


The Journal of Historical Review

Volume 16, Number 6

November / December 1997

Clash of the Titans



Pearl Harbor in History

James J. Martin

Claude Lanzmann and 'Shoah'

Serge Thion

Exonerating Pearl Harbor's Scapegoats

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Attention! Fascism!

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Lyndon Johnson and Israel

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Stalin's Plan to Conquer Europe

*Reviews by Joseph Bishop
and Daniel Michaels*

The Heart-warming, Infuriating, Informative, and Revisionist memoir that Dares to Tell the Truth About the Postwar Trials of the Germans

INNOCENT AT DACHAU

AMERICAN TEENAGER JOE HALOW was still a boy when he sailed to war-ravaged Germany in late 1946. The year he spent there, taking part in some of the most sensational of the war-crimes trials of the defeated Nazis, turned him into a man.

Innocent at Dachau is Joe Halow's account of his year in postwar Germany, above all his work as a court reporter during the U.S. Army courts-martial at Dachau. There Halow witnessed, recorded and transcribed some of the most gripping testimony from some of the most sensational trials of the postwar years: of SS guards from Buchenwald, Mauthausen, and Dora/Nordhausen; of the inmates who carried out their orders as kapos (prisoner trustees); and of German villagers who attacked and murdered downed American fliers in the last phase of the Allies' terrifying air war.

Armed with an ironclad faith in American righteousness when he arrived, young Halow soon saw the flaws and abuses in the trials: reliance on *ex post facto* law and broad conspiracy theories; abuse of prisoners during interrogation; and the shocking tolerance, even encouragement, of perjured testimony by concentration camp survivors. The teenaged American court reporter came to sympathize with the plight of the accused, particularly those convicted, sentenced or executed unjustly.

Innocent at Dachau is Joe Halow's story of his coming of age, of his loss of innocence in the Dachau courts. And it's the human drama of how he came to terms with his own anti-German feelings living and working in a Germany still heaped with rubble and ruled by the black market, in the shadow of the looming Iron Curtain and approaching Cold War.

Innocent at Dachau is also the story of how, four decades later, Joe Halow went back — back to the long-classified records of the Army's trials at Dachau where he found astounding confirmation from official sources of his own misgivings about the trials; and back to Germany for a moving visit with one of the German SS men Halow watched testify about his role at Nordhausen concentration camp.

Outspoken, informative, moving, *Innocent at Dachau* is a unique testimony to one American's quest for truth, understanding and honor, in a realm ruled even today

by shibboleth and taboo — a book that deserves to be read, and read again.

Joseph Halow was born and raised in Altoona, Pennsylvania. After a brief stint in the U.S. Army following World War II, during which he served in Peking, China, Mr. Halow served as a court reporter at the U.S. Army war crimes trials at Dachau. Mr. Halow has had a long career in the export-import business, during which he headed an association that promoted the exportation of American grain. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of The George Washington University, Joseph Halow is the author of numerous articles on agricultural affairs, as well as a book, *U.S. Grain: The Political Commodity*. He lives near Washington, D.C.

INNOCENT AT DACHAU

by Joseph Halow


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to one American's quest for truth, understanding and honor, in a realm ruled even today



TOP: The author at publisher's 1990 historical conference.

INSET: Germany, 1946: The author transcribing his courtroom "take" for the record.



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Reflections on the Origins and Consequences of the Pacific War

Pearl Harbor's Place in History

JAMES J. MARTIN

Throughout history there are spectacular and singular happenings of such dramatic circumstances that they seem to hang suspended in time, all other actions and proceedings halted at those moments as though frozen. In our recent past, two such events in particular seem to qualify for inclusion in such a category: the attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. One imagines these stunning occurrences as almost pendant backdrops to subsequent events as though incapable of being dispersed. Every time we once more see moving pictures of them we can imagine easily that the billowing smoke and the explosions at Pearl Harbor actually are still being experienced there, as we also can imagine the stupefying mushroom cloud and unbelievable dazzling light of the atomic shot over Hiroshima nearly four years later.

Journalism and pictured entertainment are heavily responsible for this illusion, as well as for draining them of relationship of all kinds, especially political, as though they were simply staged spectacles, following which the props were dismantled and carried off to be restructured for still another somewhere else to make us gasp in amazement and almost dazed prostration. Few are impressed with their consequences, and even fewer are made aware

James J. Martin graduated from the University of New Hampshire in 1942 and received his M.A. (1945) and Ph.D. (1949) degrees in history from the University of Michigan. His teaching career has spanned 25 years and involved residence at educational institutions from coast to coast. Dr. Martin's books have included the 1964 two-volume classic, *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941*, as well as *Beyond Pearl Harbor, The Man Who Invented 'Genocide': The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin*, and *An American Adventure in Book-burning in the Style of 1918*. He is also author of two collections of essays: *Revisionist Viewpoints* and *The Saga of Hog Island and Other Essays in Inconvenient History*. Dr. Martin has addressed six conferences of the Institute for Historical Review, including the first in 1979.

This essay is a slightly abridged and edited version of his introduction to *Beyond Pearl Harbor* (Little Current, Ont., Canada: Plowshare Press, 1981). It appears here by arrangement with the author.



Dr. James J. Martin in 1961

of their origins. It is easier by far to believe that such incredible affairs are indeed tableaux of massive design with intended assault on the senses so vast that there really is no reason for carrying any further rumination or speculation as to their real place in the history of our days.

Among those for whom the Pearl Harbor drama is not already as remote as Roncesvalles, research

continues and revelations are noted, genially ignored by the producers of pious puffs upholding the old fairy tales, as though everything had already been placed on the record by the circle and the elements with a vital stake in the preservation of Establishment veracity. Its fundamental plea is the claim of utter, total innocence of an impending attack upon American installations and fleet in Hawaii. Its attending corollaries are (1) complete ignoring of the nature of politics and war in Asia at the time in 1941, as though the Pearl Harbor affair was simply a mindless and isolated stunt, and (2) a similar blackout of the domestic scene in the weeks and then days prior to the attack, as though public communications lacked even the tiniest smidgen of attention to the likely consequences of the crisis of the fall of 1941.

While important new information on these matters has surfaced in the last 20 or so years, it might be mentioned that a respectable compendium of material, including accounts which actually picked Pearl Harbor as the site of the coming attack weeks before it happened, could be collected from American newspapers and magazines widely circulated late in 1941. These alone indicate that the wail of

innocence and outrage which promptly rose to the heavens on December 7, 1941, was spurious and misplaced.

Time magazine, with its immense readership, in its lamentably timed issue (December 8, 1941), gloated about the vast American and British war machine which was allegedly ready to spring on the Japanese, should they snap under President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "war of nerves" and "undeclared war," and react militarily. And Hallett Abend, a widely-read newspaper reporter on matters Japanese in those days, in his November 18, 1941, *Look* magazine article, "How the US Navy Will Fight Japan," which was exposed to a potential readership of about 12,000,000 Americans, included the following delicious morsel:

When the clash comes, the Japanese fleet will have to stay in home waters, to guard the islands of the [Japanese] Empire, against [US] naval raids. Our own fleet will cruise somewhere west of Hawaii, with scout planes far over the sea day and night to prevent surprise raids on the Pearl Harbor naval base or on our own West Coast cities.

The State Department, the War Department, and the Army Chief of Staff, the latter two responsible for the defense of both the base at Honolulu and the fleet when it was in the harbor, apparently were not among Abend's readers. But a veritable wheelbarrow full of similar journalism could easily be assembled, and those who were reading Abend and others writing in the above vein should not have affected a pose of surprise and shock over the events of that fateful Sunday 40 years ago. After all, *Time*, in its issue referred to above, had comfortably assured all that "Everyone was ready from Rangoon to Honolulu, every man was at battle stations." In view of this mass of contemporary literature of wide circulation expecting war at any time in those tense days, one may be led to wonder how the legend of treacherous "surprise attack" ever got off the ground.

But the response even now reflects a general viewpoint in harmony with the belief that we are dealing in the main with an isolated occurrence unrelated to Asian history or world affairs, and to be considered even now as a subjective event to be seen through the eyes of a politically ignorant sailor several decks down on an exploding ship or a housewife standing on a rooftop five miles from the embattled Base, describing the smoke and the noise of the explosions. And the editorial writers still produce copy which reads like contemporary indignant screeds. The gout of self-serving evasive and irrele-



Major American warships in "battleship row" at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, settle to the bottom following the Japanese attack on the morning of December 7, 1941.

vant wrath which boiled forth on the 40th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor bombing in the US press was a remarkable confirmation of the observation made nearly five centuries ago by the anonymous observer, in his four-word "review" of Poggio Bracciolini's lopsided partisan history of Florence ("good patriot, bad historian"), on how easy it still is to be simultaneously such a proper patriot and execrable historian. For most journalists it was simply another occasion to tie the past into contemporary opportunism and to use it to buttress current policy in one way or another.

So the usual two-level perception of reality continues, one prepared for the general public and quite another for the serious historical students. Essentially the former product comes under the heading of what George Orwell described as "prolefeed," casual diversionary trivia intended to mystify and mollify, while entertaining, the vast semi-informed populace. Little if any of the war that ensued is allowed to complicate the presented spectacle.

In the sense that modern war is first of all an industrial pitting of national production strengths the Pacific War represented two gigantic clusters of major industries in conflict. Nevertheless, the Japanese were wholly outclassed from the start in total size, capitalization, labor force, resources and general wherewithal. The remarkable thing is that the forces of Imperial Japan persisted so long. Though in eventual total and profound defeat, their overall performance was not lost on East Asians, and its impressiveness may never be forgotten by them, whatever devices may have been employed by their conquerors to make its conduct appear "immoral" and reprehensible (a maneuver that has been employed against the vanquished since antiquity).

The collapse of Euro-American colonialism, despite the "victory," was swift and drastic. Because its preservation was a major factor in American policy leading to the confrontation, we may begin here by noting a spectacular demise of a major war aim of the "victorious." The subsequent incredible industrial expansion of all the Far East and all the attendant changes of the last 40 years are integrally related to the course and outcome of that war. Japanese resurgence and their remarkable pressure in the industrial and commercial world today remind one of Lawrence Dennis' reflection on the "bloody futility of frustrating the strong." One may observe here that all this has seemingly taken place without any expenditure of blood at all. But the breaking of the impasse and logjam of the 1930s in the Pacific War was its presaging. Surely things could not have gone on that way very much longer; the war of 1941-45 simply detoured the course of events a few years.

There is little need to dwell upon "misunderstanding" and "lack of communication" as war causes, though these surely were abominably bad, no matter what angle one wants to pursue. Japan had a considerable exposure in the American press, almost all invidious, whether it emanated from patrician Ivy League Japanophobe political adversaries such as Henry L. Stimson, or from the Stalinist, Trotskyite and pro-Maoist columnists and reporters who proliferated in the papers and magazines, and political advisers of similar stripe who flourished behind the scenes. The latter seemed to be concerned more about future Chinese than Japanese affairs, but surely recognized that a Red China was out of the question until the Japanese had been driven from mainland Asia. So came years of malicious misrepresentation convincing Americans that the Japanese were utterly beyond the pale of respectability for their alleged limitless "militarism."

How tiny the funnel was through which actual Japanese information got to Americans was revealed after war was under way. Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress and one of the Roosevelt regime's principal propaganda chiefs, asserted that there were in his opinion only *three* non-Japanese in the entire USA at Pearl Harbor time with a real command of Japanese language. *Publishers Weekly* (September 26, 1942, p. 1192) suggested this was too small, and believed the number to be one hundred. But even this is a microscopically small percentage of a country then of about 132,000,000.

Unique among commentaries on Japan and its people was John Patric's *Yankee Hobo in the Orient*, issued originally by Doubleday in 1943 as *Why Japan Was Strong*. Its sympathetic and understanding portrait of the Japanese people must have

shocked many Americans, though overstated was his conclusion that most of what was wrong and undesirable about Japan was its Statism. Surely their version was an extremely muted form when compared with that of the USA's noble "ally," Soviet Russia, accentuated undoubtedly by the aggravated poverty of the 1930s decade, when Patric wandered about Japan almost at will. Material such as this, had it been widespread here in the decade before the war came about, might have had some modifying effect. (An absorbing summary of American misconceptions about the Japanese in the period ending about March 1941 can be found in Porter Sargent's *Getting US Into War* [Boston, 1941], "Prodding Japan Into War," pp. 525-545.)

But communication was not noticeably better on many other levels, including the diplomatic. Stimson, while Secretary of State under President Herbert C. Hoover, during the crisis of 1931-32 involving Japan in Manchuria and North China, utilized a novel device to cut down on "discourse" with the Japanese. According to the two anonymous journalists who wrote *High Low Washington* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1932, pp. 159-61), Stimson excluded all Japanese foreign correspondents from his press conferences in these times, presumably on the grounds that they lacked sufficient command of English to grasp the tortured writhings through which the Secretary of State sought to present American positions in his "agonizing acrobatics," as the authors, in attendance themselves, described the fumbling proceedings. (Stimson did far better later on as Roosevelt's Secretary of War, and was much clearer as to what he "meant" in 1940-1941, in particular.)

Under Roosevelt, and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, a few months later, the situation got no better, and, subsequently, much worse. The Japanese view that Japan was as entitled to a separate power position in Asia via a device approximating the Monroe Doctrine, behind which Roosevelt increasingly functioned in extending, ultimately, American power virtually to the western coast of Africa, was denounced in the pre-Pearl Harbor decade. The rigid unwillingness to recognize this obviously played a big part in bringing about war. Only now are we noticing attention to this matter which is sober and appreciative, not a distillation of snorts and catcalls, denunciation and ridicule. Some serious attention is due to the points made by Dr. Gerald K. Haines in his "American Myopia and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine," published in *Prologue: Journal of the National Archives* (Summer 1981, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 101-114).

If the Pearl Harbor story is still conducted on two levels, depending on the intelligence, general knowledge, sophistication and experience of the

Gerald Fleming's Distortions

How a Major Holocaust Historian Manipulates Facts

Gerald Fleming is an internationally prominent Holocaust historian who teaches history at the University of Surrey in England. In his widely-discussed 1984 book, *Hitler and the Final Solution*, he attempted to refute British historian David Irving's provocative contention that no documentary evidence exists to show that Hitler ordered the extermination of Europe's Jews, or even that he knew about any such policy or program.

Fleming's book received lavish media praise, although there were a few words of criticism. For example, a generally laudatory review in the *New York Times* (Dec. 28, 1984) nevertheless noted that Fleming's "sometimes flamboyant writing and the structure of his book as a kind of thriller will annoy some historians."

More to the point, the German-born English-Jewish historian failed conclusively to refute Irving's thesis. The best that Fleming could cite was something called the "Franke-Gricksch 'Resettlement Action Report'." However, in a detailed analysis published in the Fall 1991 *Journal of Historical Review* (pp. 261-279), Canadian scholar Brian A. Renk established that this document, which has no date or signature, contains demonstrable absurdities. He concluded that it is a postwar fabrication.

In 1993 newspapers around the world announced that Fleming had discovered in the Soviet archives proof of execution gas chambers at Auschwitz. In addition to articles about his discovery, Fleming himself reported on his findings in several articles. (See, for example, his piece, headlined "Engineers of Death," in the *New York Times*, July 18, 1993.) In fact, he was able only to cite portions of transcripts of *postwar* Soviet military interrogations of four German engineers.

In 1994 Fleming collaborated with architect Robert Jan van Pelt on a documentary film, "Blueprints of Genocide," which was broadcast in Britain on the BBC "Horizon" program, May 9, 1994, and in the United States on the NPR "Nova" program, February 7, 1995. During a dramatic high point of the broadcast, van Pelt is shown holding a document while stating: "It says very clearly, 'You will be able to kill and you will be able to burn simultaneously in this building [Crematory II]'"

This document, which is not shown to viewers, is actually a simple memorandum of January 29, 1942, not even marked "Secret," about ... electricity supply. It mentions "burning [cremation] with simultaneous special treatment" ("*Verbrennung mit*

gleichzeitiger Sonderbehandlung"). Fleming deceitfully reversed the word order, and rendered "*Sonderbehandlung*" as "kill."

Commenting on this misrepresentation, Robert Faurisson has written that "the word '*Sonderbehandlung*' could mean, by its place in the phrase, anything *except* to kill because this 'special treatment' was *simultaneous* with burning." Moreover, as Faurisson further noted, it is obvious that if Fleming, or anyone, had actually discovered a wartime German document that clearly says what Holocaust historians have been seeking for decades, it would be publicized everywhere as a discovery of the greatest historical importance. (See: R. Faurisson, "A KGB Novelist: Gerald Fleming," *Adelaide Institute online newsletter* [Australia], Dec. 1996, pp. 23-25.)

Over the years, Fleming has maintained correspondence with revisionist researchers in different countries. For example, the full text of his handwritten letter of April 3, 1991, to the editor of the *Journal of Historical Review* was published in the Fall 1991 issue (pp. 375-378), along with a response by Mark Weber. More recently, Fleming wrote a handwritten letter of April 25, 1996, to Institute Director Weber. These two letters show how Fleming deals with facts and historical evidence.

Here is the complete text of Fleming's April 1996 letter, along with Weber's reply of July 26, 1996 (to which Fleming did not respond).

Gerald Fleming
University of Surrey
re: The Rudolf Report / "Cromwell Press" 1993
Author: Germar Scheerer (formerly Rudolf)
'Strafsache gegen Volksverhetzung u.a. /
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Stuttgart / 4. 4. 96'
25 / IV / 96

Dear Sir,

I note your Institute is still distributing the 'Rudolf Report,' which refers to some of my research in foreign archives on page 107-108. In view of the fact that the information given is utter nonsense, and since the sentence passed on the author of this report by the Landgericht Stuttgart on the 23 June 1995 has been confirmed by the Federal German Supreme Court, I am writing to you to let you know, - since you may well be unaware of this fact, - that the printer of this report, who is known to the authorities, gave a written formal undertaking at the beginning of March 1994, in which he undertook not to print this report again and to

destroy any copies at that time still on his premises.

It is indeed in the printer's interest that the 'Rudolf Report,' which has led to a fourteen months' prison sentence against its author, and the printing and distribution of which is an actionable offence, should not be available in any shape or form to potential readers, since it could leave the printer and distributor open to charges.

Yours sincerely,
Gerald Fleming

INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

P.O. Box 2739, Newport Beach, CA 92659

Fri., 26 July 1996

Gerald Fleming
University of Surrey
Dept. of Linguistic
and International Studies
Guildford, Surrey GU2 5XH
England - U.K.

Dear Dr. Fleming,

Thank you for your handwritten letter of 25 April, in which you advise us not to distribute The Rudolf Report. Please pardon this tardy response.

After receiving your letter, we contacted Anthony Hancock, director of Wilson Press (The Print Factory), the English publisher of the Report. He gave us a different view of the facts. What happened, according to Hancock, is this:

Degussa, a German chemical corporation, had been concerned because the original edition of The Rudolf Report contained a single-line acknowledgment by the author expressing thanks to "Degussa AG for providing information material about Prussian Blue (trade name Vossen-Blau)." Fearful of being associated, even so tenuously, with this publication, Degussa complained to the English publisher. In a letter to Hancock, the London law firm representing Degussa stated that the Report's contents are illegal in Germany, and that the author's passing mention of the company in the first edition "has had serious adverse consequences for Degussa's business, not only in Germany but also in the United States and Israel."

On March 30, 1994, Hancock and Degussa concluded a written agreement, a copy of which Hancock sent to us. In return for a pledge by Degussa that it *would not* bring legal proceedings against him, Hancock agreed to refrain from mentioning Degussa in any future editions of the Report, and to destroy all existing copies of the Report with the word "Degussa."

Contrary to what you suggested to me, Hancock did not agree to halt all publication of The Rudolf Report.

Your objections to the Report might be more convincing if Germar Rudolf were the only independent investigator to conclude that the supposed gas cham-

ber facilities in Auschwitz and Birkenau were not used, and could not have been used, for killing prisoners as alleged. As you must know, at the time he wrote it, Rudolf was a certified chemist working at the renowned Max Planck research center, as well as a doctoral candidate at the University of Stuttgart. He wrote his detailed Report on the basis of an on-site investigation, chemical analysis of samples, and meticulous research.

Rudolf reached essentially the same conclusion as had American gas chamber specialist Fred Leuchter in his 1988 forensic investigation of the alleged gas chambers of Auschwitz and Birkenau. You may also be aware that as a result of Leuchter's findings, the Institute of Forensic Research in Krakow conducted a partial investigation, and that its forensic analysis, given in a confidential September 1990 report, corroborated Leuchter's findings. (This report was published in the Summer 1991 Journal of Historical Review). Moreover, Austrian engineer Walter Lüftl explicitly endorsed Leuchter's findings in a detailed March 1992 report (published in the Winter 1992-93 Journal), and German engineer Wolfgang Schuster and American research chemist William Lindsey reached conclusions similar to those of Leuchter and Rudolf.

If these researchers are wrong, it should not be difficult to demonstrate their error. Everyone should welcome an impartial, thorough forensic examination of all the evidence by an international team of independent scholars, engineers and historians. As it is, courageous skeptics are routinely subjected to threats, smears, physical violence, arrest and legal persecution. In Germany, France, Austria, Israel and a few other countries, it is a crime to dispute the official version of Holocaust history. Leuchter's career has been destroyed, and Rudolf has been sentenced to 14 months imprisonment.

The vicious nature of the campaign against those who call into question aspects of the Holocaust extermination story implicitly supports the merit of their findings. What kind truth is it that must be defended with threats of arrest, fines and imprisonment?

I am disappointed that you seek to bolster your position by citing the legal persecution of researchers and historians who have reached conclusions at odds with the official Holocaust story. Indeed, you audaciously seek to enlist our cooperation in suppressing Rudolf's Report, citing a transparently false concern for the best interests of the printer and distributor. As a scholar, your duty should be to join with us in protesting against this outrageous campaign against free speech and open scholarly inquiry, and to defend victims such as Germar Rudolf.

Sincerely,
s / Mark Weber
Director

Attention! Fascism in the Furniture Store!

JAROSLAW ZADENCKI

One of the great social-cultural plagues of our time is the universally spread opportunism of the educated classes known as *Political Correctness*. It proclaims itself a brave and uncompromising defender of freedom of speech, and an equally fervent enemy of all forms of censorship. While this would be entirely admirable, in reality this freedom is limited to itself.

While one is free to promulgate an unrestricted freedom of expression everywhere, problems arise when it comes to basic, day-to-day tolerance for dissenting views. These same people who claim to so cherish freedom see fit to castigate any utterance not in accord with their own interpretation of freedom.

These PC arbiters have authority to determine what is true and what is false, what is good and what is evil, what is just and what is not. And, as is so often the case, it just happens that their ideological fanaticism splendidly coincides with their secular self-interest.

It's not much of an exaggeration to say that this new priestly class, heavy with privileges but lacking accountability, is one of our greatest contemporary problems, and that bringing to an end its monopoly on identifying and framing issues is one of the most pressing political-intellectual challenges of our time.

For whoever has a monopoly in determining who is an enemy and who is a friend — and especially who does so in a ruthless, aggressive, and fanatic manner — effectively has a monopoly on power. Thus, the "Political Correctness" issue is, in the fullest meaning of the word, a political one.

In the linguistic arsenal of its adherents, you will find words or terms that not only confuse and confound reality, but also morally disarm adversaries. These terms are not meant to describe reality as it is. Instead, their basic purpose is to produce a certain intellectual and emotional aura, generate an

atmosphere of horror, conjure up a ever-lurking threat and danger, and create an atmosphere of uncertainty and existential fear. Europeans are being scared by mighty and influential persons whose power is based exclusively on socio-technical propaganda manipulation of the masses.

People are encouraged to fear things that are neither specific nor tangible, but simply to be frightened in general — metaphysically, so to speak — and to be fearful not merely of others, but even of themselves.

For the "enlightened" and "liberated" European, Political Correctness has gradually come to dictate an imperative duty: to be permanently on the alert for enemies and saboteurs, as well as to overcome one's own superstitions.

The basic method employed in this ultimate of causes is the simple, propagandistic formula of "guilt by association."

One might assume that after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Europe, people in both the East and the West would finally breathe freely. With the end of the nightmare, it's time for some cheerfulness and optimism.

Not so. The good citizen of Europe discovers with a shock while reading newspapers, watching TV, and listening to the radio that, according to society's opinion-molding circles, the enemy has not only not vanished, he is fully awake, ever ready to threaten our democratic, civil liberties.

But just who is this horrible monster? Well, he's not hard to find because he is identified by many different and familiar labels. He appears in the guise of: populism, nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, right-wing extremism, religious fundamentalism, neo-Nazism, and zoological anti-Communism — in short, *fascism*.

So, these days fascism is again on everybody's lips. Revived, it once again enjoys a dazzling career. "Fascism will never vanish," thunders the international mass media. It's nothing less, we learn, than the danger we had been told was annihilated half a century ago. The fascism we smashed to bits during the Second World War, and which is supposed to have rotted away over the past several decades, today poses the greatest and most imminent danger to all the nations and people of Europe. And today,

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we are constantly told, combatting fascism is not only an ever more urgent necessity, but also the moral duty of all people of good will.

As the memory of Communism recedes ever further into the past, the greater grows the anti-fascist hysteria. People take to the streets to demonstrate their hatred against those who hate. Intellectuals gather to express their intolerance of intolerance. Politicians call for decisive new laws to combat the danger. Lawyers vie with each other in finding new ways to lock up the enemies of an open society. The moral authorities proclaim, *urbi et orbi*: no freedom for the enemies of freedom!

As it turns out, the enemy is *everywhere* — he lurks around every corner, and behind every bush. He may take a shape of an 80-year-old neighbor or a close friend. And new reports keep arriving: in France, Jean-Marie Le Pen and his followers murder Arabs and overturn Jewish grave stones. In reunited Germany, Franz Schönhuber revives the Waffen SS, while in Italy Gianfranco Fini uses brute force to keep the trains running punctually. Saddam Hussein plants bombs in New York City, and in Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskiy threatens to soak his feet in the Indian Ocean. In Austria Jörg Haider engages in ethnic cleansing, while from Iran the Ayatollah Khomeini (although reportedly dead) is still hunting the writer Salman Rushdie. In the United States Pat Buchanan protects criminal Hitlerites, and in Poland Fr. Rydzyk (a traditionalist radio priest, something like Fr. Coughlin) is shaving the heads of libertine parliamentary deputies. In France the philosopher Roger Garaudy insults the memory of millions of victims of racist genocide, and in Sweden Count Wachtmeister sets fire to mosques. Look out! *Fascism!*

The decent citizen — our Kowalski, Schmidt, Dubois or Svenson — is shocked and terrified. Phantoms of the past rise from their graves to humiliate, torture and murder. Something must be done, and immediately. Demonstrate, protest, act to repel the forces of evil and violence! Don't wait a minute, tomorrow may be too late.

Our decent European is just about to grab a club from his basement, along with a banner proclaiming "Long live freedom!", on his way to a street protest to express his boundless contempt for people who hold other people in contempt, when all of a sudden — as if struck by lightning — he comes to his senses.

He looks around furtively, observing with suspicion. He talks with his family and friends, his neighbors and colleagues, and even strangers in the coffee shop and bar, and ... what?

Nothing. He can't locate a real fascist. Well, he has heard of an eccentric poet in Warsaw, Brzóska-Brzoskiewicz, who goes around in a Gestapo uniform, and some months ago he saw a young fellow

running in the street wearing tall leather boots and a strange leather jacket, but, frankly, he was rather more frightened by the rowdy and disheveled fellows who were chasing after him.

And so, our decent German, Frenchman, Swede or Pole lightheartedly turns his back on the world of Orwellian language, surrealism, hysteria and uproar, happy to return to reality. He once again enjoys nature, and he treats stupidity with indulgence and humor. He reads only periodicals of small circulation, while on TV he watches only soccer games. He enjoys art and music, but preferably from before 1918.

And he no longer confuses idealism with fanaticism or fundamentalism, nor a radical critique of the ruling class with populism, national pride with right-wing extremism, a strict immigration policy with racism, or controversial historical research with incitement against minority nationalities.

Above all, he is no longer afraid of "fascism," because he realizes that nowadays this notion is no longer used to describe a (possibly) dangerous ideological phenomenon, but instead is used, with rather obvious intent, to morally discredit political adversaries.

In late 1995 a sensational news item appeared in newspapers around the world. The Anti-Defamation League, based in New York, demanded \$200,000 restitution, an apology, and public repentance from IKEA, the Swedish-based international furniture chain store. According to the ADL, IKEA had some dangerous (but not clearly specified) fascist ties in the past. The ADL also threatened that if IKEA failed to accept its demands, it would proclaim a boycott of IKEA across the United States, where the company has many stores.

People wondered: what motivated this organization to take such high-profile action against a furniture company? Had the IKEA company employed slave labor or supported the German armaments industry during the last war? Not at all. As it turns out, the reason for this action by the American defenders of dignity and honor is this: during the late 1940s and early 50s, the founder and owner of the IKEA, Swedish entrepreneur Ingvar Kamprad, while he was a student in Malmö, Sweden, attended lectures of Per Engdahl, the leader of a minuscule rightist party, "The New Swedish Movement," which before the war did not hide its fascist sympathies. At that time Kamprad also wrote two letters to Engdahl, in which he expressed his interest in corporatism and admiration for Engdahl's intellect. Forty-five years later, these letters found their way into the hands of reporters, who did not hesitate to use them accordingly. And that's what the entire IKEA "fascism" scandal amounted to.

In December 1995, Ingvar Kamprad publicly repented for the sins of his youth, and his company paid the money demanded by the Anti-Defamation League. So, 50 years after the end of the Second World War, fascism suffered yet another stunning defeat — this time not on the battle field but in a furniture store.

Wartime Bombings of Neutral Switzerland

JOACHIM HOFFMANN

For some time now it has become common to beat up on prototypically democratic Switzerland in a sometimes unfriendly and occasionally almost hateful way. Apparently this is being done for political motives.

To this end, certain regrettable events during the Second World War are strongly emphasized, without in all fairness mentioning the difficult circumstances under which the Swiss Confederation had to maintain its neutrality and sovereignty toward not only the Axis powers, and especially Germany, but also toward the western Allies.

Above all the United States, which is in the forefront of the accusatory critics, should permit itself to be reminded of the great extent to which, for years, it violated Swiss neutrality. From 1943 onwards American war planes flew at will over the neutral country, sometimes in flight formations, in attacks on targets in the German Reich.

Time and again they also carried out offensive operations against Swiss territory. Thus, on April 1, 1944, Schaffhausen was the victim of an intense American air attack, with considerable human losses and heavy destruction of property. Passenger and freight rail cars, viaducts and train stations were also repeatedly bombed or fired upon, such as in Chiasso and Basel, resulting in numerous fatalities and extensive material damage. On February 22, 1945, alone 18 Swiss lost their lives, and 50 were wounded, some severely, in American bombing attacks and air raids on the northern part of the country.

In the aftermath of the American air attacks on Basel and Zürich on March 5, 1945, which once

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again caused considerable human losses and material damage, the government in Washington was notified in a strongly worded protest of the routine flouting of Swiss neutrality, and of the steadily increasing number of border violations, and that such bombings were intolerable. The situation had become so tense that Washington directed the supreme commander of the United States Army Air Force in Europe, General Spaatz, and his chief of staff, to go to Bern [the Swiss capital] in person to apologize and promise reform.

Among the various US airplanes that came down on Swiss territory were no fewer than 160 large four-motor B-17 "flying fortress" bombers and B-24 "Liberators," either because the crews wanted to avoid being taken prisoner in Germany, or were deserters who simply wanted to get out of military service, or because they were forced to land or were shot down by Swiss flyers or air defense forces.

War planes of other countries also repeatedly carried out offensive operations against Switzerland, including, on a large scale, by the British Royal Air Force, and also, not so seriously but still considerable, by the German Luftwaffe, and even on occasion by French planes.

However, none of the nations at war so massively and continuously challenged Swiss neutrality, and caused such great loss of life and destruction of property, as the bombers and fighter planes of the United States air force.



'Holocaust Pressure Groups Shut Down Japan's *Marco Polo* Magazine,' a 30-page IHR Special Report, is available from the Institute for \$20.

This important supplement to the feature article in the March-April 1995 *Journal* includes a translation of Dr. Nishioka's headline-making *Marco Polo* article, facsimile copies of numerous reports from American and Japanese English-language newspapers on the Marco Polo furor, and more.

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Revisionist Perspectives on Zionist History

RACHELLE MARSHALL

Every country has its myths — stories that may have no basis in fact but nevertheless serve as vital sources of national unity and strength. What sets the state of Israel apart is that its myths have become accepted as history, not only in Israel, but in *much of* the rest of the world as well. Thanks to the astuteness of Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, and his successors, the conventional view today is that the modern state of Israel was the creation of a heroic and beleaguered people who fled persecution in Europe and, rejected everywhere else, sought refuge in the land that had been historically theirs.

There they were attacked, the mythology relates, first by local terrorists jealous of their success in making the desert bloom, and then by the powerful armies of surrounding Arab states. Against overwhelming odds, outnumbered Jewish soldiers fought off an enemy bent on their annihilation, and the Jewish people survived to build a thriving democracy on what had been an unpopulated wasteland. Ever since, the legend concludes, the tiny nation has been under siege by 100 million Arabs dedicated to its destruction.

Because the myth of Israel's birth was so closely linked to the horrors of the Holocaust, to question its truth was for years as unthinkable as doubting the truth of the Holocaust itself. But today a new breed of historians is challenging much of that myth. Palestinian and other Arab scholars, Western Middle East specialists, and non-Zionist Jews such as Elmer Berger, Alfred Lilienthal, and Norman Finkelstein have already published well-documented refutations of the official version of Israel's history. The current debunking process, however, is being carried out for the first time by Israeli Jews — a younger generation of historians with impeccable credentials as Zionists, patriotic Israelis and scholars.

Much of their research was made possible by the

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opening in 1978 of files from the British Public Record and the Israeli State Archives that had been kept closed for 30 years. The information contained in these files, combined with the research of Palestinian historians, has enabled Israeli scholars to present a new perspective on the origins of a conflict that after 60 years shows no signs of abating. A significant aspect of their work is that it reveals the remarkable consistency of Israeli policy throughout those years and the use by successive Israeli leaders of the same strategies and deceptions to achieve their goals.

Benny Morris was among the first of the younger Israeli scholars to receive widespread notice when he refuted Ben Gurion's long-accepted assertion that the Palestinian refugees of 1947-48 left Palestine at the instruction of Arab leaders. According to Ben-Gurion, "they did so under the assumption that the invasion of Arab armies at the expiration of the mandate will destroy the Jewish state and push all the Jews into the sea, dead or alive." In *The Birth of the Palestine Refugee Problem*, published in 1988, Morris concluded that Arab leaders had not urged the local population to leave but that the exodus was mainly the result of attacks by the official Jewish army, the Haganah, and the Irgun, a militia headed by Menachem Begin that had carried out assassinations and bombings against both the British and the Palestinians during the British mandate.

Morris also discounted the claim that the 1950s were years of Arab terrorism against Israel. In many cases, he found, the "terrorists" were simply dispossessed Palestinian farmers who had sneaked back across the border in an attempt to harvest some of their crops. Morris and other Israeli historians believe that Israel's military raids during those years were the main cause of continued violence and hostility.

'Plan D'

Although Morris does not believe it was official Jewish policy to carry out massacres and other atrocities against Palestinians in the process of achieving statehood, other scholars cite the leadership's Plan Dalet, or Plan D, as evidence that the Jews were determined to expel the Palestinians from as much territory as possible and by whatever

means necessary. A recent book by Ilan Pappé, associate professor of Middle East history at the University of Haifa, emphasizes the importance of Plan D in the creation of Israel. In *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, Pappé writes that the Jewish army formally adopted the plan in early 1948 after Arabs protested a United Nations partition proposal that allocated to the Palestinians only 38 percent of mandatory Palestine although they made up more than 65 percent of the population.

Under Plan D, once the British authorities were out of the way, Jewish fighters would treat all of Palestine as a no-man's land and seize any Arab village or town from which an attack on Jews was launched. But officials of the Jewish Agency's Land Department, which was headed by a close ally of Ben-Gurion, chose to ignore the difference between friendly and hostile villages and encouraged local commanders to evacuate Arabs wherever there was fertile land. Jewish forces also attacked villages that lay along strategic routes, such as Deir Yassin, where on April 9, 1948, the Irgun slaughtered more than 250 men, women, and children. After Deir Yassin, frightened Palestinians fled in even greater numbers. From April 1, 1948, to the end of the war, Pappé writes, "Jewish operations were guided by the desire to occupy the greatest possible portion of Palestine."

Early 'Facts on the Ground'

Plan D was the first concerted attempt by the Israelis to preempt future negotiations by using force to create "facts on the ground." It is a strategy that Israel has pursued to this day, when almost every week brings the announcement of additional confiscation of Palestinian land. Between 1947 and 1951, Israel's drive to expand resulted in the replacement of the Palestinian majority by Jewish immigrants from all over the world, the obliteration of more than 400 Palestinian villages, and the permanent homelessness and impoverishment of nearly a million people. What Israelis call "an exchange of populations" was for the Palestinians a calamity.

Israel's apologists blame the Palestinians' misfortune on their opposition to partition, and especially to a Jewish state. If the Arabs chose to fight rather than share, then Israel would also fight — and take enough territory to insure its future security. But Pappé describes a more complex situation, in which blame is shared several ways.

First, US determination to control deliberations on Palestine resulted in the appointment to the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) of "inexperienced members From all parts of the world who had very little prior knowledge, if any, of the regional situation." Consequently, Pappé goes on,

"they proposed a Jewish state where half the population would be Arab." Like the rest of the world, members of UNSCOP were strongly influenced by their sympathy for the victims of the Holocaust, whose plight they had witnessed during a tour of Europe's displaced persons camps. In 1947 when the US refused to admit a substantial number of Jewish DPs, a Jewish state seemed the only solution.

Pappé blames the Arab leadership for diplomatic and political incompetence. While the Jews appeared willing to compromise, members of the Arab Higher Committee, representing the Palestinians, refused even to meet with UNSCOP. They insisted on an Arab state in all of Palestine, with no Jewish political participation or further immigration. Unlike the Jews, who by 1948 had an infrastructure already in place, the Arab leaders made no plans for transition to statehood. In fact, according to Pappé, by late 1947 only one member of the Arab Higher Committee was in Palestine. The others had fled at the prospect of fighting.

The scattered, though sometimes punishing, attacks on Jewish settlements by Palestinian irregulars provided the excuse for the Jewish army to proceed with what Pappé calls the "uprooting, expulsion, and pauperization of the Palestinians, with the clear purpose of taking firm control over Western Palestine." Israel's expansion into territory designated for the Palestinians precipitated the Arab invasion of May 1948. Contrary to myth, that invasion never threatened Israel's survival. Each side had roughly the same number of troops to begin with, but Israel's army was far better trained and equipped. Pappé writes that the weak and disunited Arab leaders had launched the invasion reluctantly, forced to act by popular pressure instigated largely by their political opponents. By July 1948 the Arab armies totaled 46,800; Israel's army was twice as large.

A chief obstacle to the Arab cause was the fact that King Abdullah of Jordan was playing a double game. While posing to the Arab world as an anti-Zionist, he was at the same time secretly conspiring with Jewish leaders to divide up Palestine. In November 1947 Abdullah met with Jewish Agency representative Golda Meir and agreed not to attack Israel in return for Israel's acquiescence to Transjordan's annexation of the West Bank. Abdullah's crack Arab Legion did fight the Jewish army in Jerusalem, but elsewhere he kept to the agreement. The remaining Arab armies from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were ultimately no match for Israeli forces, so that by 1949 Israel occupied all of mandatory Palestine except for East Jerusalem and the West Bank, which were taken over by Transjordan.

By razing Palestinian villages to the ground in

advance of boundary negotiations, Jewish leaders planned to cement the future state's hold on captured Palestinian territory and make it impossible for the inhabitants to return. Ben-Gurion's other strategy was to enter peace talks with the determination not to yield on any important issue — an Israeli approach to negotiations that since has become familiar.

The last chance for a negotiated peace between the two sides was the Lausanne Conference, which opened in April 1949 and fizzled to a close the following September — leaving Israel in full possession of the territory it had captured and the Palestinians in permanent exile. Hopes rose briefly at the beginning, when both sides agreed to a two-part protocol, calling for recognition of the UN partition plan as a basis for negotiations, and for acceptance of the right of Palestinian refugees to return. Pappé points out that in accepting partition, the Arabs in effect recognized the state of Israel. But Ben-Gurion had no intention of yielding any territory or allowing the Palestinians to return. Israel's application for membership in the UN was scheduled to be voted on in May and the State Department had hinted there might be difficulties if Israel did not sign. Israel did sign, but shortly after the UN vote, the Israeli delegation in Lausanne reneged on the agreement by refusing to discuss the refugee question until a number of other issues had been resolved, and by demanding that the Arab leaders formally recognize Israel. The US representative at Lausanne, Mark Etheridge, was convinced that Israel had signed the protocol solely to gain admission to the United Nations. More than 40 years later Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir adopted the same tactic when he agreed in Madrid to enter Middle East peace talks while secretly intending, as he later admitted, to drag them out indefinitely.

Pappé describes the Arab delegates at Lausanne as disunited and inconsistent, but despite the persistent myth that they wanted only to push Israel into the sea, he concludes that “there were indeed Arab leaders who sought peace with Israel.” The Arabs had come to Lausanne with two objectives, reviving the partition resolution and securing repatriation of the refugees, but by the summer of 1949 Israel had greater priorities than peace. When Syria's military ruler Husni Zaim proposed that he and Ben-Gurion meet personally to discuss a possible peace treaty, Ben-Gurion rejected the offer despite the advice of his foreign minister, Moshe Sharrett. Zaim was shortly afterward overthrown. When Sharrett suggested that Israel accept the return of as few as 75,000 Palestinians, Ben-Gurion refused even that concession.

The failure of the Lausanne Conference left Israel in possession of the Negev as well as the Gali-

lee, with the rest of the world's tacit acceptance. Although members of the Truman administration viewed Israel's actions during 1947-48 as obstructive of long-term peace in the region, the US exerted only minimal pressure on the new Jewish state. The reason has since become familiar: in 1948 Truman was in a close election race with Thomas E. Dewey of New York and he desperately needed support from the traditionally Democratic Jewish community. When Dewey accused Truman of undermining Israel's security by supporting a peace plan by UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte that would have given the Galilee to Israel and the Negev to the Palestinians, Truman withdrew his endorsement of the plan and never again wavered in his support for Israel.

Since then the only US president who has dared to challenge Israel was Dwight D. Eisenhower, who used the threat of economic sanctions to force Israel back from its invasion of the Sinai in 1956. In 1990 George Bush opposed a US guarantee of \$10 billion in loans to Israel without a promise that Israel would build no more settlements in the occupied territories, but he gave in when Yitzhak Rabin became prime minister.

During the 1996 American presidential election campaign, candidates of both parties behaved as if they were running for office in Israel: President Clinton ordered a US veto of an otherwise unanimous UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel's seizure of 134 acres of Arab-owned land; Senator Bob Dole, who in 1990 opposed a Senate resolution declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel, in May 1995 introduced a bill to move the US embassy to Jerusalem.

The Republican majority in Congress voted to slash funds for disabled children and reduce foreign aid by 15 percent, but preserved every penny of US aid to Israel. There was not a murmur from Washington as the Israeli government talked of peace while swallowing up more and more Palestinian land in violation of international law as well as the Oslo Agreement.

In addition to highlighting the continuity of Israeli policy and tactics over nearly 50 years, Pappé's book also provides insight into why the Palestinian cause failed for so long. At every stage of the conflict, between 1947 and 1951, the Palestinians relied on outsiders for help. But then as now, at each crucial point those presumed allies — whether the Arab leadership, the US, or the UN — had more urgent priorities. The success of the intifada in forcing the Israelis into at least a semblance of negotiations is evidence of how effective Palestinian action can be.

More convincing evidence came on May 22, 1995, when the five Arab members of the Knesset were

able to halt Israel's latest land grab in Jerusalem. By shrewdly threatening Rabin with a no-confidence vote they knew the right-wing Likud would support, they forced him to suspend the seizure. Afterward one of the Arab members, Mohammed Baraka, exulted: "What the Security Council could not succeed in doing, and what the Arab League could not do, we did!" Supporters of a long-overdue peace in the Middle East can only hope Baraka's statement is a portent of the future, and that the Palestinians, while welcoming outside help, ultimately will rely on no one but themselves.

Hundreds Check Out IHR Material Daily Acclaimed Internet Web Site Offers Worldwide Access to Revisionism

Through his personal Internet web site, *Journal* associate editor Greg Raven makes available an impressive selection of material from the Institute for Historical Review, including dozens of IHR *Journal* articles and reviews.

An independent service that impartially reviews and rates web sites has given the site a positive rating. In the summer of 1996, Gale Research posted on the "Cyberhound" web site a rating for Raven's site of three stars (out of a possible four). It also praised the site for its "strong content that has been endorsed by other publications."

The laudatory rating predictably prompted complaints. Laura B. Cohen, a network services librarian at the University of Albany (New York), voiced the most heated objections, calling the IHR's *Journal* "a notoriously racist publication." In response to such protests, Gale Research lowered its rating of Raven's site, and revised its description to include the warning: "The authoritativeness of the [IHR] journal has been widely denounced."

Global interest in Raven's web site remains strong. Between August 1 and November 13, 1997, an average of 700 persons in countries around the world visited Raven's site every day — with a total of 73,422 visits or "hits" during this period. In recent weeks the site has been receiving as many as 3,000 visits per day.

During this 105-day period, visitors to the site retrieved or transferred more than a million kilobytes of information altogether. On recent peak days, visitors have been retrieving some 30 megabytes of revisionist information daily, or the equivalent of some 21 million pages of double-spaced

typewritten text.

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For Our Posterity

"Our Fathers in a wondrous age,
Ere yet the Earth was small,
Ensured to us an heritage,
And doubted not at all
That we, the children of their heart,
Which then did beat so high,
In later times should play like part
For our posterity.

....

"Then, fretful, murmur not they gave
So great a charge to keep,
Nor dream that awestruck Time shall save
Their labor while we sleep.
Dear-bought and clear, a thousand year
Our fathers' title runs.
Make we likewise their sacrifice,
Defrauding not our sons."

— Rudyard Kipling, "The Heritage," 1905.

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Lyndon Johnson Was First to Align US Policy With Israel's

DONALD NEFF

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963. While a traumatized nation grieved for its youngest president, he was succeeded by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was to become the most pro-Israel president up to that time. A sea change was about to take place in America's relations with Israel.

Johnson was quick to declare his support for the Jewish state. Shortly after being sworn in as president, Johnson reportedly remarked to an Israeli diplomat: "You have lost a very great friend, but you have found a better one." Commented Isaiah L. Kenen, one of the most effective lobbyists for Israel in Washington: "... I would say that everything he did as president supported that statement."¹

Up to Johnson's presidency, no administration had been as completely pro-Israel and anti-Arab as his. Harry S Truman, while remembered as a warm friend of Israel, was more interested in his own election than Israel's fate. After winning office on his own in 1948 with the support of the Jewish vote, he seemed to lose interest in the Jewish state.² Dwight D. Eisenhower was distinctly cool toward Israel, seeing it as a major irritant in America's relations with the Arab world and US access to oil. There were no powerful partisans of Israel in his administration, and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, was a frequent critic of Israel.

Kennedy was considerably warmer toward the Jewish state and became the first president to begin providing major weapons to it, breaking an embargo in place since 1947.³ Yet he valued the US position in the Arab world, particularly with Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and as a result maintained a fairly even-handed policy despite having a number of pro-Israel officials in his administration.

All this changed dramatically under Johnson. Not only was he personally a strong supporter of the Jewish state but he had a number of high officials, advisers and friends who shared his view. These included officials within the administration such as McGeorge Bundy, Clark Clifford, Arthur Goldberg, Harry McPherson, John Roche, the Rostow broth-

ers, Walt and Eugene, and Ben Wattenberg. These officials occupied such high offices as the ambassador to the United Nations, the head of the National Security Council, and the number two post at the State Department. They were assiduous in putting forward Israel's interests in such memoranda as "What We Have Done for Israel"⁴ and "New Things We Might Do in Israel"⁵ and "How We Have Helped Israel."⁶

The president was repeatedly urged by Israel's supporters to embrace Israeli policy, give the Jewish state increased aid, and distance America from the Arab world. So pervasive was the *influence* of Israel's supporters during Johnson's tenure that CIA Director Richard Helms believed there was no important US secret affecting Israel that the Israeli government did not know about in this period.⁷

So closely allied were US and Israeli interests in the mind of "Mac" Bundy, the special coordinator of Middle East policy during the 1967 war, that he once sought to buttress a recommendation to Johnson by remarking: "This is good LBJ doctrine and good Israeli doctrine, and therefore a good doctrine to get out in public."⁸ When initial war reports showed Israel making dramatic gains and several officials in the State Department Operations Room outwardly showed satisfaction, Undersecretary of State Gene Rostow turned to them with a broad smile on his face and said ironically: "Gentlemen, gentlemen, do not forget we are neutral in word, thought and deed."⁹ In the State Department's summary of the start of the war, Rostow's brother, Walt, the national security adviser, wrote on a covering letter to Johnson: "Herewith the account, with a map, of the first day's turkey shoot."¹⁰

Beyond the administration's supporters of Israel, one of Johnson's closest informal advisers was Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, another warm friend of Israel's. Two of Johnson's closest outside advisers were Abraham Feinberg and Arthur B. Krim, both strong supporters of Israel. Feinberg was president of the American Bank & Trust Company of New York and the man whose "activities started a process of systematic fund-raising for politics [in the late 1940s] that has made Jews the most conspicuous fund-raisers and contributors to the Democratic Party," according to a study by Stephen D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics*. Johnson routinely consulted Feinberg on Middle East policy.

Vocal Supporters of Israel

Feinberg was a vocal supporter of increased aid to Israel. Although an American, Feinberg at various times owned the Coca-Cola franchise in Israel and was a part-owner of the Jerusalem Hilton Hotel. When his bank fell into trouble in the 1970s and two of its officers were convicted of misappro-

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propriating funds, the Israeli Bank Leumi Company, in a generous act of reverse aid, purchased Feinberg's American Bank & Trust Company.¹¹

Arthur Krim was president of United Artists Corporation of Hollywood, a New York attorney and another major Democratic fund-raiser. He served as chairman of the Democratic National Party Finance Committee and chairman of the President's Club of New York, the most potent source of Johnson's campaign funds. Krim was married to a physician, Mathilde, who in her youth had briefly served as an agent for the Irgun, the Jewish terrorist group led by Menachem Begin.

The Krims were so close to Johnson that they built a vacation house near his Texas ranch to be close to him on long weekends and were regular guests at the White House. Mathilde Krim stayed at the White House during much of the 1967 war and was a regular caller at the Israeli Embassy,

passing reports and gossip back and forth. The Krims, like other Johnson friends, did not hesitate to advise the president on Middle East policy.¹²

How influential the Krims were in forming Johnson's Middle East policy was hinted at by notes in the president's daily diary for June 17, 1967. The notes reported that at a dinner with the Krims and others at Camp David, Johnson openly discussed a speech he was working on that was to establish the nation's Middle East policy for the years ahead. According to the notes, Johnson read from various drafts of the speech around the dinner table, "inserting additions and making changes, also accepting comments and suggestions from all at the table." Thus two passionate partisans of Israel, the Krims, helped Johnson refine what was later called the "five great principles of peace," the pillars of US policy in the Middle East for the next two decades.

After Johnson delivered the speech on June 19, he received a report of an enthusiastic phone call from Abe Feinberg saying that the Jewish community was delighted with the speech. "Mr. Feinberg said he had visited with Israelis and Jewish leaders all over the country and they are high in their appreciation."¹³

Under Johnson, aid to Israel increased and the old arms embargo was completely shattered, portending the massive transfer of treasure, technology and weapons that began in the next administration of Richard M. Nixon. That, of course, was only the beginning of the age of total support of Israel, which has reached new heights under Bill Clinton.

Notes

1. Merle Miller, *Lyndon: An Oral History* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1980), p. 477. This was generally the assessment in Israel as well; see Stephen Green, *Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Mili-*

tant Israel (New York, W. Morrow, 1984), pp. 184-86.

2. See, for instance: Evan M. Wilson, *Decision on Palestine: How the US came to Recognize Israel* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 148-49; Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp. 9-10, 31; Walid Khalidi, ed., *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, second printing, 1987), pp. liii-lxvii; Donald Neff, "Palestine, Truman and America's Strategic Balance," *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 25, Summer 1988, pp. 30-41. See also: Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977).
3. Donald Neff, *Fallen Pillars: US Policy toward Palestine and Israel since 1945* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), pp. 170-71.
4. State Dept., NEA/IAI: Feb. 8, 1967; confidential, declassified April 16, 1981.
5. W. W. Rostow, Memorandum for the President, May 21, 1966; secret, declassified March 13, 1979.
6. Unsigned, White House papers, May 19, 1966; secret, declassified March 13, 1979.
7. Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East* (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 110.
8. D. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem* (1984), p. 273.
9. D. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem* (1984), p. 213.
10. Rostow to the President, June 5, 1967, secret.
11. Stephen D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 83. Detailed information on Feinberg, including his aid to Israel's nuclear program, is in Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 93-111.
12. D. Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem* (1984), pp. 83, 156-158.
13. Marvin to the President, memorandum, 6:30 pm, June 19, 1967. Reprinted in Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem* (1984), pp. 307-308.



Lyndon Johnson

"Nothing could be more irrational than to give the people power and withhold from them information without which power is abused."

— James Madison

Russian Specialist Lays Bare Stalin's Plan to Conquer Europe

Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?, by Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun). London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990. Hardcover. Maps. Photos. Source references. Index.

Reviewed by Joseph Bishop

It sometimes happens that the most significant historical works are virtually ignored by the mainstream press, and consequently reach few readers. Such is the case with many revisionist studies, including this important work by a former Soviet military intelligence officer who defected to the West in 1978. Even before the appearance of this book, he had already established a solid reputation with the publication of five books, written under the pen name of Viktor Suvorov, on the inner workings of the Soviet military, and particularly its intelligence operations.

In *Icebreaker* Suvorov takes a close look at the origins and development of World War II in Europe, and in particular the background to Hitler's "Operation Barbarossa" attack against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Since its original publication in Russian (entitled *Ledokol*) in France in 1988, it has been published in an astonishing 87 editions in 18 languages. In spite of its importance to the historical record, *Icebreaker* has received very little attention in the United States. The few reviews that have appeared here have been almost entirely brief and dismissive — a shameful treatment that reflects the cowardice and intellectual irresponsibility of a "politically correct" scholarly establishment.

According to the conventional view, Hitler's perfidious attack abruptly forced a neutral and aloof Soviet Russia into war. This view further holds that a surprised Stalin had naively trusted the deceitful German *Führer*. Rejecting this view as political propaganda, Suvorov shows Stalin's personal responsibility for the war's outbreak and progression. Above all, this book details the vast Soviet preparations for an invasion of Europe in the summer of 1941 with the goal of Sovietizing central and western Europe. Suvorov is not alone in his view. It is also affirmed by a number of non-Russian historians, such as

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American scholar R. H. S. Stolfi in his 1991 study *Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted* (reviewed by me in the Nov.-Dec. 1995 *Journal*).

In spite of rigid Soviet censorship, Suvorov has succeeded in digging up many nuggets of valuable information from publicly available Soviet writings that confirm his central thesis. *Icebreaker* is based on the author's meticulous scouring of such published sources as memoirs of wartime Soviet military leaders, and histories of individual Soviet divisions, corps, armies, fleets, and air units.

'Second Imperialist War'

A central tenet of Soviet ideology was that the Soviet Union, as the world's first Marxist state and bulwark of "workers' power," would eventually liberate all of humanity from the yoke of capitalism and fascism (the "last resort of monopoly capitalism"). While Soviet leaders might disagree about the circumstances and timing of this process of global liberation, none doubted the importance of this objective. As Suvorov notes:

For Lenin, as for Marx, world revolution remained the guiding star, and he did not lose sight of this goal. But according to the minimum program, the First World War would only facilitate a revolution in one country. How, then, would the world revolution take place thereafter? Lenin gave a clear-cut answer to this question in 1916: as a result of the second imperialist war ...

Initially the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was made up of only a handful of constituent republics. Lenin and the other Soviet leaders intended that more republics would be added to the USSR until it encompassed the entire globe. Thus, writes Suvorov, "the declaration accompanying the formation of the USSR was a *clear and direct declaration of war on the rest of the world.*"

Hitler understood this much better than did the leaders of Britain, France or the United States. During a conversation in 1937 with Lord Halifax, one of Britain's most important officials, he said: "In the event of a general war [in Europe], only one country can win. That country is the Soviet Union." In *Icebreaker*, Suvorov explains how in 1939 Stalin exploited the long-simmering dispute between Germany and Poland over Danzig and the "Polish Cor-

ridor” to provoke a “second imperialist war” that would enormously expand the Soviet empire.

Stalin anticipated a drawn-out war of attrition in which Germany, France and Britain would exhaust themselves in a devastating conflict that would also spark Communist uprisings across Europe. And as the Soviet premier expected, “Ice-breaker” Germany did indeed break up the established order in Europe. But along with nearly everyone else outside of Germany, he was astonished by the speed and thoroughness with which Hitler subdued not only Poland, but also France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece. Dashing Kremlin expectations that a “second imperialist war” would quickly usher in a Soviet Europe, by July 1940 Hitler was effectively master of the continent.

Soviet Preparations

Throughout history, every army has had a basic mission, one that requires corresponding preparations. An army whose mission is basically defensive is accordingly trained and equipped for defensive war. It heavily fortifies the country’s frontier areas, and employs its units in echeloned depth. It builds defensive emplacements and obstacles, lays extensive minefields, and digs tank traps and ditches. Military vehicles, aircraft, weapons and equipment suitable for defending the country are designed, produced and supplied. Officers and troops are trained in defense tactics and counter-offensive operations.


An army whose mission is aggressive war acts very differently. Officers and troops are trained for offensive operations. They are supplied with weapons and equipment designed for attack, and the frontier area is prepared accordingly. Troops and their materiel are massed close to the frontier, obstacles are removed, and minefields are cleared. Maps of the areas to be invaded are issued to officers, and the troops are briefed on terrain problems, how to deal with the population to be conquered, and so forth.

Carefully examining the equipping, training and deployment of Soviet forces, as well as the numbers and strengths of Soviet weaponry, vehicles, supplies and aircraft, Suvorov establishes in great detail that the Red Army was organized and deployed in the summer of 1941 for attack, not defense.

Peculiar Tanks

Germany entered war in 1939 with 3,195 tanks. As Suvorov points out, this was fewer than a single Soviet factory in Kharkov, operating on a “peace-time” basis, was turning out every six months.

By 1941 everyone recognized the tank as the primary weapon of an army of attack in a European



The Soviet armies of the First Strategic Echelon were deployed in mid-1941 to strike against Europe. Another seven armies in the rear were making their way to the frontier in preparation for the massive Soviet offensive.




The Soviet 9th Army was concentrated not on the German border, but on the frontier with Romania. A 9th Army strike at Romania would quickly seize Germany’s most important source of oil.



Two Soviet mountain armies were set to help cut off Germany’s oil “jugular” and prevent the movement of German forces into Romania.



Deployment sites of the “first wave” Soviet airborne corps. Another five airborne corps were secretly being organized deep inside the Soviet Union.



The Soviet KT (A-40) winged tank. Upon landing, the wings and tail were quickly detached, making the tank immediately ready for battle. Suited only for offensive warfare, this remarkable weapon was rendered useless by Hitler's "Barbarossa" attack.

land war. During this period, Suvorov shows, the Soviets were producing large quantities of the well armed "Mark BT" tank, predecessor of the famed T34 model. "BT" were the initials for the Russian words "high speed tank." The first of this series had a top speed of 100 kilometers per hour, impressive even by today's standards. But as Suvorov goes on to note, this weapon had a peculiarity:

Having said so many positive things about the numbers and quality of Soviet tanks, one must note one minor drawback. It was impossible to use these tanks on Soviet territory ...

Mark BT tanks could only be used in an aggressive war, only in the rear of the enemy and only in a swift offensive operation, in which masses of tanks suddenly burst into enemy territory ...

The Mark BT tanks were quite powerless on Soviet territory. When Hitler began Operation Barbarossa, practically all the Mark BT tanks were cast aside. It was almost impossible to use them off the roads, even with caterpillar tracks. They were never used on wheels. The potential of these tanks was never realized, but it certainly could never have been realized on Soviet territory. The Mark BT was created to operate on foreign territory only and, what is more, only on territory where there were good roads ...

To the question, where could the enormous potential of these Mark BT tanks be successfully realized, there is only one answer: in central and southern Europe. The only territories

where tanks could be used, *after* their caterpillar tracks were removed, were Germany, France and Belgium ... Caterpillar tracks are only a means for reaching foreign territory. For instance, Poland could be crossed on caterpillar tracks which, once the German autobahns had been reached, could then be discarded in favor of wheels, on which operations would then proceed ...

It is said that Stalin's tanks were not ready for war. That was not so. They were not ready for a *defensive* war on their own territory. They were, however, designed to wage war on others.

Airborne Assault Corps

Similarly designed for offensive war are paratroops. This most aggressive form of infantry is employed primarily as an invasion force. Germany formed its first airborne assault units in 1936, and by 1939 had 4,000 paratroops. And the USSR? Suvorov explains:

By the beginning of the war [1939], the Soviet Union had *more than one million* trained paratroopers — 200 times more than all other countries in the world put together, including Germany... It is quite impossible to use paratroopers in such massive numbers in a defensive war... No country in history, or indeed all countries in the world put together, including the Soviet Union, has ever had so many paratroopers and air assault landing sub-units as Stalin had in 1941.

As part of the planned invasion, in early 1940 orders were given for large-scale construction of airborne assault gliders, which were produced in mass quantity from the spring of 1941 onward. The Soviets also designed and built the remarkable KT "winged tank." After landing, its wings and tailpiece were discarded, making the KT instantly ready for combat. The author also describes a variety of other offense-oriented units and weapons, and their deployment in June 1941 in areas and jumping-off points right on the frontiers with Germany and Romania. All these weapons of offensive war became instantly useless following the Barbarossa attack, when the Soviets suddenly required defensive weapons.

Suvorov tells of a secret meeting in December 1940 attended by Stalin and other Politburo members at which General Pavel Rychagov, deputy defense minister and commander of the Soviet air force, discussed the details of "special operations in the initial period of war." He spoke of the necessity of keeping the air force's preparations *secret* in order to "catch the whole of the enemy air force on the ground." Suvorov comments:

It is quite obvious that it is not possible to "catch

the whole of the enemy air force on the ground” in time of war. It is only possible to do so in peacetime, when the enemy does not suspect the danger.

Stalin created so many airborne troops that they could only be used in one situation: after a surprise attack by the Soviet air force on the airfields of the enemy. It would be simply impossible to use hundreds of thousands of airborne troops and thousands of transport aircraft and gliders in any other situation.

Suvorov also reports on the dismantling in June 1941 of the Soviet frontier defense systems, and the deployment there of masses of troops and armor poised for westward attack.

Stalin Preempted

During the period just prior to the planned Soviet invasion, the USSR’s western military districts were ordered to deploy all 114 divisions, then stationed in the interior, to positions on the frontier. Thus, remarks Suvorov, June 13, 1941, “marks the beginning of the greatest displacement of troops in the history of civilization.”

Such a massive buildup of forces directly on the frontier simply could not be kept secret. As Suvorov notes, Wilhelm Keitel, Field Marshal and Chief of Germany’s armed forces High Command, spoke about the German fears during a postwar interrogation:

All the preparatory measures we took before spring 1941 were defensive measures against the contingency of a possible attack by the Red Army. Thus the entire war in the East, to a known degree, may be termed a preventive war ... We decided ... to forestall an attack by Soviet Russia and to destroy its armed forces with a surprise attack. By spring 1941, I had formed the definite opinion that the heavy buildup of Russian troops, and their attack on Germany which would follow, would place us, in both economic and strategic terms, in an exceptionally critical situation ... Our attack was the immediate consequence of this threat ...

In 1941, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov was the Soviet Navy minister, as well as a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. In his postwar memoirs, published in 1966, he recalled:

For me there is one thing beyond all argument — J. V. Stalin not only did not exclude the possibility of war with Hitler’s Germany, on the contrary, he considered such a war ... inevitable ... J. V. Stalin made preparations for war ... wide and varied preparations — beginning on dates ... which he himself had selected. Hitler upset his calculations.



In early 1941 the Soviet Union had vastly more paratroops than all other countries combined. Parachutists, by their nature, can only be used in offensive operations.



Suvorov comments:

The admiral is telling us quite clearly and openly that Stalin considered war inevitable and prepared himself seriously to enter it at a time of his own choosing. In other words, Stalin was preparing to strike the first blow, that is to commit aggression against Germany; but Hitler dealt a preventive blow first and thereby frustrated all Stalin’s plans ...

Let us compare Keitel’s words with those of Kuznetsov. Field Marshal Keitel said that Germany was not preparing an aggression against the Soviet Union; it was the Soviet Union which was preparing the aggression. Germany was simply using a preventive attack to defend itself from an unavoidable aggression. Kuznetsov says the same thing — yes, the Soviet Union was preparing for war and would inevitably have entered into it, but Hitler disrupted these plans with his attack. What I cannot understand is why Keitel was hanged [at Nuremberg], and Kuznetsov was not.

Suvorov believes that Hitler’s preemptive strike came just two or three weeks before Stalin’s own planned assault. Thus, as Wehrmacht forces smashed Soviet formations in the initial weeks of the “Barbarossa” attack, the Germans marveled at the great numbers of Soviet tanks and other materiel destroyed or captured — an enormous buildup sufficient not just for an assault on Germany, but for the conquest of all of Europe. Suvorov writes

Hitler decided that it was not worth his while waiting any longer. He was the first to go, without waiting for the blow of the “liberating” dagger to stab him in the back. He had begun the war in the most favorable conditions which could possibly have existed for an aggressor;



These Soviet tanks, with removable caterpillar tracks, were designed for use on German roads and highways. So equipped, they were of little use on Soviet territory, where few roads were paved.

but given the nature of Stalin's grand plan, he could never have won it. Even in the most unfavorable conditions, the Red Army was able to "liberate" half of Europe ...

As devastating as it was, Hitler's assault was not fatal. It came too late to be successful. "Even the Wehrmacht's surprise attack on the Soviet Union could no longer save Hitler and his empire," Suvorov writes. "Hitler understood where the greatest danger was coming from, but it was already too late." With great effort, the Soviets were able to recover from the shattering blow. Stalin succeeded in forming new armies to replace those lost in the second half of 1941.

As Suvorov repeatedly points out, the widely accepted image of World War II, and particularly of the roles of Stalin and Hitler in the conflict, simply does not accord with reality:

In the end ... Poland, for whose liberty the West had gone to war, ended up with none at all. On the contrary, she was handed over to Stalin, along with the whole of Eastern Europe, including a part of Germany. Even so, there are some people in the West who continue to believe that the West won the Second World War.

... Stalin became the absolute ruler of a vast

empire hostile to the West, which had been created with the help of the West. For all that, Stalin was able to preserve his reputation as naive and trusting, while Hitler went down in history as the ultimate aggressor. A multitude of books have been published in the West based on the idea that Stalin was not ready for war while Hitler was.

A Soviet Europe?

An intriguing historical "what if" is to speculate on the fate of Europe if Stalin, and not Hitler, had struck first. For example, a less rapidly successful German campaign in the Balkans in the spring of 1941 could have forced the postponement of Barbarossa by several weeks, which would have enabled Stalin to strike the first blow.

Could German forces have withstood an all-out Soviet assault, with tens of thousands of Soviet tanks and a million paratroopers? With the advantage of striking first, how quickly could Stalin have reached Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, Rome and Madrid? Suvorov writes:

It would be a mistake to underestimate the enormous strength and vast resources of Stalin's war machine. Despite its grievous losses, it had enough strength to withdraw and gather new strength to reach Berlin. How far would it have gone had it not sustained that massive blow on 22 June, if hundreds of aircraft and thousands of tanks had not been lost, had it been the Red Army and not the Wehrmacht which struck the first blow? Did the German Army have the territorial expanse behind it for withdrawal? Did it have the inexhaustible human resources, and the time, to restore its army after the first Soviet surprise attack?

Partially answering his own question, Suvorov states: "If Hitler had decided to launch Operation Barbarossa a few weeks later, the Red Army would have reached Berlin much earlier than 1945."

Suvorov even presents a hypothetical scenario of a Soviet invasion and occupation of Europe, replete with Stalinist terror and oppression:

The [Soviet] troops meet endless columns of prisoners. Dust rises on the horizon. There they are, the oppressors of the people — shopkeepers, bourgeois doctors and architects, farmers and bank employees. The Chekists' [NKVD] work will be hard. Prisoners are cursorily interrogated at every stopping place. Then the NKVD investigates each one in detail, and establishes the degree of his guilt before the working people. But by now it has become necessary to expose the most dangerous of the millions of prisoners: the former Social Democrats, pacifists, socialists and National Socialists,

former officers, policemen and ministers of religion.

Millions of prisoners have to be sent far away to the east and the north, in order to give them the opportunity, through honest labor, to expiate their guilt before the people ...


In Suvorov's scenario, a camp called Auschwitz is captured early on by the advancing Soviets. In response to the question, "Well, what was it like in Auschwitz, pal?," a Red Army man replies: "Nothing much, really. The worldly-wise soldier in his black jacket shrugs his shoulders. 'Just like at home. Only their climate is better'."

Actually, "what if" historical speculation is normally uncertain because key factors are often simply imponderable. In this case, one such factor is Soviet morale. While it is certainly true that Soviet troops fought bravely and tenaciously in 1941-1943 defending their home territory, they may not have fought with the same fervor and morale in an invasion of Europe. The tenacity and endurance shown by Red Army troops in Hungary and Germany in 1944 and 1945 is not necessarily indicative, because these soldiers were bitterly mindful of more than two years of savage fighting against the invaders, and of stern occupation, on their home territory.

Another imponderable is the response of Britain and the United States to an all-out Soviet invasion of Europe. If Soviet forces had struck westward in July 1941, would Britain and the United States have sided with Stalin and the USSR, or would they have sided with Hitler and Germany, Italy, France, Romania, Finland, Hungary, Denmark, and the rest of Europe? Or would Roosevelt and Churchill have decided to remain aloof from the great conflict?

Anyway, when Hitler did launch his preemptive strike against Soviet Russia, Roosevelt and Churchill immediately sided with Stalin, and when the Red Army took half of Europe in 1944-45, neither the British nor the American leader objected.

What can now be stated with certainty — thanks to the work of Suvorov and other revisionist historians — is that in smashing the great Soviet military buildup in 1941, Hitler dashed Stalin's plan to quickly conquer Europe, and that, in spite of his defeat in 1945, Hitler saved at least the western half of Europe, and tens of millions of people, from the horrors of Soviet subjugation.



By mid-June 1941, Stalin had concentrated enormous Red Army forces on the western Soviet border, poised for a devastating attack against Europe. This diagram appeared in the English-language edition of the German wartime illustrated magazine *Signal*.

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Historian Details Stalin's Two-Year 'Mobilization' Plan for European Conquest

Der Tag M ("M Day"), by Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir B. Rezun). Translated from the Russian by Hans Jaeger. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995. Hardcover. 356 pages. Photos. Source references. Bibliography. Index.

Reviewed by Daniel W. Michaels

When Hitler launched "Operation Barbarossa" against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Germany's leaders justified the attack as a preemptive strike to forestall an imminent Soviet invasion of Germany and the rest of Europe. After the war, Germany's most prominent surviving military and political leaders were put to death at Nuremberg for, among other things, planning and waging "aggressive war" against the Soviet Union. The Nuremberg Tribunal rejected outright defendants' pleas that "Barbarossa" was a preventive attack.

In the decades since, historians, government officials, and standard reference works in the United States, Europe and the USSR accordingly have held that Hitler betrayed the trusting Soviet leaders to launch his treacherous surprise attack, motivated by greed for Russian and Ukrainian resources and "living space," and as part of a mad drive to "conquer the world."

In this well researched and powerfully argued study, a Russian-born specialist has presented abundant evidence that essentially affirms the German contention. Based primarily on a scrupulous analysis of the pertinent military and political literature, and the memoirs of prominent members of the Soviet military and Party elite, military analyst Suvorov has produced an important revisionist work that obliges a radical reevaluation of the long-accepted view of Second World War II history.

The author, whose real name is Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, was trained as a Soviet army officer in Kalinin and Kiev. Later, after staff level service and completing studies at the Diplomatic Military Academy in 1974, he served as a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer, working for four years in Geneva under diplomatic cover. He defected in 1978, and was granted diplomatic asylum in Britain.

His first work on this subject, *Icebreaker*, was

initially published in Russian (in France) in 1988, followed by editions in other languages, including English. It caused a sensation in the military and intelligence community, especially in Europe, because it carefully documents the offensive nature of the massive Soviet military buildup on the German border in 1941. In "M Day" Suvorov adds substantially to evidence and arguments presented in *Icebreaker*.

In making his case, Suvorov stresses here the central importance to Stalin's planning of military strategist Boris Shaposhnikov, Marshal and Chief of the General Staff. His most important work, *Mozg armii* ("The Brain of the Army"), was for decades required reading for every Soviet officer. Stalin not only respected Shaposhnikov's military acumen, but, uncharacteristically, personally liked the man. He was the only man Stalin was ever known to address routinely in public by his first and patronymic names (Boris Mikhailovich), in Russia a personal form of address, less than formal but definitely respectful. Stalin addressed everyone else by his family name preceded by Comrade ("Comrade Zhdanov," for example). Stalin's admiration was also shown by the fact that he always kept a copy of Shaposhnikov's *Mozg armii* on his desk.

Shaposhnikov's mobilization plan, faithfully implemented by Stalin, laid out a clear, logical, two-year program (August 1939-summer 1941) that would inexorably and purposefully culminate in war. According to Suvorov, Stalin announced his decision to implement this plan at a Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939, four days before the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. (It was also at this Politburo meeting, which came shortly after Stalin had concluded his draconian purges of military and political "unreliables," that the Soviet leader ordered General Georgi Zhukov to attack, and defeat, in classic *blitzkrieg* fashion, the Japanese Sixth Army at Khalkhin-Gol, Mongolia.)

Thirteen days after Stalin's speech, German troops struck against Poland, and two days after that — September 3, 1939 — Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Once Stalin decided to embark on this process of mobilization, the regime radically retooled the nation's economy, directing the enormous physical and human resources of the Soviet Union for war. By its nature, this all-encompassing process could be pursued only to its logical conclusion — war. Simply stated, Stalin's 1939 decision to mobilize inevitably meant war.

Daniel W. Michaels is a Columbia University graduate (Phi Beta Kappa, 1954), a Fulbright exchange student to Germany (1957), and recently retired from the US Department of Defense after 40 years of service.

Massive Buildup

In 1938 some 1,513,400 men were serving in the Red Army. This was about one percent of the Soviet population, which is generally considered the normal, economically sustainable, maximum ratio of men under arms to total population. As part of their two-year mobilization program, Stalin-Shaposhnikov more than doubled the number of men under arms — to more than five million.

During this period — August 1939 to June 1941 — Stalin raised 125 new infantry divisions, 30 new motorized divisions, and 61 tank and 79 air divisions — a total of 295 divisions organized in 16 armies. The Stalin-Shaposhnikov plan also called for mobilizing an *additional* six million men in the summer of 1941, to be distributed into still more infantry, tank, motorized and air divisions.

Between July 1939 and June 1941, Stalin increased the number of Soviet tank divisions from zero to 61, with dozens more in preparation. By June 1941, the “neutral” Soviet Union had assembled more tank divisions than all the other countries of the world put together — a mighty force that could be effectively employed only in offensive operations.

In June 1941 Hitler threw ten mechanized corps into battle, of which each, on average, had more than 340 light and medium tanks. By contrast, Stalin had 29 mechanized corps, each with 1,031 light, medium and *heavy* tanks. While it is true that not every Soviet corps was at full strength, a single Soviet mechanized corps was militarily stronger than two German corps put together.

When Hitler attacked Poland in September 1939, Germany had a total of six tank divisions. If this light tank force can be regarded as conclusive proof of Hitler’s intention to launch a war of world (or at least European) conquest, what — asks Suvorov — can we conclude from Stalin’s buildup of 61 tank divisions between late 1939 and mid-1941, and with further dozens in preparation?

In mid-1941, the Red Army was the only military force in the world with *amphibious* tanks. Stalin had 4,000 of these weapons of offensive war; Germany had none. By June 1941, the Soviets had increased the number of their paratroop corps from zero to five, and the number of their field artillery regiments from 144 to 341, in each case more than all the other armies of the world put together.

At the outbreak of war in September 1939, Germany had a fleet of 57 submarines, a fact that is sometimes cited as proof of Hitler’s aggressive intentions. But at that same time, Suvorov points out, the Soviet Union already had more than 165 submarines. These submarines, he notes, were not inferior vessels, but rather of standard quality. By June 1941, the Soviet navy had more than 218 sub-



Stalin with his most trusted military adviser, Boris Shaposhnikov. Together they worked out a two-year mobilization plan that was to culminate in an attack against Germany and the subjugation of Europe.

marines in service, with another 91 under construction. Stalin commanded the world’s largest submarine fleet, a force that was created for aggressive war.

A ‘World’ War?

As Suvorov points out, at the time of Hitler’s 1939 strike against Poland, no one in Germany or western Europe regarded this as the outbreak of a “world war.” Even the declarations of war against Germany by Britain and France two days later — on September 3, 1939 — did not make this a “world war.” It was only much later, looking back, that Germany’s Polish campaign came to be regarded as the start of the Second World War. Only in Moscow, writes Suvorov, was it understood right from the outset that a world war had begun.

Echoing the findings of such historians as A. J. P. Taylor and David Hoggan, Suvorov points out that Hitler neither wanted nor planned for a European-wide conflict in 1939. It was the British and French declarations of war against Germany that transformed a local conflict between Germany and Poland into a European-wide one.

Consequently, Hitler did not authorize the con-



Vladimir Rezun, a former Soviet military intelligence officer, wrote *Icebreaker* and several other books under the pen name of Viktor Suvorov.

version of his nation's economy to a war footing. Soviet GRU chief Ivan Proskurov accurately informed Stalin that German industry was not geared to full-scale war. In fact, Germany did not begin in earnest to put its economy on war footing until early 1942, two years after the Soviet Union. But whereas Soviet military and arms production reached a crescendo in the summer of 1941, Germany's did not peak until 1944 — three years too late.

Attack Plan

Suvorov presents overwhelming evidence to show that Stalin was preparing for a massive surprise attack against Germany, to be launched in the summer of 1941. (Suvorov believes the attack was set for July 6, 1941.) In preparation for this, the Soviets had deployed enormous forces right on the German frontier, including paratroops, together with airfields and large caches of weapons, ammunition, fuel and other supplies.

In April 1941 the Red Army ordered a massive

deployment of artillery pieces and ammunition production to the frontier, and their storage there *on the ground and in the open*. This alone, writes Suvorov, proves Stalin's intention to attack, because this weaponry and ammunition had to be used before the fall, when the annual rains would begin. Storing munitions in the open in 1941 meant that an attack had to come that same year. "Any other interpretation of this fact is not conceivable," he writes.

Suvorov sums up:

By studying the archive records and the publicly available publications, I came to the conclusion that the transport [in 1941] to the frontier of millions of boots, munitions, and spare parts, and the deployment of millions of soldiers, and thousands of tanks and airplanes, could not have been a mistake, or a miscalculation, but rather that it must have been the result of a thoughtful policy ...

This process had as its goal the preparation of industry, the transport system, agriculture, the state territory, the Soviet population, and the Red Army to carry out the war of "liberation" in central and western Europe.

In short, this process is called mobilization. It was a secret mobilization. The Soviet leadership prepared the Red Army and the entire country for the conquest of Germany and western Europe. The conquest of western Europe was the main reason that the Soviet Union unleashed the Second World War.

The final decision to start the war was taken by Stalin on August 19, 1939.

The Soviet attack plan, Suvorov explains, called for a strike on two major fronts: the first, west and northwest, into Germany proper, and the second, equally powerful, southwest into Romania to quickly seize the oil fields there.

Three main strategic echelons would carry out the invasion. The first echelon consisted of 16 invasion armies and several dozen corps and divisions for auxiliary thrusts, made up of professional Red Army men trained to smash through the German lines. The second strategic echelon, consisting of seven armies of inferior troops (including many Gulag prisoners), would secure and expand the breakthroughs of the first echelon. The third echelon, consisting of three armies made up mostly of NKVD troops, would secure the Soviet occupation. It would thwart any and all potential resistance by rounding up and killing Germany's social, political, and military elite — much as had already been done in the Baltic states and eastern Poland (as in the Katyn massacre).

As his main strike aircraft Stalin had settled on the "Ivanov" (one of Stalin's nicknames), later known as the Su-2, a highly effective attack bomber

plane that was produced and deployed in large numbers. Stalin ordered construction of more than 100,000 Su-2s, as well as the training of 150,000 pilots. Weighing four tons, the Su-2 had a top speed of 486 km/h, a range of 1200 km, and a bomb load capacity of 400-600 kg. Similar, but superior to the German JU-87 "Stuka" dive bomber, it strikingly resembled the Japanese Nakajima B-5N2, which was the main warplane used in the attack on Pearl Harbor.



Enormous numbers of Soviet troops were captured during the first months of Germany's "Barbarossa" offensive. Greatly contributing to the seizure of so many prisoners was the concentration of Soviet forces on the frontier in preparation for an invasion of Europe.

Hitler's Miscalculation

For decades establishment historians have held that Stalin naively trusted Hitler. This image of a trusting Stalin and a treacherous Hitler is widely and officially accepted in the United States and much of Europe. Suvorov mocks this view, and contends that, to the contrary, it was Hitler who fatally miscalculated Stalin's cunning, at least for some 15 months, by which time it was too late.

While Hitler succeeded in foiling Stalin's great invasion plan, the German leader fatally underestimated the magnitude and aggressiveness of the Soviet threat. Suvorov writes: "Hitler grasped that Stalin was preparing an invasion, but he failed properly to estimate the entire extent of Stalin's preparations ... Hitler was unclear about just how great and how close the danger was."

Historians, notes Suvorov, do not adequately explain why Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union at a time when Britain was still not subdued, thus engaging Germany in a dangerous two-front war. They often simply refer to Hitler's lust for *Lebensraum* or "living space." Actually, the Russian author writes, "Stalin gave Hitler no alternative way out. The secret [Soviet] mobilization was of such an enormous dimension that it would have been difficult to ignore." Stalin's "secret mobilization had reached such an extent that it could no longer be disguised. For Hitler the only possibility left was a preventive strike. Hitler beat Stalin to it by two weeks." In short, given the situation, the only responsible recourse for the German leadership was to launch a preemptive strike.

Stalin did not need Churchill, Roosevelt or ace Soviet spy Richard Sorge to warn him of a possible German attack. He had already made his own preparations to deal with Germany. But in readying his forces for offensive war, Stalin did nothing for the country's defense.

The Germans, writes Suvorov, enjoyed the temporary advantage of surprise because they were able to position and launch their strike forces just two weeks before the Red Army was scheduled to attack, catching it completely off balance. The surprise was all the greater because Stalin did not believe the Germans would dare open a second front in the East while still engaged against the British. Also contributing to the spectacular initial German successes was the daring and professionalism of the German soldier.

As Suvorov writes:

The [Soviet] defeat at the outbreak of the war [June-September 1941] was due to the fact that the German Wehrmacht launched its surprise attack at just the moment when the Soviet artillery was being moved to the border, and together with it the corresponding supplies of munitions. The artillery was not prepared to deal with a defensive war, and on June 22 was not able to go on the offensive.

Because Germany lacked the natural resources to sustain a protracted war, Hitler could prevail only by completely subduing Russia within four

months — that is, before the onset of winter. In this he failed. During the summer and fall of 1941 Hitler shattered, but did not destroy the Soviet military machine. (As it was, the Germans were able to achieve stunning initial successes only by utilizing Soviet stores captured during those first few months.)

In "Operation Barbarossa," Hitler threw 17 tank divisions against the Soviets. After three months of fighting, only about a quarter of his tanks were left, while Stalin's factories were turning out not only many more tanks, but of generally higher quality.

During the first four months of the "Barbarossa" attack, Axis forces destroyed perhaps 75 percent of Stalin's war-making ability, thereby eliminating the immediate military threat to Europe. Between July and November 1941, German forces seized or overran 303 gunpowder, munitions and grenade factories, which annually produced 85 percent of the country's entire Soviet munitions production.

But as Suvorov points out, this was not enough: "Hitler's attack could no longer save Germany. Stalin not only had more tanks, artillery pieces and airplanes, more soldiers and officers, but Stalin had also already put his industry on a war economy basis and could produce weapons in whatever quantities he desired." On November 29, 1941, Reich Armaments Minister Fritz Todt informed Hitler that from an armaments and war economy point of view, Germany had already lost the war.

Stalin ultimately prevailed because a residual 25 percent of the giant Soviet war economy, including 15 percent of her munitions production — mostly from factories east of the Volga, in the Urals and in Siberia — remained intact. Thus, with just a fraction of her initial superpower strength, Stalin was still able to win the decisive battles of Stalin-grad, Kursk, and Berlin, and defeat the mighty forces of Germany (and her Axis allies). Also contributing substantially to the Soviet victory was the entry into the war of the United States, the substantial American aid, and, of course, the legendary stoic toughness of the Russian soldier.

Even though Hitler struck the first blow, at the end of the war Stalin controlled Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and eastern Germany.

Noting that Hitler repeatedly postponed the launch date of "Operation Barbarossa," Suvorov remarks:

Let us suppose that Hitler had postponed once more the attack against Stalin, and Stalin had struck the first blow on July 6, 1941 ... Let us try to imagine what would have happened if Hitler had delayed his attack so that he became victim to the devastating assault prepared by Stalin. In this case Stalin would have had not

just 15 percent of the production capacity of the Munitions Industry Commissariat, but 100 percent. In that case how would be Second World War have concluded?

In this situation, it is not unreasonable to suppose that by November-December 1941 Soviet forces would have reached the Atlantic, hoisting the red flag over Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam, Rome and Stockholm.

Uncovered Speech Text

Since the publication of "M Day," Russian scholars have dug up additional evidence from the former Soviet archives that further confirms the Suvorov thesis and obliges a radical rewriting of Second World War history.

While it is likely that many records have been removed and destroyed, some revealing papers are being unearthed. One of the most important of these long-suppressed documents is the complete text of Stalin's secret speech of August 19, 1939. For decades leading Soviet figures denied that Stalin ever delivered this address, even insisting that no Politburo meeting was held on that date. Others have dismissed this speech as a forgery.

Russian historian T. S. Bushuyeva found a version of the text among the secret files of the USSR Special Archives, and published it, together with commentary, in the prominent Russian journal *Novy Mir* (No. 12, 1994). German writer Wolfgang Strauss reports on this, and other recent findings by Russian historians, in the April 1996 issue of the German monthly *Nation und Europa*. To this reviewer's knowledge, no American historian has yet taken public notice of the speech text.

It should be kept in mind that this address was delivered just as Soviet officials were negotiating with British and French representatives about a possible military alliance with Britain and France, and as German and Soviet officials were discussing a possible non-aggression pact between their countries. Four days after this speech, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop met with Stalin in the Kremlin to sign the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

In this speech, Stalin declared:

The question of war or peace has entered a critical phase for us. If we conclude a mutual assistance pact with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off from Poland and seek a *modus vivendi* with the Western powers. War would be avoided, but down the road events could become dangerous for the USSR. If we accept Germany's proposal and conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will of course invade Poland, and the intervention of France and England in that war would be unavoidable.

Western Europe would be subjected to serious upheavals and disorder. Under those conditions, we would have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan the opportune time for us to enter the war.

The experience of the last 20 years has shown that in peacetime the Communist movement is never strong enough to seize power. The dictatorship of such a party will only become possible as the result of a major war.

Our choice is clear. We must accept the German proposal and politely send the Anglo-French mission home. Our immediate advantage will be to take Poland to the gates of Warsaw, as well as Ukrainian Galicia ...

Summing up, Wolfgang Strauss points out that Stalin strove for an all-European war, a war of exhaustion that would bring down Europe's states and system. Further, Stalin planned to enter the war on the ruins of "capitalist" Europe, and then dictate its Sovietization by military force. (The key term "*Sovietizatsia*" comes up repeatedly in his speech.)

While noting that this speech further confirms Stalin's aggressive intentions, the cautious Bushuyeva quotes Clausewitz to the effect that wars tend to assume their own directions and dimensions, regardless of what one side or the other might have planned or said.


Painful History

In her *Novy Mir* article Bushuyeva writes of the pain that Russians must now endure in acknowledging that much of what they have believed for decades about the "Great Patriotic War" is wrong. She notes that of the young men born between the years 1922 and 1925, and who were sent to war by Stalin, only three out of a hundred survived the conflict. Writes Bushuyeva: "The entire depth of the tragedy that befell our five-million-man army in June 1941 must be plumbed. The evil that the rulers of the Soviet Union had planned for others suddenly, by some inscrutable fate, struck our own country."

It would be easy, Bushuyeva continues, to curse those who "are rewriting" history, and to continue to believe in the familiar contrived myths and symbols that appeal to our national pride — to the patriotism of the Russian people. "Yes, it would be possible to go on as before," she writes, "if it were not for one peculiar circumstance. Man is so constituted that the truth, however painful, is more important in the final analysis than the spurious bliss of living in lies and ignorance."

Suvorov likewise acknowledges that many Russians despise him for his revelations. He writes:

I have challenged the one sacred thing the Rus-



The Soviet "Ivanov" Su-2 attack bomber (above), produced in large numbers, was designed for surprise attack. It resembled the Japanese "Nakajima" B-5N2 (below), used in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

sian people still cling to — their memory of the "Great Patriotic War." I have sacrificed everything dear to me to write these books. It would have been intolerable to have died without telling the people what I have uncovered. Curse the books! Curse me! But even as you curse me try to understand.

Further Confirmation

Following the publication of Stalin's speech in *Novy Mir*, historians at Novosibirsk University undertook a major revisionist study of the immediate prewar situation. The results of this scholarly seminar were published in April 1995. Russian historian I. V. Pavlova, stated bluntly in her seminar contribution that for decades Communist Party historians worked to bury the background, origins and development of the Second World War, including Stalin's August 1939 speech, under a mountain of lies.

Another of the participating scholars, V. L. Doroshenko, said that the new evidence shows that "Stalin provoked and unleashed the Second World War." Suggesting that Stalin and his regime should have been on trial at Nuremberg, Doroshenko went on explain:

... Not just because Stalin helped Hitler but because it was in Stalin's own interests that the war begin. First, because of his general goal of seizing power in Europe, and, second, because of the immediate advantage of destroying Poland and taking over Galicia. But Stalin's most important motive was the war itself ... The collapse of the European order would have made it possible for him to establish his dictatorship [over all of Europe].

To this end, Stalin wanted for the time being to stay out of the war, but only with the intention of entering it at the most favorable moment. In other words, the nonaggression pact freed Hitler's hands and encouraged Germany to unleash a war [in Poland]. As Stalin signed the Pact, he was already determined to break it. Right from the outset he did not intend to stay out of the conflict but, to the contrary, to enter the war directly at the most advantageous moment.

Revisionist Breakthrough

One must marvel at the courage shown by such Russian historians in their willingness to come to grips with this very emotion-laden chapter of history. They show much greater forthrightness and open-mindedness in confronting taboos of 20th century history than do their counterparts in western Europe and the United States.

But there are exceptions. In recent years, a few Western historians have likewise affirmed this drastically revisionist view of Second World War history. These include German historian Max Klüver in his 1986 book, *Präventivschlag 1941* ("Preventive Strike"), and Austrian scholar Ernst

Topitsch in *Stalins Krieg*, published in English in 1987 by St. Martin's Press as *Stalin's War*. American historian R. H. S. Stolfi echoes Suvorov's views in his 1991 book, *Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted* (reviewed in the Nov.-Dec. 1995 *Journal*), and German historian Dr. Joachim Hoffmann has added considerably to the discussion with his impressively researched 1995 study, *Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945* ("Stalin's War of Annihilation").

In the view of Wolfgang Strauss, the new revelations about Stalin's long-suppressed speech, and the treatment of this issue by younger Russian historians, constitute a victory for European revisionism and represent a major shift in historical research. Meanwhile, Suvorov and other historians continue to track down historical evidence. In addition to archival digging, Suvorov reports that, in response to *Icebreaker* and "M Day," Soviet and German veterans of World War II have written to offer further evidence in support of his thesis. He bolsters his case in a third book, "The Last Republic," recently published in Russian, and in a fourth, still unpublished volume on this subject.



Jailed in 'Democratic' Germany: The Ordeal of an American Writer New!

A courageous German-American civil rights activist tells the full, inside story of his arrest in Germany in August

1955, and five months' imprisonment, for remarks he made in letters and periodicals written in and sent from the United States. German authorities jailed the outspoken 68-year-old publicist because his references to the "Holocaust tale" and the "Jew-infested" German political system were judged to be insulting to Jews, and thus a violation of the country's selectively enforced "popular incitement" law. Although he is a naturalized American citizen, the US State Department refused to protest his arrest.

Written in an engagingly upbeat style, with an eye for the telling anecdote, Hans Schmidt recounts his legal struggle and the rigors of his imprisonment, and provides valuable insights and commentary on post-war Germany's subservience to powerful supra-national forces. This protest against totalitarian injustice is a devastating indictment of Germany's blatant double standard on democratic rights, as well as an eloquent plea for free speech and truthful, revisionist awareness of history.

Jailed in 'Democratic' Germany

by Hans Schmidt

Softcover. 490 pages. Notes. Index. (#0432)

\$19.50, plus \$2.50 shipping

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Exonerating Pearl Harbor's Scapegoats

Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor, by Edward L. Beach. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Hardcover. 225 pages. Eleven photographs. Bibliographical references essay. Index.

Reviewed by John Weir

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, inflicted one of the worst blows ever endured by American military forces. During the two-hour raid, Japanese warplanes sunk or seriously damaged 16 major US naval vessels, including six battleships, and killed 2,400 American servicemen. The next day, in an often-quoted address that reflected the national mood, President Franklin Roosevelt spoke of "a date which will live in infamy."

Angry Americans wanted to know why their Pacific fleet was caught by surprise, and who was responsible for the woeful lack of preparedness. In the rush to fix blame, attention naturally turned to the two men who were responsible for Pearl Harbor base security: Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the ranking US Navy commander in Hawaii, and his Army counterpart, Lt. General Walter C. Short.

Formal investigations found that Kimmel and Short had been seriously derelict in their duties, and responsible for the lack of preparedness. The two were stripped of their commands, and sent into the wilderness of an early retirement at lower rank.

Until his death in 1968, Kimmel worked hard to clear his name, an effort that others, including his son and grandson, have carried on to this day. For example, in October 1990, the officers and trustees of the US Naval Academy Alumni Association at Annapolis unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the Navy to posthumously restore Kimmel's rank as four-star Admiral. This rehabilitation effort also includes this book, written by retired US Navy Captain Edward Beach.

A scapegoat, the book of Leviticus tells us, is a goat upon whom the sins of the people are placed before being driven into the wilderness. In an interview shortly before his death, Kimmel said: "They made me the scapegoat. They wanted to get the United States into the war." Asked just whom he meant by "they," he named President Roosevelt, US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and "others

in the Washington high command." Kimmel continued:

FDR was the architect of the whole business. He gave orders — and I can't prove this categorically — that no word about Japanese fleet movements was to be sent to Pearl Harbor except by Marshall, and then he told Marshall not to send anything.

Meanwhile, others have continued to defend the official line. In a much-discussed work published in 1992, *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement*, Henry C. Clausen (with co-author Bruce Lee) acknowledged that Washington had ample warning of an imminent Japanese attack, but contends that the information passed on to Kimmel and Short should have sufficed to motivate them to take defensive measures. [Dr. James J. Martin reviewed this book in the Jan.-Feb. 1995 *Journal*.] "The debacle at Pearl Harbor was the result of Short's and Kimmel's being asleep at the switch," concludes Clausen.

As its title indicates, *Scapegoats* was written with the goal of exonerating Kimmel and Short. Author Edward Beach tries to show why the Pearl Harbor naval base was unprepared for the Japanese attack, and who was to blame for the Pacific Fleet's lack of readiness. More specifically, Beach presents strong evidence to show that Kimmel and Short were unjustly blamed for the misdeeds of Roosevelt, Marshall and other higher-ups in the US military command.

Little of this book is really new. Most of the facts and arguments laid out here have already been presented, often more clearly and persuasively, in works — often cited by Beach — by earlier revisionist historians. (See, for example, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, an outstanding anthology edited by Harry Elmer Barnes [softcover IHR edition available from the IHR for \$11.75 postpaid].)

Indeed, Beach openly acknowledges his debt to such works as *The Pacific War*, by British historian John Costello, and *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War*, the still unsurpassed study by George Morgenstern. [A handsome IHR softcover edition, with a special introduction by James J. Martin, is available for \$11.45 postpaid.]

Much of the ground covered by Beach has also been covered in issues of this *Journal*. These include the special Winter 1983-84 "Pearl Harbor" issue, which contains seven essays by Percy L. Greaves, Jr., chief of the minority research staff of the 1945-46 Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, along with an essay by James J. Martin, "Where Was General Marshall?" Three of the most

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Admiral H. E. Kimmel during a relaxed moment, prior to his appointment as commander of the US Pacific fleet.

important books on this subject — *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* by John Toland, *The Pacific War* by John Costello, and *At Dawn We Slept* by Gordon W. Prange — are reviewed by Greaves in the Fall 1982 issue of this *Journal*. Charles Lutton provided a lucid, detailed overview of the debate in “Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy,” in the Winter 1991-92 *Journal*. Also noteworthy is Roger Stolley’s essay, “Pearl Harbor No Surprise,” in the Spring 1992 *Journal*.

Inadequate Defense

As Beach explains in this book, Roosevelt decided in 1940 that American forces in the Philippines, and not at Pearl Harbor, were the most likely target of a possible Japanese attack. As a result, Washington neglected to supply the Hawaii base with the requisite new, long-range patrol aircraft and spare parts. This failure adequately to supply Pearl Harbor is a very important factor in consider-

ing the single most important accusation leveled against Kimmel and Short: that having been informed that north was the most likely direction of a possible Japanese attack, they nevertheless failed to set up a sustained air patrol to spot any approaching enemy strike force.

A detailed article in the December 1994 issue of the *Proceedings* of the US Naval Institute (cited by Beach) authoritatively exonerates Kimmel of this specific charge. Entitled “Reopen the Kimmel Case,” it is written by Dr. Michael Gannon, professor of history at the University of Florida. Gannon also points out that an effective reconnaissance patrol over a protracted period, with a complete, 360-degree surveillance sweep, would have required a fleet of 250 operational aircraft. But during the first week of December 1941, only 49 such patrol aircraft were available. Adequate crews, spare parts, and experienced aviation machinists were likewise not available. Although Kimmel had been promised delivery of 100 new PBV-1 Catalina aircraft for surveillance, these were never delivered, and Hawaii was left without the means to sustain an effective air patrol.

‘Magic’ Intercepts

Washington’s most egregious failure with regard to the forces in Hawaii was in neglecting to pass on vital intelligence information to Kimmel and Short. Because the Washington high command no longer gave the highest priority to Pearl Harbor as a possible Japanese target, and (according to Beach) because Washington feared compromising the source of its intelligence intercepts, known as “Magic,” Washington failed to supply the Hawaii commanders with the intelligence that would have sufficiently alerted them to the strong likelihood of an impending attack.

For some time prior to December 1941, US cryptographers had broken Japan’s diplomatic code, and high-level administration officials were routinely reading all confidential communications between Tokyo and Japanese embassies in Washington and elsewhere. During the weeks prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, US officials decrypted several Japanese messages that indicated an imminent outbreak of war with the United States and Britain.

These included a secret message sent by Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin on November 30, 1941. He was told to meet immediately with Hitler and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and in confidence to inform them:

Say to them [Hitler and Ribbentrop] that lately England the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably

have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

On the evening of December 3, the US Navy Department in Washington intercepted Tokyo's coded "winds execute" message, which informed its embassies that Japan would soon be at war against the United States and Britain.

By December 6th at the latest, US officials had enough information to indicate Pearl Harbor was the likely target of an impending Japanese attack. For one thing, Washington knew on the 6th that Japan's envoy in Washington was ordered to deliver his final message to US Secretary of State Hull at 1:00 p.m., Washington time — which coincided with dawn in Hawaii.

During a 1944 naval inquiry, Captain Laurance Safford, the leading cryptologist responsible for decoding intercepted Japanese messages, courageously testified on what he and his office knew:

On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States ...

On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military [US Army] Intelligence at this same time. Finally at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941 [about 5:00 a.m. Hawaii time], we received positive information ... that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) that date.

All decoded messages, Safford explained, were promptly passed on to the President and other key civilian and military personnel. Yet both Kimmel and Short were kept in the dark about the most pertinent of these messages. The responsibility for failing to pass along this critically important information to the Hawaii commanders, Beach writes, belonged to Admiral Harold Stack, General George Marshall, and Vice Admiral Richmond Turner.

As Beach points out, the real value of intelligence is measured only by its utility. Paralysis based on fear of losing a valuable source of informa-



Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, commanding general of the US Army's Hawaiian Department.

tion only makes the data derived therefrom worthless.

Beach and other historians believe that at a secret, late-night White House meeting on the evening before the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt was informed of the most recently intercepted Japanese communication. A Navy officer who was present later testified that upon reading it, Roosevelt exclaimed "This means war!" Beach contends that it was fear of exposing "Magic" that explains Roosevelt's failure to immediately alert Kimmel, Short and other appropriate officials, and even to deny that this late-night White House meeting ever took place.

Just one hour and seven minutes before Japanese bombs began falling on Pearl Harbor, an important telegram by General Marshall was dispatched to General Short in Hawaii. It read:

JAPANESE ARE PRESENTING AT ONE PM EASTERN STANDARD TIME TODAY WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN ULTIMATUM ALSO THEY ARE UNDER ORDERS TO DESTROY THEIR CODE MACHINE IMMEDIATELY STOP JUST WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE HOUR SET MAY HAVE WE DO NOT KNOW BUT BE ON ALERT ACCORDINGLY STOP INFORM NAVAL AUTHORITIES OF THIS COMMUNICATION MARSHALL



Secretary of War Henry Stimson speaks with Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall.

Marshall could have used a trans-Pacific telephone to make sure that Hawaii learned instantly of this momentous news, but this was not done. Instead, this message was sent by regular commercial radio telegraph, and was not received by Short and Kimmel until after the Japanese attack.

In his 1955 book, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, Husband Kimmel summed up his view of the situation:

The deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as a fleet base were well known in the Navy Department. In an interview with Mr. Roosevelt in June 1941, in Washington, I outlined the weaknesses and concluded with the remark that the only answer was to have the fleet at sea if the Japs ever attacked.

I accepted the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor in the firm belief that the Navy Department would supply me promptly with all pertinent information available and in particular with all information that indicated an attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

... The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages ["Magic"] was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation.

... Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the intercepted Japanese messages was withheld from me. This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me.

I was not supplied with any information of the intercepted messages showing that the Japanese government had divided Pearl Harbor

into five areas and was seeking minute berthing information as to the berthing of ships of the fleet in those areas, which was vitally significant.

'Second Class Revisionist'

In a much discussed, and much criticized, 1982 study, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* [soft-cover edition available from the IHR for \$10.00 postpaid], historian John Toland laid out evidence for his thesis that President Roosevelt fully anticipated Japan's attack, and intentionally withheld this vital information from Kimmel and Short in the expectation that a devastating Japanese attack in Hawaii would bring the United States decisively and irrevocably into war. This is also the view that Kimmel himself came to hold. In a 1958 interview (published in the Winter 1991-92 *Journal*), he stated:

My belief is that General Short and I were not given the information available in Washington and were not informed of the impending attack because it was feared that action in Hawaii might deter the Japanese from making the attack. Our president had repeatedly assured the American people that the United States would not enter the war unless we were attacked. The Japanese attack on the fleet would put the United States in the war with the full support of the American public.

Oddly, Beach does not accept the view of the man he seeks to exonerate, and even dismisses Toland's thesis as "off the wall."

Discussing the current state of the debate about Pearl Harbor and its background, Beach writes:

There is today a great need for historical reappraisal, even at the risk of being labeled a "revisionist." This word is so often used as a pejorative that some historians have developed knee-jerk reactions whenever they hear it, and any suggestion of revisionist thinking causes those advocating a thoughtful approach to become defensive.

To be a "revisionist" these days means that one believes Roosevelt deliberately exposed our fleet at Pearl Harbor to "lure the Japanese to attack," had full knowledge of the approach of the six-carrier task force across the north Pacific for that purpose, and refrained from alerting our forces in Hawaii in order that Japan's "first blow" would be so devastating that it would coalesce our entire national political spectrum into support for entry into the war. While this approximates the facts of what happened, there is no proof that it was intentional or deliberate on his part.

The author of these pages will admit to

being what might be called a "second-class revisionist" in that he feels that Roosevelt was convinced by mid-1941 of the necessity of our entry into the war and did all he could to bring it about ...

Roosevelt's Push for War


Perhaps reluctant to confront the issue of Roosevelt's role and responsibility, Beach keeps his book focused on the responsibility of Kimmel and Short for the Pearl Harbor debacle, and therefore does not dwell on the larger issue of Roosevelt's campaign to involve the United States in war with Japan and Germany. This is regrettable, because US policy toward Japan in the period before prior to Pearl Harbor attack must be considered in determining the culpability of these two commanders.

Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, popular sentiment against American involvement in the European and Asian wars was so strong that Roosevelt resorted to deceit and outright lies in his campaign from mid-1939 to December 1941 to bring the US into war.

Against Japan, he applied increasingly severe pressure. In September 1940 Roosevelt imposed an embargo on all US exports of scrap iron and steel to the country. On July 26, 1941, he ordered a freeze on all Japanese assets in the United States, which ended trade between the two countries. This was a severe blow to Japan, which depended heavily on the US for its scrap steel, and oil and petroleum products. Roosevelt's order, which amounted to an economic declaration of war, threatened Japan's survival as a developed, industrialized nation.

Also in July 1941, the President secretly authorized devastating American bombing raids against Japanese cities. Roosevelt and his top military advisers approved a daring plan to use American pilots and American war planes, deceitfully flying under the Chinese flag, to bomb Japan's major cities. (See "Roosevelt's Secret Prewar Plan to Bomb Japan," *Winter 1991-92 Journal*.)

On November 26, 1941, Secretary of State Hull handed the Japanese ambassador in Washington a ten-point memorandum that bluntly spelled out the US government's stern policy toward Japan. The core of this virtual ultimatum was a demand that



Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941: A rescue launch approaches the badly crippled battleship "West Virginia" to pick up survivors.

Japan "withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina."

It was this paper that convinced the Tokyo leadership that further discussions with the US were pointless, and that Japan now had no choice but resort to arms. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the "back door to war," Roosevelt attained the goal for which he had been striving so ardently for more than two years. (For an authoritative summary of Japan's view of the background to Pearl Harbor, see "Hideki Tojo's Prison Diary," in the *Spring 1992 Journal*. See also *A Time for War: Franklin Roosevelt and the Path to Pearl Harbor*, by Robert Smith Thompson, reviewed by Joseph Bishop in the *March-April 1996 Journal*.)

Beach expresses approval of, or at least understanding for, Roosevelt's artful campaign to maneuver Japan into striking the first blow. At the same time, though, he derides the President for his failure to fully prepare for this conflict, thus leaving US forces in the Pacific unprepared. That is, Roosevelt was guilty of not letting his military hand know what his diplomatic hand was doing. If he worked for and anticipated war with Japan, he should simultaneously have fortified US forces in Hawaii and the Philippines to make them fully prepared for attack. This lack of consistency or coordination resulted in the unforgivable sacrifice of thousands of men in the initial Japanese onslaught. It is only within this context that one can fairly assess the guilt of Kimmel and Short, if any.

Beach makes an interesting comparison between the ignominious post-1941 fates of Kimmel and Short, and the celebrated post-1941 career of Douglas MacArthur, who commanded American

forces in the Philippines in December 1941. Although Washington provided MacArthur with warnings of a possible Japanese attack that were at least as clear as those given the commanders in Hawaii, he was no better prepared for a Japanese assault. MacArthur's forces were devastated by Japanese raids much as those under the command of Kimmel and Short.

But instead of ignominy and early forced retirement, MacArthur — in contrast to Kimmel and Short — was promoted, and went on to an acclaimed wartime career that secured a legendary place in history. So blame was not only misdirected, it was also (as Beach points out) inconsistently assigned. A factor that may have contributed to protecting MacArthur's reputation, Beach notes parenthetically, is the fact that MacArthur, along with his boss, General Marshall, were both 32nd degree Freemasons.

Confronting a Powerful Myth

In trying explain why Kimmel and Short still remain scapegoats, even after more than half a century, Beach writes:

Were the awesome personalities of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Gen. George C. Marshall not involved, it is my conviction that the events leading to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would long since have been seen in their true light. The blame leveled, in the heat of that tragic day, upon our two unfortunate commanders there would no longer be part of the historical record.

But this assessment misses the mark. What's at stake here is much greater than these two "awesome personalities." Roosevelt and Marshall are regarded as "awesome" above all because of the roles they played during World War II — the conflict by which America attained its superpower status. An important pillar of America's mythical self-image as a righteous superpower is the Pearl Harbor legend that the United States was minding its own business until the mad Japanese launched their unprovoked attack, dragging reluctant Americans into a terrible world war, and thereby obliging the United States to shoulder "international responsibilities" as world judge, philanthropist and policeman.

A broader understanding of the background to the Pearl Harbor attack, and especially President Roosevelt's secretive and unlawful efforts to provoke war, would go far toward shattering this popular legend — an issue that, regrettably, Beach does not adequately address. For as long as the myth of the United States as the reluctant geopolitical messiah endures, Americans will resist viewing this century's history with candor, and Kimmel and Short will remain scapegoats.

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
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