexandretta
and Ladikiya were seen. Delegations were thus heard from every
part of O. E. T A. West. Arrangements as to program, demonstrations,
and the like, were in general maintained as in other areas.
The French officials were at great pains to arrange suitably
for the hearings of the Commission, and to provide for its comfort
and well-being.
The women of the Moslem Trades School at Beirut had woven
a rug for presentation to the Peace Conference, which is interesting
as being a map, patterned so as to show the area claimed by
Syrian Nationalists for United Syria.
2. Wishes of the People.-In general the situation
was in accordance with that in Palestine and the Damascus area.
With few exceptions the Moslems were for American or British
assistance according to the "Damascus Program"; the Druses were
for an English Mandate, the Maronites and all varieties of Catholics
were for France. But the Greek Orthodox were divided, instead
of standing for a British Mandate as usually in Palestine and
Damascus. The Ismailians were mostly for France, and the Nusairiyeh
were divided.
Those who stood for a French Mandate were of different opinions
as regards the place and relationship of Lebanon in Syria. From
Tyre to Tripoli they mostly followed a rigid formula which calls
for a Greater Lebanon, absolutely independent of the rest of
Syria, and under France; the supporters of this view showed
no response to the idea of Syrian national unity, and apparently
wish to become French citizens at an early moment.
Others desire the unity of Syria under the French Mandate,
preferring ordinarily that the Lebanon District should be enlarged
and given a high degree of autonomy.
In the Lebanon proper the majority is probably sincerely
for a French, as opposed to a British mandate. The Commission
could not inquire whether those who declared for France were
well disposed toward an American Mandate, in case this were
possible and a French Mandate for any reason undesirable; but
there were a number of emphatic assurances that the great majority
of the population, including even the Maronites, prefers America
to any other; this is said to be based upon America's unselfish
part in the war, her generosity before and after the armistice,
and the personal relationships established by the large number
of Lebanese who have gone to live for shorter or longer periods
in the United States and to return home loyal.
The Druses ask emphatically to be left out of the Lebanon
in case it be given to France,
But outside the Lebanon proper, in the areas which it is
proposed to include in the "Greater Lebanon," such as Tyre,
Sidon, "Hollow Syria," and Tripoli, a distinct majority of the
people is probably averse to French rule. This includes practically
all the Sunnite Moslems, most of the Shiites, a part of the
Greek Orthodox Christians, and the small group of Protestants.
Most of these ask earnestly for America, with Britain as second
choice; the balance for Britain with America as second choice.
In the rest of the O.E.T.A. West, north of the proposed Greater
Lebanon, the majority is probably against a French Mandate in
any circumstances. A considerable proportion of the remainder
are averse to a separation from the interior of the country,
and place the unity of Syria above their preference for France.
It is worthy of note that whereas the Syrian nationalists
everywhere distinctly and by name rejected the assistance of
France, no one who supported France declared for a specific
rejection of England or America. In a number of instances, however,
the fear was expressed by Christians that England, if made the
mandatory power, would show more favor to Moslems than to Christians.
3. The Lebanon.---The mountainous area set off in
1861 to be under the nominal protection of six European powers,
with a Christian governor, has been a particular interest of
France ever since. The population is largely Maronite and Roman
Catholic. As in the case of all regions that have been removed
from the direct jurisdiction of the Porte, progress has been
comparatively rapid; roads have been built, trees planted, and
a large number of stone houses erected. Money earned in America
has helped greatly in these improvements. The Maronite ecclesiastical
and monastic organizations have increased greatly in wealth
in these years
The Lebanon has been freed from the burden of military service,
and taxes have consequently been light. The area has been predominantly
Christian and the Christians have enjoyed rather more than their
proportion of the offices. Druses on the other hand have shown
a tendency to emigrate to join their brethren in the Hauran,
and they resent the inequalities of treatment to which they
have been subjected.
The French policy of "colonization" shows its fruits in many
inhabitants of this area, as well as of Beirut and other parts
of Syria, who feel that they know French better than Arabic,
and who are apt to hold themselves as of a distinctly higher
order of civilization than the people of the interior. It is
among these that the idea of a complete political separation
of the Lebanese area from the rest of Syria has taken root.
The propinquity of this area led the Turkish government to
be lenient and favorable to Christians and others in adjacent
regions, so that no very sharp line of difference of prosperity
is visible. Nevertheless the appeal of lighter taxes and military
service, greater security and opportunities for office-holding
has an effect upon Christians in neighboring areas, so that
many of them incline toward a Greater Lebanon under a permanent
French mandate. But there is a considerable party, even among
the pro-French, who are opposed to becoming a part of France.
This is in fact the official Maronite position.
Any revision of the situation should not diminish the security
of the inhabitants of the Lebanon, but should raise the rest
of Syria to a like security. This can be provided for in a United
Syria by a sufficient measure of local autonomy. Care should
be taken to avoid leaving this portion of the country in a position
of perpetual special privilege, in which the common burdens
would rest more heavily on other areas.
III-THE AREA UNDER ARAB OCCUPATION
1. The Commission spent nine days in Damascus, six of which
were filled up with interviews, held with representatives of
religious and political groups, councils and boards of the Government,
and prominent officials and other notable persons of every grade,
including even the Emir Feisal and General Allenby. More time
was spent here than anywhere else in Syria, because Damascus
will he the capital of United Syria, if such be created, and
an Arab government over O. E. T. A. East is already in operation
there, showing much activity and endeavoring by accomplishment,
display, and intrigue to prepare the way for the larger unity.
During the Commission's visit, the "Syrian Congress" met, whose
charter and program are described below. The bazars were placarded
with the signs "We want absolute independence," and these were
removed by government orders. The interview of the Commission
with the Mufti, Radi, and Ulema was published with considerable
accuracy in the local newspapers (of course by no act or permission
of the Commission) and this gave rise to animated discussions
on the part of the people and the press. The Commission accepted
hospitality from the Emir Feisal on two occasions.
In the midst of the stay in Damascus a trip was taken southward
to Amman and Deraa for the purpose of conferring with people
from the edge of the desert. The note received from all Moslems
was for complete independence without protection or a mandatory
power; but recognizing that they need financial and economic
advice, they proposed after the recognition of independence
to ask advisers from America. Eloquent Arab orators appealed
to America, as having freed them, to uphold their independence
before the Peace Conference, saying that they hold our country
responsible before God for completing the work we have begun.
The Christians, who are few in these areas, were in great fear.
They desire that a strong mandatory power be appointed over
Syria, so that they may have full protection; they prefer that
Britain be that power, and that the area be annexed to and governed
with Palestine.
After leaving Damascus, a day was spent at Baalbek, where
was encountered first the struggle for and against annexing
"Hollow Syria" (known as the Bekaa) to the Greater Lebanon.
After ten days in O. E. T. A. West, the Arab area was entered
again by the road from Tripoli to Homs. Delegations were heard
at Homs and Hama, after which three days were spent in Aleppo.
Besides hearing delegations of all important Allepine groups
and opinions, visits were paid to the centers of relief for
refugee Armenians.
The claim for the independence of Mesopotamia was presented
very vigorously in the north. Certain groups at Aleppo were
much interested, however, in pushing the boundary of Syria well
to the east, so as to include the Syrian desert.
2. Attitude of the Occupying Government. -The higher
Arab officials include a number of men of dignity, ability,
intelligence, and apparent honesty and patriotism. Practically
all are Syrian born. Some of them, as General Haddad Pasha,
chief of police and gendarmerie, and Said Pasha Zoucair, financial
adviser, have been trained under British Administration in Egypt,
and others, as Col. Yussef Bey, aide-de-camp of the Emir Feisal,
General Jaafar Pasha, Military Governor of Aleppo, and Ihsan
Allah Djabri, Mayor of Aleppo, have had their education and
experience in the Turkish service. Most of the lower officials
in this area (as well as in the other O. E. T. A. regions) have
simply been continued from the Turkish regime, and in many cases
are said to practice extortions and malversations much as under
the former Government.
Every effort was made to do honor to the Commission and execute
its wishes. Sometimes ostentatious attempts were made to give
the impression of absolute non-interference with freedom of
access to an expression before the Commission.
3. Wishes of the People.- The declarations in O. E.
T. A. East were much nearer to unanimity than in the South or
the West, as may be seen by a glance at the Tables of "Petition
Summaries." The greater part of the declarations both oral and
written. conformed to the resolutions of the Syrian Congress
at Damascus, which is discussed separately below. This program
was reached by the action of conflicting forces, in the presence
of a general feeling that it was overwhelmingly important for
reasons of national safety to reach unity of expression. The
pressure brought to bear by the Government and the different
political parties was of undoubted weight in bringing into line
opinions of a more extreme sort, such as those in favor of independence
in the highest degree and those which called for a perpetual
strong mandatory control. But on the whole there can be no doubt
that the main elements of this program represent the popular
will as nearly as that can be expressed in any country.
The people of the area declared themselves almost unanimously
for United Syria, for its complete independence, and against
any help from France, and against the Zionist program. The Moslems
were in nearly unanimous agreement upon a request for American
assistance. The Jews asked for autonomy for themselves, and
the Zionist scheme for their brethren in Palestine. The Druses
were for the Arab Government under a British mandate. The Christians
were divided, partly by sects and partly by geographical location.
All of the few Christians in the south, including Latin Catholics
were for a British mandate, with America in case for any reason
Britain cannot come. So also were the Greek Orthodox of Damascus
and a portion of the Greek Orthodox farther north. The small
groups of Protestants were for an Anglo-Saxon mandate, some
preferring America and some Britain. The Orthodox Syrians were
for America. All the Catholics (except at Amman and Deraa) and
the Maronites were for France. Nearly all of the Christians
were for a strong mandatory control.
4. The Syrian Congress at Damascus.- From the time
of reaching Jerusalem, the Commission began to be told of a
congress that was in preparation, to be held soon at Damascus,
which would for a large part of the population determine the
question of a mandate. Sessions were held while the Commission
was at Damascus, and on the last day there, a deputation presented
to the Commission the program that had been prepared.
The Congress was not elected directly by the people, or by
a fresh appeal to the people, the reason given being that time
was lacking to revise the voting lists and carry through a new
scheme. At the last Turkish election, before the war, electors
were chosen to select deputies for the Turkish parliament. The
survivors of these electors chose the members of the Damascus
Congress. Criticisms were made against the plan of choice to
the effect that it was unconstitutional and extra-constitutional,
that the electors had mostly belonged to the Party of Union
and Progress, and that the members of the Congress were not
distributed in proportion to population. Sixty-nine members
attended, and about 20 others from the west and north had been
elected, but bad not arrived. There were a number of Christians
in the Conference, but no Jews, though some Jews among the electors
were said to have given their approval. Much evidence goes to
show that the program prepared represents well the wishes of
the people of Syria. The program is as follows:
"We, the undersigned, members of the General Syrian Congress,
meeting in Damascus on Wednesday, July 2, 1919, made up of representatives
from the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western,
provided with credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants
of our various districts, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have
agreed upon the following statement of the desires of the people
of the country who have elected us to present them to the American
Section of the International Commission; the fifth article was
passed by a very large majority; all the other articles were
accepted unanimously.
"1. We ask absolutely complete political independence
for Syria within these boundaries. The Taurus System on
the North; Rafeh and a line running from Al-Juf to the south
of the Syrian and the Mejazian line to Akaba on the south;
the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers and a line extending east
of Abu Kamal to the east of Al-Juf on the east; and the
Mediterranean on the west
"2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country
should be a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy on
broad decentralization principles, safeguarding the rights
of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal who
carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation
and merited our full confidence and entire reliance.
"3 Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the
Syrian area are not naturally less gifted than other more
advanced races and that; they are by no means less developed
than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians at
the beginning of their independence, we protest against
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing
us among the nations in their middle stage of development
which stand in need of a mandatory power.
"4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference
of this just protest for certain considerations that we
may not understand, we, relying on the declarations of President
Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an end to
the ambition of conquest and colonization, can only regard
the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations
as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical
assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence.
And desiring that our country should not fall a prey to
colonization and believing that the American Nation is farthest
from any thought of colonization and has no political ambition
in our country, we will seek the technical and economic
assistance from the United States of America, provided that
such assistance does not exceed twenty years.
"5. In the event of America not finding herself in a
position to accept our desire for assistance we will seek
this assistance from Great Britain, also provided that such
assistance does not infringe the complete independence and
unity of our country, and that the duration of such assistance
does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article.
"6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French
Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and
refuse that she should assist us or have a hand in our country
under any circumstances and in any place.
"7. We oppose the pretentions of the Zionists to create
a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known
as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of
our country; for we do not acknowledge their title, but
consider them a grave peril to our people from the national,
economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots
shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.
"8. We ask that there should be no separation of the
southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, nor of the littoral
western zone which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country.
We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed
against partition under whatever circumstances.
"9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia
and that there should be no economical barriers between
the two countries.
"10. The fundamental principles laid down by President
Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest
most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the
partition of our Syrian country and against any private
engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the
southern part of Syria, therefore we ask the complete annulment
of these conventions and agreements.
"The noble principles enunciated by President Wilson
strengthen our confidence that our desires emanating from
the depths of our hearts, shall be the decisive factor in
determining our future; and that President Wilson and the
free American people will be supporters for the realization
of our hopes, thereby proving their sincerity and noble
sympathy with the aspiration of the weaker nations in general
and our Arab people in particular.
"We also have the fullest confidence that the Peace Conference
will realize that we would not have risen against the Turks,
with whom we had participated in all civil, political, and
representative privileges, but for their violation of our
national rights, and so will grant us our desires in full
in order that our political rights may not be less after
the war than they were before, since we have shed so much
blood in the cause of our liberty and independence.
"We request to he allowed to send a delegation to represent
us at the Peace Conference to defend our rights and secure
the realization of our aspirations."
The program mostly speaks sufficiently for itself. Various
points in it are commented upon elsewhere in this report. It
is the most substantial document presented to the Commission,
and deserves to be treated with great respect. The result of
an extensive and arduous political process, it affords a basis
on which the Syrians can get together, and as firm a foundation
for a Syrian national organization as can be obtained. The mandatory
power will possess in this program a commitment to liberal government
which will be found to be very valuable in starting the new
state in the right direction.
CILICIA
1. General-
(a) The Commission did not endeavor to give thorough
hearings in this region, feeling that it is not seriously
to be considered a part of Syria, and desiring not to open
up as yet the question of the Turkish-speaking portion of
the former Turkish Empire.
(b) The population statistics vary considerably, but
there can be no doubt of a marked Moslem majority in Cilicia
before the war, now probably somewhat increased.
2. Wishes of the People
(a) The Turks here, like most of those heard previously,
wish to retain Turkish unity under the house of Osman, and
leave the question of what shall be the Mandatory Power,
if any, to the Turkish Government at Constantinople.
(b) The Arabs (who are mainly Turkish-speaking, but are
chiefly Nusairiyeh or Alouites) ask for union with Syria
under a French mandate.
(d) The other Christians, a small minority are mostly
for France, particularly the Greeks who are working in close
relation with the French in the northern regions of Turkey.
(c) The Armenians (who are also chiefly Turkish-speaking)
ask for the union of Cilicia with Armenia under an American
mandate.
(d) The other Christians, a small minority, are mostly
for France, particularly the Greeks who are working in close
relation with the French in the northern regions of Turkey.
MESOPOTAMIA
It was impossible for the Commission to visit Mesopotamia
at this time. Earnest requests to make such a visit were presented
at Damascus and Aleppo, accompanied by complaints that the British
occupying forces are restricting freedom of speech, movement,
and political action, and that they show signs of an intention
to allow extensive immigration from India, to the great detriment
of the rights and interests of the inhabitants of the region.
A committee at Aleppo presented a program for Mesopotamia
which parallels closely the "Damascus Program" for Syria. An
abstract of their claims follows:
1. Mesopotamia should be completely independent, including
Diarbekir, Deir-ez-Zor, Mosul, Bagdad, and Muhammerah.
2. The Government should be a constitutional civil kingdom.
3. The king should be a son of the King of the Hejaz, either
Abdullah or Zeid.
4. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is
protested against.
5. No outside government should interfere in the country.
6. After the recognition of independence technical and economical
assistance is to be asked for from America
7. Objection is raised to all immigration and especially
to that of Hindus and Jews.
8. The complete independence of Syria is asked for.
9. It is asked that there be no interference of France in
Syria.
It will be noticed that conformably to the custom of all
nascent nations, wide boundaries are claimed, which would involve
difficulties with adjacent areas, such as Deir-ez-Zor with Syria,
Diarbekir with Armenia, and Muhammerah with Persia.
The Orthodox [Nestorian?-Ed.] Syrian Patriarch, from Der
Zafran, near Mardin, met the Commission at Homs. He stated that
90,000 of his people were slain in 1915; when the British came
in 1918, all were willing to submit to their rule; but emissaries
came from Constantinople to stir up the Kurds and Arabs in favor
of independence, and now the situation is much worse, the area
occupied by his people should go with Mesopotamia, under the
mandate of either America or Britain.
The entire data have been given, thus so fully as to make
it possible to test at every point the legitimacy of the inference
drawn from the data, and of the final recommendations for action
by the Peace Conference.
Further data from our final inference and recommendations
were afforded by comprehensive reports of the entire survey,
made by all three advisers. The recommendations of the Commissioners
have thus been shaped in the light of surveys made from different
points of view, and taking into account a wide range of considerations-local,
national racial, and religious considerations both of principle
and of practical policy; and of the world's dire need of a peace
everywhere justly and so permanently based.
II-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Commissioners have sought to make their survey of Syria,
and the report upon Syria now submitted, in the spirit of the
instructions given them by the Council of Four, and especially
in harmony with the resolutions adopted on January 30, 1919,
by the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain France,
Italy and Japan, and with the Anglo-French Declaration of November
9, 1918, both quoted at length in the Commission's instructions.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth of the resolutions
adopted on January 30th are particularly pertinent to this report,
and should be here recorded. The general purpose of the Peace
Conference Concerning these areas in the former Turkish Empire
is here clearly disclosed.
2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of
the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples
and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent
years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia,
Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely
severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to
the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.
3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage
should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity
of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging
to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of
the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred
trust of civilization and that securities for the performance
of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the
League of Nations.
4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method
of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage
of such peoples should he entrusted to advanced nations who,
by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical
positions, can best undertake this responsibility, and that
this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on
behalf of the League of Nations.
5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the
character of the mandate must differ according to the stage
of development of the people, the geographical situation of
the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.
6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging
to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where
their existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice
and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they
are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must
be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory
power....
In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render
to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the
territory committed to its charge.
The Anglo-French Declaration [Note: This Charter of
Freedom, issued a few days prior to the Armistice, is the standard
by which the Near East judges the post-Armistice conduct of
Europe.] was spread broadcast throughout Syria and Mesopotamia,
and, as bearing directly upon our problem, may also well be
called to mind at this point:
The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting
in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete
and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the
Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations
deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice
of the native population.
In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great
Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment
of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia
already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which
they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize
such governments as soon as they are effectively established.
So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the
populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure,
by their support and effective assistance, that the governments
and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free
will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which
the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated
territories is to insure impartial and equal justice for all;
to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging
local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and
to put an end to the division too long exploited by Turkish
policy.
Of this Declaration, M. Pichon very properly said in the
French Chamber December 29, 1918: "Of course we admit the complete
freedom of the Conference, and its right to give these agreements
their proper conclusions, but these agreements are binding both
upon England and upon us." This statement is the more significant
because it is exactly these two peoples of the Allies who are
immediately related to the problems in the Arabic-speaking portions
of the Turkish Empire. Our survey made it clear that this Anglo-French
Declaration and similar utterances of the Peace Conference,
and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, had made a deep impression
upon the Syrian people and lay in the background of all their
demands. The promises involved not only cannot justly be ignored
by the Peace Conference, but should be faithfully fulfilled.
This is particularly true of the British-French Declaration;
for it is completely in accord with the repeated statements
of the aims of the Allies, and was expressly directed to the
Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire especially Syria
and Mesopotamia.
It is noted that these resolutions of January 30, 1919, and
this Declaration of November 9, 1918, clearly look to complete
separation of the Arabic-speaking areas from Turkey propose
that Syria and Mesopotamia shall not be colonies in the old
sense at all; shall not be exploited for the benefit of the
occupying power; but shall rather be directly encouraged and
assisted in developing national independence as quickly as possible.
And the Declaration makes the promises equally binding for Syria
and Mesopotamia.
The resolutions and declaration invoked in the instructions
given to our Commission thus form the basis of the whole policy
of sending a Commission, and of ascertaining the desires of
the people.
The sincerity of the professed aims of the Allies in the
war, therefore, is peculiarly to be tested in the application
of these aims in the treatment of the Arabic-speaking portions
of the former Turkish Empire. For the promises here made were
specific and unmistakable. It is worth consideration, too, that
the whole policy of mandatories under the League of Nations
might here be worked out with special success, and success here
would encourage the steady extension of the policy elsewhere,
and do something so significant for world progress as to help
to justify the immeasurable sacrifices of the war. There is
also probably no region where the Allies are freer to decide
their course in accordance with the principles they have professed.
The gravity of the Syrian problem is further to be seen in
certain well-known facts. The fact that the Arabic-speaking
portion of the Turkish Empire has been the birthplace of the
three great religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and
that Palestine contains places sacred to all three, makes inevitably
a center of interest and concern for the whole civilized world.
No solution which is merely local or has only a single people
in mind can avail.
As a portion of the bridge-land uniting Europe, Asia, and
Africa, too-where in a peculiar degree the East and the West
meet-Syria has a place of such strategic importance, politically
and commercially, and from the point of view of world civilization,
as also to make it imperative that the settlement here brought
about should be so just as to give promise of permanently good
results for the whole cause of the development of a righteous
civilization in the world. Every part of the former Turkish
Empire must be given a new life and opportunity under thoroughly
changed political conditions.
The war and the consequent breaking up of the Turkish Empire,
moreover, give a great opportunity-not likely to return -to
build now in Syria a Near East State on the modern basis of
full religious liberty, deliberately including various religious
faiths, and especially guarding rights of minorities. It is
a matter of justice to the Arabs, in the recognition of the
Arab people and their desire for national expression, and of
deep and lasting concern to the world, that an Arab state along
modern political lines should be formed. While the elements
are very various, the interests often divisive, and much of
the population not yet fitted for self-government, the conditions
are nevertheless as favorable as could be reasonably expected
under the circumstances to make the trial now. The mixed and
varied populations have lived together with a fair degree of
unity under Turkish domination, and in spite of the divisive
Turkish policy. They ought to do far better under a state on
modern lines and with an enlightened mandatary.
In any case, the oversight of a mandatory power, and of the
League of Nations, would prevent this attempt from taking such
a course as that taken by the Young Turk Movement. The Arabs,
too, will know that this is their best opportunity for the formation
of an Arab State, and will be put on their mettle to achieve
a distinct success. The insight and breadth of sympathy revealed
by Emir Feisal make him peculiarly well fitted, also, for the
headship of a State involving both Oriental and Occidental elements.
The trial at least could safely be made under a sympathetic
mandatary Power, and made with good promise of success. If the
experiment finally failed division of territory could still
follow. But to begin with division of territory along religious
lines is to invite increasing exclusiveness, misunderstanding,
and friction. As Dr. W. M. Ramsay has said concerning certain
other portions of the Turkish Empire:
"The attempt to sort our religions and settle them in different
localities is wrong and will prove fatal. The progress of history
depends upon diversity of population in each district." And
there is real danger in breaking Syria up into meaningless fragments.
Any policy adopted, therefore, for Syria should look to "the
establishment of a national government and administration deriving
their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native
populations," and should treat it as far as possible in harmony
with its natural geographic and economic unity. This is the
natural course to be taken, if at all feasible. It is directly
in line with the expressed purpose of the Peace Conference.
And it is the plain object of the desires and ambitions of
a large majority of the population concerned.
It is interesting, also, to find that both British and French
officers in Syria seemed agreed in the belief that the unity
of all Syria under one mandatary was desirable; and that there
were certain to be constant friction and dangers to peace among
British, French, and Arabs, if both British and French remained
in the country.
On the other hand, the practical obstacles to the unity of
Syria are: The apparent unwillingness of either the British
or the French to withdraw from Syria-the British from Palestine,
or the French from Beirut and the Lebanon; the intense opposition
of the Arabs and the Christians to the Zionist Program; the
common Lebanese demand for complete separate independence; the
strong feeling of the Arabs of the East against any French control;
the fear on the part of many Christians of Moslem domination;
and the lack of as vigorous a Syrian national feeling as could
be desired. These obstacles will be discussed in the recommendations
of the Commissioners.
In the light, now, of these practical obstacles to the unity
of Syria, of the general considerations favoring that unity,
and of the wide range of data secured by our survey, we turn
to our recommendations.
III-RECOMMENDATIONS
The commissioners make to the Peace Conference the following
recommendations for the treatment of Syria:
We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony
with our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration
(whether of one or more powers) is brought into Syria, should
come in not at all as a colonizing Power in the old sense of
that term, but as a Mandatary under the League of Nations with
the clear consciousness that "the well-being and development"
of the Syrian people form for it a "sacred trust."
(1 ) To this end the mandate should have limited term, the
time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations,
in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year,
in the annual reports of the Mandatary to the League or in other
ways.
(2) The Mandatary Administration should have, however, a
period and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new
state, and especially to make possible carrying through important
educational and economic undertakings, essential to secure founding
of the State.
(3) The Mandatary Administration should be characterized
from the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis,
in clear recognition of the imperative necessity of education
for the citizens of a democratic state, and for the development
of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of national
spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which
has only recently come to self-consciousness.
(4) The Mandatary should definitely seek, from the beginning
of its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent
self-government as rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up
all the institutions of a democratic state, and by sharing with
them increasingly the work of administration, and so forming
gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly
in the progress of the country, and forming at the same time
a large group of disciplined civil servants.
( 5 ) The period of "tutelage" should not be unduly prolonged,
but independent self-government should be granted as soon as
it can safely be done, remembering that the primary business
of governments is not the accomplishment of certain things,
but the development of citizens.
(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatary in a country
like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious
liberty is ensured. both in the constitution and in the practice
of the state, and that a jealous care is exercised for the rights
of all minorities. Nothing is more vital than this for the enduring
success of the new Arab State.
(7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount
of indebtedness on the part of the new state should be avoided,
as well as any entanglements financially with the affairs of
the Mandatary Power. On the other hand the legitimate established
privileges of foreigners such as rights to maintain schools,
commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject
to review and modification under the authority of the League
of Nations in the interest of Syria. The Mandatary Power should
not take advantage of its position to force a monopolistic control
at any point to the detriment either of Syria or of other nations;
but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as possible
to economic independence as well as to political independence.
Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of
the Commission, the fulfillment of at least the conditions now
named should be assured, if the Peace Conference and the League
of Nations are true to the policy of mandataries already embodied
in "The Covenant of the League of Nations." This should effectively
guard the most essential interests of Syria, however the machinery
of administration is finally organized. The Damascus Congress
betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country
would become, though under some other name, simply a colonial
possession of some other Power. That fear must be completely
allayed.
B. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Syria
be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the
great majority of the people of-Syria
(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population
too small and the economic, geographic, racial and language
unity too manifest, to make the setting up of independent states
within its boundaries desirable, if such division can possibly
be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in language, culture,
traditions, and customs.
(2) This recommendation is in line with important "general
considerations" already urged, and with the principles of the
League of Nations, as well as in answer to the desires of the
majority of the population concerned.
(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined
by a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory
has been in general allotted. The Commissioners believe, however,
that the claim of the Damascus Conference to include Cilicia
in Syria is not justified, either historically or by commercial
or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking
and the Turkish-speaking populations would quite certainly class
Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too,
has no such need of further seacoast as the large interior sections
of Asia Minor.
(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of
Syria, the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon which
have already had a measure of independence, should not be forgotten.
It will make for real unity, undoubtedly, to give a large measure
of local autonomy, and especially in the case of strongly unified
groups. Even the "Damascus Program" which presses so earnestly
the unity of Syria, itself urges a government "on broad decentralization
principles."
Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity
and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should
not find her legitimate aspirations less possible within a Syrian
national State. On the contrary, it may be confidently expected
that both her economic and political relations with the rest
of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of
the State, rather than entirely independent of it.
As a predominantly Christian country too, Lebanon naturally
fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such
domination she would have a fourfold safeguard; her own large
autonomy: the presence of a strong mandatary for the considerable
period in which the constitution and practice of the new State
would be forming, the oversight of the League of Nations, with
its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities;
and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity
of such a state, if it were to commend itself to the League
of Nations. Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary
Moslem attitude, if Christians were present in the state in
considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside
the state, as experience of the relations of different religious
faiths in India suggests.
As to predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted
that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and
more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian state,
feeling its problems and needs and sharing all its life, instead
of outside it absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For
the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria,
then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that
many of the more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view.
A similar statement might be made for Palestine; though, as
"the Holy Land" for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike, its
situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique treatment,
if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed
more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning
Zionism.
C. We recommend, in the third place that Syria be placed
under one Mandatary Power, as the natural way to secure real
and efficient unity.
( 1 ) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria
among several mandataries, even if existing national unity were
recognized- or to attempt a joint mandatary of the whole on
the commission plan: -neither of these courses would be naturally
suggested as the best way to secure and promote the unity of
the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people.
It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference
to some such form of divided mandate, but it is not a solution
to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger
interests of the people, as considerations already urged indicate.
(2) It is not to be forgotten either, that, however they
are handled politically the people of Syria are there, forced
to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to live
with one another-the Arabs of the East and the people of the
coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped or
hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations,
by a single mandatary ? No doubt the quick mechanical solution
of the problem of difficult relations is to split the people
up into little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly,
as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the relations are
so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable.
But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates
the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson
of the modern social consciousness points to the necessity of
understanding "the other half," as it can be understood only
by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local autonomy
to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatary ought to
form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity of
feeling throughout the state, and ought to steadily improve
group relations.
The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often
insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto
prevailed among various groups, it has been very largely due
to the direct instigation of the Turkish Government. When justice
is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain that the aim
of the common government is the service of all classes alike,
not their exploitation, decent human relations to be secured-a
foundation which could not be obtained by dividing men off from
one another in antagonistic groups.
The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future
good of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole
of Syria under-a single mandate.
D. We recommend, in the fourth n place, that Emir Feisal
be made head of the new united Syrian State.
(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the representative
Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there
seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the
population of Syria sincerely desire to have Emir Feisal as
ruler.
(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems
naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their, long training under
tribal conditions, and with their traditional respect for their
chiefs. They seem to need; more than most people, a king as
the personal symbol of the power of the State.
(3) Emir Feisal has come, too, naturally into his present
place of power, and there is no one else who could well replace
him. He had the great advantage of being the son of the Sherif
of Mecca, and as such honored throughout the Moslem world. He
was one of the prominent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility
for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the
complete deliverance of the Arab-speaking portions of the Turkish
Empire. He was consequently hailed by the "Damascus Congress"
as having "merited their full confidence and entire reliance."
He was taken up and supported by the British as the most promising
candidate for the headship of the new Arab State-an Arab of
the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Shefifian
connection, and through his broad sympathies with the best in
the Occident. His relations with the Arabs to the east of Syria
are friendly, and his kingdom would not be threatened from that
side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to the
Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East, but
no man can be named who would have a stronger general appeal.
He is tolerant and wise, skillful in dealing with men, winning
in manner, a man of sincerity, insight, and power. Whether he
has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is too
early to say, but certainly no other Arab leader combines so
many elements of power as he, and he will have invaluable help
throughout the mandatary period.
The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the
fact that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship
of this new state in the Near East.
ZIONISM
E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification
of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration
of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish
State.
(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds
predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine,
coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed
by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to
the recommendation here made.
(2) The commission was abundantly supplied with literature
on the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine;
heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and
their claims; and personally saw something of what had been
accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations
and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the
devotion of many of the colonists and for their success, by
modern methods, in overcoming natural obstacles.
(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement
had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's
often quoted statement in its approval by other representatives
of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour
Statement are adhered to -favoring "the establishment in Palestine
of a national home for the Jewish people," "it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights existing in non-Jewish communities
in Palestine"-it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist
Program must be greatly modified.
For "a national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent
to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection
of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass
upon the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the
Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the
Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession
of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various
forms of purchase.
In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down
the following principle as one of the four great "ends for which
the associated peoples of the world were fighting"; "The settlement
of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of
economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the
basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people
immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material
interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may
desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior
influence or mastery." If that principle is to rule, and so
the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to
what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered
that the non-Jewish population of Palestine-nearly nine tenths
of the whole-are emphatically against the entire Zionist program.
The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population
of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people
so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial
and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross
violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's
rights, though it kept within the forms of law
It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist
program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally
by the people throughout Syria as our conferences clearly showed.
More than 72 per cent-1,350 in all-of all the petitions in the
whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only
two requests-those for a united Syria and for independence-had
a larger support This genera] feeling was only voiced by the
"General Syrian Congress," in the seventh, eighth and tenth
resolutions of the statement. (Already quoted in the report.)
The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact
that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense
and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted
by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could
be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally
thought that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would
be required even to initiate the program. That of itself is
evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program,
on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria.
Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary,
but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests
of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted
by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine,
based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously
considered.
There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored,
if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely
Jewish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration
grows out of the fact that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for
Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians
and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as
the Jews with conditions in Palestine especially with those
conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The
relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and
difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted
whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or
Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of
the Holy Land as a whole.
The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to Christians-those
having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to Moslems,
are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is
simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and
Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish
hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places
about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from
this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places
of all three religions are sacred to them have made very naturally
much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the
Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning,
in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine
has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist
program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate,
the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions
of the world which look to Palestine as "the Holy Land."
In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense
of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound
to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be
attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very
gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration
should be definitely limited, and that the project for making
Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.
There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be
included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of
the country, the holy places being cared for by an International
and Inter-religious Commission, somewhat as at present under
the oversight and approval of the Mandatary and of the League
of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon
this Commission.
The recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity
of recommending what power shall undertake the single Mandate
for all Syria.
(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the qualifications,
ideally to be desired in this Mandatary Power: First of all
it should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing
to enter heartily into the spirit of the mandatary system, and
its possible gift to the world, and so be willing to withdraw
after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to exploit
the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the
education of the common people and for the development of national
spirit. It needs unlimited sympathy and patience in what is
practically certain to be a rather thankless task, for no Power
can go in honestly to face actual conditions (like land-ownership,
for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making
many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with less
developed peoples, and abundant resources in men and money.
(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications,
certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these
qualifications that has not been more or less definitely indicated
in our conferences with the Syrian people and they certainly
suggest a new stage in the development of the self-sacrificing
spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power
that undertakes the single mandate for all Syria, in the spirit
of these qualifications will have the possibility of greatly
serving not only Syria but the world, and of exalting at the
same time its own national life. For it would be working in
direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the war, and
give proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And
that would mean very much just now, in enabling the nations
to keep their faith in one another and in their own highest
ideals.
(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30,
1919, quoted in our instructions, expressly state for regions
to be "completely severed from the Turkish Empire," that "the
wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration
in the selection of the Mandatory Power." Our survey left no
room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people.
Although it was not known whether America would take a mandate
at all; and although the Commission could not only give no assurances
upon that point, but had rather to discourage expectation; nevertheless,
upon the face of the returns, America was the first choice of
1,152 of the petitions presented-more than 60 per cent-while
no other Power had as much as 15 per cent for first choice.
And the conferences showed that the people knew the grounds
upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared
that their choice was due to knowledge of America's record,
the unselfish aims with which she had come into the war, the
faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who had been in America;
the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in
Syria, especially the College in Beirut, with its well known
and constant encouragement of Syrian national sentiment, their
belief that America had no territorial or colonial ambitions,
and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian state was well
established as her treatment both of Cuba and the Philippines
seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit,
and her ample resources.
From the point of view of the desires of the "people concerned,"
the Mandate should clearly go to America.
(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already
stated as needed in the Mandatary for Syria, America as first
choice of the people, probably need not fear careful testing,
point by point, by the standard involved in our discussion of
qualifications, though she has much less experience in such
work than Great Britain, and is likely to show less patience
and though her definite connections with Syria have been less
numerous and close than those of France. She would have at least
the great qualification of fervent belief in the new mandatary
system of the League of Nations, as indicating the proper relations
which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one. And though
she would undertake the mandate with reluctance, she could probably
be brought to see, how logically the taking of such responsibility
follows from the purposes with which she entered the war and
from her advocacy of the League of Nations.
(5) There is the further consideration that America could
probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at
least, with less friction than any other Power. The great majority
of Syrian people, as has been seen, favor her coming, rather
than that of any other power. Both the British and the French
would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America
than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests
to press. She would have abundant resources for the development
of the sound prosperity of Syria, and this would inevitably
benefit in a secondary way the nations which have had closest
connection with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the
Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be more welcome,
as a neighbor, to the British, with their large interests in
Egypt, Arabia and Mesopotamia; or to the Arabs and Syrians in
these regions; or to the French with their long-established
and many-sided interests in Beirut and the Lebanon.
(6) The objections to recommending at once a single American
Mandate for all Syria are: first of all, that it is not certain
that the American people would be willing to take the Mandate-
that it is not certain that the British or French would be willing
to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America's coming, a
situation which might prove steadily harassing to an American
administration; that the vague but large encouragement given
to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to
America, on account of her large influential Jewish population-
and that if America were to take any mandate at all, and were
to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia Minor Mandate
would be more natural and important. For there is a task there
of such peculiar and worldwide significance as to appeal to
the best in America, and demand the utmost from her, and as
certainly to justify her in breaking with her established policy
concerning mixing in the affairs of the Eastern hemisphere.
The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could
come into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice
to all the peoples concerned.
To these objections as a whole, it is to be said, that they
are all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and
that they only form the sort of obstacles that must be expected,
in so large and significant an undertaking. In any case they
do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of recommending
the course which, in their honest judgment, is the best courses
and the one for which the whole situation calls.
The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the
logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked
to undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.
If for any reason the mandate-for Syria is not given to America,
then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express
request of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate
be given to Great Britain. The tables show that there were 1,073
petitions in all Syria for Great Britain as Mandatary, if America
did not take the mandate. This is very greatly in excess of
any similar expression for the French.
On the contrary-for whatever reason -more than 60 per cent
of all the petitions, presented to the Commission, directly
and strongly protested against any French Mandate. Without going
into a discussion of the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners
are reluctantly compelled to believe that this situation itself
makes it impossible to recommend a single French mandate for
all Syria.
The feeling of the Arabs of the East is particularly strong
against the French. And there is grave reason to believe that
the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war
between the Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain
a dangerous alternative. The Commissioners may perhaps be allowed
to say that this conclusion is contrary to their own earlier
hope, that-because of France's long and intimate relations with
Syria, because of her unprecedented sacrifices in the war, and
because the British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater
accessions of territory from the war-it might seem possible
to recommend that France be given the entire mandate for Syria.
But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more clear
it became that that course could not be taken.
The Commissioners recommend, therefore that if America cannot
take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain;
because of the choice of the people concerned; because she is
already on the ground and with much of the necessary work in
hand; because of her trained administrators; because of her
long and generally successful experience in dealing with less
developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications
needed in a Mandatary Power, as we have already considered them.
We should hardly be doing justice however, to our sense of
responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add
some at least of the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed
and implied in our conferences, which led to the preference
for an American mandate over a British mandate. The people repeatedly
showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatary power
would become simply a colonizing power of the old kind; that
Great Britain would find it difficult to give up the colonial
theory, especially in case of a people thought inferior; that
she would favor a civil service and pension budget too expensive
for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated
to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after
all, too much exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit;
that she would never be ready to withdraw and give the country
real independence; that she did not really believe in universal
education, and would not provide adequately for it, and that
she already had more territory in her possession-in spite of
her fine colonial record-than was good either for herself or
for the world.
These misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely
explain their demand for "absolute independence," for a period
of "assistance" of only twenty years, their protest against
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations etc. They
all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send
into Syria, should go in as a true mandatary under the League
of Nations, and for a limited term. Anything else would be a
betrayal of the Syrian people.
It needs to be emphasized, too, that under a true mandatary
for Syria, all the legitimate interests of all the nations in
Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there is no reason
why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should
be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatary
power, or in an independent Syria.
There remains only to be added, that if France feels so intensely
concerning her present claims in Syria, as to threaten all cordial
relations among the Allies, it is of course possible to give
her a mandate over the Lebanon (not enlarged) separated from
the rest of Syria, as is desired by considerable groups in that
region. For reasons already given, the Commissioners cannot
recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES R. CRANE,
HENRY C. KING.
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