

The Journal of Historical Review

Peter H. Oppenheimer

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Learned and Applied*

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Volume Seven, Number Two

Summer 1986

The Journal of Historical Review

VOLUME SEVEN, NUMBER 2 / SUMMER 1986

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The Journal of Historical Review is published quarterly by the Institute for Historical Review, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505. Subscriptions include the *IHR Newsletter*, containing news of interest to academic and lay historical Revisionists, which is issued eight times per year in months *The Journal of Historical Review* is not issued. Combined subscription price is \$30 per year, \$50 for two years and \$70 for three years. Add \$10 per year for domestic first class delivery. Add \$10 per year for foreign subscriptions. Add \$20 per year for overseas airmail delivery. Remittances for subscriptions must be payable in U.S. dollars drawable on a U.S. bank. Quantity subscription and bulk issue rates are available on request. Appropriate manuscripts are welcomed by the editor, and must be accompanied by return postage.

Listed:

Library of Congress
British Library
PTLA Catalog
EBSCO Librarians Handbook
Ulrich's International Periodical Directory
Turner Periodical Catalog
Standard Periodical Directory

ISSN: 0195-6752

**Institute for Historical Review
P.O. Box 1306
Torrance, California 90505**

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Two copies of each reprint should be submitted to the publisher of *The Journal of Historical Review*.

Table of Contents

Volume Seven, No. 2

Summer 1986

Articles

- From the Spanish Civil War to the Fall of France: 133
Luftwaffe Lessons Learned and Applied
Peter H. Oppenheimer
- Politics, Prejudice and Procedure: 175
The Impeachment Trial of Andrew Johnson
Robert C. Black
- The Legionary Movement in Romania 193
Alexander E. Ronnett, M.D.
Faust Bradescu, Ph.D.

Book Reviews

- Miron Dolot, *Execution by Hunger:* 229
The Hidden Holocaust
Arthur S. Ward
- C. Paul Vincent, *The Politics of Hunger:* 231
The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919
Robert A. Hall, Jr.
- John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle:* 236
Montenegro and Austria, 1908-1914
W.K. v. U.-Ziechmann

Historical News and Comment

- Historians Wrangle over the 239
Destruction of European Jewry
Dr. Wilhelm Stäglich
- Shoah*: Abraham Bomba, the Barber 244
Bradley R. Smith
- About the Contributors* 253



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*From the Spanish Civil War
to the Fall of France:
Luftwaffe Lessons Learned and Applied*

PETER H. OPPENHEIMER

Operation Magic Fire (28 July 1936 – 29 March 1939)

Hermann Göring proclaimed the existence of the reconstructed German *Luftwaffe* on 10 March 1935.¹ Within eighteen months, the new *Luftwaffe* embarked upon Operation Magic Fire, a program to assist the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. The war, which broke out in the summer of 1936, provided Hitler with an excellent opportunity to distract European attention from his machinations elsewhere on the Continent while at the same time enabling the fledgling *Luftwaffe* to field test its air warfare doctrine and equipment in military action.² The *Luftwaffe* learned much from the Spanish War in the way of strategy, tactics, logistics, and operations. These lessons were reinforced by the Polish Campaign in September 1939 and applied in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France in 1940.

Condor Legion was the name given to the German military units dispatched in November 1936 to fight in Spain. The task of this paper is to address issues surrounding the Condor Legion in Spain. Specifically, what lessons did the *Luftwaffe* learn from the Spanish War? What was the role of the Condor Legion in that war? Was the *Luftwaffe* helped or hampered by the experience of the Spanish Civil War? Did the Spanish War play a decisive role in influencing the *Luftwaffe* operational doctrine that contributed to Germany's defeat in World War II? By answering these questions, I hope to

show that the Spanish War provided ambiguous benefits to the nascent *Luftwaffe*. Although the Condor Legion involvement in Spain proved an invaluable training and testing opportunity, the lessons it taught were occasionally interpreted erroneously. On the whole, however, the Condor Legion experience in Spain established a wellspring of variegated experience from which the *Luftwaffe* was to draw heavily at the beginning of the Second World War.

Small Beginnings

On 18 July 1936, Adolf Hitler approved the Spanish Nationalist request for military assistance in the civil war that had begun one day earlier.³ Within ten days, twenty Junker Ju52s had been dispatched to Spain, flown by *Lufthansa* (Germany's commercial airline) pilots and *Luftwaffe* volunteers. Shortly thereafter, six Heinkel He51 biplane fighters were shipped to Spain, along with twenty 20mm flak guns.⁴ Although many historians have claimed that Germany entered the Spanish conflict without reservation, this is untrue. Hitler supported Franco over the objections of every ministry in his government.⁵ However, the initial German assistance was restricted in both men and materiel. Indeed, only 85 *Luftwaffe* volunteers were sent originally to serve in Spain under the command of Major General Hugo Sperrle, and the designated mission explicitly excluded direct military participation in combat operations.⁶ The *Freiwillige* (volunteers) released from the *Luftwaffe* were under orders only to train Spanish men to fly the German planes. In less than a week, however, one of the Spanish trainees killed himself and destroyed a plane, while two other Spaniards crashed on their first mission.⁷ Because of these mishaps, the German pilots sought and received permission to fly combat missions.⁸

The international reaction to German intervention in Spain was both immediate and hostile. Great Britain lodged a formal protest against the German volunteers and began to support the Spanish Republicans.⁹ The Soviet Union subscribed to a French non-intervention plan in principle, but then demanded that Germany immediately cease aid, and began to aid the Republicans themselves.¹⁰ Göring, having succumbed to Hitler's desire to intervene in Spain, demanded that the *Luftwaffe* expand yet faster.¹¹

Hitler's true reasons for intervening in Spain had little to do with Franco's need of assistance or the simple desire to test and develop military equipment; rather, they were strategic.¹² A Nationalist-

controlled Spain, as Antony Beevor points out, "would present a threat to France's rear as well as the British route to the Suez Canal."¹³ There was also the tempting possibility of U-Boat bases on Spain's Atlantic coast (Spanish ports were actually used occasionally by the Germans during World War II). Hitler also viewed the war as a way to forge the Axis with Italy while distracting Mussolini's attention from Austria and the Balkans. The idea of the war as a testing ground for German equipment was secondary at best. Yet as the equipment initially provided to the Legion demonstrated itself deficient, Berlin responded by supplying new, untested aircraft.¹⁴ Spain became a testing ground for the *Luftwaffe* by chance, not design.

In Spain, the Condor Legion was divided into six parts: a command staff (S/88), one bomber wing with three squadrons of Ju52s (K/88); one fighter wing with three squadrons of He51s (J/88), a reconnaissance squadron of twelve He70s and four heavy flak batteries of 88mm guns (A/88), two 20mm light flak batteries (F/88), and a communications detachment (Ln/88).¹⁵

Pre-Spanish Civil War *Luftwaffe* Doctrine

The airwar theoreticians most influential in the West in the 1920s and the 1930s were Douhet in Italy, Mitchell in the U.S.A, and Trenchard in England. Basically, these men postulated that airplanes could be the decisive factor in the next major war. The air provided a third dimension in which the static trench warfare of World War I could be avoided.¹⁶ The essence of their idea lay in "strategic" bombing. Countries would possess large numbers of long-range bombers capable of destroying the enemy's cities and industrial base. Large-scale destruction would quickly lead to the collapse of the enemy's economy, the demoralization of his people, and a quick end to the war. Inherent in this theory was the belief that "the bomber always gets through." In other words, fast, long-range, heavily armed bombers were invincible and unstoppable. Some of Douhet's extreme adherents even claimed that air warfare made the army and navy superfluous.¹⁷

Germany's airwar visionary during this period was Walther Wever, head of the *Luftwaffe* until his death in 1936. Wever studied Douhet's teachings but believed that a broadly based air strategy was superior to "strategic" bombing,¹⁸ and he argued that the air force should complement the army and navy.¹⁹ His death left the *Luftwaffe* with less capable men in charge. Nonetheless, the doctrine governing *Luftwaffe* air power was formulated by Wever

before he died. Fundamentally, the three military services were to cooperate in order to achieve the foremost goal of any war, that of destroying the enemy armed forces. "It is the task of the air force in leading the war in the air within the wider framework of the whole war to serve this goal."²⁰ More specifically, *Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung* (*Luftwaffe* Service Regulation 16: Conduct of the Air War) laid down three points: (1) subjugation of the enemy air force in order to achieve and maintain air superiority; (2) support of the army and navy; (3) attack against the enemy industry.²¹

These three points implied that the *Luftwaffe* should destroy the enemy air force over its own territory, if possible when it was still on the ground. For good measure aircraft factories, ground installations, and air fields were also to be bombed. Secondly, support of the army was critical. Bombers were to clear the way for tanks and infantry by destroying depots, harassing enemy troops, and disrupting communications. Already, *Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16* hinted at the future subordination of the *Luftwaffe* to the Army. Once these two primary tasks had been accomplished, airplanes were to bomb production centers, food supplies, railroads, ports, traffic centers, military recruiting centers, and government administrative centers.²²

Luftwaffe doctrine presumed that the defense of the homeland would be the responsibility of the flak batteries. This was not nearsighted daydreaming. Prewar anti-aircraft units were highly trained and extremely effective, perhaps the best in Europe.²³ Therefore, the prescription for aircraft production prior to the Spanish War, based on the assumption that fighters were not required for homeland defense, was three bombers to every fighter.²⁴ When, as a result of the Spanish War, Colonel Ernst Udet, head of the *Luftwaffe*'s technical department and Office of Air Armament, decided to change the *Luftwaffe*'s force structure from a three bomber to one fighter ratio to two bomber to one fighter ratio, it was for purely offensive reasons.²⁵ As far as German naval air theory was concerned, an independent naval air arm was to be created, consisting of floatplanes, flying boats, and naval fighter planes.²⁶ This arm would cooperate with the Navy, both offensively and defensively. Inexplicably, no aircraft carriers were completed by the Germans, although two were planned and construction on the *Graf Zeppelin* was begun. This strategic error indicated the myopia of the Navy general staff, which did not expect a general war until 1943-44, the landlocked nature of German air power thinking, and the fierce interservice rivalry within the *Wehrmacht* (armed services).

The psychological component of air warfare was not neglected by *Luftwaffe* theorists. As early as 1933, the *Luftwaffe* began to plan for war. Most strategists argued that the next war would be total, entailing the complete mobilization of the civilian population and the engagement of all the country's resources. Under these conditions, many people argued that the unity created by the Nazis would better enable Germany to withstand an all-out struggle. Terror bombing of cities by the *Luftwaffe* would result in the collapse of the enemy's morale and his consequent surrender. The same people assumed that a totalitarian society like National Socialist Germany would more easily endure bombing attacks than the fractured societies of France and Britain. This attitude oriented *Luftwaffe* thinking throughout the 1930's.²⁷

In spite of the explicit air power doctrine laid out by Wever in *Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16*, the *Luftwaffe* had little opportunity to field test its aircraft and theory in the years between its inception in 1933 and the beginning of the Spanish War in 1936. Thus, the *Luftwaffe's* overriding theory was "to employ maximum forces at the decisive point of the battle."²⁸ The course of the battle would necessarily dictate changes in both strategy and tactics, but this was something the *Luftwaffe* was prepared to do.

Tactical Lessons from the Spanish Civil War

It was in the realm of tactics, among other areas, that the Germany military excelled, and it was in the realm of air tactics that the *Luftwaffe* benefitted the most from the Spanish War. The key individual in this area was Werner Mölders. During the Spanish War, Mölders grasped the change in airwar brought about by the monoplane's increased speed and maneuverability, and he developed the *Rotte* and *Schwarm* fighter formation (called the finger-four by the British and Americans), which in one form or another is still in use today. Instead of the World War I fighter group locked in tight wing-to-wing "V" formation, the *Rotte* consisted of two planes, one tailing the other to protect the lead plane's rear.²⁹ A *Schwarm* consisted of two *Rottes*, and the *Schwarm* configuration mimicked that of the *Rotte*.³⁰ When several of these units of four joined to make a *Staffel* (squadron), the units were staggered at different altitudes as a means of mutual search and protection.³¹ This formation possessed several advantages. The increased distances between the planes allowed for greater maneuverability and higher plane speeds. This in turn gave pilots greater flexibility when confronting opponents and enabled them to

use their firepower more effectively against those opponents.

The Spanish War also indicated how difficult it was for conventional bombers to hit targets both at day and night.³² This difficulty led the *Luftwaffe* command to favor the more accurate dive bomber over conventional bombers. The Germans' failure to develop an accurate bombsight further reinforced support for the dive bomber. Night attacks pointed to the difficulty of not only hitting targets, but finding them as well. As a consequence, the *Luftwaffe* placed great emphasis on the development of navigational aids essential for bad weather and night operation. The ultimate result was the *Knickebein* system, first used in the Battle of Britain. *Knickebein* was a blind-bombing system which utilized radio direction to assist aerial navigation.

Low-level attacks were another result of conventional bombing's inherent inaccuracy. A First World War development refined during the Spanish conflict, low-level attacks enabled pilots to judge their bombing runs more accurately and to conduct strafing attacks which demoralized enemy troops, disrupted enemy communications, and pinpointed enemy artillery. The one great disadvantage of ground level attacks was that they exposed aircraft to ground fire. No less significantly, ground level attacks increased the chance of crashes since there was very little time for a pilot to deal with an engine stall, unexpected terrain features, or any similar disastrous surprise.

The Spanish conflict revealed the importance of communications as well. The *Luftwaffe* realized that the signal corps needed to be equipped with radios to maintain close contact between air and ground forces. Furthermore, the new *Rotte* formation dictated an increase in the distance between planes. Although hand signals had sufficed in the past, German pilots perceived that air-to-air radio communications had become critical to the success of the new tactics.

Yet in order to understand the influence of the Spanish War on the *Luftwaffe*, several other areas of air warfare tactics must be addressed in greater detail. They are the development of close ground support of infantry by the Condor Legion, the evolution of fighter tactics, bombing, and reconnaissance.

Close Ground Support

Low-level attacks and close support of the infantry were tactics developed by Wolfram von Richthofen during the Spanish Civil War.³³ During the first battle of Madrid in 1936, German air tactics proved inadequate, primarily because they were experimental.³⁴ The

Legion acted as airborne artillery, bombing and strafing Republican strongpoints and then quickly fleeing.³⁵ This proved ineffective. However, by functioning as airborne artillery, the Germans learned the importance of close coordination with the ground forces so as to avoid attacking friendly troops. The Legion developed extensive communications, linking planes and ground forces, to avoid just this danger. A Legion officer was assigned to the assault troops and linked by radio to the Legion Command Post. An advantageous relationship resulted. Because the Versailles Treaty had forbidden the Germans from having an air force, almost "all future *Luftwaffe* officers, in the early period, had extensive training and experience in the infantry, artillery, or cavalry, and held a great knowledge and appreciation for the problems of ground commanders."³⁶ In addition, Nationalist troops often attached white panels to their backs so they could be easily identified from the air. When necessary, they used flares and smoke pots as well.³⁷

The equipment initially supplied to the Condor Legion also impelled close ground support. Condor Legion pilots soon discovered that their He51 biplanes were outclassed by the Russian Polikarpov I-16 monoplanes and took pains to avoid direct combat confrontation.³⁸ Moreover, the Nationalists were deficient in artillery.³⁹ As a result, the He51 was assigned the role of low-flying artillery in support of Nationalist infantry.

Ground support tactics did not develop immediately, nor did they ever attain the simplicity of textbook formulation. Rather, experience illustrated the necessity of a flexible response to local conditions. The general pattern was for German 88mm guns to bombard enemy strongpoints, followed by bomber and fighter attacks. The infantry advanced directly behind the low-flying planes.⁴⁰ There were many variations of this basic pattern. For instance, during the Battle of Brunete in July 1937, General Sperrle divided his squadron into four flights of two planes each. Successive flights swept in abreast of the enemy flak batteries, opening fire with their machine guns while still a good distance away. Over the batteries, they salvoed their bombs and pulled up as quickly as possible to avoid their own bomb blasts.⁴¹ It was essential to neutralize the enemy flak batteries because the cumbersome Ju52 bombers which followed the fighters were easy targets.⁴² Low altitude attacks also helped ensure that the Ju52s would not bomb friendly infantry. By dispatching successive relays of air attacks, the Legion wore down Republican defenses and shattered the morale of Republican forces.⁴³

In the North, tactics perfected during the attacks against the

Basques were put into practice. Heavy artillery and aerial bombardments destroyed the enemy defenses while He111 bombers escorted by Bf109s penetrated deep into Republican territory, bombing important enemy targets.⁴⁴ During the Nationalist attack on Madrid in late 1936, the Republican chief of staff complained of the devastating air strikes launched against him. "The machine gun fire kept [his] men pinned to the ground to the point where they could not man their guns, and attacks in the rear caused great confusion."⁴⁵

Mass formation of bombers was yet another revision of tactics prompted by the well-fortified enemy strong points in the Basque North. Because an attack by only one or two aircraft simply drove the enemy into his dugouts, safe to reappear after the planes had passed overhead, the Condor Legion pilots approached the enemy from the rear, dropping their bombs all at once. The combined explosive power of the bombs was often sufficient to destroy the fortified dugouts. This innovation the pilots dubbed, "the little man's bomb-carpet."⁴⁶ Thus carpet-bombing was born.⁴⁷ The talent for responding flexibly to local circumstances characterized the Legion's development of close ground support tactics, and it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that Colonel von Richthofen deserves the primary credit for the development of these tactics.

Evolution of Fighter Tactics

Fighter tactics in World War I were crude in form, constrained by the slow and unwieldy triplanes then available and limited by the lack of knowledge about aerial combat in general. As the war progressed, pilots gained experience, armaments were developed, and airplane designs advanced. But relative to World War II, airplanes and tactics in World War I were primitive. Usually, each side massed its planes to maximize total firepower in twisting dogfights. With the advent of fast monoplanes, however, tactics changed to accommodate and exploit the improved capabilities of the single-winged aircraft. Raymond Proctor explains that monoplanes

emphasized the elements of maneuver to firepower in formations. With speed and maneuver came closure, and with it the need to sight the enemy first and to protect the vulnerable tail areas. 80% of all aerial kills are attained with the aircraft shot down never knowing the enemy is there and the attack usually comes from dead to the rear (or the 6 o'clock position). In the traditional formation the pilot of the new high-speed aircraft had far too much of his attention distracted by guarding against crashing into his wingman and was thereby vulnerable to enemy attack.⁴⁸

As a consequence of the increased vulnerability of the monoplane fighter, particularly when utilizing biplane tactics, Werner Mölders devised the *Rotte* and *Schwarm* configurations described above. Yet until the Condor Legion received advanced equipment, fighter tactics in Spain differed very little from those of World War I. Indeed, the slowness of the He51s in comparison to the Russian monoplanes was not an overwhelming handicap in most instances. Only when the pilot of an He51 broke off combat with an enemy monoplane fighter did the relative slowness of his biplane become potentially fatal.⁴⁹

On 29 October 1936 the decision was made in Germany to send modern equipment to Spain, including the Bf109 monoplane fighter.⁵⁰ The Bf109 enabled the Condor Legion to drive the Soviet I-15s and I-16s from the skies, conclusively establishing German air superiority in Spain.⁵¹ The offensive and defensive advantages of Mölder's finger-four fighter formation soon proved extraordinarily successful. Each *Rotte*, when necessary, could act as an independent entity in search, defense, and attack. Cooperation between two *Rottes* — as a *Schwarm* — increased total firepower and visual protection. When one *Rotte* was attacked, the other *Rotte* of the *Schwarm*, some 600 feet from its companion, was able to turn in on the enemy, bringing all its guns to bear. When attacking, the *Rotte* leader assumed the role of a gunship while his wingman flew in a "cone" pattern to his rear, effectively protecting the lead plane's 6 o'clock position.⁵² The increased distance between the planes of a *Rotte* allowed the pilots to focus their attention on scanning the sky rather than on striving to maintain close formation.⁵³

At times, He51s were used as bait in Spain. The biplanes flew several thousand feet below a squadron of Bf109s, which waited until Russian I-16s attacked the He51s. The I-16s were then attacked by the Bf109s. During an attack, the Bf109 sought to dive from a superior altitude and pass the enemy aircraft from below, coming up behind the intended victim in his blind spot. If the pilot missed, he could use his diving velocity to escape with speed, or climb again and attempt another pass.⁵⁴ Another particularly innovative fighter tactic involved a good measure of foresight and a careful calculation of "aloft" time. Several German planes would circle in the sky near the Soviet airfields. Soon, Soviet fighters scrambled to challenge the Condor Legion pilots, who intentionally stayed out of range until the Soviet interceptors ran low on fuel. Then, another Legion flight, carefully timed to arrive over the enemy airbase as the Soviet planes refueled, bombed and strafed the grounded aircraft.⁵⁵ Eventually, the Soviets responded with

appropriate defensive measures, but not before they had lost many planes.

Bombing

The effectiveness of bombing in the Spanish Civil War remained uncertain and for that reason provided the Condor Legion with lessons of dubious value. Spain was an unusual war because by mid-1937 the Condor Legion had achieved an infrequently contested dominance of the air, an advantage rarely enjoyed by an air force.

Throughout the war, German bomber pilots usually flew sorties without a fighter escort deep into enemy territory. The Republicans possessed little artillery, and what they had was generally ineffective. The freedom to bomb the enemy, unhindered by opposition, either in the air or from the ground, led the Germans to believe that a fast, heavily armed bomber was the decisive weapon in a military conflict involving aerial attacks. In many ways, the German experience seemed to support Douhet's concept of "strategic" bombing in that it illustrated the ability of unescorted bombers to penetrate deep into enemy territory and inflict great destruction in mass bombing attacks. Yet the Germans did not enlarge upon Douhet's theory. Rather, they attempted to combine the elements of both fighters and bombers into one plane on the assumption that the resulting aircraft would be better than either of its precursors.⁵⁶ Close ground support tactics also uncovered the desirability of combining both bombing and strafing capabilities into one airplane. In this way, the Germany military expenditures for the *Luftwaffe* could be economized, thus burdening the economy to a lesser degree. However, this was one of the many erroneous lessons drawn from the Spanish Civil War experience. The German experience with daylight bombing, night bombing, dive bombing, and naval bombing must be more fully examined to explain the development of Legion bombing tactics in Spain.

From the beginning of the war, the Legion used classical bombing tactics, adapting their methods whenever necessary to meet local contingencies. Basically, classical tactics entail close ground support of friendly infantry, interdiction of enemy supplies, and bombing attacks against enemy strongholds, troop formation, transportation, and communications. Occasionally, fighter escorts were assigned to the bombers, but this became less necessary as the Legion attained air supremacy. During the attack on Bilbao in the summer of 1937:

German bombers and other air groups dropped heavy bombs in daily attacks, from morning till night, on hill positions, tunnels, command posts, artillery positions, and troop concentrations. Also, they continually bombed the passes north of Miravelles to interrupt all traffic. All air groups were ordered not to bomb, under any circumstances, villages or populated areas.⁵⁷

The latter order, forbidding the bombing of populated areas, was soon violated. Madrid was the first European capital city in history to suffer aerial bombardment. The Germans bombed most of the residential districts of the city in a vain attempt to break the morale of the civilian population. According to Antony Beevor, this methodical experiment in psychological warfare "served only to make the populace more defiant."⁵⁸ The *Stuka* was to alter that.⁵⁹ But until dive bombing received greater emphasis, the Germans concentrated on low altitude bombing runs to compensate for the difficulty Legion bomber crews encountered in accurately placing their bombs on target. Even if the Germans had possessed an accurate bombsight, it is unlikely that it would have made much difference. Bomber crews required exhaustive training to learn precision bombing, and the Condor Legion airmen could afford neither the time nor the effort for such training. Yet, because of the minimal opposition encountered by Legion aircraft, daylight bombing was very effective. The Heinkel He111, a fast, heavily-armed medium bomber, arrived in Spain in 1938 and admirably fulfilled the role prescribed by the Spanish situation.⁶⁰

Because of the He111's successful performance in Spain, the *Luftwaffe* deduced that the medium bomber could be improved simply by designing a larger version. When the Ju52 demonstrated itself inadequate as a bomber,⁶¹ the *Luftwaffe* Technical Office staff requested a plane that would both correct the deficiencies of the Ju52 and extend the capabilities of the He111. More specifically, they ordered a medium bomber that:

- 1) had a flight time of five rather than three hours
- 2) had a bomb capacity of at least two tons
- 3) had a fully glazed nose for better visibility
- 4) had heavier armaments (*i.e.*, more defensive machine guns)
- 5) had improved radios
- 6) had a stronger landing gear and fuselage
- 7) had larger engines to cope with the increased weight and to provide improved flight performance.

The plane ultimately developed was the Ju88, the so-called "super" medium bomber.⁶² Initially, this plane proved a failure, and saw little combat action in Spain.⁶³ Nevertheless, the *Luftwaffe* had

wed itself to the medium bomber concept embodied by the He111, a concept that though spectacularly successful in Spain, eventually contributed to the *Luftwaffe* defeat several years later.

Night bombing was practiced infrequently in Spain due to the virtually insurmountable difficulties night operations posed. Yet during the early stages of the conflict, when the Republicans were still capable of mustering a significant fighter defense, General Sperre decided to engage the enemy in hours of darkness only.⁶⁴ Over Madrid the Legion bomber flights could gauge distances and destinations accurately because the truck traffic, upon which the city depended, was illuminated by its own headlights. Perceptively, Legion bombers struck when truck progress was slowed by bottlenecks at bridges and by the narrow roads of small towns. Weather permitting, the pilots flew sorties every night. However, the results left no doubt that it was difficult to hit small bridges with poor bomb sights at night. *Luftwaffe* Chief of Staff Albert Kesselring, Walther Wever's successor, drew the obvious conclusion: night bombing was effective only when the crews possessed a high degree of discipline and technical competence.⁶⁵

Night bombing was also extraordinarily demanding in terms of training, navigation, and mission execution. As a result, bomber research and development were directed towards two distinct goals. Men like Colonel Ernest Udet were convinced that every bomber should have a dive bombing capability. Others pushed *Luftwaffe* scientists to experiment with radio directional systems to aid navigation and answer the problem of bombing at night and in poor weather conditions. To fulfill the latter goal, the *Knickebein* system was developed and then tested for the first time in the Battle of Britain. The former goal, that of dive bombing, received a great deal more attention during the Spanish Civil War, where it was elaborated and refined.

The Spanish Civil War suggested to the German Air Staff that dive bombing was the single most accurate bombing method. As elucidated above, the special circumstances that existed in Spain enabled the Condor Legion to operate virtually uncontested in the skies over the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, the equipment with which the Legion was provided proved unsuitable for "strategic" bombing missions. At first, the Germans attempted to use the Ju52 as a bomber, but it was slow and lumbering, and thus an extremely vulnerable target for Republican anti-aircraft batteries. Not until later, in 1937, did the Legion receive aircraft, such as the He111, which was more adequate for "strategic" bombing missions. In any event, the unqualified success of close ground support operations underlined the need for an aircraft that could drop bombs with

pinpoint accuracy — something conventional bombers proved unable to do — so as not to scatter bombs on friendly forces. The plane that fulfilled these requirements was the Junker Ju87 dive bomber, first used during the Battle of Teruel in 1938.⁶⁶ The plane had peculiarly angled wings which gave it the appearance of an ugly culture, and *Luftwaffe* officers in Spain claimed that the *Stuka* could drop its bomb load within five meters of a target.⁶⁷

Wolfram von Richthofen discovered the Ju87 not only to be an accurate bomber but a psychologically demoralizing weapon as well. A technician suggested attaching sirens to the landing gear, a development which gave the *Stuka* its trademark whistling sound as it hurtled down on its target. Perhaps more so than the bombs themselves, the *Stukas'* sirens scared Republican forces, sometimes creating such a panic that the troops abandoned their weapons and fled. As the *Stuka* proved the value of dive bombing, the emphasis in production in Germany shifted toward the Ju87, confirming the belief among the military staff that the bomber was a tactical offensive weapon.⁶⁸ Precision bombing replaced "strategic" bombing for the *Luftwaffe* in Spain, and this partially explains why the Air Staff neglected the development of a heavy, four-engine conventional bomber so sorely needed in later years.

For the Germans, the story of naval bombing in the Spanish Civil War was characterized by minimal results. German naval air theory in the years 1935–1939 supported the idea of an independent naval air arm with floatplanes, flying boats, and naval fighter planes cooperating directly with the Navy. However, the theory was rarely applied. Initially, land-based attacks by planes also proved ineffective. In late October 1936 Franco urged the Condor Legion to bomb Republican naval and supply ports. It did so with disappointing results.⁶⁹ Over a year later, in the Mediterranean, another attempt was made at maritime bombing to interdict Soviet shipping. This time the Condor Legion enjoyed greater success, its seaplanes raiding shipping at sea by day and in harbor by night. On Franco's orders, the maritime bombing attacks escalated into a full-scale offensive. As Willard C. Frank notes, "Raids became continuous, severely reduced the supplies needed to maintain the [Republican] civilian population, and did serve to undercut morale."⁷⁰ By the end of the war in 1939, Italian and German aircraft had sunk 115 Republican and 51 foreign merchant ships, a total equal to nearly 75 percent of all enemy ships destroyed by those two countries during the entire war. Another 225 bombing sorties during this period damaged or delayed many Republican cargoes, choking off a source of the besieged population's food, clothing, fuel and medical supplies and producing increased misery and despair.

Dive bombers were intended as the basic instrument of enemy shipping's destruction. However, the only plane available at the time, the Ju87, originally had only a one-hundred mile operational radius, a factor which limited flight time. Legion pilots did ascertain that torpedo attacks and dive bombing were very promising.⁷¹ But the *Luftwaffe* developed neither a long-range dive bomber nor a torpedo bomber. The He59 and He115 floatplanes were intended to be torpedo bombers, but they never carried out an operation. The Germans were aware of their limitations, but because of their indifferent attitude, they failed to exploit the equipment at hand. The Air Staff believed that the larger German warships received adequate service from their Arado and Heinkel floatplanes. This helps to account for the nearsighted decision not to complete the German aircraft carrier, the *Graf Zeppelin*.⁷² In any case, the High Command in 1937–39 believed that war with Great Britain could be avoided, and men like Ernst Udet did not believe that Germany would wage war against a maritime power like Great Britain.⁷³ As a result of the maritime air war during the Spanish War, the Germans falsely deduced that ships underway did not need to fear aerial attack. Consequently, naval officers procrastinated dangerously on improvements for shipboard anti-aircraft defenses.⁷⁴ Overall, the *Luftwaffe* concluded that a separate naval air arm was unnecessary, and by 1940, it had begun to be reabsorbed into air force land-based squadrons.

Reconnaissance was ultimately the most successful element of German naval air policy in Spain. Initially, reconnaissance, both over land and sea, was viewed negatively because of the scanty results obtained.⁷⁵ It was believed more important to wear the Republicans down through continual bombing. But this anti-reconnaissance attitude changed as the reports obtained through aerial observation demonstrated their value. Observation planes located the enemy, thereby conserving resources by eliminating the wasteful practice of simply sending bombers on haphazardly planned and implemented missions. Given the nature of the conflict, with the great mobility of ground forces, it was important to know the enemy's exact location at any given time. At the Battle of Brunete, Nationalist observation planes were sent aloft. Within thirty minutes of sighting the enemy concentrations, Legion bombers appeared to strike and strafe the Republican troops.⁷⁶

The Republican Air Force always made a great effort to shoot down the Nationalist reconnaissance craft, and these observation planes were forced to engage in evasive tactics to preserve themselves. As a general rule, observation planes were less heavily

armored and armed than combat aircraft. Speed was most important. When attacked, the reconnaissance planes made for a cloudbank to hide. If none was available, the planes went into a dive to gain sufficient speed to escape their pursuer, or at least limit him to one attack. Another tactic practiced by the reconnaissance planes was to begin firing their machine guns long before they were in range of enemy fighters, occasionally causing the enemy to break off his attack too early. "Considering its technical disadvantage, the Legion lost few reconnaissance planes."⁷⁷

Logistics & Operations

Mobility was the key logistical lesson taught the *Luftwaffe* by the Spanish War. The need for mobility had been demonstrated by the Italian military experience in Ethiopia in 1935–36. Mobility was frequently the key to the success of the Italian forces against the well-armed and well-trained Ethiopian Army. Yet, for the Germans in Spain, mobility meant more than just rapid deployment of men and equipment. It found its essence in ground-staff mobility.⁷⁸ The use of air transport and railroads to move entire unit installations quickly lay the groundwork for the *Blitzkrieg* as later practiced in Poland. The *Wohnzug* (railroad caravan) was the quintessential example of mobility in practice. The *Wohnzug* consisted of approximately eleven railway cars, two of which were locomotives attached at either end of the train, eliminating the need for turn-arounds. One-third of the cars contained sleeping compartments for the officers and enlisted men. At a moment's notice, the *Wohnzug* could be underway with all the squadron's equipment and support personnel. The flight crews flew their planes to the next designated base of operations to await the rest of the railroad-transported squadron. By 1939, each Condor Legion squadron was also assigned two Ju52s to be used both as transports and as radio direction-finding stations.⁷⁹ The Ju52s proved reliable workhorses, perfectly suited to the task which was set for them.

In operations, the Condor Legion learned how important ground support personnel were, particularly in the inhospitable environment of Spain. The men who fueled the motors, tinkered with the engines, and replaced broken or damaged parts played an indispensable role in the Condor Legion. At first, the Legion underestimated the number of personnel required to care for the aircraft properly as well as the number of reserves needed to replace overtired, injured, or killed front-line pilots. The exertions demanded of the men, including long, irregular hours frequently under harsh,

The lesson in operations typified the manner in which the *Luftwaffe* took advantage of the war not only to evaluate its practices but also its organization. During the course of the war, the flight elements of the battle squadrons and their ground personnel were reorganized, forming the basis for what later became standard operational configurations.⁸¹ A special combat reporting team was set up in Berlin and dispatched to Spain with orders to send back periodically for analysis and evaluation.⁸² In addition, the *Lehr Division* (Technical Development Flying Unit) was formed at Greifswald in 1937.⁸³ Its purpose was to discover the lessons of the Spanish conflict and distill the experience derived from air competitions and factory research. Essentially, the *Lehr Division* functioned as a post-graduate flight school and advanced operational training center devoted to absorbing and teaching new tactical air lessons, many of which came from Spain. Not surprisingly, much of what was learned was subsequently adopted as standard procedure to be used by the *Luftwaffe* throughout World War II.

Air Theory Applied in Spain

The theory of air doctrine described by Giulio Douhet in his book, *The Command of the Air* (1921), postulated a concept of "strategic" bombing which simply did not apply to the conflict raging on the Iberian Peninsula between 1936 and 1939. Douhet's theory was predicated on the premise that the static trench warfare epitomized by World War I set the pattern for all future ground wars and that "strategic" bombing provided the only means to avoid bloody wars of attrition. In Spain, the contest between the Nationalists and the Republicans was of a fluid and mobile nature, covering many different types of terrains and climates, constrained by delicate political circumstances, and limited by the available equipment. Douhet suggested the way to win a war was to destroy the enemy's cities and industrial base. In Spain, however, there was very little large-scale, heavy industry. It was perhaps to be expected that Spain was not, and, indeed, could not be, the war to verify Douhet's theory. Except for the unusual circumstances that

enabled Condor Legion bombers to attack the Republicans virtually unmolested, there was little proof that a well-organized fighter defense would be unable to check "strategic" bombers.

The development of close ground support tactics arose naturally, then, from the peculiar situation in Spain, as did the emphasis placed on dive and medium bombers. Many other factors contributed to the course of these developments, but they were of a more secondary nature.

On 1 May 1937 Richthofen wrote a letter to the *Luftwaffe* High Command stating "Spanish [Nationalist] artillery is always late in arriving; it fires too slowly and too poorly to keep the enemy pinned down. The load of the battle rests with the flyers; first by inflicting casualties, second, by holding him down, making him run, destroying his spirit to fight, and hindering his resupply and reinforcement."⁸⁴ Here was a cogent summary of Condor Legion air doctrine as practiced in Spain. The air force, claimed Richthofen, bore the primary responsibility for executing the attack. Intrinsic to this belief was the desirability, indeed necessity, of close coordination between the army and the air force. The goal of the Legion flight elements was threefold: (1) seek out the enemy air force in order to remove the threat to the army, (2) attack the enemy army, harass his troops, transport, and communications, and (3) protect ground troops and infantry from enemy air attack.⁸⁵ After air superiority had been established, the air force could then switch from air-to-air to air-to-ground attacks.

The *Luftwaffe* High Command was unaware of the efficacy and applicability of close ground support tactics at the outset of the Spanish War. It was still enthralled by the concept of "strategic" bombing. Von Richthofen slowly but surely weaned the High Command from its strategic airpower beliefs and persuaded it that close support tactics had great potential.

Some authors argue that Germany came to have an air force based on tactical air power rather than general air power because of the influence and predominance of the German Army.⁸⁶ For such authors, it was natural that the fledgling *Luftwaffe* be subordinated to the long-established army. But in truth, there was such general opposition to anything but "strategic" bombing that it was only Richthofen's perseverance and determination that led to the acceptance of tactical air power.⁸⁷ The first close support operations in Spain took place in March 1937, when He51 fighter bombers made a low-level attack on the Republican front at Bilbao with great success.⁸⁸ For the Germans, tactical air power as an operational doctrine and a strategy dates from this incident, and in retrospect,

changed the course of the next war and all future wars.

Other forms of bombing were not precluded as a strategy merely because Richthofen developed close ground support tactics. But that bombing was included in strategic planning does not mean the same thing as "strategic" bombing. As indicated above, high-altitude "strategic" bombing was practiced infrequently by the Condor Legion during the Spanish War because of the various political, economic, and structural circumstances. Yet the Spanish Civil War was not spectacularly successful with interdiction bombing. Its pilots discovered that conventional, high-level, precision bombing was difficult in the best of conditions and virtually impossible against heavily defended or pinpoint targets.⁸⁹ The lack of an accurate bombsight contributed to this inadequacy. Therefore, the move towards dive bombing was natural. The putative effects of "strategic" bombing — destruction of industrial bases, devastation of morale among the working population, and psychological demoralization of the civilian populace — as the 1938 *Luftwaffe* Yearbook indicates, simply had not occurred.⁹⁰ In this light, it became apparent that "strategic" bombing was not only difficult to carry out, but was ineffective as well. Dive bombing, with its promise of great precision, seemed to portend the future. Another reason for the demise of "strategic" bombing in Spain was inextricably linked to the death of Walther Wever. Wever's belief in the heavy, four-engined "Ural" bomber died with him, and there was no one else in the High Command willing to put through a costly and hypothetical program without sure knowledge of its ultimate result.

Personalities also exerted influence on the direction of *Luftwaffe* air theory. For example, Ernst Udet maintained a hold upon Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek, *Luftwaffe* Chief of Staff from February 1939 onwards.⁹¹ Udet's preoccupation with speed propelled German Air Staff policy in the direction of a fast, light bomber, rather than Wever's "Ural" bomber.⁹² As a consequence, Germany never manufactured the equivalent of the United States Air Forces's Boeing B17, a blunder that contributed to the *Luftwaffe's* failure to bomb England into submission during the course of 1940.

The intermingling of hard-headed doctrine and vain desire, economic constraints, and overrated successes led to an erroneous application of fighter forces in the defense of the Reich in 1943–44. Spain engendered a belief in the quasi-omnipotence of the flak batteries. Germany had produced an extraordinarily effective anti-aircraft gun in the 88mm, a weapon used with repeated success in the three years of the Spanish War. The 88mm gun was used in

Spain not only to protect against enemy aircraft but also to attack ships, tanks, troops, or any other ground targets. The confidence in the flak batteries was reinforced by the elite nature of the men that operated the guns. Pre-war anti-aircraft units constituted an independent, highly-trained body of men.⁹³ Total reliance was placed upon these men to protect against intruding enemy aircraft. As a result, the *Luftwaffe* neglected to develop early warning radar, as the British did, or fighter control, by the outbreak of war. This weakness was partially compensated by the excellent aircraft reporting system linking flak and fighter units (*cf.* Richthofen and close support tactics), but it was hardly sufficient. Because of the success of the flak batteries in Spain and the influence of Douhet's theory of attack, as well as Hitler's belief that the noise and the flash of the batteries had a salutary political and psychological effect on civilians, the *Luftwaffe* rested defense of the *Heimat* (Homeland) on these 88mm batteries, and manufactured fighters and bombers heavily weighted in favor of the latter. 40 percent of the pre-war *Luftwaffe* units were bombers and dive bombers and only 25–30 percent were fighters.⁹⁴ In the short-run, this imbalance of fighters and bombers was not a problem in Spain. But in the long-run, it subjected Germany to the "strategic" bombing envisioned by Douhet. Once again, the German military aptitude for brilliant short-term tactical problem-solving undermined the long-term strategic planning imperative to the successful prosecution of war.

Summary of the *Luftwaffe* Lessons from Spain

From the broadest perspective, the Condor Legion intervention in the Spanish Civil War quickened the pace of rearmament in Germany. As Edward Homze states, the war "encouraged the Reich leadership to speed up the introduction of new models as rapidly as possible even though reductions in total output and a vast increase in expenditures would result. The Spanish Civil War, coupled with the Austrian and Czech crises of 1938, also removed the last vestiges of resistance in the more conservative camp that argued for a slowdown of rearmament."⁹⁵

At peak strength in Spain in the late summer of 1938, the Condor Legion had 40 Heinkel He 111s, 3 Junker Ju 87s, 45 Messerschmitt Bf109s, 5 Dornier Do 17s, 4 He 45s, 8 He 59s and 8 batteries of light and heavy flak.⁹⁶ In addition, the Nationalist air units at that time contained 146 Spanish and 134 Italian planes. Upon returning to Germany in May 1939, the Condor Legion

counted 281 officers, 4,383 men, and 472 civilian technicians. In total, approximately 19,000 Germans served duty in Spain. The Legion shot down 386 enemy aircraft, of which 59 were downed by the anti-aircraft batteries. The Germans lost 72 aircraft by direct enemy action and 160 through accidents. In terms of lives, 298 Germans were killed while serving in Spain; 131 were killed by the enemy and 167 died from illness and vehicular accidents.⁹⁷ Those wounded by the enemy totaled 139. Though a comparatively small price to pay in relation to what the *Luftwaffe* hoped to gain, German losses were substantial because of the diminutive size of the youthful air force and the materiel constraints imposed by the German economy and military-industrial complex on aircraft production.

In the concrete realm of day-to-day operations, the Spanish War furnished a mother lode of knowledge, although at times this knowledge was misapplied. The combat experience gained by Condor Legion pilots was invaluable particularly because many of these pilots became instructional officers in pilot training schools in Germany.⁹⁸ The pilots also learned the importance of detailed maps, the benefits from rapid, positive target identification, and the need for adequate radio communications.⁹⁹ As a catalyst for the development of technology, the conflict emphasized the value of weather forecasting, radio directional systems (*i.e. Knickebein*), the use of pathfinder aircraft, and incendiary flares for effective night bombing. With regard to aircraft, Spain was a very helpful testing ground and incubator. The He51 biplane demonstrated its obsolescence as a fighter when matched against the Russian I-16 monoplanes and fruitfully exchanged that role for one of close ground support. The Ju52 proved an extremely reliable transport aircraft but a limited bomber, so it too assumed a role it was to fulfill more than adequately. During the course of 1937, the Bf109 fighter, the Ju87 *Stuka* dive bomber, and the He111 and Do17 bombers were introduced in Spain and all showed their value as combat aircraft.

The mistakes engendered by the Spanish War, more than the successes, indicate the difficulty in drawing general conclusions from an unusual and specific conflict. Because Legion bomber squadrons rarely encountered much opposition after the Nationalists attained air supremacy, the introduction of the He111 fast bomber suggested incorrectly that bombers required only a light armor and little fighter protection. The high command mistakenly believed that bombers could rely on speed alone to penetrate the enemy's defenses.¹⁰⁰ Berlin failed to perceive that even high performance,

well-armed bombers in mass formation could not protect themselves against determined fighter opposition, particularly during daytime missions. This oversight caused the *Luftwaffe* to neglect the coordination of fighter and bomber development. After realizing that bombers needed fighter escorts, the *Luftwaffe* command discovered that their fighters lacked the range to protect the bombers during the missions. A similar nearsighted rationale approved of the concept of an all-purpose aircraft for strategic and tactical operations. Indeed, Hitler demanded that heavy, multi-engined bombers possess both a strategic and dive bomb capability.¹⁰¹ The resulting hybrid aircraft, the Ju88, was unable to carry out either mission properly. The success of the 88mm flak guns in Spain suggested that flak cannons were the best weapon for air defense, and that therefore little attention need be paid to a fighter defense system to protect Germany. The horrific losses inflicted on Germany by USAF and RAF bombers attest to the inaccuracy of this belief. The most valuable lessons taught in the laboratory of the Spanish War was the tactical concept of combat operational doctrine. The Spanish experience established within the *Luftwaffe* the belief in close ground support tactics as the preeminent and foremost task of the German air force. This belief produced both the *Luftwaffe*'s most spectacular success in Poland and later contributed to the Third Reich's utter defeat.

The Polish Campaign (1 September–27 September 1939)

In many ways, the Polish campaign justified the principles which had been enumerated and developed in Spain. The first of these principles was the concentration of all available effort on one task at a time. The second principle was the elimination of any obstacle that might hamper the movement of the ground forces.¹⁰² The German Air Staff planned the military operations against Poland, *Fall Weiß* (Case White), largely according to these principles, and was rewarded with a spectacular success.

The strategy and tactics applied in Poland to implement the two principles elucidated above were taken from Condor Legion experience in Spain. Basically, the *Luftwaffe* supported infantry and mechanized armor units, clearing the path of obstacles and seeking to achieve air superiority. The Polish Campaign demonstrated the efficacy of the lessons learned in Spain: close ground support tactics, air transport, and dive bombing. The Polish Campaign also provided the first opportunity to combine the full

might of the Army and the *Luftwaffe*. *Blitzkrieg* (lightning war), as this new type of warfare was termed, was the close cooperation between tactical air and mechanized ground formations to penetrate deeply and rapidly into enemy territory.¹⁰³ The basic elements of *Blitzkrieg* had been developed in Spain. In Poland, they were fully implemented for the first time.

Prior to the attack on Poland, the *Luftwaffe* comprised 370,000 men grouped in three unequal divisions. The air force alone had 208,000 men, of which 20,000 were aircrew and 1,500 were paratroopers. The flak had 107,000 men, and the air signal units 58,000 men.¹⁰⁴ The *Luftwaffe* had amassed over 2000 aircraft in preparation for *Fall Weiß*, a number far in excess of the Polish Air Force's 500 mostly obsolete fighter planes.¹⁰⁵ Of the German aircraft, 1000 were bombers and 1050 fighters. Despite the Spanish Civil War, the *Luftwaffe* was not prepared to embark upon a campaign against Poland, or any other country for that matter. In September 1939 the *Luftwaffe* had stocked only enough bombs for three weeks and ammunition for six weeks.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the *Luftwaffe* lacked a long-range strategic bomber, an adequate night bomber, bombs heavier than one thousand pounds, air torpedos, modern mines, modern armament, and accurate bombsights. Bombers and escort fighters still lacked the means to communicate with one another.¹⁰⁷ Luckily, the campaign against Poland was short. It did not last long enough to reveal Germany's underlying inventory and supply weaknesses, nor did it fully test the limited capabilities of a still unprepared *Luftwaffe*.

Within the context of the overall German military strategy of *Fall Weiß*, the *Luftwaffe*'s first and foremost objective was the destruction of the Polish Air Force in order to attain air superiority.¹⁰⁸ Only with the attainment of air superiority could the *Luftwaffe* hope to provide unhampered support of the Army. As part of this objective, the *Luftwaffe* was to dislocate the entire Polish Air Force support, supply and organization, and to disrupt the Polish aircraft industry. Secondly, the *Luftwaffe* would take part in the destruction of the Polish Army by bombing and strafing strong points, artillery batteries, and concentrations of ground troops. The combination of planes and mechanized ground units of the Army was to prove extremely successful, as the course of the campaign illustrated.

The German attack against Poland began at 4:45 AM on 1 September 1939.¹⁰⁹ Fog and low cloud cover delayed the morning air operations, but by afternoon, the *Luftwaffe* was heavily committed. The *Luftwaffe*'s primary targets were Poland's

airfields. Those at Kattowitz, Krakow, Lwow, Lublin, Wilna, Kida, Glodno, and others received a thorough pounding. The outdated Polish P.Z.L. P.11 fighters which managed to take off were easily intercepted and repulsed by the Bf109s and Bf110s.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, the Polish pilots exhibited great courage and determination in the air. The Germans did not know, however, that the Polish planes that rose to meet them were decoys fighting a feinting action. Though the *Luftwaffe* had hoped to catch all of Poland's planes on the ground, Polish intelligence had discovered signs of the imminent German attack, and the Polish Air Force had transferred most of its operation aircraft to camouflaged emergency airstrips.¹¹¹ The Germans naturally attacked Poland's well-known, permanent airfields. Thus, they succeeded only in destroying outmoded fighters and a number of training craft not immediately serviceable. The bulk of the Polish Air Force escaped, giving the Polish Air Command time to improvise a plan for the defense of Warsaw.¹¹²

On the assumption that it had obliterated the Polish Air Force, the *Luftwaffe* shifted part of its efforts on 3 September to secondary targets and operations in support of the army. These operations followed the plans laid out prior to the campaign. The *Luftwaffe* bombed and strafed strong points, artillery batteries, and troop formations. To dislocate enemy supply organization, the bombers focused on factories, barracks, ammunition dumps and depots. Further behind enemy lines, aircraft attacked railway stations, bridges, tracks, and road junctions to disrupt communications and to prevent the Poles from moving up reinforcements.¹¹³

Cooperation between the air force and the army was excellent, due mostly to Wolfram von Richthofen.

So concerned was Richthofen with providing the army with what it needed from the air that he offered to share his quarters and command post inside Schönwald Castle, six miles from the front, with General Walther von Reichenau, commanding the 10th Army. It was a happy arrangement, for Reichenau's armor was scheduled to punch holes in the Polish defenses while Richthofen's ground attack formations blasted a clear path ahead. This was interservice cooperation at its closest, a thing Richthofen had learned to value while dealing with some of Franco's generals in Spain.¹¹⁴

Richthofen also stayed current on the ground situation by stationing himself as close to the front as possible. Whenever feasible, he flew over enemy territory in his Fiesler Storch to engage in personal reconnaissance. Indeed, on the first day of the attack, he was downed by anti-aircraft fire, but he crash-landed and returned

unharméd. Aside from his own fly-overs, Richthofen had at his disposal specially equipped signal units and a reconnaissance squadron to furnish him with timely intelligence information.¹¹⁵

The Battle near Kutno from 9–18 September is a good example of the effects produced by the *Luftwaffe* in Poland. Under General Kutzeba, the commander of the Army of Poznan, the Poles had successively launched a surprise attack in the area around Kutno. To counter the Polish Army's movement, the *Luftwaffe* was called in to blunt the attack. Thirty Henschel Hs123s swarmed over the Army of Poznan at low levels, utilizing their wide range of armaments to bomb, strafe, and generally disrupt the enemy troops.¹¹⁶ The Hs123s were followed by *Stukas*, *Domiers*, and *Heinkels*. The attack was so demoralizing that some of the Polish troops threw down their weapons and fled.¹¹⁷ On 18 September 50,000 Polish troops surrendered and on the next day, another 105,000 capitulated. Herbert Molloy Mason Jr. describes vividly the inferno inflicted on the Poles.

To Kutzeba's men, almost none of whom had been under air attack before, the next twenty minutes were like a nightmare in hell. The machine guns cut swaths in the ranks of men and horses; hundreds of light-weight scatter bombs flamed and exploded; the heavier detonations of the 110-pounders tore gouts out of the earth, ripped through trees and flung jagged metal shards thudding into men and animals. Even when the last of the various missiles had been delivered, the 123s were not finished with their low-level attacks. The pilots discovered that when the BMW engine was pushed to 1,800 r.p.m., the resultant effect on the three-bladed, variable pitch airscrew produced an ear-splitting and indescribable sound that was both inside and outside of the man subjected to it. Even hardened soldiers were unnerved, and ran in all directions to escape. Horses simply went insane.¹¹⁸

The Polish planes, so cleverly removed before the surprise attack to be used in the defense of Warsaw, never stood a chance against the *Luftwaffe*'s overwhelming numbers. In the skies above the capital, Polish P.Z.L. P.11 fighters rose to meet the Bf109s, only to be outgunned by the faster and more maneuverable German aircraft. Occasionally, a Polish pilot, by dint of bold determination, shot down an enemy fighter or bomber, but for the most part, the Polish fighters succumbed in the face of the larger numbers, the greater firepower, and the more modern equipment of the *Luftwaffe* fighter force.

Before bombing the Polish capital, the *Luftwaffe* dropped thousands of leaflets, requesting the city's surrender. When the request was refused, the *Luftwaffe*'s bombers went into action.

Thereafter, the skies over Warsaw were never clear of German aircraft as the *Luftwaffe* bombed the city. The operation began on 23 September with swarms of *Stukas* stacked up in groups several thousand feet apart, diving in systematic relays on the city. Following the dive bombers, Ju52 transport planes, jury-rigged to serve as bombers, blasted the city as crewmen literally shovelled loose thermite incendiary bombs out of the cargo doors.¹¹⁹ No city or people could withstand such a devastating attack, and on 27 September 1939 the Polish Government surrendered the capital.

Despite the success of the *Luftwaffe*, it was the Army which accounted for the quick and overwhelming German victory in Poland. The Army's rapid advance overran the Polish early-warning systems and forward bases, preventing a coordinated direction of Polish fighter aircraft. The army's advance also engulfed depots and dumps, thereby cutting off the supply of spare parts to the remaining operational Polish aircraft. It was not until 14 September that the *Luftwaffe* succeeded in surprising most of the Polish bombers at an airfield near Hutnicki.¹²⁰ The Polish Air Force was broken primarily by internal collapse, not external pressure. The *Luftwaffe's* major contribution was not so much the destruction of the outmoded Polish Air Force as it was the effective close support of ground troops and the destruction of the Polish Army.

Fall Weiß proved a costly campaign for the *Luftwaffe*. Of the 10,761 Germans killed during the campaign, 189 were pilots and aircrew. 261 aircraft of all types were lost — 7.6 percent of the *Luftwaffe* force structure — mostly to anti-aircraft defenses against close ground support operations.¹²¹ Among these 261 aircraft were 47 Bf109s (5.6 percent of force structure), 81 bombers (6.5 percent of force structure) and 50 close support craft (13.2 percent of force structure). In Poland, the *Luftwaffe* suffered grave, though not irreparable damage.

The Polish campaign showed beyond doubt the value of the lessons learned in Spain. The Ju52s demonstrated their utility as transport aircraft, supplying the *Wehrmacht's Panzer* (armor) and mechanized units, and providing the Bf109 squadrons with spare parts, ammunition, and aviation fuel.¹²² Carpet-bombing was practiced occasionally, as at the Krakow airfield by 60 He111s.¹²³ The He111s were followed by the plane that conclusively proved its worth in Poland, the Ju87 dive bomber. At Krakow, thirty Ju 87s plummeted down upon the airstrip to unload over thirty tons of bombs on hangars, parked aircraft, and runways. The Ju87 achieved astounding results because the Polish Air Force mustered

little opposition to hamper it. Lacking effective opposition, the *Stukas* were able to exploit the very high inherent accuracy of the steep diving attack while simultaneously demoralizing the infantry with their piercing sirens.¹²⁴ The *Stukas'* success reinforced the belief among the German High Command that the airplane should be used primarily for ground support.¹²⁵

The overall result of the Polish campaign was to entrench firmly the notion within command circles that the air force was an exceedingly powerful weapon. At the time, much was made in the press and elsewhere of the vital role played by the *Luftwaffe* and the new type of *Blitzkrieg* war made possible by the air force. The success of *Fall Weiß* was overwhelming, perhaps deceptively so. The Polish Air Force was outdated and outmoded, and those planes which managed to get airborne were outnumbered by the Germans almost four to one. Yet, the campaign led to wild claims regarding the *Luftwaffe's* ability. In retrospect, such declarations accounted in part for Göring's claim prior to Dunkirk that the *Luftwaffe* alone could win the battle, and perhaps the war. Albert Kesselring wrote,

Beyond all other military arms, the *Luftwaffe*, by virtue of its mobility in space, accomplished tasks which in former wars had been inconceivable... The Polish Campaign was the touchstone of the potentialities of the German Air Force and an apprenticeship of special significance. In this campaign, the *Luftwaffe* learned many lessons ... and prepared itself for a second, more strenuous and decisive clash of arms.¹²⁶

Denmark and Norway (7 April – 10 May 1940)

After *Fall Weiß*, the warring countries entered a period that became known as the "Phony War." Military engagements occurred infrequently. During this time, the *Luftwaffe* units that had participated in the Polish campaign returned to their bases in Germany. Aircraft were repaired, serviced, and refitted, and the air force continued to expand in anticipation of the spring campaign in the West. *Luftwaffe* operational activity was reduced to a minimum, restricted to occasional bombing runs on shipping and reconnaissance sorties. Fighter units, especially those stationed near France's highly touted Maginot Line, were discouraged from engaging in combat.¹²⁷ The *Luftwaffe* was concerned primarily with repairing the damage suffered in Poland and preparing itself for the next attack.

In the spring of 1940, the Phony War ended abruptly. Instead of pushing westward, Germany launched a surprise attack northward

against Scandinavia. The attack was intended to pre-empt British plans to secure Scandinavia as a military base as well as to protect crucial iron ore imports from Sweden.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the Germans wished to gain Scandinavia for themselves as a strategic base for future air and naval attacks on the British isles.

Luftwaffe strategy for *Weserübung* (Exercise Weser), as the campaign against Norway and Denmark was code-named, was based on the same two principles that had dictated the course of action in Poland. Denmark, bordering Germany's northernmost province of Schleswig-Holstein, presented much less of a problem than Norway. Norway had a lengthy coastline that made the country easily accessible to intervention by the Royal Navy. As a result of these concerns, Germany needed to act covertly and with complete surprise. For the first time in modern warfare, paratroopers were used to achieve this element of surprise. Notwithstanding some tactical innovations, the *Luftwaffe's* first goal was still attainment of air superiority followed by support of the army. Once these objectives had been accomplished, the *Luftwaffe* could begin its secondary tasks: supply and reinforcement of ground and motorized units, reconnaissance of coastal areas, attacks on British naval forces, support of troops operating in Norwegian valleys, and protection by fighters and flak of territory already taken.¹²⁹

The attack against Denmark and Norway began on 7 April 1940. Ju52s dropped airborne troops on the periphery of the Danish capital as well as at two airfields at Ålborg. Land forces crossed the Danish frontier at the same time as seaborne forces landed on the Danish coastal islands. Within several hours, King Christian X had ordered his troops to cease fire, awed by a display of He111s and Do17s flying in massed formations over Copenhagen.¹³⁰ Germany had conquered Denmark with the loss of only twenty men killed and wounded.

The attack on Norway, which began concurrently with the attack on Denmark, quickly became the focus of extensive military action. German troops occupied the towns of Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, but they encountered determined opposition from Norwegian troops. Paratroops dropped on Oslo overwhelmed harbor forts that had sunk the German heavy cruiser *Blücher* as she had entered the fjord. *Luftwaffe* bombers knocked out forts at Christiansand protecting the harbor entrance so that the *Kriegsmarine* (Navy) could land troops. Large numbers of Ju52s delivered airborne troops to the strategically vital airfields at Fornebu (outside of Oslo) and Sola (near Stavanger). Long range twin-engined Bf110 fighters escorted the lumbering Ju 52s, but

opposition was slight.¹³¹ Much of the small Norwegian fighter force, its equipment largely obsolete, was destroyed by attacks on the airfields that preceded the paratroop drops. The Germans soon occupied the airfields and rushed in additional reinforcements by air.

The operation did not continue unopposed. The Royal Navy stepped up pressure on the coastal towns occupied by the Germans. At Narvik, the besieged Germans under General Eduard Dietl had to be supplied and then reinforced by air.¹³² British troops landed at Narvik, Namsos, and Andalsnes on 15–17 April. The *Luftwaffe* was forced to redirect its efforts against the British landing, the amphibious transports, and their naval escorts. Level and dive bomber units mounted continuous sorties. In the face of negligible air opposition, they inflicted serious damage on the British force.¹³³ German control of the airfields, a result of their successful surprise attacks, was crucial to turning back the British landing force. Indeed, the British had to call off a direct seaborne attack on the Trondheim area because the fleet would have been subject to air attack.¹³⁴ The distances were too great for the RAF to maintain a sizeable air contingent, and this prevented the British from establishing a force inside Norway. *Luftwaffe* reconnaissance planes spied an attempt by the RAF to operate old Gladiator fighters from frozen lakes. Shortly, German bombers arrived, unloading explosives which broke up the ice and destroyed the landing surface. Towards the end of the campaign, a small number of Hurricanes appeared, but it was too late for them to have much of an effect on the fighting.

At maximum strength, the *Luftwaffe* in Norway (*Fliegerkorps X*) comprised over 700 aircraft. There were 360 long-range bombers (He111s and Ju88s), 50 dive bombers (Ju87s), 50 single-engined fighters (Bf109s), 70 twin-engined fighters (Bf110s), 60 reconnaissance craft (Do17s) and 120 coastal types (He115s, He59s, Do18s).¹³⁵ In addition to these aircraft, 500 Ju52s were made available for transport, supplemented by a small number of four-engined Ju90Bs¹³⁶ and Focke Wolf FW200 Condors.

Throughout *Weserübung*, the Germans made extensive use of air transport to move, supply, and reinforce troops. Indeed, the primary function of the *Luftwaffe* in the seizure of Scandinavia was that of a transport service. The German expedition's commander, General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, wished to execute a friendly invasion, and for this reason, the *Luftwaffe's* role as an air shuttle service was emphasized. German air transport theory was fully and successfully tested. Other lessons learned during the Scandinavian

campaign stressed the importance of fighter escorts for bombers striking targets protected by fighters. Air superiority was crucial, enabling the Germans first to establish and then to maintain troops in isolated and otherwise inaccessible areas. Furthermore, the Germans inflicted grave damage on the Royal Navy ships protecting the attempted seaborne landings at Trondheim. As Sims notes, "Air power properly installed and employed could force even the most powerful ships and navies from waters within aerial bombing range."¹³⁷ The surprise occupation of towns like Oslo and Stavanger was made possible only by the use of paratroops and air-landed units. Air reconnaissance, carried out extensively over the broad reaches of the Scandinavian peninsula, facilitated communications in areas where roads were poor. Reconnaissance also pinpointed the location of the Royal Navy, enabling the *Luftwaffe* and the German Navy to sink several British transport- and warships.

In short, the *Luftwaffe* learned five lessons in Scandinavia. Paratroops and airborne operations rendered surprise easy, caused confusion among enemy troops, and invested the attacking German troops with the initiative; the air force intervened effectively in ground fighting in the rugged terrain of the peninsula; reconnaissance aircraft facilitated communications between pockets of isolated infantry and furnished accurate information on the whereabouts of enemy concentrations; air transport proved invaluable in delivering, supplying and maintaining troops from the air; and air power inflicted great damage on naval ships lacking aerial escort. Many of these lessons served well in the planning of the next German move, an attack against the Low Countries and France.

Battle in the West (10 May – 26 June 1940)

The German attack against Holland, Belgium, and France began on 10 May 1940. The *Luftwaffe* arrayed over 4,000 planes against the Allies 1,700, a mismatch that to a large extent indicated the course of the battle. Against 1,680 bombers, France and England could gather only 830 fighters, while the *Luftwaffe* could put over 800 Bf109s into the air to escort their bombers.¹³⁸ Of the total German planes available for the attack, there were 1,300 long-range bombers, 380 dive bombers, 860 single-engined fighters, 350 twin-engined fighters, 640 reconnaissance planes, 475 transport aircraft, and 45 assault gliders.¹³⁹

For the fourth time in as many campaigns, the *Luftwaffe's* role in the Battle against France and the Low Countries was primarily that of support and transport. Initially, the *Luftwaffe* was to gain control

of the air. Then, it was to clear the way for airborne operations by powerful attacks on enemy airfields. In conjunction with airborne attacks, Ju52s were to transport paratroops to their destinations. Subsequent to and subject to the success of these objectives, the *Luftwaffe* was to support the *Wehrmacht's* armored thrust westward. Finally, the *Luftwaffe* was to supply the advancing mechanized and ground troops, keeping disparate forces in motion and in contact with command headquarters.¹⁴⁰ Hitler added, perhaps superfluously, that "the air force will prevent attacks by the Anglo-French air forces on our army and will give all necessary direct support to the advance."¹⁴¹

The meticulously prepared and well-integrated attack of the German army and air force in the Low Countries was overwhelming. The *Luftwaffe* bombed and strafed Dutch and Belgian airbases, destroying the meager and obsolete equipment those countries possessed. *Luftwaffe* paratroops seized bridges and road junctures, while glider forces assaulted the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael. This fortress, an underground system of fortifications manned by 1,200 Belgian soldiers and reputed to be impregnable, was besieged by 85 German assault pioneers until German reinforcements arrived on 11 May, forcing the garrison to capitulate.¹⁴² The element of surprise was achieved by means of airborne gliders, which had been towed by Ju52s from Cologne and released over Aachen, 15 miles from the fortress.¹⁴³ At the Hague, airborne troops captured the three main airfields and took the important Moerdijk bridge near Rotterdam. However, a plan to capture the Dutch Royal family and government failed.¹⁴⁴ The Willems bridge, spanning the Meuse River in the center of Rotterdam, was seized in an unorthodox attack by troops landed on the river by He59 floatplanes. Holland surrendered on 15 May and the Belgian Army laid down its arms thirteen days later.

The focus of the battle then shifted towards France and the all-important Meuse River crossing. The west bank of the Meuse was strongly fortified, for the river marked the last natural boundary and impediment between the advancing German forces and the French countryside beyond. On 13 May at 4 PM, the *Luftwaffe* began to bombard French positions on the west bank. As the battle got underway, the *Luftwaffe* acted as a mobile artillery barrage, providing powerful and direct air support for ground troops. The French Air Force, in the process of converting to a new generation of aircraft, proved less than a match for the *Luftwaffe*. Operational ready-rates in the *Armée de l'Aire* squadrons were as low as 40 percent.¹⁴⁵ German reconnaissance gave the German High

Command a detailed picture of the British and French forces. In the remaining hours before darkness, the *Luftwaffe* carried out over 500 sorties by dive and level bombers. As in Poland, when Richthofen had shared his quarters with the army's General Reichenau to facilitate close interservice cooperation, General Heinz Guderian carefully worked out a plan ahead of time with General Bruno Loerzer, head of *Fliegerkorps II* (Air Force Corps II), to coordinate the attack.¹⁴⁶ The two men decided that continuous support by the *Luftwaffe* would best serve the troop movements. Continuous dive bombing attacks prevented French artillerymen from firing at the German infantry crossing the Meuse. By nightfall, the troops had established a bridgehead on the west bank.

An example of the devastation wreaked by the *Luftwaffe* took place at the town of Sedan, situated on the banks of the Meuse. On 13 May, Do17s accompanied by He111s unloaded explosives on the town for over four hours, demolishing telephone lines, roads, railroad tracks, and many buildings. Following the conventional bombers, *Stukas* stacked in layers dove on the city for a total of five more hours, dropping 500 pound bombs which penetrated reinforced bunkers, upended artillery pieces, and flattened barracks. The bombers were effectively guarded by Bf109s and Bf110s which fended off British and French fighters.

The following day, as the tanks prepared to cross the Meuse, Bf109s shot down half of a French bomber squadron which had launched an attack on the pontoons spanning the river. A second attempt by the RAF Advanced Strike Force under Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, with 71 Blenheims and Battles, and an assortment of 250 French Moranes, Curtisses, and Dewoitine fighters, suffered a similar fate. The attack was decimated by flak and Bf109s which broke through the fighter screen to shoot down 40 bombers. In the aerial melee, 50 of the Allied fighters also perished. "No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the RAF."¹⁴⁷ The advancing German *Panzers* forced the French Army divisions to retreat and resistance along the river disappeared.

The rapid deployment of troops and equipment essential to the mobile warfare practiced by the Germans was made possible by the Ju52 transport planes. Fuel, spare parts, ammunition, and ground personnel were flown to their destinations because the Meuse bridge crossings were often congested. Thereafter, as the mechanized *Panzer* corps advanced, the supply lines lengthened dangerously. The Ju52s again played a vital role, transporting all the necessary supplies. The lumbering craft themselves had to be

moved forward to new airbases every day. The rapid German advance was indicative of the course of the fighting, which became a rout of the Allied forces.

As the German troops moved northwest towards the English Channel some 200 miles away, long-range bombers with fighter escorts attacked a broad spectrum of targets, from railway marshalling yards to all movements of the Allied armies. The French and British forces were subject to incessant bomber and fighter attacks, usually conducted at low levels to achieve surprise and accuracy. Bf109s and Bf110s rained a veritable hail of machine gun and cannon fire on enemy troops. Bombers followed closely behind with explosives fused for a delay of several seconds to ensure ground level explosion.¹⁴⁸

The French and British armies retreated towards the coastal town of Dunkirk. Göring pleaded with Hitler to permit the *Luftwaffe* to be the sole instrument of the Allied armies' destruction. Hitler acceded, and ordered General Guderian's tanks to halt outside of Dunkirk. What followed was the first rebuff of the *Luftwaffe* in World War II. British fighters, operating closer to their bases than the German planes, could remain over the Dunkirk beaches for a longer period of time than the Bf109s and Ju87s. The Spitfire fighters proved a match for the snout-nosed 109s, and as a result, the *Luftwaffe* failed to achieve air superiority.¹⁴⁹ During the nine days between 26 May and 3 June, the *Luftwaffe* lost 240 planes to the RAF's 177.¹⁵⁰ Poor weather also prevented the German fighters and bombers from achieving the prolonged concentration of attack essential to success.¹⁵¹ Frustrated by the quantitatively and qualitatively equal British fighters, the *Luftwaffe* also discovered that bombing the beaches was ineffectual. "Dropping 110 and 550 pound bombs into the soft sand was like stuffing firecrackers deep into sawdust."¹⁵² To deprive the *Luftwaffe* of the visibility afforded by daylight, British and French troops were evacuated under cover of darkness. Countered at almost every turn, the *Luftwaffe* focused on the ships transporting the Allied armies across the English Channel. 243 of the 861 ships involved in the evacuation from Dunkirk were sunk by German bombers.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, the bulk of the Allied troops escaped — 338,226 men — and the Germans had to be content with the mass of equipment left behind.

Although France capitulated on 26 June 1940, the *Luftwaffe's* failure over Dunkirk contained ominous signs for the future aerial attack on Britain. Yet, the air doctrine applied by the German Air Force in the last continental campaign of 1940 had not been rendered invalid. The air support throughout the 46 day battle was

fundamentally a large scale application of the lessons learned in Spain and improved in Poland. The validity of those lessons was, if anything, strengthened. The *Luftwaffe* successfully attained air superiority until Dunkirk, and control of the air proved to be an element essential to the success of the ground troops. The *Luftwaffe* followed through on its close cooperation with the mechanized ground forces, delivering, supporting, supplying, and reinforcing paratroops and infantry. The reputation of the *Stuka* was further enhanced in the campaign, as it destroyed enemy dugouts, fortifications, pill-boxes, and tanks with frightening accuracy. The potential logistical problems brought about by the rapid advance of the army was averted by the dependable Ju52 transport plane.

Luftwaffe failures in the West taught the Germans that formations of unescorted bombers could not survive in the face of a well-equipped and determined fighter opposition, such as the British mustered over Dunkirk. The German bomber crews who believed their Do17s to be as fast as British fighters, and were therefore possessed of a reasonable chance of success in a dogfight, were quickly disillusioned.¹⁵⁴ The German fighter crews also realized that the twin-engined Bf110 could not confront the single-engined British fighters.¹⁵⁵ The *Luftwaffe* had been dealt a sobering lesson at Dunkirk. This lesson was soon followed by an even more disastrous defeat in the skies over the British Isles.

Conclusion

Despite the *Luftwaffe*'s failure over the beaches of Dunkirk, the lessons derived from the Condor Legion experience in the Spanish Civil War were not invalidated. Rather, the aerial battles over Dunkirk finally revealed that some of the lessons the *Luftwaffe* drew from the Spanish War experiences had been misinterpreted and misapplied.

Luftwaffe air warfare doctrine was encapsulated in *Luftwaffedienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung*. Throughout the course of the Spanish War and the campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France, the *Luftwaffe* adhered faithfully to three basic air warfare rules. The first was the subjection of the enemy air force and the attainment of air superiority. Second was the support of the army and the navy (especially of the army). Third was the destruction of the enemy's industrial base and the disruption of his means to wage war.

In Spain, the Condor Legion followed only the first two rules. Spain had very little industry, and the nature of the civil war often

precluded attacks on Spain's meager industrial base. Nevertheless, the application of these two rules resulted in success, and within the context of those rules, tactics were conceived and bore fruit. Close ground support tactics were developed by Wolfram von Richthofen. Fighter tactics evolved, primarily under the tutelage and perseverance of Werner Mölders. Daylight bombing, night bombing, dive bombing, and naval bombing were practiced and refined. The Condor Legion learned and absorbed the advantages afforded by mobility and rapid deployment of men and equipment. The structure and organization of the Condor Legion was rationalized and improved. When the Condor Legion returned to Germany in March 1939, it brought with it experienced pilots who taught and trained new *Luftwaffe* recruits. Inevitably, the Condor Legion brought back to Germany combat lessons and field experience which nourished the minds planning the next *Luftwaffe* campaign, the assault on Poland.

The Polish campaign demonstrated on a larger scale the value of the lessons learned in Spain. As in Spain, the *Luftwaffe* concentrated on destroying the enemy's air force and attaining air superiority. This accomplished, the *Luftwaffe* proceeded to the second rule, support of the army. The *Blitzkrieg*, first employed in Poland, combined mechanized *Panzer* units and air power to devastate the Polish Army. Reflecting the rapidity of the German advance, the Poles surrendered after four short weeks, their army and air force crushed. The *Luftwaffe's* major contributions were close ground support tactics, dependable air transport, and accurate dive bombing. Luckily for the *Luftwaffe*, the Polish Campaign was too short to reveal its supply and equipment deficiencies. Nevertheless, its strategy and tactics proved spectacularly successful, and it had time to recuperate before the next campaign.

The *Weserübung* against Scandinavia followed the basic pattern established in Poland. The *Luftwaffe* quickly attained air superiority and used paratroops for the first time in modern warfare to achieve complete surprise. The *Luftwaffe* then supported the German ground forces, providing reconnaissance and transport services to bolster the army's assault. By the end of the campaign on 10 June, the *Luftwaffe* had learned the importance of fighter escorts for bombers, the ability of air power to force naval ships from waters within aerial bombing range, the necessity of air reconnaissance, the surprise rendered by airborne assault, and the positive services provided by air transport. These lessons formed the foundation for Germany's last continental victory.

Against Holland, Belgium, and France, the *Luftwaffe* applied its

well-tested air warfare doctrine, again achieving success. Gliders delivered airborne troops, an innovation which enabled 85 men to capture the fortress of Eban Emael. The army and air force cooperated closely, relentlessly forcing the Allied army to retreat. The French Air Force, like the Polish, Norwegian, Belgian and Dutch air forces before it, failed to halt the *Luftwaffe*, while suffering grievous losses trying. At Dunkirk, the *Luftwaffe* was finally rebuffed by the Royal Air Force, which enjoyed qualitative and quantitative equality.

Over four years, the *Luftwaffe* showed the world air power unexcelled. The essence of its strategy was air superiority. Without superiority in the air, troops could not be easily transported, motorized ground units could not move rapidly, enemy troop concentrations could not be disrupted, and enemy fortifications and communications could not be destroyed. When the *Luftwaffe* failed to attain air superiority, as at Dunkirk, it failed to win. The lessons learned in Spain, and enlarged and elaborated in the succeeding European campaigns, were faithfully though not always correctly applied. After the fall of France, the *Luftwaffe's* neglect of heavy bombers, long-range fighters and radar manifested itself. The British began to outproduce the *Luftwaffe*, and the Russian quagmire swallowed entire squadrons. There can be no question that the Spanish Civil War decisively affected the development of *Luftwaffe* operational doctrine. There can also be no question that initially, the result of that doctrine was success, demonstrated as the *Luftwaffe* rendered indispensable assistance in the triumphs over Germany's enemies. At the same time, the *Luftwaffe's* deceptively easy victories hid the seeds of its defeat. Although this defeat was a long time in coming, often masked by brilliant German inventions and innovations, come it did. Like the air forces it had helped vanquish, the *Luftwaffe* too learned defeat.

Notes

1. Alfred Price, *A Pictorial History of the Luftwaffe, 1933-1945* (London: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969), p. 11.
2. Hauptmann Dr. (E.) Eichelbaum, *Die Luftmächte der Welt: Ein Bilderwerk* (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1939), p. 16.
3. Edward L. Homze, *Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-1939* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), p. 170.
4. Flak is a contraction of the German *Flieger abwehr kanone* (anti-aircraft gun).
5. Raymond L. Proctor, *Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War* (Wes-

- port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 252.
6. David Irving, *The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Luftwaffe Marshall Erhard Milch* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p. 49.
 7. Homze, p. 170.
 8. Jesus Salas Larrazabal, *Air War over Spain*, trans. Margaret A. Kelley (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969), p. 68.
 9. Irving, p. 50.
 10. Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 330.
 11. Irving, p. 50.
 12. Antony Beevor, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1982), p. 113.
 13. Beevor, p. 113.
 14. Proctor, p. 255.
 15. Homze, p. 170.
 16. Paul Deichman, *Der Chef im Hintergrund: Ein Leben als Soldat von der preußischen Armee bis zur Bundeswehr* (Hamburg: Stalling Verlag GmbH, 1979), p. 58. Also see Williamson Murray, *Luftwaffe* (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1985), pp. xi-xiii (Introduction) on Douhet's doctrine of "strategic bombing."
 17. Deichman, p. 58.
 18. Kenneth Macksey, *Kesselring: The Making of the Luftwaffe* (London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1978), pp. 46-7. Wever had thought about the creation of a "strategic" air force of which a long-range, four-engined bomber was to be the mainstay. This was reflected by a project to develop the "Ural" bomber, a long-range bomber to be used to strike eastward at Russia's industrial base. After Wever's death, the "Ural" bomber project was scrapped.
 19. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 9.
 20. R.J. Overy, *The Air War, 1939-1945* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), p. 10.
 21. Deichman, pp. 60-61.
 22. Irving, p. 72.
 23. Great Britain Air Ministry, *The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force: 1933-45*. With an introduction by H.A. Probert (London Arms & Armour Press, Lionel Leventhal Ltd., 1983), p. 45.
 24. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 42.
 25. Williamson Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 8.
 26. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 44.
 27. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 11.
 28. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 43.
 29. Homze, p. 171.
 30. Edward Jablonski, *Terror from the Sky* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1971), p. 15.
 31. Edward H. Sims, *Fighter Tactics and Strategy, 1914-1970* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. 1972), p. 92.
 32. Beevor, p. 18.
 33. Jablonski, p. 15.
 34. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
 35. Proctor, p. 90.
 36. Proctor, p. 257.
 37. Proctor, p. 90.

38. Heinkel He51 biplane performance statistics: SPEED - 205 m.p., CEILING - 24,000 feet, RANGE - 242 miles, ARMAMENT - two machine guns. {from Proctor, p. 89.}
39. Proctor, pp. 256-57.
40. Proctor, p. 242.
41. Proctor, p. 149.
42. Junkers Ju52 performance statistics: SPEED - 165 m.p.h., CEILING - 18,000 feet, RANGE - 800 miles, TROOP CAPACITY- 17, CARGO CAPACITY- 2,000 pounds. Three-engined transport plane used to carry cargo or troops and to tow gliders. {from Gurney, p. 340.}
43. Proctor, p. 153.
44. The Bf109 was designed by Willy Messerschmitt who worked for the *Bayerische Flugzeugwerke* (Bavarian Aircraft Company). This explains why the prefix "Me" is occasionally used in place of the "Bf."
45. Proctor, p. 153.
46. Proctor, p. 165.
47. Herbert Molloy Mason, Jr., *The Rise of the Luftwaffe: Forging the Secret German Air Weapon, 1918-1940* (New York: The Dial Press, 1973), p. 236.
48. Proctor, p. 256.
49. James J. Halley, *The Role of the Fighter in Air Warfare*, ed. Charles W. Cain ((New York: Ziff-Davis Flying Books, 1978), p. 34.
50. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 49. Messerschmitt Bf109 performance statistics: SPEED - 354 m.p.h. at 12,300 feet, CEILING - 37,500 feet, RANGE - 412 miles, INITIAL CLIMB RATE - 3,100 feet/minute, ARMAMENT - two 20mm cannon and two 7.9mm machine guns. {from Sims, p. 90.}
51. Homze, p. 171.
52. Proctor, p. 256. The lead plane flew at the tip of a cone-shaped figure, while the wingman flew in a large two-dimensional circle some distance behind, drawing an imaginary "cone" in the air.
53. Jablonski, p. 15.
54. Sims, p. 139.
55. Proctor, pp. 82-3.
56. The attempt to combine elements of both fighters and bombers in one plane began in 1934. The *Luftwaffe* wanted a multipurpose, high-altitude, long-range reconnaissance aircraft that could fulfill a battle-plane function. This *Kampferstörer* was to have a speed of 240 m.p.h., a range of 1,200 miles, and a night-flying capability. The Focke-Wulf FW57 and the Henschel Hs124 were developed to fulfill these requirements. However, the *Luftwaffe* Technical Office soon recognized the difficulties in reconciling the dual assignment, and terminated the program. The requirement for a speed bomber were ultimately met by the Ju88. {from Homze, pp. 127-8}
57. Proctor, p. 136.
58. Beevor, p. 139.
59. In this instance, *Stuka* refers to the Junkers Ju87 dive bomber. However, the word is a contraction of the German *Sturzkampfflugzeug* (dive bomber), and thus actually describes all dive bombers, not any particular one.
60. Heinkel He111 performance statistics: SPEED - 255 m.p.h., CEILING - 27,500 feet, RANGE - 1,100 miles, BOMB LOAD - up to 4,000 pounds. {from Gurney, p. 339.}
61. The plane was too slow, too heavy, unmaneuverable, lacked power re-

- serve, had poor climbing characteristics, an excessively dispersed and poorly coordinated crew and unsuitable radios.
62. Homze, p. 173.
 63. The Junkers Ju88 was designed in 1935 according to requirements set down by Walther Wever for a conventional high-speed bomber. The first operational model could carry two tons of bombs at 300 m.p.h. and had a range of 2,000 miles. After Spain showed the failure of horizontal bombing, Junkers was ordered to redesign the plane with a dive-bombing capability. The resulting plane was a catastrophe. It was slower than the obsolescent He111, take-offs were difficult with full tanks and the plane had a nasty habit of catching on fire while in flight. Eventually after many modifications, the plane proved very successful. {from Irving, pp. 107-8}.
 64. Proctor, p. 82.
 65. Beevor, p. 18.
 66. Proctor, pp. 182-3, Junkers Ju87 ("Stuka") dive bomber performance statistics: SPEED - 254 m.p.h., CEILING - 24,000 feet, RANGE - 600 to 1,200 miles. {from Gurney, p. 341.}
 67. Beevor, p. 22. The *Luftwaffe* training wing, the *Lehrgeschwader*, conducted extensive high-altitude bombing exercises at Greifswald with disappointing results. Bombing from an altitude of 13,000 feet, experienced crews with no opposing ground fire in He111 and Do17 level bombers placed only 2 percent of their bombs inside a circle with radius of 330 feet. At 6,500 feet, their average increased to between 12-25 percent. The Ju87 dive bomber proceeded to put 25 percent of its bombs in a circle with a radius of only 165 feet. {from Mason, p. 254.}
 68. Allen Andrews, *The Air Marshals: The Air War in Western Europe* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1970), p. 30.
 69. Willard C. Frank, Jr., "Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939." *Naval War College Review*, January-February, 1984, p. 33.
 70. Frank, p. 46.
 71. Homze, p. 173.
 72. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 44.
 73. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 17. In a conversation with Dr. Ernst Heinkel in April 1940, Ernst Udet, Director of Air Armament said, "I never really thought there would be a war with Britain." {from Irving, p. 83.}
 74. Frank, p. 48.
 75. Proctor, p. 91.
 76. Proctor, p. 150.
 77. Proctor, p. 30.
 78. Andrews, p. 30.
 79. Homze, p. 173.
 80. Overy, p. 9.
 81. Proctor, p. 96.
 82. Homze, p. 171.
 83. Great Britain Air Ministry, pp. 17-18.
 84. Proctor, p. 134.
 85. Overy, pp. 8-9.
 86. Proctor, p. 45.
 87. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 17.
 88. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
 89. Homze, p. 172.

90. Murray, *Luftwaffe*, p. 17.
91. Macksey, p. 55.
92. Andrews, p. 29.
93. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 45.
94. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 42.
95. Homze, p. 174.
96. Homze, p. 171.
97. Proctor, p. 253.
98. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
99. Homze, p. 171.
100. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 17.
101. Beevor, p. 258.
102. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 53.
103. Murray, p. 31.
104. Irving, p. 81.
105. Gurney, p. 43.
106. Andrews, p. 81.
107. Irving, p. 81.
108. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 54.
109. Price, p. 18.
110. The Polish Air Force in 1939 numbered only about 400 aircraft, all but 160 of which were fighters. The majority of the fighters were P.11s, gull-winged monoplanes of a design dating back to 1931; performance statistics; SPEED - 240 m.p.h. at 18,000 feet, 186 m.p.h. at sea level, ARMAMENT - initially two, and later four light machine guns. The Bf109s surpassed the P.11s in every performance category. {from Mason, p. 293.}
111. Halley, p. 56.
112. Mason, p. 293.
113. Price, p. 18.
114. Mason, pp. 288-89.
115. Mason, p. 293.
116. The Henschel Hs123 had a 880 hp BMW radial engine with a 210 m.p.h. top speed. The plane was designed to operate at altitudes under 500 feet. Four types of armament were possible: (1) two twin 7.9mm machine guns firing through the propellor, (2) two 20mm cannon in pods under the wings, (3) underwing containers holding 94 small 4.4 pound anti-personnel bombs, or (4) four 110-pound high-explosive bombs. Additionally, the plane carried a small auxiliary fuel tank underneath the fuselage that could be jettisoned with a napalm-like effect. {from Mason, pp. 297-99.}
117. Murray, p. 32.
118. Mason, p. 298.
119. Mason, pp. 301-02.
120. Macksey, pp. 62-63.
121. Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 16.
122. Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 17.
123. Mason, p. 291.
124. Price, p. 19.
125. Gurney, p. 43.
126. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 57.
127. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 57.
128. Murray, p. 38.

129. Great Britain Air Ministry, pp. 63-64.
130. Mason, pp. 319-21.
131. Halley, pp. 64-65.
132. Mason, pp. 334-35.
133. Price, pp. 20-21.
134. Sims, pp. 116-17.
135. Price, pp. 20-21.
136. These were *Lufthansa* derivatives of the scrapped "Ural" bomber design.
137. Sims, p. 116.
138. Mason, pp. 340-1.
139. Price, p. 22.
140. Murray, p. 38.
141. Murray, p. 38.
142. The fortress Eban Emael was completed in 1935. It was 1/2 mile long, almost that wide, and festooned with 3" and 5" gun turrets, supplemented by machine gun cupolas. Its reputation of impregnability was similar to that of the Maginot Line in France. See also Cajus Bekker, *The Luftwaffe War Diaries*, trans. and ed. Frank Ziegler (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 93-100.
143. Mason, p. 344.
144. Price, p. 22.
145. Murray, pp. 41-42.
146. Murray, p. 41.
147. Mason, pp. 352-53.
148. Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 70.
149. The Spitfire model J had performance characteristics very similar to the Bf109 (see above). SPEED - 362 m.p.h. at 19,000 feet, CEILING - 35,000 feet, RANGE - 395 miles, INITIAL CLIMB RATE - 2,500 feet/minute, ARMAMENT - eight .303 inch machine guns. {from Sims, p. 90.}
150. Murray, pp. 42-43.
151. Macksey, pp. 73-74.
152. Mason, p. 358.
153. Mason, p. 358.
154. Sims, pp. 100-01.
155. Though the Bf110 was designed as a long-range fighter, it was easily outmaneuvered by the nimble British Spitfires. In any case, the *Luftwaffe* never had enough of them. Drop tanks designed to extend the range of the Bf109s, though initially tested in Spain, were not widely used, nor were aircrews trained in their employment. A reluctance on the part of pilots to experiment with the drop tanks was understandable in light of the pilots' inexperience with them, and because usage had not yet become routine or standardized. {from Murray, "The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West," p. 9.}

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Politics, Prejudice and Procedure: The Impeachment Trial of Andrew Johnson

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Recent years have seen some erosion in the traditional view of the Andrew Johnson impeachment trial as a lawless episode of political partisanship. Johnson's reputation has worsened even as historians have come to see the essentially moderate character of the Republican Reconstruction program.¹ Legally, the impeachment is not as self-evidently insupportable as it once seemed. Scholars and (thanks to Watergate) public officials now generally agree that impeachable offenses need not be indictable crimes,² as Johnson's lawyers argued and some of the Republicans who voted to acquit him supposed.³ But most scholars still take it for granted that, as Raoul Berger has written, the trial was unfairly conducted and the judges prejudiced: "What made the trial 'disgraceful' was not that the charges were altogether without color of law but that the proceeding reeked with unfairness, with palpable prejudgment of guilt."⁴

This, the received view, I regard as mythical as the other tenets of the old historiography of Reconstruction. Political and personal prejudice there certainly was, but it worked both ways, and on balance, it worked to Johnson's benefit. Far from being one-sided, the Senate's procedural and evidentiary rulings were often more favorable to the defense than they should have been. Johnson had eminent counsel who outperformed the House-appointed Managers and made the most of the prosecution's weaknesses. Chief Justice Chase, presiding over the trial, succeeded in enlarging his own role

in the trial and tilting toward the defense in his comments and rulings. Despite the partisan feeling against him, Johnson was not openly deprived of his constitutional rights.⁵ Behind the scenes he bargained for the votes of conservative Republicans. Since Johnson was acquitted by only one vote,⁶ it is more likely that a fairer trial would have resulted in his conviction.

Of course the impeachment was thoroughly political. The in-court statements of both sides reflected awareness that the real issue was presidential obstruction of Congressionally ordered Reconstruction.⁷ But the Framers of the Constitution would probably not have been shocked by that dimension of the case. They expected partisan excesses by the House's prosecutors to be redressed by trial before the Senate where, as Hamilton wrote, the "security to innocence" afforded by the requirement of a two-thirds vote to convict "will be as complete as itself can desire."⁸ As Michael Les Benedict points out, if politics motivated the majority that voted to convict, it equally actuated the minority that voted to acquit.⁹

Johnson's lawyers and the scholars who echo their arguments contended that the Senate, by passing upon charges that included defiance of Congress, was judging its own case; that further bias from self-interest was injected by the happenstance that the President of the Senate, Benjamin Wade, would succeed Johnson; and that Wade's own participation in the voting was especially improper.¹⁰ Some of the Managers such as Thaddeus Stevens and Benjamin Butler had long called for impeachment and so, it is said, were biased against the accused.¹¹ (But then the Managers participated as prosecutors, not judges, and took no oath to act impartially.) The argument from Senatorial self-interest proves too much, being essentially an argument against impeachment as a process. The Framers must have anticipated that many Senators would be definitely friendly or inimical to the President, and it would be absurd to disqualify them as in an ordinary trial.¹²

The circumstance that Wade was next in succession had the most appeal for so-called Radical Republicans who hardly needed further incentive to remove a president they considered a traitor. But the prospect frightened anti-Johnson but conservative Republicans who detested Wade's high-tariff, soft-money, pro-labor and women's suffrage sentiments: such men feared that Wade would use his patronage power to secure the 1868 Republican vice-presidential nomination.¹³ Defense counsel Evarts alluded to the "shock" and "disturbance" and "confusion" which would ensue from such a succession. At least three of the seven "recusant" Republicans who voted to acquit were personal enemies of Wade.¹⁴ And so was the

Chief Justice, Chase. The men had been at odds as rival Ohio Republican leaders since the 1850's, and Chase believed, with good reason, that Wade's dark-horse presidential ambitions in 1860 doomed Chase's own campaign for the Republican nomination.¹⁵ As events were to reveal, Chase was well positioned to frustrate Wade's hopes. After the trial a Detroit newspaper wrote: "Andrew Johnson is innocent because Benjamin Wade is guilty of being his successor."¹⁶

As for Wade's own voting to convict, it was doubtless technically improper,¹⁷ but it hardly mattered. Wade and his supporters felt that his state was entitled to both of its votes, balloting equally with other states; nonetheless, he refrained from voting until the day of balloting on the verdict, and he voted to convict only after acquittal was already a mathematical inevitability. As was pointed out at the time, Johnson's son-in-law Senator Patterson should have been disqualified if anyone was, but he voted (consistently pro-defense) throughout the trial.¹⁸ Since one vote to acquit is effectively worth two to convict, the balance of bias favored the President. As a legal matter the Senate, notwithstanding its biases, had the power and the duty to try Johnson. Under the legal doctrine of necessity, a tribunal whose members are subject to disqualification for bias or interest must nevertheless act if there is no other body with jurisdiction to proceed.¹⁹ It is, after all, somewhat circular to complain of politicization in the Johnson impeachment when the nature and magnitude of the issues raised by Johnson's course of conduct must necessarily arouse political passions.²⁰

Another aspect of the issue of prejudice is the Managers' occasional pejorative references to the President — the "great criminal," as even conservative Manager Bingham called him²¹ — but there is no evidence that they had any real prejudicial impact. A famous example took place toward the close of Manager Butler's otherwise pedestrian three-hour opening statement when he said with reference to Johnson, "By murder most foul he succeeded to the Presidency, and is the elect of an assassin to that high office."²² Probably this remark did the prosecution more harm than good,²³ but in any event it was the kind of oratorical extravagance typical of both the 19th century courtroom and the political performance then a prime source of popular edification and entertainment. Johnson, certainly, was anything but squeamish in *his* speeches. In fact, the context of the Butler statement was his discussion of Article Ten, a minor article accusing Johnson of vilifying the Congress based on statements during his "swing around the circuit" when he called his

Republican critics traitors, likened himself to a Christ among Judases, and generally shocked Republicans by the virulence of his invective.²⁴ Such flashes of color only stand out, for better or for worse, on account of the dullness of the larger part of a sprawling 1200 page transcript. Although Johnson's lawyers may have been somewhat more restrained, one of them carried his oratory so far as to be censured by the Senate for in effect challenging Butler to a duel.²⁵ Critics of the Managers' language may be unaware of the latitude traditionally accorded to the prosecutor in abusing an accused. In California, for instance, prosecutors may use "appropriate epithets" if the language is warranted by the evidence; thus defendants have been called "sneaky mother killer," "the lowest of the lows," and "a smart thief and a parasite on the community."²⁶ Johnson had much less to complain of than many less eminent accused malefactors.

The Constitution provides that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to Try all Impeachments," and specifies that "when the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside." The Chief Justice replaces the Senate's usual presiding officer, the Vice-President, on such occasions for the obvious reason that the latter is next in line of succession to the presidency, and might be biased.²⁷ The Chief Justice seemed a safe choice to preside because, as Justice Story wrote, "his impartiality and independence could be as little suspected as those of any person in the country."²⁸ Unfortunately the ambitions of the Chief Justice in 1868 confounded the Framers' precautions. Chase is often credited with conducting the trial impartially,²⁹ but there is no doubt in my mind that he prejudged the merits of the case and it is clear that he had a lively personal interest in its outcome.

Chase, like the proponents of impeachment, understood how to pursue political ends by legal means. Before the Civil War he was instrumental in formulating a dubious yet plausible constitutional grounding of the Free Soil Party ideology inherited by the new Republican Party.³⁰ Despite his single-issue radicalism respecting slavery (and later black suffrage), Chase was a conservative at heart. Although he opposed Johnson's Reconstruction measures, he made known his opposition to impeachment "as a policy." During the trial he wrote to correspondents that Johnson had "a perfect right" to dismiss Secretary of War Stanton regardless of the provisions of the Tenure of Office Act — "a grave violation of judicial ethics," in Michael Benedict's words.³¹ Even more important in shaping Chase's behavior than his legal prejudgment, political preference, and personal antipathy (to Wade and to

Stanton³²), was Chase's almost lifelong, obsessive pursuit of the presidency. He sought the Republican nomination in every election year from 1856 through 1868. Lincoln said that Chase (his Secretary of the Treasury until 1864) was "a little insane" on the subject of the presidency, and Lincoln's only concern in appointing him Chief Justice was his (well-founded) fear that Chase would "neglect the place in his strife and intrigue to make himself President." A fellow Justice said of Chase that "his first thought in meeting any man of force was...how can I utilize him for my presidential ambitions." By the time of the impeachment trial it was apparent that Grant would be the Republican nominee. Chase had hitherto been considered a Radical Republican, but changing parties for the fourth time was easy enough. During the trial, Chase solicited the Democratic nomination — that is, the nomination of what was *de facto* Johnson's party insofar as he had any.³³ At best, then, Chase fell a bit short of being the one person whose "impartiality and independence could be as little suspected as those of any person in the country."

Before the trial commenced the Senate committee which drafted rules of procedure invited Chase's comments. Chase wanted the Senate to organize itself as a "Court of Impeachment," distinct from its normal legislative capacity; and as presiding officer of that "court" he sought a vote for himself.³⁴ The Senators, some of them now doubtful of Chase's political loyalties, took care to delete all references to the Senate as a court of impeachment. The original version of the rules gave the presiding officer the right to make preliminary rulings on evidentiary matters, subject to Senate reversal after one-fifth of the Senators challenged a ruling; now Senator Chandler, Radical Republican from Michigan, sponsored an obscurely worded substitute amendment whose purpose was evidently to shift this power back to the Senate collectively.³⁵

By determined manipulation and good luck, Chase undid the committee's work soon after Wade relinquished the chair to him. Almost the first matter to arise was a Democratic challenge to Wade's right to take the oath. After some debate Senator Grimes (later a recusant) moved that the "court" adjourn for a day; Senator Howard replied that the Senate should adjourn itself and "relieve" the Chief Justice and pass to its legislative business — a subtle distinction, but one that posed a controversial issue. Chase settled it, for the time being, by an adroit *fait accompli*: "The court must first adjourn. Senators, you who are in favor of adjourning the court until to-morrow at 1 o'clock will say 'ay,' and those of the contrary opinion will say 'no'." Those who denied that the Senate was a

court could not say anything, and "the motion was agreed to."³⁶ The next day a point of order arose regarding which Senator Howard invoked Rule XXIII of the impeachment rules. Chase made his move: "The twenty-third rule is a rule for the proceeding of the Senate when organized for the trial of an impeachment. It is not yet organized; and in the opinion of the Chair the twenty-third rule does not apply at present." Senator Drake appealed the decision of the chair, but, to the cheers of the gallery, Chase was sustained by a 24-20 vote. Following up on this success, Chase told the Senate that, having now passed over into its special impeachment capacity, it would have to readopt its impeachment rules — and again he posed the question in such a way that a Senator could vote for or against the rules, but not vote against Chase's presumption that the rules had to be readopted: "Senators, you who think that the rules of proceeding adopted on the 2nd of March should be considered as the rules of this body will say 'ay'; contrary opinion, 'no'." The ayes prevailed.³⁷

Among the rules adopted (and readopted) by the Senate was Rule VIII, requiring the accused to "file his answer to said articles of impeachment" on the date specified in the summons served upon him; if he failed to appear or file an answer, "the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as upon a plea of not guilty." Defense counsel appeared on the appointed date, March 13, but instead of filing an answer they sought forty days more in which to do so, invoking the analogy of criminal procedure. The Managers replied that the Senate's own rules were controlling, not analogies from other areas of law; if Johnson would not enter a plea, the rules were clear that the trial should commence then and there as if he had pleaded not guilty. No elaborate formal reply was necessary anyway since, as Bingham said,

technical rules do in nowise control or limit or fetter the action of this body; and under the plea of "not guilty," as provided in the rules, every conceivable defense that the party accused could make to the articles here preferred can be admitted. Why, then, this delay of forty days to draw up an answer of not guilty?³⁸

Why indeed? But the Senate, touchy about insinuations that the President was being railroaded, allowed ten days to answer. On March 23 the defense filed an answer even more turgid than the articles, whereupon the trial should have begun. Yet Johnson's lawyers prevailed upon the Senate to grant another continuance until March 30. Raoul Berger complains that the defense received "extraordinarily short shrift," but it got more time by far than the rules allowed it, and nothing in the answer, the course of the trial or

the verdict suggests that Johnson got any less time than he needed in order to mount a successful defense.³⁹

On the second day of the trial, Chase overturned the rules in another respect. Manager Butler was trying to elicit hearsay testimony as to the expressed intentions of General Lorenzo Thomas, Johnson's *ad interim* appointee as Secretary of War, in going to the War Department on February 21 to challenge Stanton. The defense objected that the testimony was irrelevant. Chase stated: "The Chief Justice thinks the testimony is competent, and it will be heard unless the Senate think otherwise." When Senator Drake challenged his right to make such a preliminary ruling — a power which the Senate had earlier stripped him of, seemingly — Chase insisted "that in his judgment it is his duty to decide upon questions of evidence in the first instance, and that if any senator desires that the question shall then be submitted to the Senate it is his duty to submit it." The Managers belatedly protested that Chase's arrogation of power detracted from the Senate's "sole power" to try impeachments: "Every judgment that must be made is a part of the trial, whether it be upon a preliminary question or a final question.' By chance Chase got more than he hoped for by the resolution of the question. A motion that the Senate retire for consultation (in effect, to debate unconstrained by Chase) eventuated in a 25–25 tie (Wade and three others not voting). Chase announced the result and said: "The Chief Justice votes in the affirmative. The Senate will retire for conference." He then left the room.⁴⁰ Emerging from conference, the Senate defeated actions by Drake and Sumner denying Chase's right to vote, and instead the rules were amended to legitimate Chase's claim to make preliminary rulings, except that any Senator's objection would put the matter before the Senate.⁴¹ If less than a trial judge, Chase was at least more than a mere moderator.⁴²

Central to the fairness of any trial is the court's reception or exclusion of evidence. In impeachment trials, exclusionary rulings will be somewhat less important than in a jury trial, since the Senators cannot be kept from hearing about proffered evidence and taking it into account as they, severally, see fit.⁴³ Johnson impeachment critics claim that prejudicial rulings stud the record,⁴⁴ but they have ignored the possibility that the rulings were correct, or at least within the range of reasonable differences under the law of evidence as it then stood. A look at a few of the more important evidentiary controversies suggest that, as in other matters, the Senate was more than fair to Johnson. Seeming injustices, *e.g.*, the admissions of hearsay declarations against an accused but not those

in his favor, may be ingrained features of criminal evidence law, not the blatantly unequal treatment they might resemble to the lay observer.⁴⁵

Most of the eleven articles involved Johnson's dismissal of Secretary of War Stanton and his attempted *ad interim* appointment of General Lorenzo Thomas to the post, allegedly in violation of the Tenure of Office Act. Johnson's defense was threefold: the Act was unconstitutional; if constitutional, it nonetheless did not cover Stanton; and if constitutional and applicable, "the President acted from laudable and honest motives, and is not, therefore, guilty of any crime or misdemeanor."⁴⁶ The latter defense of good faith had important evidentiary implications if accepted by the Senate. If the wrongful intent, with which Johnson was accused of having acted, had to be the intent to break a law Johnson knew to be valid, then the Senate should consider evidence that Johnson desired to precipitate a test case for the courts or that his Cabinet unanimously advised him that the Act was constitutional.⁴⁷ Not so, however, if the requisite intent, as for most criminal offenses, was merely to have voluntarily and consciously done the acts charged; or if ignorance of the law is, as usual, no defense; or if, as Thaddeus Stevens argued, the object of impeachment is simply to end a course of unconstitutional conduct by removing the perpetrator: "Mere mistake in intention, if so persevered in after proper warning as to bring mischief upon the community, is quite sufficient to warrant the removal of the officer from the place where he is working mischief by his continuance in power."⁴⁸ As a matter of constitutional exegesis and common prudence, the Managers' theory is closer to the correct view, and it was evidently also the view of the Senate.⁴⁹ If so, just about every exclusion of proffered defense evidence is defensible.

But there were further infirmities in important parts of defense testimony. Defense attorney Stanbury sought to elicit from Thomas what Johnson had told him on February 21, 1868, immediately after Thomas had confronted Stanton at the War Department. Bingham objected that this was an attempt "to introduce in the defense of an accused criminal his own declaration made after the fact." Noting that the acts charged (dismissal of Stanton and appointment of Thomas) were by then completed, Butler said that "Mr. Thomas cannot make evidence for himself by going and talking with the President, nor the President with Mr. Thomas." The objection was valid. A party charged with crime can never put in evidence in his own behalf his declarations made after commission of a crime.⁵⁰ But the Senate, to which Chase submitted the point

without a preliminary ruling, voted 42-10 to admit the hearsay. Thomas then quoted Johnson's response to the War Department incident: "Very well; we want it in the courts."⁵¹

Next the defense questioned General Sherman about his talk with Johnson on January 14, prior to the final firing of Stanton. The defense argued that the Johnson hearsay was germane to intent, and Chase ruled it admissible. Because this declaration preceded the act charged, it was not subject to the previous objection — but there was still a crucial condition on letting such evidence in. Contemporaneous declarations of purpose, "made with no apparent motive for misstatement," are admissible to prove the declarant's purpose. The defense agreed such statements are admissible "if they do not appear to have been manufactured." Senators might readily conclude that Johnson was already creating evidence for use in the impending showdown over Stanton. Chase intervened to endorse the defense view, saying that "proof of a conversation shortly before a transaction is better evidence of the intent of an actor than proof of a conversation shortly after a transaction. The Secretary will call the roll." By a 23-28 vote of which Chase complained bitterly in private, the evidence was excluded.⁵²

But even this ruling, for which several arguable grounds of support appear, was effectively reversed. Later, by one of those one-vote margins made possible by Wade's self-restraint, Sherman was allowed to report what Johnson told him at later interviews (January 27 or 31) as to his purpose in offering Sherman the post of *ad interim* Secretary of War. Johnson said it was for the good of the country. When Sherman asked why the courts could not settle the conflict, Johnson said that was impossible, but "if we can bring the case to the courts it would not stand half an hour." As Stanbury said, "that which was closed to us by the decision of the court on Saturday, is now opened by the question of the senator to-day."⁵³ Yet the Johnson-Sherman talks, which came after the Senate had refused to assent to Stanton's removal on January 13, were well before the final firing on February 21 and rather remote in time to count as contemporaneous declarations of intent.

A subsidiary issue in the case was whether Johnson had contemplated the use of force to install Thomas. To prove otherwise, the defense sought to have Secretary of State Welles testify that on February 21 Johnson opined that Stanton would acquiesce peaceably in the Thomas appointment. Chase announced that he was "clearly of opinion that this is a part of the transaction, and that it is entirely proper to take this evidence into consideration as showing the intent of the President in his acts. The Secretary will

call the roll." By a 26–23 vote the evidence was admitted.⁵⁴ Again, an after-the-fact, self-serving hearsay declaration, which must have been made in anticipation of future controversy, was admitted to prove a kind of "intent" which was not really material anyway. The defense, often with the weight of the Chief Justice's authority behind it, overall benefitted greatly from the Senate's evidentiary rulings. And even when the Managers succeeded in excluding evidence of Johnson's innocent intent, the Senators heard what the evidence would have been even as the Managers made themselves look bad by trying to suppress evidence favorable to Johnson.⁵⁵

The most important lapses from procedural propriety in the impeachment trial did not take place in court at all. They consisted of negotiations between Johnson's lawyer Evarts (who would surely be disbarred for it today) and susceptible conservative Republican Senators which eventuated in a virtual trade of not-guilty votes for political favors. Senator Grimes, with the knowledge of Senators Fessenden and Trumbull, obtained assurances that acquittal would not be followed by presidential reprisals. The nomination of a conservative Republican general to succeed Stanton also pleased the Republican right. Senator Ross — a recusant often held up as the hero who placed principle above politics in casting "the vote that saved Johnson" — let the President know that his prompt transmission of the new, reconstructed South Carolina and Arkansas constitutions would cause him and others to vote to acquit. Johnson complied the next day. Johnson also agreed to enforce the Reconstruction Acts.⁵⁶ It is curious that impeachment critics who point to the immense political pressure brought to bear on wavering Senators overlook that the President still wielded enough power and patronage to outbid the Radical Republicans for enough votes to win.

The evidence is overwhelming that while an impeachment trial is a judicial proceeding before the Senate sitting as a court,⁵⁷ it is not a criminal trial.⁵⁸ Procedurally this means that the technicalities of indictment and pleading which characterized criminal procedure had no place in the Johnson impeachment trial. Hamilton wrote that such a proceeding "can never be tied down to such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors of the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security."⁵⁹ All the early commentators, seconded by the best modern authorities, agreed that the Senate was not bound to the strict forms of common-law pleading and procedure, particularly with respect to the formulation

of charges; the articles might be very general and the Senators were entitled to construe them broadly from considerations of policy.⁶⁰

The defense, however, assailed obscurities and possible technical defects in the articles as if they appeared in an indictment. In the criminal law of the day, no conviction could stand unless the proof adduced at trial closely corroborated the allegations of the indictment, even if the proof showed other criminality on the defendant's part. Johnson's lawyers cited this principle in his behalf, insisting, for instance, that since criminal intent was alleged in each article, conviction required proof of criminal intent.⁶¹ Actually it is doubtful if this rule applied even if the trial had been criminal in character. Immaterial allegations in an indictment had long been allowed to be ignored as surplusage.⁶² If most senators thought that criminal intent (at least as the defense understood it) was not necessary to sustain conviction, their disregard of allegations of criminal intent would not mean they were voting to convict Johnson of something different from what he was charged with. And yet the defense argument paid off. Five of the seven recusant Republicans filed opinions justifying acquittal in part because the proof only showed an attempt to remove Stanton (because he refused to go), not an effective removal as alleged!⁶³

The fate of the eleventh article, "the gist and vital portion of this whole prosecution" as Stevens called it, illuminates the circumstances which led to Johnson's acquittal. The Radical Republicans added it because, as Stevens complained, the other articles were so narrowly and legalistically framed as to have no "real vigor in them."⁶⁴ In extraordinarily convoluted language it alleged a conspiracy to frustrate enforcement of the Tenure of Office Act and certain Reconstruction legislation pursuant to Johnson's alleged assertion that the Congress was not a constitutional body. It was the most important article and the one most likely to be adopted because, in its obscure but unmistakable way, it was understood by all to state Johnson's real offense: his obstruction of Congressional Reconstruction. Instead of meeting the charge head-on, defense counsel tried to make light of it by professing an inability to make any sense out of it. Impeachment proponents were not fooled and induced the Senate to vote on the eleventh article first.⁶⁵

Chase now made the last and possibly most important of his unauthorized encroachments upon the Senate's sole power to try impeachments. Speaking as if he were the trial judge charging the jury as to the applicable law, he prefaced the voting by his own narrow construction of the article. "The single substantive matter charged," he said, "is the attempt to prevent execution of the tenure-

of-office act [sic]; and the other facts are alleged either as introductory and exhibiting this general purpose, or as showing the means contrived in furtherance of the attempt." By collapsing the eleventh article into a mere rehash of the others, Chase effectively eliminated the breadth which was intended to distinguish it from the other ten.⁶⁶ It is argued that Chase did not determine the verdict of the trial because formally the Senate had the right to overrule him.⁶⁷ As the disposition of the eleventh article shows, that is a naïve view of the matter. By his comments, his control of the proceedings, the prestige of his office and his mastery of the *fait accompli*, Chase exerted a pervasive influence on the whole course of the proceedings, and his influence was usually exerted for Johnson's benefit.

A few years after the Johnson acquittal, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is accorded due process of the law "if the trial is had according to the settled course of judicial proceedings," consonant with "the law of the land."⁶⁸ In that sense, it was the Managers rather than Johnson who were denied due process. The case is shot through with ironies inuring to the accused's benefit. Johnson portrayed his prosecutors as prejudiced and partisan while secretly taking full advantage of prejudices cutting his way and exploiting extrajudicial political clout. His lawyers insisted he be tried solely according to the literal terms of the impeaching articles — the rule of law required no less — and then belittled those "technical and formal crimes" as "of very paltry consideration." After incurring attack for contending that the Senate was not a court, the Managers made more use than the defense of evidentiary technicalities inappropriate in an impeachment trial. Ostensibly upholding the Constitution and laws against partisan abuse, the defense — aided by the Chief Justice — repeatedly induced the Senate either to break its own rules or to rewrite them to suit Chase or Johnson. The trial included its share of errors and injustices, but they more often benefited the accused than the accusers. Unlike his prosecutors, Andrew Johnson got a fair trial.⁶⁹

Notes

1. Michael Les Benedict, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973), vii, 1-8; Hans L. Trefousse, *Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975), ix-x.
2. Benedict, 27; Raoul Berger, *Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 53-102; Charles L. Black, Jr., *Impeachment: A Handbook* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 35; John R. Labovitz, *Presidential Impeachment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 27, 99-100; William Lawrence, "The Law of Impeachment," *American Law Register*, O.S.15 (Sept. 1867), 644, 647; William Rawle, *A View of the Constitution of the United States of America* (Philadelphia: H.C. Carey & I. Lea, 1825), 201, 204; Alexander Simpson, *A Treatise on Federal Impeachments* (Philadelphia: Law Association of Philadelphia, 1916), 30-60.
3. *Trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Before the Senate of the United States, on Impeachment by the House of Representatives for High Crimes and Misdemeanors* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1868), 1:49 (hereafter *Trial*); Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 51.
4. Berger, 264. Berger has been influential in discrediting the idea that American impeachments are criminal trials and that only indictable crimes justify impeachment. He is, however, tendentious and hyper-legalistic in all that he publishes, and his chapter on the Johnson impeachment, based on obsolete sources, is a caricature of events and issues which at times approaches the grotesque.
5. Simpson, 28.
6. *Trial* 2:486-87, 496-97. There is reason to believe, though, that several more Republicans — including the Chief Justice's son-in-law, Senator Sprague — would have voted to acquit if their votes were needed. Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 169.
7. *Trial* 1:121-22 (Manager Butler), 2:14-16 (Manager Logan), 110 (Manager Boutwell), 232-33 (Manager Williams), 270-71, 277 (defense counsel Evarts); Benedict, 135, 160; Berger, 269-70; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 140-41, 159.
8. Labovitz, 177; Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 1961) No. 66 (Hamilton), 402.
9. Benedict, 126.
10. *Trial* 1:411 (defense counsel Curtis), 2:324 (Evarts), 3:360-401 (Senate debate on letting Wade take the oath); Berger, 267 & n. 100.
11. Benedict, 52; Berger, 269-70; Hans L. Trefousse, *Ben Butler: The South Called Him Beast!* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1957), 186; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 51-52.
12. Black, *Impeachment*, 11.
13. Benedict, 133-35; H.L. Trefousse, *Benjamin Franklin Wade: Radical Republican From Ohio* (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1963), 8, 284-85, 306; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 149, 176-77. In February 1868 the future recusant Senator Fessenden wrote that Johnson's impeachment would mean "the end of us." Benedict, 103.
14. *Trial* 2:271; Trefousse, *Wade*, 8.

15. Thomas Graham Belden and Marva Robins Belden, *So Fell The Angels* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 181; Albert Bushnell Hart, *Salmon Portland Chase* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1899), 358; Trefousse, *Wade*, 68–69, 121–24, 140. “Chase,” said Wade, “thinks there is a fourth person in the Trinity.” Trefousse, *Wade*, 235. Ironically, Wade actually preferred Chase to Grant as the 1868 Republican presidential nominee. Benedict, 72.
16. Trefousse, *Wade*, 309.
17. Rawle, 206.
18. *Trial* 3:360–61 (Senator Sherman); Trefousse, *Wade*, 297, 300, 303–04. Several matters were decided by one vote or by a tie (broken by the Chief Justice) during the trial. Wade has never received historical credit for his forbearance. Given the closeness of these votes and of the verdict, Wade’s abstention is another of those imponderables which might have made the difference between conviction and acquittal.
19. *In re Leeffe*, 2 Barb. Ch. 39, 39–40 (N.Y. 1846). Here and hereafter an effort has been made, where legal issues are discussed, to rely on 19th century decisional law in contexts remote from impeachment. As discussed more fully later, some of the most-criticized legal determinations of the impeachment trial were fully in accord with the law at the time, a possibility overlooked by virtually all commentators on the trial.
20. Labovitz, 31.
21. *Trial* 2:407.
22. *Trial* 1:119; Trefousse, *Wade*, 298–99.
23. Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 154.
24. *Trial* 1:114–120; Benedict, 13–14. Johnson was surely among the most vulgar and uncouth of presidents save only, perhaps, the only other president to face a real impeachment threat. Johnson, for instance, attended his own and Lincoln’s inauguration while drunk.
25. *Trial* 2:307 (Censure of defense counsel Nelson). One wonders what Berger is talking about when he writes: “The Managers indulged in vituperation without restraint by the Senate; yet defense counsel, who must have felt themselves in the midst of a pack of wolves, never departed from reasoned, measured advocacy” (Berger, 274–75) — except to challenge Butler to a duel! The defense team’s relative restraint is perhaps to be explained less by its lofty ethical rectitude than by a shrewd assessment of tactics. Defense attorney Evarts made good use of Butler’s logorrhea, evoking derisory laughter by his references to Butler’s invective. *Trial* 2:285.
26. *People v. Wein*, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 397 (1958); *People v. Hardenbrook*, 48 Cal. 2d 345, 352 (1957); *People v. La Fontaine*, 79 Cal. App. 3d 176, 186 (1978); *People v. Rodriguez*, 10 Cal. App. 3d 18, 36 (1970); Robert C. Black, “Attorney Discipline for ‘Offensive Personality’ in California,” *Hastings Law Journal* 31 (May 1980), 1132 & nn. 219–222.
27. U.S. Const., art. I, §3, cl. 6; Berger, 267 n. 100; Joseph Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States*, ed. Melville M. Bigelow (5th ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1891), 1:557; Joseph Story, *The Constitutional Class Book: Being a Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States* (Boston: Hillsard, Gray & Company, 1834); Rawle, 206.
28. Story, *Commentaries*, 1:568.

29. William R. Brock, *Conflict and Transformation: The United States, 1844-1877* (New York: Penguin Books, 1973), 347-48; Hart, 360; M. Kathleen Perdue, "Salmon P. Chase and the Impeachment Trial of Andrew Johnson," *The Historian* 27 (Nov. 1965), 75-92; J. W. Schuckers, *The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), 558.
30. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1971), 76-77, 87.
31. Belden and Belden, 185; Benedict, 136-37; Hart, 358-59; Eric L. McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 115 n. 42; Perdue, 89; Schuckers, 577-78.
32. Chase, who tended to see treachery everywhere, thought that Stanton had betrayed him by not resigning from Lincoln's Cabinet in 1864 when he did; Chase considered Stanton not "reliable for anything except hatred of enemies & offenses to friends." Belden and Belden, 176.
33. Belden and Belden, 198-200; Benedict, 136-37; Frederick J. Blue, "Chase and the Governorship: A Stepping Stone to the Presidency," *Ohio History* 90 (Summer 1981), 197-98, 219-220; David Donald, ed., *Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), 3, 5, 260; Schuckers, 578-79; G. Edward White, *The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges* (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1978), 87, 201 (quoting Justice Samuel Miller).
34. Perdue, 76-77.
35. *Trial* 1:13-15 (Senate rules of impeachment); Benedict, 115-16.
36. *Trial* 3:388; Benedict, 118.
37. *Trial* 1:12.
38. *Trial* 1:18-24.
39. *Trial* 1:33-36, 37-53 (answer); Benedict, 122-23; Berger, 267.
40. *Trial* 1:175-76, 180-87; Benedict, 120-22, Perdue, 81; Schuckers, 554-55.
41. *Trial* 1:185-87; Benedict, 121-22, Schuckers, 555-56.
42. Hart, 359. Some of the Chief Justice's claimed prerogatives may, of course, have properly belonged to him. William Alexander Duer, *A Course of Lectures on the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1845), 78 (Chief Justice as member of court of impeachment); Rawle, 206 (Chief Justice's right to vote).
43. Black, *Impeachment*, 18. Modern authorities favor a relaxation of exclusionary rules of evidence in impeachments, in the interest of shedding the fullest light on facts which may be relevant. Black, *Impeachment*, 18; Labovitz, 118; Simpson, 66. Ironically the only Senator to anticipate this approach was the much-maligned (by Berger) Radical, Charles Sumner (Berger, 269-70) who voted to admit any evidence offered by either side and, partway through the trial, made a motion to expedite the trial by receiving all evidence "not trivial or obviously irrelevant," with any objections going to its weight instead of its admissibility. The motion was overwhelmingly defeated, 13-30. *Trial* 1:589-90, 633.
44. Berger, 268.
45. *United States v. Wood*, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430, 443 (1840); compare *Trial* 1:175, 194-95, 209 (admitting admissions of Thomas as Johnson's agent or co-conspirator) with 1:700 (excluding evidence that Johnson

- and his cabinet prior to the Stanton firing, considered the Tenure of Office Act unconstitutional).
46. *Trial* 1:383, 386 (defense counsel Curtis), 2:153, 169 (defense counsel Logan).
 47. *Trial* 1:462-65 (Stanbury), 689 (Curtis); Berger, 268-69.
 48. *Trial* 1:541 (Bingham), 681 (Manager Wilson), 22:24-25 (Boutwell), 220-23 (Stevens), 413 (Bingham).
 49. *Trial* 1:693; Berger, 294; Labovitz, 129-31 & *passim*; Rawle, 201.
 50. *Nudd v. Burrows*, 91 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1875); *State v. Vann*, 82 N.C. 631, 633 (1880); *Trial* 1:420-22, 425.
 51. *Trial* 1:426, 428; Perdue, 84.
 52. *Trial* 1:466, 480, 483; Perdue, 85; *State v. Fessenden*, 151 Mass. 359, 360-61 (1890) (per Holmes, J.).
 53. *Trial* 1:520-21, 524.
 54. *Trial* 1:673-75.
 55. Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 154.
 56. Benedict, 137-38; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 157-59.
 57. Berger, 264; Black, *Impeachment*, 9-11; Duer, 76; *The Federalist Papers* No. 65, at 396, 398 (Hamilton); Rawle, 205; Simpson, 21-27.
 58. Berger, 75-85, 297; Labovitz, 245. English impeachments, in contrast, were criminal in character. Matthew Hale, *The History of the Common Law of England*, ed. Charles M. Gray (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1971), 35.
 59. *The Federalist Papers* No. 65, at 395 (Hamilton); Story, *Commentaries* 1:555.
 60. Duer, 76-77; Theodore W. Dwight, "Trial by Impeachment," *American Law Register* O.S. 15 (March 1867), Labovitz, 117-18, 180; Rawle, 201, 205; Story, *Class Book*, 61; Story, *Commentaries* 1:559-60.
 61. *Trial* 1:689, 2:169; Labovitz, 88.
 62. *Respublica v. Shryber*, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 68 (Pa. 1782); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935) (the question is whether the variance between indictment and proof is so great as to take a defendant by surprise).
 63. Labovitz, 68-69.
 64. Benedict, 112; Labovitz, 61.
 65. *Trial* 1:10, 2:110, 114-16, 279, 484; Benedict, 114-15, 160; Labovitz, 61-62; Trefousse, *Impeachment*, 138-41.
 66. *Trial* 2:480-81; Labovitz, 62.
 67. Perdue, 91-92.
 68. *Walker v. Sauvinet*, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875).
 69. *Trial* 1:475, 2:129-34, 136, 303-04.

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*The Legionary Movement in Romania**

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It is the authors' observation that most people make the mistake of not considering socio-political phenomena in their natural context in order to discover the legitimate causes, the true sense of their development, and especially their importance in the environment which fostered them. Carried away by the passion of political convictions or by the hope of immediate benefits, they reduce every phenomenon to a linear problem: good or bad, to be accepted or rejected.

Moreover, governments, the authorities, "reason" in the same manner. This maintains an atmosphere of suspicion and misunderstanding and is detrimental to the awakening of consciousness to what we believe are certain essential truths. In addition, when the age has been ravaged by bloody conflicts and when bad memories or hates are not yet dissipated, nothing is easier than to maintain this partial and prejudiced way of judging matters each time that circumstances bring the discussion of such a problem before the public.

*Ed. Note: *The authors of the following article are both members of and avowed partisans of the Legionary Movement. The history of the Romanian Legionary Movement has most often been portrayed in an antagonistic light. We feel that this actively partisan treatment, based as it is on Movement documents and extensive interviews with Movement members, will help in its way as an alternate reading and alternate primary source on this controversial period of Romanian and European history.*

This disposition of the public to a puerile partisanship is manipulated by those who are interested in compromising, or even in annihilating, a historical, political, or social truth. They know that the mass man:

...reduces everything to his personal conception, considering as false and dangerous anything which does not conform to his thoughts;

...is incapable of placing himself in the socio-historical context of the phenomenon in order to judge it according to reality, nor does he manage to make abstraction from his own reality, and comparisons are reduced to what seems just and perfect in relationship to himself;

...and is influenced by what the press disseminates without ever being able to perceive the lies, exaggerations and perfidious insinuations which infest most of these communications.

Therefore, playing upon these attitudes of the mass man, it is easy for dishonest people to direct even the most liberal and intelligent opinion and to lead the most honest and just people into error. That is not surprising, for, if the coalition of detractors is always powerful (because it works on the ease of emotional and uncontrollable arguments), those who are the target of this relentless propaganda are most often those who are ill-equipped to defend themselves. People are not sufficiently distrustful of this kind of sporadic attack, which is of little documentary importance. In the long run, for lack of pertinent refutation, these hoaxes end up being considered as authentic documents and the game is won.

Thus prejudice and the distortion of reality become lethal weapons capable of confusing the soundest minds and creating an undercurrent of hate or distrust toward certain socio-political doctrines which are valuable. Such is the case of the Romanian Legionary Movement. The purpose of this synthesis is to help the public reach a more accurate understanding of the Movement, as viewed by its former members.

Those who have read only the stories spread by the persistent detractors of the thinking, educational methods, and activities of this spiritual movement have acquired a picture of a blood-thirsty terrorist organization. That is totally unjust and far from the truth.

A doctrine which seeks to modify an individual's spiritual structure in order to make him a better, more intelligent and more honest person, a doctrine whose foundations are morality and love can certainly *not* be terrorist, racist or oligarchic. It addresses itself to every individual, regardless of race, social or professional position, regardless of culture, religion or philosophical opinion.

What is important in the realization of this "New Man" is the transformation of an ordinary person into an individual of quality. This new person can surpass himself by renouncing every tendency toward hate, materialism and the taste for power.

One young Italian writer had the courage to go beyond the prejudices imposed by the enemies of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (The Legionary Movement) and to go to the legitimate sources of Legionary Doctrine. This is what he says about the Legionary Movement:

Above all, one thing should be very clear to everyone: The Legion of the Archangel Michael is not a party as we understand it, nor a pressure group, nor a para-religious organization, nor in any way denominational. It is an absolutely original movement whose primary goal and purpose are: a spiritual and moral renewal, and the creation of a new individual — an individual who will stand in contrast to the democratic *homo œconomicus*, who is essentially pragmatic and egotistical.¹

If, up until now, the Legionary Movement has been presented in a derogatory light, it is because the foundations of its doctrine, as well as its educational precepts, ran counter to all the political conceptions based on materialism and immorality. In it people discovered a powerful renewing force which in the long run would be capable of overthrowing the dominant conceptions of our mixed-up and indecisive world — not only at the philosophical level, but also at the practical socio-political level. A national mission and a universal vocation were perceived in the strength of its exceptional norms. Such ideas could not help but disturb the political factions which were dominant or dreaming of domination.

That may seem unlikely, given that the doctrine in question arose from a small country, from the bosom of a people without expansionist tendencies or pretensions. In the Legionary substance there is, nonetheless, a spiritually based messianism which addresses every honest man who is conscious of his human value and who wishes to change the course of history. Change is brought about through the use of moral norms in peoples' behavior and in nations' lives; these norms replace the egoism which is presently dominant. Such modification is surely difficult, but certainly not impossible. This explains the doggedness with which the Legionary doctrine and its members are still attacked today, 40 years after the Communist takeover of Romania and the outlawing of the Legionary Movement. It is because the Legionary spirit persists, invisible but tenacious, anchored in the depths of the Romanian soul as the only salvation for the nation, and perhaps for the world, which sees and feels itself carried toward the abyss.

The accusations, insinuations and lies about the Legionary Movement are well known. Every opportunity is taken to forbid its precepts or to savagely attack those near or far who envision this doctrine as the path of salvation for the Romanian Nation. It will take many years to re-establish an equilibrium and to give the original and highly spiritual content of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's doctrine its proper value in the eyes of the world.

The following work is one sincere effort among others to put some explanation of what the Romanian Legionary Movement really is at the disposal of those who have the conscience and the courage to look beyond the sordid propaganda. This is not a detailed analysis of the Legionary phenomenon, but a synthesizing summary of the various phases and attitudes assumed by the Legion of the Archangel Michael during its first fourteen years of existence: that is, up to Romania's entry into the war. At that time, several tens of thousands of Legionnaires were in the prisons of General Ion Antonescu, who had usurped the Legionary Movement's victory over the dictatorship of King Carol II and had installed his own dictatorship.

Brief History of the Legionary Movement

In the face of the ferociously materialistic, morally bankrupt tendencies which dominated the national scene, it was felt that nothing but the authority of the Commandments, a return to religious sources and the force of sacrifice could stop the slide toward total ruin.

For that reason, since the beginning, the Legionary Movement was set on original foundations:

- it has a *hierarchical character*;
- it values *personal responsibility*;
- it calls for *national affection*;
- it rests on *Christian spirituality*;
- and it raises the *notion of sacrifice* to the highest dignity.

Under these conditions, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu did not address the crowds in order to organize them and turn them into an opposition party. He was not interested in electoral change, but in the *internal change of the individual*. He sought to modify a mentality. He wanted above all to create a school which would prepare people for the future — people who would be honest, hard-working, moral, intelligent and willing to make sacrifices for the common good.

Nowhere in the Legionary norms and precepts can any incitement

to social, racial or religious hate be found. The basis of the Legionary Movement and education is love. Love in the purest sense of the word: that of *respect for one's fellow man*, whatever he may be; that of *respect for work*, even the most humble; that of *respect for each person's opinion*, no matter how absurd or contradictory it may be.

Germans, Hungarians, Turks, and Tartars entered the Legion's ranks because the Legionary ideal was not posed in racial or religious terms. They were engaging in a battle against a mentality which could dominate the masses of another race just as well as the Romanian masses. Everyone had the right and the obligation to participate. There was only one essential condition: each person had to blend himself body and soul into the great spiritual revolution. That was the only way to be able to comprehend the profound sense of the political vision of Corneliu Codreanu.

The beginnings of the Movement were extremely difficult. There were numerous reasons for that difficulty, and many of them were justified:

—The Legion of the Archangel Michael represented a new set of principles which were totally opposed to those that were then practiced.

—At the outset, the group was made up of inexperienced young people who promised absolutely nothing concrete and immediate.

—There was a natural distrust of a new organization, a new "party," which was assumed to be similar to all the others. (At that time there were around thirty different parties in Romania.)

—There was a general skepticism about anything which might announce a possible change.

—The Press immediately lumped the Legionary Movement into the ranks of the Fascists and later the National Socialists.

—Government authorities were hostile toward a voluntary movement which proved to be resistant to every attempt at maneuvering.

—There was a reticence of the masses before an uncustomary political power.

—The organization being formed was in a state of total poverty. It literally started from *absolute zero*. It was not supported by any monetary power: bank, capitalist group, etc.

It is for these reasons that Codreanu based his Movement on the value of its unusual principles:

1. The Militant Organization:

He placed it under the insignia of personality, capacity for sacrifice and will.

The basic unit of the Legion of the Archangel Michael is not an assembly of members who have a political center, but a small group of individuals recruited one by one by the person who is going to become their leader. This unit, called a "Nest," is an independent unit, but it is hierarchically attached to a higher unit, and so on up to the top of the pyramid to the Leader of the Legion.²

2. The Political Organization:

This organization does not depend on committees and subcommittees which seek the satisfaction of particular interests. It is a hierarchical system ending with the Legionary Senate and Chief of the Legion, who are dedicated entirely to the nation, its well-being and its harmonious development.

3. The Spiritual Organization:

This constitutes the most important part of the Legionary purpose. The goal is to provoke a radical transformation in the mental structure and the morals of the nation through continuous work on the individual. Therefore, the Legionnaire continually seeks to educate according to moral and ethical norms, by rules of comportment, and by voluntary submission to a spiritual discipline. In the long run, this spiritual discipline will give rise to other impulses, other attitudes, other convictions about the meaning of life in society and about man as the central element of society.³

4. The Financial Organization:

The establishment of the resources which are indispensable to the activity of the Movement was definitely removed from the usual system of financing owed to particular interest groups, to social monopolies or to even more obscure organizations. It was decided that in order to arrive at a fundamental modification of the reigning mentality, the Legionary Movement would set the example of independence. It would support itself by means of its own resources. The self-sufficiency of a movement which desires to be respected signifies its independence of all other groups and gives it the opportunity to face its fight without fearing anyone. From this painful beginning up to the present, the Legionary Movement has fed its efforts by the dues and donations of its members and sympathizers.

The following is a chronological history of the Movement:

June 24, 1927: Codreanu and his four companions (Ion Mota, Ilie Garneata, Comeliu Georgescu, Radu Mironovici) lay the foundations of the Legionary Movement under the name of The Legion of the Archangel Michael. The birth certificate of this organization contains only the following lines:

Today, Friday, the 24th of June, 1927, (Saint John the Baptist), at 10 P.M., the Legion of the Archangel Michael is founded under my direction. May he whose belief is unbounded enter its ranks. May he who has doubts remain outside. I hereby name Radu Mironovici, chief of the Guard of the Icon. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu.

July 10, 1927: Codreanu specifies the first spiritual lines of the new Legionary life: faith in God, confidence in the mission of the Legionary Movement, love among the legionnaires, and song.

August 1, 1927: The bi-monthly magazine *Pamantul Stramosesc* (*The Land of the Ancestors*) appears. This is the first publication and the official organ of the Movement, under the direction of Codreanu.

November 8, 1927: Codreanu receives the solemn oath of the first Legionnaires. In total: 28 people.

February 19, 1928: A truck is purchased, thanks to the contributions of the first Legionnaires (begun December 1, 1927).

Summer 1928: Legionary commerce based on the new principles begins. The team responsible uses the truck to transport staples and fruits (produced by another Legionary team in a rented garden) to health resorts where they are sold.

December 10, 1928: Professor Ion Gavanescul takes the Legionary oath.

January 3-4, 1929: General Ion Tamoschi takes the Legionary oath and the first meeting of the "Nest" leaders takes place. Codreanu stipulates the fundamental principles of the system of "dynamic education." (Action is education.)

During the same meeting, the Legionary Senate is formed. The first members are: Hristache Solomon, General Dr. Macridescu, General Ion Tamoschi, Spiru Peceli, Colonel Paul Cambureanu, Professor Ion Butnaru, and Traian Braileanu.

Summer 1929: As a follow-up to the decision to use the dynamic educational system, Corneliu Codreanu organizes two educational levels whose goal is: to develop the will; to accept a hard life; and to impose the obligation for each person to be strict with himself.

December 15, 1929: The first public Legionary meeting takes place in the small Moldavian village of Beresti. The authorities appear and try to prevent the meeting.

January 1930: Corneliu Codreanu decides to intensify Legionary propaganda among the peasant masses. Legionary teams begin to penetrate the districts of Moldavia. The first "conflicts" with the authorities arise.

February 10, 1930: A large Legionary demonstration takes place at Cahul. More than 20,000 peasants are present. From this moment on, the peasants of other regions (Bessarabia, Maramures) begin to ask that the Legionnaires come to their region, too.

June 1930: Codreanu decides to launch a new national organization for combating the communist propaganda in Bessarabia. This was to be an organization inclusive of the Legion of the Archangel Michael and other youth groups not affiliated with any political party. His appeal had as its main goal a peaceful march and demonstration against the communist influence in Bessarabia.

At a meeting with his co-workers the formation and name of the new organization was discussed. Mr. Granganu proposed the name of the organization to be The Iron Guard. (The Iron Guard later became the political party of the Legionary Movement.)

An authorization from the government for the march by the Iron Guard was obtained from Mr. Vaida-Voevod, at that time the Minister of Internal Affairs. Later, however, Mr. Vaida-Voevod, under pressure from the controlled press, withdrew the approval of the planned march into Bessarabia by the Iron Guard.

July 20, 1930: The government forbids the distribution of the Legionary Movement's propaganda in Bessarabia, although it had previously given its authorization for that distribution.

Corneliu Codreanu issues a Manifesto-Notice in which he criticizes the maneuvers of the Jewish leaders and of bribed politicians. He calls upon spiritually upright Romanians to fight. An extremely violent campaign against the Legionary Movement is begun by the press.

November 8, 1930: The first center of the Legion is inaugurated at Bucharest.

December 1930: Without saying anything to anyone, an exasperated Legionnaire, Dumitrescu-Zapada, attempts to assassinate Socor, a Communist journalist who is the director of the newspaper *Dimineata* (*The Morning*).

January 9, 1931: Codreanu is arrested and confined in the prison of Vacaresti along with a group of Legionary leaders.

January 11, 1931: Ion Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, dissolves the Iron Guard and the Legion of the Archangel Michael for the first time by an executive order issued by the Council of Ministers. (An illegal act under the constitution of

Romania.) Falsified documents are published which attempt to compromise the Supreme Leader of the Legion in the eyes of the public.

End of February, 1931: In the trial of the first dissolution of the Iron Guard and the Legion of the Archangel Michael, the Tribunal of Ilfov delivers a unanimous verdict for acquittal.

March 31, 1931: After 81 days of prison, Codreanu and the six Legionnaires involved in the previously mentioned trial are freed.

June 1, 1931: The Legionary Movement participates in the general elections for the first time and obtains 43,183 votes but no deputy is elected.

August 31, 1931: Partial elections are held in the district of Neamt. In spite of many obstacles, the Legionary forces obtain their first success: 11,301 votes. Corneliu Codreanu is proclaimed deputy.

December 31, 1931: Codreanu delivers his first speech to Parliament. In this speech he specifies the cardinal points of his generation: *God, Country, King, Family, Property, and Army.*

Next he expounds on the fundamental problems of the time for Romania: "The Jewish Problem;" "The Problem of Youth;" "The Problem of Foreign Policy;" "The Problem of the Misery of the Peasant Class;" and "The Problem of Communism." He accuses the democratic political parties of being responsible for the nation's misery.

On this occasion, he also stipulates the Legionary position on foreign affairs for the first time: "As for our position, if it is a question of choosing between these two extremes (Fascism or Communism), we are among those who believe that the Sun does not rise in Moscow, but in Rome." It is also during this speech that Codreanu formulates several political measures considered of extreme urgency:

- to introduce capital punishment for defrauders of public funds;
- to confiscate the fortunes of these defrauders;
- to bring to justice all politicians who have acted against the country;
- to forbid politicians to take part in the Administrative Council;
- to expel all foreign exploiters from the country;
- to declare the territory of Romania as the inalienable and imprescriptible property of the Romanian Nation;
- to make all elected officials work honestly;
- and to institute a central administrative authority.

- January 9, 1932:** Codreanu opens the electoral campaign for the election of a deputy in the district of Tutova.
- March 1932:** The Iorga-Argetoianu government disregards the law and dissolves the Iron Guard for the second time. This does not keep the propaganda teams from continuing their efforts, but it makes it impossible for Codreanu to defend his cause in Parliament.
- The press makes accusations and injurious statements and urges the annihilation of the Iron Guard. Scores of Legionnaires are beaten and imprisoned by the authorities.
- April 17, 1932:** Even so, the Iron Guard wins the elections at Tutova, and Professor Ion Zelea Codreanu, Corneliu's father, becomes the second Legionary deputy to enter Parliament.
- July 17, 1932:** General elections are held. The Iron Guard wins 70,000 votes and elects five deputies.
- December 10, 1932:** Corneliu Codreanu creates the first superior rank in the Legionary hierarchy: that of "Legionary Commander."
- The Movement's periodicals have reached 35,000 copies per issue. The Legion owns a print shop and two trucks.
- April 1933:** A propaganda team dubbed "The Team of Death" leaves on a two-month journey to include the provinces of Oltenie, Banat, and Transylvania. (The team was so named because of a Legionary song of that name, and because its members were determined to sacrifice themselves to the last man without replying to the provocations and armed attacks made against them.)
- June 1933:** The first court case is brought against the "Team of Death" at Arad (Banat). All are acquitted.
- Beginning of July, 1933:** Second trial of the "Team of Death" at Alba Iulia (Transylvania), also results in an acquittal.
- July 10, 1933:** The A. Vaida-Voevod government forbids the opening of the community work camp of Visani, where more than 200 Legionnaires were to build a 6 km. dam. The arrested Legionnaires are brutally mistreated by the police.
- August 4, 1933:** Construction is begun on the *Casa Verde* (The Green House) at Bucurestii Noi (New Bucharest), a suburb north of the capital. The initial purpose of the *Casa Verde* is to make a home for the wounded Legionnaires. Later, it becomes the Headquarters of the Legionary Movement.
- July–August 1933:** A ferocious press campaign is launched against the Legion and its social activities. During this campaign of calumnies, the Legionary Movement is accused of

having set up a counterfeiting ring at Rasinari (Transylvania), of working for foreigners, of being financed by Hitler, Mussolini, and Moscow. The most dogged are the newspapers of Sarindar street where the Jewish press is concentrated.

November 15, 1933: The liberal government of I.G. Duca comes into power. It attempts to destroy the Iron Guard. New elections are scheduled for December 20.

The electoral campaign is very favorable to the Legionary Movement. The government unleashes an unheard of terror against the legal activity of the Iron Guard: arrests, prohibition of placarding and meeting, suspension of the Legionary press, *etc.*

November 22, 1933: The first Legionnaire falls. While hanging posters, a student named Virgil Teodorescu is killed by police at Constanta (Dobroudja).

November 28, 1933: Legionnaire, Nita Constantin, a driver, is assassinated at Jassy (Moldavia).

December 4, 1933: Corneliu Codreanu distributes a memorandum in which he criticizes the terror of the liberal government. He accuses the following members of the government of assassinating and torturing Legionnaires: I.G. Duca, Nicoale Titulescu, Victor Iamandi, Inculet, Victor Antonescu, Valer Roman, General Dumitrescu (Commander of the Police), Eugen Critescu (Director of Security).

December 9, 1933: Nicolae Balaianu, a peasant, is assassinated in the district of Vlasca (Wallachia).

December 10, 1933: The Duca government dissolves the Iron Guard for the third time in order to keep it from participating in the elections. More than 18,000 Legionnaires are arrested and imprisoned. Corneliu Codreanu succeeds in hiding.

December 1933: Gheorghe Bujgoli, a Romanian Macedonian, is assassinated in the province of Dobroudja.

December 29–30, 1933: Legionnaires Nicolae Constantinescu, Doru Belimace and Ion Caranica assassinate Prime Minister I.G. Duca, who had ordered the savage terror against the Legionary Movement. All three immediately turn themselves in to the authorities.

The terror is intensified. The assassinations carried out by the authorities multiply.

December 29–30, 1933: Sterie Ciumetti, Codreanu's secretary, a Romanian Macedonian, is assassinated by means of atrocious tortures for refusing to reveal where his leader is hiding.

December 30, 1933: Toader Toma, a tailor, is assassinated at

Tecuci (Moldavia).

The two large daily newspapers, *Calendarul (The Calendar)* and *Cuvantul (The Word)*, which support the Legionary struggle are abolished and their directors, Nichifor Crainic and Professor Nae Ionescu, are sent to Jilava prison.

March 14, 1934: Three days before the opening of the trial for the dissolution of the Legionary Movement, Corneliu Codreanu presents himself, of his own free will, before the Council of War, which is to judge him. This Council is made up of five generals: Ignat, Costandache, Comanescu, Dona and Filip. Royal Commissioner (prosecutor): General Petrovicescu.

April 5, 1934: The Council of War of the Military Tribunal of the Capital declares the Legionary Movement not guilty and consequently acquits the 52 indicted Legionnaires. The three Legionnaires who assassinated I.G. Duca are condemned to life at hard labor.

From this time on, The Central Headquarters of the Legionary Movement is established in the home of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino at 3 Gutenberg Street, Bucharest.

After this acquittal the prestige of the Legionary Movement grows greater and greater. The great period of education through work begins for the Legionnaires. Community work camps spring up in every region of the country. The most famous are: Giulesti, near Bucharest (commercial truck garden and brickyard), Dealul Negru in Transylvania (construction of a school), Rarau, in Bucovina (construction of a convalescent home for the Legionnaires made ill from the prisons), Cotiugenii Mari in Bessarabia (reconstruction of a church in ruins), and Movila Techirghiol in Dobroudja (rest camp for the wounded).

September 5, 1934: A plot against Corneliu Codreanu is discovered. Mihail Stelescu, Legionary Commander and Deputy, and a very ambitious man, falls under the influence of forces which are trying to destroy the Legionary Movement. Stelescu is plotting to poison Codreanu.

September 25, 1934: Mihail Stelescu is judged by a "Council of Honor" composed of 23 Legionary Commanders, like himself, with General Cantacuzino presiding. Found guilty, Stelescu is eliminated from the Legion.

January 1, 1935: Memorandum by Codreanu containing the log of the terror of the liberal government of Romania.

—18,000 arrests

—300 hospitalized with serious injuries

—16 Legionnaires assassinated

—3 Legionnaires condemned.

March 20, 1935: Codreanu institutes *Totul Pentru Tara* (Everything for the Country) as a legal party under the presidency of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino.

June 1935: Hundreds of Community Work Camps are inaugurated.

July 5, 1935: The work camp, Carmen Sylva, begins on the coast of the Black Sea. 800 Legionnaires work there under the direction of Codreanu.

July 20, 1935: In a memorandum, Codreanu explains to 242 Legionnaires of Camp Arnota (Oltenie) what constitutes Legionary propriety: "The Legionnaire must behave in such a manner as to be the personification of a saying: 'He is as proper as a Legionnaire.' Proper from every point of view: in regard to himself, in regard to outsiders (behavior, attitude, good faith, respect, etc.), in regard to the organization, in regard to his fellows, to his superiors, in regard to his country, in regard to God."

September 13, 1935: The inauguration of Legionary Commerce. The first Legionary Cooperative appears.

September 19, 1935: Memorandum on Legionary Commerce. Codreanu gives instructions to Department leaders. He ends his memorandum with the following words: "Legionary commerce signifies a new phase in the history of commerce which has been stained by the Jewish spirit. It is called: Christian commerce — based on the love of people and not on robbing them; commerce based on honor.

October, 1935: The first meeting of the Leaders of the 13 Legionary Regions is held. These 13 regions comprise the framework of the Movement on the national level.

November 11, 1935: Codreanu institutes "The Legionary Control," whose goal is "to see that Legionary activity is maintained at the highest level of effectiveness and morality."

November 26, 1935: On the occasion of a difference of opinion between the Legionary Movement and the nationalist newspaper *Porunca Vremii* (*The Order of Time*), Corneliu Codreanu recalls in a memorandum one of the main principles of the Legionary Doctrine: "According to Legionary dogma, we are not permitted to behave dishonorably even toward our enemy. How he behaves or will behave toward us is his business."

April 5, 1936: Codreanu finishes the first volume of his book *Pentru Legionnaires* (*For My Legionnaires*).

April 22, 1936: The first Legionary camps and work projects of the year begin and throughout the country more than a thousand appear.

May 30, 1936: Memorandum concerning the external politics of the Romanian government. Codreanu denounces Nicolae Titulescu's maneuvers to draw Romania nearer to the U.S.S.R.: "That would be an act of treason on the part of the Romanian people toward God and toward the moral order of this world."

July 16, 1936: Mihail Stelescu, traitor to the Legion who continued his betrayal and infamy in his newspaper *Cruciada Romanismului* (*The Crusade of Romanianism*), is killed by a group of ten comrades who are historically to bear the name of *Decemviri* (The Ten Men).

The same day, Legionnaire Gheorghe Gligor is killed by Communists at Cernauti (Bucovina).

October 1, 1936: Even though it is banned throughout the country, Corneliu Codreanu's book comes out in Sibiu (Transylvania).

October 25, 1936: The "Corps of Legionary Workers" is organized.

November 5, 1936: Corneliu Codreanu addresses a *Memoire* on foreign policy problems to the king, the politicians and the country. In this publication he affirms: "There is neither a Petite Entente nor a Balkan Entente. Whoever believes in all that proves that he understands nothing..."

"Two worlds are face to face. All diplomatic liaisons will crumble under their pressure in time of war. These two worlds: the States where there have been national revolutions which fight to defend the cross and a millennial civilization, and Bolshevism which, with its dependencies, fights to destroy nations and to topple Christian civilization.

"Today all those who are on the line of destiny and national history have a duty to demand and to enforce that both internal and external Romanian politics be removed from the influence and control of Free Masonry, of Communism, and of Judaism. This is the only salvation for the future of this nation."

November 24, 1936: A Symbolic team of seven Legionary Commanders (Ion Mota, Vasile Marin, Gheorghe Clime, Neculai Totu, Alexandru Cantacuzino, Banica Dobre, Father Ion Dumitrescu-Borsa) leaves for Spain to fight at the side of Spanish nationalists against Communism.

January 13, 1937: Legionnaires Ion Mota (brother-in-law of

Corneliu Codreanu) and Vasile Marin fall on the Spanish front at Majadahonda near Madrid.

January 26, 1937: Codreanu writes a Memorandum in which he clarifies the meaning of Legionary victory: "...The Legionary Movement will never resort to the idea of a plot or coup d'état in order to win. The Legionary Movement can only win by the accomplishment of an internal process of conscience of the Romanian Nation. The victory that we await in this manner is so great, so luminous, that we will never accept that it be replaced by a cheap, fleeting victory born of a plot or a coup d'état."

February 12, 1937: The "Oath of Ranking Legionnaires," who constitute the Movement's elite, takes place in Saint Ilie Gorgani Church before the bodies of Mota and Marin. Codreanu ends the eulogy with this statement:

"That is why you are going to swear that you understand that being a Legionary elite in our terms means not only to fight and win, but it also means above all a permanent sacrifice of oneself to the service of the Nation; that the idea of an elite is tied to the ideas of sacrifice, poverty, and a hard, bitter life; that where self-sacrifice ends, there also ends the Legionary elite."

February 13, 1937: Mota and Marin are buried in the mausoleum of the *Casa Verde*. The funeral procession is several kilometers long. Attendance is estimated at several hundred thousand people.

The pro-Legionary wave takes on significant proportions. The government becomes uneasy. A new campaign of calumnies and provocations is organized against the Legionary Movement with the help of the press. There is increasing talk of the plots and the "coups d'état" that the Legion is supposedly fomenting.

March 2, 1937: The liberal government of Gheorghe Tatarescu begins a new phase against the Legionary Movement:

—all Romanian universities (powerful centers of the Movement) are closed *sine die*;

—all canteens and student housing are closed;

—all cases brought against Legionary students end in sentences;

—all Legionary camps and work projects are banned.

April 15, 1937: The Council of War at Bucharest begins the trial of the *Decemviri*. The defense is eliminated from the court and the principle witnesses for the defense are not allowed to appear.

April 27, 1937: The Council of War condemns the *Decemviri*.

- Eight are condemned to life at hard labor, two to ten years at hard labor.
- June 18, 1937:** Memorandum by Codreanu on the occasion of ten years of Legionary existence. This memorandum ends with the following words: "Be proper, be just, be pure, be of good humor as you would want every Romanian to be and to behave in his Legionary country."
- July 14, 1937:** Corneliu Codreanu rejects the government-demanded control by the O.E.T.R. (Office of Education of Romanian Youth) over the Legionary work camps.
- October 9, 1937:** Death of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino, party leader of *Totul Pentru Tara*.
- October 12, 1937:** Gheorghe Clime, an engineer, Commander of the *Buna Vestire*, is proclaimed the new party leader of *Totul Pentru Tara*.
- October–December 1937:** Legionary business takes on national proportions. Restaurants, canteens, boarding houses, cooperatives, factory warehouses, *etc.*, are opened everywhere.
- November 11, 1937:** Codreanu opens the electoral campaign for the general elections which will take place on December 20.
- November 30, 1937:** Corneliu Codreanu's declaration on foreign policy. Among other things, he says: "I am against the great Western Democracies; I am against the Petite Entente; I am against the Balkan Entente; and I have no attachment to the League of Nations in which I do not believe. I am for a Romanian foreign policy at the side of Rome and Berlin, at the side of the States which have had national revolutions. Against Bolshevism. Forty-eight hours after the victory of the Legionary Movement, Romania will have a new alliance with Rome and Berlin and will thus begin on the path of her historical mission in the world: for the defense of the Cross, of culture and of Christian Civilization."
- December 20, 1937:** General elections. The Legionary Movement party obtains 16% of the votes and 66 seats in Parliament in spite of the terror unleashed against its members.
- December 28, 1937:** Having lost the elections, the Tatarescu government resigns. Octavian Goga is commissioned to form the new Cabinet.
- January 13, 1938:** On the occasion of the commemoration of the deaths of Mota and Marin, Codreanu creates a special order in the ranks of the Legionary units: "The Mota-Marin Corps" under the direction of Alexandru Cantacuzino. The members of this elite corps have as their slogan "Ready To Die." The pro-

Legionary movement among the masses is growing at a tremendous rate.

- February 8, 1938:** Following the infamous campaign of calumnies of the Cuza-Goga government and the deaths of several Legionnaires killed by the myrmidons of a "nationalistic government," Corneliu Codreanu reveals his decision to remove the Legionary Movement from electoral propaganda.
- February 10, 1938:** The Cuza-Goga government is dismissed by the king. The patriarch Miron Cristea sets up the new government.
- February 12, 1938:** The coup d'état of King Carol II:
—annuls the Constitution;
—adjourns elections;
—suppresses party activities;
—poses the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Romanian Church as Council President;
—imposes Armand Calinescu, the future assassin of Corneliu Codreanu, as Minister of the Interior;
—imposes a new constitution entirely directed against the Legionary Movement; and invokes the death penalty for the members of the Legionary Movement.
- February 21, 1938:** Codreanu decides upon the self-dissolution of the party *Total Pentru Tara* and the liquidation of Legionary commerce in order to avoid conflict with the authorities.
- February 22, 1938:** Codreanu sends a letter of protest to the royal Councilors in which he denounces the coup d'état and the imposition of the new Constitution.
- March 5, 1938:** The government suspends all salaried Legionary administrators from their posts (ministers, professors, teachers, civil servants, etc.).
- March 25, 1938:** Codreanu sends Professor Nicolae Iorga a letter concerning the latter's campaign of calumny undertaken against the Legionary Movement in his newspaper *Neamul Romanesc (The Romanian People)*. In this letter, Codreanu brands Professor Nicolae Iorga's lack of character with infamy before the nation and before history: "...From the depths of my battered soul, I cry to you and I will cry even from the depths of the tomb: *you are a spiritually dishonest being* who has without reason mistreated our innocent souls. Neither you, Professor, nor those who have assumed responsibility for a bloody and unjustifiable oppression will encounter any violence or even any opposition on our part."
- March 29, 1938:** Codreanu addresses a letter to the director of

the newspaper *Neamul Romanesc* in which he denounces the attitude of Professor Nicolae Iorga who had published his reply to Codreanu's letter without also publishing the text of that letter. He demands that his letter of March 26 be published as the code of honor prescribes.

March 30, 1938: Professor Nicolae Iorga, instead of replying, goes to the public prosecutor and demands the opening of a lawsuit against Codreanu for insult and injury. This suit constitutes the basis of all later government action which culminates in the assassination of Corneliu Codreanu on November 30, 1938.

April 17, 1938: Codreanu is arrested at Predeal. This is the beginning of the Great Persecution unleashed by King Carol and his Minister, Armand Calinescu. Hundreds of well-known Legionnaires are sent to concentration camps. Tens of thousands of militants are arrested and imprisoned.

April 19, 1938: Codreanu is condemned to six months in prison (the maximum penalty) by the Council of War at Bucharest in the suit filed by Professor Iorga. At the same time, the government is preparing another suit in which he is to be presented as a traitor to the country, a betrayer to the Nazis and the organizer of a revolution against the regime.

May 23, 1938: This second trial takes place before the same Council of War of Bucharest. The public is not allowed to attend. The only people admitted are press correspondents.

May 27, 1938: The Council of War delivers the sentence for the second trial of Codreanu: the latter is condemned to *ten years* at hard labor on the basis of imaginary accusations.

June 16, 1938: The Legionnaires who have not been arrested organize. Ion Belgea reconstitutes the "Chain of Command of the Legionary Movement." Those who take part: Ion Belgea, Iordache Nicoara, Horia Sima, Ion Antoniu, Constantin Papanace and Gheorghe Dragomir-Jilava.

July 11, 1938: Ion Belgea is arrested. Ion Antoniu takes command. A few days later, he, too, is arrested. Constantin Papanace follows him.

July 23, 1938: Constantin Papanace is arrested and freed immediately. However, he passes the command to Horia Sima before disappearing in the country to throw off police searches.

September 8-12, 1938: New concentration camps are created and quickly filled by floods of Legionnaires who are arrested everywhere. Hunted Legionnaires are tortured and assassinated.

Beginning of October 1938: Second reorganization of Legionary Command: Vasile Cristescu, Alexandru Cantacuzino, Father Dumitrescu-Borsa, Horia Sima, Constantin Papanace and Nicolae Petrascu.

October 1938: This is the month of "Manifestos" and "Memorials" launched by the Legionary Command, student organizations, officers, *etc.*, for cessation of the terror. A revision of the case of Corneliu Codreanu is brought up for consideration, as well as the issue of responsibility in case the conflict between the king and the nation should continue to worsen.

November 10, 1938: On the occasion of Carol II's departure abroad, the Legionary Command sends a "Manifesto-Communiqué" in which Armand Calinescu's already extant plan to assassinate Corneliu Codreanu is denounced.

November 13, 1938: King Carol II leaves for London and Paris.

November 30, 1938: Under the direct order of Armand Calinescu, Minister of the Interior, Codreanu, the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri* are assassinated by the police 30 km. from Bucharest in the forest of Tancabesti during a transfer from one prison to another.

December 1, 1938: A manifesto is signed by Vasile Christescu and Dumitrescu-Borsa, a priest, in which peace and self-control are recommended to the Legionnaires.

The Legionary Movement begins a new clandestine life. The raids, arrests, summary executions and executions without due process intensify. The tension between the king and his government and the nation, revolted by the injustice and the barbaric methods employed, intensifies to the point of paroxysm.

December 15, 1938: Beginning of Legionary exile. The first group of Legionnaires passes secretly into Poland.

January 8, 1939: A second Legionary group also passes into Poland.

January 26, 1939: Professor Vasile Christescu is assassinated by the police.

February 4, 1939: Accompanied by a group of Legionnaires, Horia Sima crosses the border into Hungary, and four days later, they arrive in Berlin.

February 8, 1939: A Legionary team (Enache Nadoleanu, Martin Vucu, Gherman, Dragos Popovici and Dr. Ion Iovu), which is preparing an attempt on the life of Armand Calinescu,

- Codreanu's assassin, is arrested and its members are shot on the spot, after which their bodies are thrown into the crematory oven.
- February 27, 1939:** With a group of Legionnaires, Constantin Papanace takes refuge in Berlin after passing through Czechoslovakia.
- May 1939:** In Berlin the New Legionary Command is organized: Father Ion Dumitrescu-Borsa, Constantin Papanace, Horia Sima, Ion Victor Vojen, Victor Silaghi and Alexandru Constant.
- September 21, 1939:** Armand Calinescu, the executioner of the Legionary Movement, is cut down by a team of nine Legionnaires, later dubbed *Rasbunatorii* (The Avengers): Miti Dumitrescu, Cezar Popescu, Traian Popescu, Nelu Moldoveanu, Ion Ionescu, Ion Vasiliu, Marin Stanciulescu, Isaia Ovidiu, and Gheorghe Paraschivescu.
- After the execution of the tyrant, the team announces the punitive measure on the radio in these terms: "Armand Calinescu, President of the Council of Ministers, has been executed by a team of Legionnaires. We are sons of Romanians of Prahova, and we have accomplished a painful necessity. We have punished the one by whose consent the greatest Romanian, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, was executed."
- After that, they turned themselves in. After torturing them for eight hours, the police executed them without trial. Their bodies were thrown on a public square to be exposed to the view of passers-by.
- September 21-22, 1939:** The great massacres. The new government of General Argeseanu orders execution on the spot of all Legionary directors in concentration camps and prisons in Romania. A total of 252 Legionnaires are thus massacred among the thousands who are imprisoned. Later several hundred others pay with their lives for being Legionnaires.
- January 1940:** Father Dumitrescu-Borsa, Alexandru Constant, and Victor Vojen voluntarily withdraw from the directing group in Berlin and the leadership falls to Horia Sima and Constantin Papanace.
- January-March 1940:** In Romania a Legionary delegation made up of Ilie Gameata, Corneliu Georgescu, Radu Mironovici (all three founders of the Legionary Movement), Augustin Bidianu and Dr. Vasile Noveanu, continues the bargaining for a detente which was begun in December, 1939, with King Carol II.
- March 28, 1940:** The first Legionary delegation (Radu

Mironovici and Constantin Stoicanescu) arrives in Berlin with the official mission of setting forth the condition of the case for detente and to negotiate the return of the Legionary refugees.

May 2, 1940: The second Legionary delegation (Constantin Stoicanescu and Augustin Bidianu) arrives in Berlin. Horia Sima and Constantin Papanace send letters, addressed to King Carol II, in which the Legionary Movement's point of view on external politics (anti-communist) is specified.

May 5, 1940: Horia Sima, accompanied by a group of Legionnaires, leaves Germany to secretly penetrate into Romania where he is arrested on May 19.

June 13, 1940: Horia Sima is set free.

June 23, 1940: Horia Sima is given an audience with the king.

July 3, 1940: The Tatarescu government resigns. Three Legionnaires (Horia Sima, Dr. Vasile Noveanu and Dr. Augustin Bidianu) take part in the new Gigurtu government.

July 7, 1940: Horia Sima resigns. He is replaced by another Legionnaire, Radu Budisteanu.

End of July, 1940: The "Legionary Forum," whose decisions become unassailable, is created. The members are Horia Sima, Col. Zavoianu, Popescu-Buzau, Aristotel Gheorghiu, Vasile Iasinschi, Comeliu Georgescu, Ilie Garneata, Mile Lefter, Prof. Traian Braileanu, and Radu Mironovici.

August 16, 1940: There is a collective audience of Legionary directors, Horia Sima, Traian Braileanu, Comeliu Georgescu and Radu Mironovici, with King Carol II. No acceptable result is attained.

September 3, 1940: Following a Manifesto drawn up by Horia Sima on September 1, in which the abdication of King Carol II was demanded, large anti-Carolist demonstrations take place in the urban centers of the country. During these demonstrations, eight Legionnaires meet their deaths.

September 4, 1940: General Ion Antonescu is assigned to form a new government.

September 5, 1940: General Antonescu receives complete powers. The Constitution of 1938 is suspended. The Legionnaires arrested on September 3 are freed.

September 6, 1940: Abdication of King Carol II under pressure of the Legionary forces. The Legionary Movement is requested to take part in the formation of the government.

The same day, the Legionary Forum, the supreme entity of the Movement, represented by Comeliu Georgescu (one of the founders of the Legion) salutes Horia Sima as the successor of

Comeliu Codreanu.

September 14, 1940: The “National Legionary State” is proclaimed. Several Legionnaires take part in the government directed by General Antonescu:

—Horia Sima	—Vice President
—Vasile Iasinschi	—Labor and Health
—Traian Braileanu	—Education
—Ion Protopopescu	—State Inventory
—Michel Sturdza	—Foreign Affairs
—Comeliu Georgescu	—Colonization
—Constantin Papanace	—Finance
—A. Constant	—Propaganda
—Horia Cosmovici	—Under Secretary of State
—General Ion Petrovicescu	—Interior

November 23, 1940: Legionary Romania joins the Tripartite Pact which was signed on September 27, by Germany, Italy and Japan.

November 25, 1940: At the prison of Jilava, work is begun to exhume Comeliu Codreanu, the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri* who were assassinated the 29/30 of November, 1938 at the order of Armand Calinescu and with the consent of the government and of King Carol II.

November 27, 1940: The throng of Legionnaires who take part in that work are unable to contain themselves at the sight of the mortal remains of their great leader and the other martyrs. In an outburst of rage, they execute the 64 members of previous political regimes who are imprisoned at Jilava and who had tortured and massacred Legionary youths.

November 29, 1940: General Antonescu initiates official steps to oust the Legionary Movement from the government.

January 12, 1941: General Antonescu tries to cause a rupture in the heart of the Legionary Movement by proposing to Mr. Vasile Iasinschi, Minister of Health, that he take over leadership of the Legionary Movement. This proposal was made by the General in front of Mihail Antonescu, Minister of Finance. Of course the proposal was politely refused.

January 13, 1941: Legionary circles learn that that the General has been preparing a personal rapprochement with Hitler for a long time and is leaving for Berlin the next day for an interview with him. The same day, Berlin requests by telegram that Mr. Horia Sima participate in that conference. Notified at the last moment, the Movement’s leader, in agreement with the other

Legionary directors, refuses to take part in it.

January 14, 1941: General Antonescu discusses with Hitler the question of Romanian participation in the eventuality of a war with the U.S.S.R. He appears disposed to such participation under certain conditions. One of the conditions is *German neutrality in case of a settling of accounts between him and the Legionary Movement*. His principal argument is that the army is entirely on his side and ready to follow him. The chain of events shows that the argument evoked carried more weight in Hitler's calculations than the Legionary Movement's ideological kinship to and spiritual influence on the Romanian nation. On the other hand, if General Antonescu posed the problem that way, it was because he envisioned taking action against the Legionary Movement shortly.

January 15, 1941: The General returns. He resumes his activities without acquainting Horia Sima, Vice-President of the Council and leader of the Legionary Movement, with the results of his interview with the Führer.

The same day, Mr. Constantin Greceanu, Romanian Minister to Berlin, is recalled to Bucharest for "consultation." It was only later that the astuteness of this re-call was understood. General Antonescu was contemplating replacing several Legionary Ministers as the first step in his plans for the coup d'état. Therefore, it was necessary that there be no one in Berlin who could promptly appeal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and protest this use of force.

January 16, 1941: It is learned that the German Embassy, by order of Ambassador Fabricius (a confessed enemy of the Legionary Movement), is spreading false news about the atmosphere brought about by the attitude of the Legionnaires. That false news goes so far as to state that in the large cities the Legionnaires are scuffling with the army; that their behavior is provoking a growing anxiety in the population; that the army can no longer put up with the audacity and provocations of the Legion's troops; that General Antonescu will be obliged to take exceptional measures.

Such news circulated everywhere. The General, approving these rumors, waited for the psychological preparation of public opinion to reach the optimum point to proceed to his politico-military offensive.

On the other side, the German Embassy collected those "internal events" (which it spread) and transmitted them to Berlin in the form of libel against the Legionary Movement.

According to them, the Legionary Movement was undisciplined, incapable of facing up to difficult political moments, questionable for the Reich in a conflict with the U.S.S.R., *etc.* The Legionary Movement had to be discredited to that extent in Romania as in Berlin before the General's authoritarian action.

January 17–18, 1941: While Legionary Ministers devote themselves to their daily work, and the organization is far from suspecting anything, General Antonescu and the forces supporting him take the last steps to assure that the coup d'état will succeed and that the guilt will fall on the Movement.

January 19, 1941: Doring, a German major, head of the military transports bound for Bulgaria, is assassinated. The anti-Legionary coalition which is preparing the coup d'état immediately releases word that the German major's death was a consequence of the negligence of the Minister of the Interior, General Petrovicescu. The goal was two-fold: it was an admirable pretext for eliminating a Legionnaire from one of the most important Cabinet posts: it was an exceptionally good way to anger Hitler and turn him against the Movement.

By the time the assassin was arrested and it was ascertained that it was a Greek who had come to Romania with a passport, it was too late to change public opinion and modify the reports sent to Berlin.

General Antonescu unilaterally decides to dismiss the Commissioners of Romanization (all Legionnaires).

January 20, 1941: General Antonescu takes a series of anti-Legionary measures without consulting the Council of Ministers, which shows that coup d'état had been ready for a long time. He removes General Petrovicescu (Minister of the Interior) from office without warning or reason. Michel Sturdza (Minister of Foreign Affairs), another Legionnaire, had already been dismissed on December 8, 1940, for reasons which were just as insignificant. The elimination of the Minister of the Interior completed a plan which was already well-established and nearing its culmination.

If in Legionary circles everyone thought Minister Michel Sturdza's dismissal was one of General Antonescu's customary whims — a whim which would pass in the long-run — the dismissal of General Petrovicescu put them on guard. It was too abusive. In Bucharest, huge protests took place.

At this time, to increase his chances of winning, General Antonescu summons all the Legionary Prefects of the entire country to be in Bucharest the next day, January 21, for

administrative reasons. The majority of those Prefects will later be arrested, tried and condemned.

January 21, 1941: While the Prefects arrive in the Capital, believing they are there for an administrative convocation, military Prefects are assigned to their places. The lists of those military Prefects had already been prepared for several days. The take-over of the Prefectures was made *manu militari*, without respecting the slightest rule of transmission of power — as happens in coups d'état.

Two other Legionnaires are dismissed for no official reason other than General Antonescu's wish: Alecu Ghica (Head of Security) and Radu Mironovici (Chief of Police of Bucharest). Still more evidence of the General's true intentions.

When the news of General Petrovicescu's dismissal spread through the country, there was a reaction on the part of Legionnaires. Where they were able to assemble, they barricaded themselves in and resisted the military forces.

The Coup D'État of January 21, 1941

One of the most unusual accusations which hovers over Legionary past is that only four and one-half months after the birth of the National Legionary State, the Legionary Movement is supposed to have provoked a rebellion for motives which are poorly defined and which the authorities of Antonescu's government have always avoided discussing. After those unhappy days of January, 1941, a host of Legionary leaders were condemned to harsh prison sentences as high as 25 years at hard labor, but *never* for reasons in direct relation to that famous "rebellion." That is because there was a painful discomfort among the ranks of the "conquerors" who knew quite well the real truth of the matter in which the Legionary Movement was only the victim.

One thing must be clear from the beginning: the uprising of January 21, 1941 *was neither prepared nor set off by the Legionary Movement.*

First, the Legionary Movement had no plausible motive to do it, because:

1. It had just emerged from a long period of persecution which had decimated its leading ranks.
2. It was in the midst of internal restructuring and administrative preparation of what had been saved.
3. It knew all too well that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to replace the existing ranks without provoking a long

period of political instability and national economic collapse.

4. In addition, the international political climate did not lend itself to that type of manifestation.

On the other hand, the Legionary Movement was in power, and it had no reason to want to overthrow General Antonescu. The duties of the two forces present (the army and the Legionary Movement) were perfectly defined.

The Legionary Movement, in accordance with its doctrine, faced a vast education of the masses according to its principles, which would require several years of arduous social, scholastic and cultural efforts. One can even advance the argument that General Antonescu's presence as the head of the government was considered indispensable. A patriotic, energetic man who kept a tight rein on the armed forces, he could not help but play the desired role of allowing the Legionary Movement to accomplish its preliminary projects and prepare the administrative and political ranks it was lacking.

For the Legionary Movement, the essential problem was not the presence or absence of General Antonescu at the head of the government, but the Communist danger, which was an unceasing menace in the East, and the actions of the political survivors of the old regime who were maneuvering in the wings to regain their former status.

With this in mind, the reconciliation between the Legionnaires and the forces supporting General Antonescu was fraternally accepted. For the same reason, a host of privileges for the army was also accepted. It was necessary to maintain internal harmony and to give evidence of complete understanding.

Why? Because the Legionary Movement was perfectly aware that political circumstances demanded *a continual sacrifice on its part*. The supreme leader of the Legion was not preoccupied by being first in the government, and even less by the idea of starting a revolution to take the place of a capable ally. The most elementary principles of Legionary life precluded such a solution. After years of persecution, irreparable losses and continual tension, the Legionary Movement hoped for a period of relative tranquility to rebuild itself and complete its mission.

The idea of breaking off collaboration with General Antonescu, especially under the circumstances of that time, and even less by force, never existed in the leading circles of the Legionary Movement. Such an idea went against the most intimate convictions of the Legionary Movement, whose fundamental principle is never to resort to brute force or to foul play: and for the Legionary

Movement, principles are not slogans meant to trick people. They are current, obligatory standards of conduct. It is only in submitting to those standards that the Legionnaire becomes a different man.

In addition, in accepting entrance into a government directed by General Antonescu, the Legionnaires had sworn fidelity to him, and nothing in the world could make them become perjurers.

Finally, it must be taken into account that the new political order proclaimed by the King and General Antonescu was based upon militant Legionary formations. The State itself bore the name of "National Legionary State." Is it humanly possible to revolt against oneself?

The most convincing evidence of Legionary innocence in this matter is that the military forces that took part in the coup d'état under the direct order of General Antonescu, encountered a massive but totally unorganized resistance. It was, therefore, resistance and not offensive attack or an organized plan on the part of the Legionary forces. They simply answered the military forces' attempts to seize administrations, prefectures, city halls, police stations, *etc.* which were *officially* directed by Legionnaires.

Logically, what revolutionary force in the world would start a revolution without preparing it, without having a plan of attack, without having a part of the army on its side, without starting off its "revolution" with a general offensive in several parts of the country, and without trying before everything else, to seize some members of the government in order to break constitutional continuity? That is the least that could be demanded of such an action. Not one of these characteristics can be attributed to the Legionary Movement, which only defended itself against the deliberate action of General Antonescu. In fairness, if the Legionary Movement had decided to take recourse to armed action in order to eliminate the non-legionary Ministers from the government, the famous "rebellion" would have had a different complexion and would not have ended in the defeat of those accused of having stirred it up.

Then there is the question of who planned this revolt and why.

History written by the conquerors almost always presents the conquered as the instigators of all the trouble: from evil intentions right up to the secret preparation of the operation — from the unleashing of the action up to the most odious crimes committed during the conflict. In this case, things were no different. And since after this episode the Legionnaires were either in Romanian prisons or in German concentration camps, it was impossible for them to bring out the truth. And that truth absolves them of all guilt and heaps it completely upon General Antonescu.

With the perspective of time, there is no longer any doubt in the minds of those who took the trouble to dissect the events of the time. The entire plot and execution of this said "affair" is on the General's shoulders. It was he who decided to break the pact of collaboration with the Legionary Movement and to bring about a conflict permitting him to expel the Legionnaires from power in order to become the absolute master of the government and, if possible, of the entire Movement. This was all the easier to accomplish because the Legionnaires, in their sincerity and loyalty, did not suspect anything and believed firmly in the political rapports established between themselves and General Antonescu under the aegis of the National Legionary State.

But why would the General have made such an illogical, anti-national, hazardous decision? For one and only one reason — which for millenia has brought about the worst conflicts and brought on the most disastrous consequences: ambition. Those who knew him confess that one could rarely encounter a more ambitious individual or one who longed more for greatness or was more exclusive in command. It went to such a point that he was nicknamed "the red dog" not as much because of the color of his hair as because of his character. In a book which was laudatory of General Antonescu and venomous toward the Legionary Movement, that person is described in the following manner:

Antonescu did not owe his nickname "the red dog" to the fidelity and devotion which are characteristic of the canine race. If he passed for a dog, it was in the pejorative sense. "He bites when one expects it the least," said the officers who had served under him. The first feeling that he inspired was fear. His severity, his insensitivity which caused him not even to know the meaning of the verb to pardon, certainly had a part in that. But it must be added that he was not of our time: in him lived again a man of the primitive kind which was only slowly domesticated through the ages. What feeling other than fear could be caused by the anachronistic presence among us of a direct descendant of the tricky, savage warriors of long ago?⁴

These lines are taken from a book extremely favorable to General Antonescu, written by a person in his entourage who cannot be suspected of sympathy for the Legionnaires. Caught in the web of his ambition, the General could not accept, or even envision, sharing a power which he considered rightfully his. The presence of a Legionary hierarchy, and especially the existence of Horia Sima as supreme leader of a political movement which escaped his personal influence, weighed heavily upon him. There was one organization in the State which, in spite of its loyalty, escaped him

as an organized power and foundation of the new regime.

General Antonescu would have liked for the Legionary Movement to be dependent on him and to recognize him as the sole leader of the Movement. He even tried to win the sympathy of the Legionary masses by wearing the green shirt and trying to talk and act like a Legionnaire, while trying to outdo Horia Sima's personality. These were vain efforts, for he in no way possessed the qualities indispensable to such a feat. He even went to the point of demanding that the Legionary forces recognize him as supreme leader of the Movement. This attempt also met with total failure.

Nothing was left for General Antonescu in order to satisfy his boundless ambition but to eliminate the Legionary Movement by indirect means. The circumstances lent themselves marvelously to such actions:

1. War with the U.S.S.R. was becoming imminent for Germany. The General could pose the question of Romanian participation in that war in terms of his personal prestige.

2. The General was sure that between the Legionary Movement (a nationalistic movement entirely politically independent with regard to Hitlerian doctrine and goals) and him (as head of the government and "commander" of the armed forces), the Germans would support the one who had direct hold on the fighting forces.

3. The political parties deprived of their power by the action of the Legionary Movement (September 3-6, 1940) manifested an open hostility against the Movement but never expressed any negative gestures against the intentions of General Antonescu.

4. From the political point of view, the Legionary Movement was far from reaching the threshold of equilibrium and internal consolidation. The frightful losses of elite men, the years of prison and clandestineness imposed up to that time, put it in a state of professional inferiority, which caused a certain hesitation in the activities of Legionnaires in positions of responsibility. The four months of active presence in the administrative machine were insufficient for a strong structure with a basis of Legionary elements to have time to assert itself.

5. In addition, the Legionary Movement was not distrustful. It counted on the loyalty of the General. No one could imagine that a man otherwise of perfect integrity would be capable of giving in to the morbid compulsion of his unbounded ambition. Mr. Horia Sima, Vice President of the Council, as well as the Legionary Ministers, knew the hateful, arbitrary and dominating temperament of the head of the government, but he believed him to be incapable of an act that would ruin the understanding which reigned among

them and which was sealed by the recognition of the "Legionary State." That was seeing things in the light of reciprocal loyalty which the Legionary Movement considered as existing.

6. On the other hand, General Antonescu knew perfectly well that the Legionary Movement would not start a rebellion against anyone, for the simple reason that one does not set off such an action when one is in power. Even the term "rebellion" that has been given to this tragic action is absurd; but under that name it could more easily be blamed on the Legionnaires and thus cover up the aspect of a "coup d'état" which should be attributed to it.

7. Finally, for the General, the few minor incidents which had occurred between Legionary elements and certain military representatives attached directly to the head of the government could serve admirably as a cover for the legal motivation of the foreseen act.

The contingencies were favorable to General Antonescu's intentions, as the chain of political circumstances which ended in the events of January 21, 1941, and in Antonescu's dictatorship, shows. The facts interlock like pieces of a puzzle, revealing the true character of the affair provoked and executed under General Antonescu's orders.

The entire drama effectively unfolds between the 21st and 23rd of January, 1941, when the legitimate Legionary reaction takes place against the abuse of power perpetrated by the head of the government. However, the antecedents are of such a nature that there is no longer any doubt about the General's guilt in the preparation and execution of the coup d'état.

General Antonescu's entourage, made up of a military coterie (Colonel Rioseanu at the head), a great part of the politicians ousted by the new regime, and some camouflaged Communists had been counting for a long time on the General's megalomaniac ambition. That was his weakness on which the Legionary Movement's enemies played thoroughly.

Nothing was easier than to make him think that the presence of a supreme Legionary leader diminished his authority and his prestige, and that the only way to regain his "rights" was to eliminate that obstacle. The "reason-excuses" for such an action were not lacking. It was a post-revolutionary period full of enthusiasm, of painful adjustment, of exaggerations, even of errors. In addition, it was not easy for a regime with a Legionary doctrine to exist harmoniously next to General Antonescu, an authoritarian, exclusive person, who considered any initiative not emanating from him as a direct attack on his pre-eminent position. That state of mind lead him to see the

supreme Legionary leader as a threatening shadow to his political grandeur.

Naturally, the others did not miss a chance to poison the fraternal relations established between the two forces which made up the foundation of the nationalist government. The Legionary Movements's enemies used three principal means of preparing the General's coup d'état:

a. Continual provocation by means of special agents, some of whom had even entered Legionary ranks after September 6, 1940 (later called the *Septembristi*). These agents' actions had a precise goal: to compromise the name of Legionnaire in public opinion, to attract disdain and even hate toward the Movement. It was those government agents and former political parties which committed reprehensible acts for which the Legionary Movement was then reproached. But at the same time it was very difficult to discover them and bring them to justice. Some were protected by secrecy, others by the Legionary uniform they wore to accomplish their heinous crimes.

Thus, anything disagreeable or violent that happened on Romanian territory was indiscriminately blamed on the Legionary Movement and the news was carefully spread by the General's entourage so that public opinion would lose confidence and withdraw from the Legionary Movement. The latter, sure of its innocence and preoccupied by its internal reorganization, paid too little attention to these intrigues, and waited for a better moment to re-establish the truth. That was not possible, because its presence in the government only lasted four and one-half months.

b. The second means was the exaggeration of incriminating facts in reports addressed to General Antonescu. Thus, in the eyes of the latter, each incident took on the appearance of provocation, intentional aggression, or arbitrary action. All these adjectives, knowingly set off, profoundly irritated the General's military temperament and made him consider the Legionary Movement as an anarchical organization, difficult to command; therefore, in perspective, a great danger, if not a formidable competitor, due to its ambitions. Scruples did not bother this coalition of informers, and the truth never counted for General Antonescu when his personal prestige and his desire for power were in question.

c. Finally, the third means was the job of undermining the German Embassy at Bucharest so that when the time came, the Legionary Movement would have no moral or material support from the Germans. The most perfidious calumnies were hurled at the Legionary Movement to show the representatives of the Reich

that if there were any impediments to German troops' movements toward Bulgaria or elsewhere on Romanian territory, the fault was entirely incumbent upon the Legionary Movement. Therefore, if there were a question of a war with the U.S.S.R., it would first be necessary to push Legionary elements out of the government and annihilate the Movement's influence in the country. The only sure element for an eventual war would be General Antonescu, who had the army's confidence.

These three methods all bore their fruit and brought about an irresolution in people's minds in regard to the Legionary Movement, just at the moment when General Antonescu instigated his coup d'état. Furthermore, seen in the light of consecutive facts, the coup d'état of January 21, 1941 had been premeditated quite far in advance (perhaps even from the first day that General Antonescu and Horia Sima, leader of the Legionary Movement, were united in the same government). In the anti-Legionary book, *Mémorial Antonescu — The Third Man of the Axis*, which appeared in 1950, the author states that following some conflicts between the General and the Legionary Movement,

Under Berlin's pressure, Antonescu consented to keep the Legionary Movement in his government even though his faith in the possibility of collaboration with it was definitively shaken. But from that moment on, he wanted only for a favorable opportunity to dismiss the Legionary Ministers.⁵

And later, when he recounts the preliminaries of the coup d'état (which he calls the "Legionary rebellion"), the author affirms, however, that for the army, "The disposition for the fight had already been carefully studied."⁶ In the same book are found innumerable passages which demonstrate German complicity in ousting the Legionary Movement in addition to the premeditation of the coup d'état. Germany found it easier to get along with General Antonescu than with the indomitable Legionary Movement. Thus, in the course of a visit with Hitler, in the midst of a discussion on the modern revolution, General Antonescu made the following remark:

"And what do you do with the fanatics, for it would be difficult to make a renovating movement without them?"

"You have to get rid of them," replied Hitler without hesitation, and he smilingly threw the General a look of complicity.⁷

Hitler ended his exposition with these sentences:

The man who allows himself to be dispossessed of his command — and he stared at the General with insistence — proves that he does not know how to use a machine gun. A 20th century dictator cannot be overthrown. If he falls, it is because he committed suicide...

Back in Bucharest, Antonescu maintained absolute silence about the matters discussed during the fifteen minutes he spent alone with Hitler. The conversation which had taken place in the presence of witnesses gave the impression that he had gotten satisfaction as far as his conflict with the Legionary Movement was concerned...⁸

January 22, 1941: Dawn of this day finds the military forces and the Legionnaires face to face. The military attacks buildings occupied by Legionnaires, the latter defend themselves. The clashes between the two belligerents seem more like a siege, in which the besieged are those who are accused of fomenting the rebellion and who defend themselves with whatever weapons they can find. It is a strange "rebellion" in which the supposed rebels choose not to attack and to avoid any conflict with the forces that besiege them.

There appears to be a kind of stabilization of positions and expectations of the two sides. In certain regions there is even collaboration between the army and the Legionnaires. Some local incidents have taken place in Bucharest, Braila and Prahova where several Legionnaires but no military fell.

The most serious problem for General Antonescu arises on January 22, 1941, because of the attitude of the peasant masses. By the hundreds of thousands they begin to penetrate into the cities to help the besieged Legionnaires.

In the meantime, negotiations take place during the day between the German representative, Neubacher and Horia Sima for the cessation of hostilities. Result: The Legionary Movement agrees to stop all resistance. General Antonescu pledges not to take any action against the Legionary Movement or its militants. However, parallel to those negotiations, General Antonescu increases his intrigues, his accusations against the Legionnaires and his military offers to Hitler. All of those accusations only completed the series of calumnies made in Berlin against the Legion and worsened the Legionary position in Hitler's eyes. Under those circumstances, nothing could be more natural than the order received during the night of January 22– 23 by the German troops stationed in Romania to "...put themselves at the disposition of General Antonescu to crush the Legionary rebellion."

Therefore, it was the Germans who determined the fate of General Antonescu's coup d'état.

January 23, 1941: The troops being unable to rout the Legionnaires from the official buildings they occupy, General Antonescu gives the order to employ artillery against them. At the same time, the troops in the Capital receive orders to fire into the crowd of passers-by who are automatically considered as partisans of the Legionary Movement. Several hundred who had nothing to do with politics or the Legionary Movement were killed. These were premeditated actions which were to be charged to the Legionary Movement and presented to the Germans as undisciplined and unconscionable actions on the part of the Legionnaires.

And yet, at dawn, Horia Sima had ordered that the resistance cease and that the buildings be evacuated. It should be pointed out that in many cases, the public buildings occupied by the Legionnaires were first turned over to the German army, which then turned them over to Romanian military authorities so that all possibility of conflict would be entirely avoided.

The pact accepted by Horia Sima and General Antonescu before the German diplomat was categorical: total liberty for Legionnaires. Nonetheless, that pact was not respected by the General, nor even considered by the Germans. A few hours after the Legionnaires' capitulation, General Antonescu gave the order for repression. The enactment of that repression registered several hundred killed and tens of thousands arrested. The Legionary Movement entered a new phase of persecution.

April 9, 1941: Horia Sima, leader of the Legionary Movement, arrives in Berlin as an ordinary refugee.

April 18, 1941: The Legionary refugees in Germany are informed that they will be confined from then on to compulsory quarters in certain areas (Rostock, Berkenbruck, *etc.*) as a result of agreements between the German and Romanian governments.

By Way of Conclusion

This work does not pretend to serve the immense flood of problems and questions that the Legionary Movement's doctrine and behavior bring up. Its intentions are much more modest and are confined to some aspects of a past which has not succeeded in destroying the image of this organization so different from all others.

The world is still unaware of many truths which were hidden

through the care of some powers of the time. It is especially unaware of the positive, and therefore real and beneficial, side of nationalist movements. They are habitually called Nazi, terrorist, dictatorial, *etc.*, and all possible defects are imputed to them. The truth is something different, and it must come out as soon as possible, before the wind of hate which is blowing everywhere sweeps away the last vestiges of good sense and humanity. The wave of calumny must cease, and society must become aware that there are two sides to the coin.

The Legionary Movement is among those nationalistic movements that have been shamelessly abused and upon which the most unlikely accusations have been heaped even today. It is even surprising that it is possible to be so persistent and repeat the same lies about problems which are either totally invented or out-of-date for 30 or 40 years without saying one word about what is really the essence of the Legionary Movement! These are unworthy methods which play the game of the political speculators who hope to eliminate from their way the forces which are conscious of the danger they constitute for the future of the world.

As wisdom says, "patience, too, has its limits." As for us, Legionnaires of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (Legionary Movement), we have reached the limits of our patience. We have decided to put an end to all the calumny, lies and absurd accusations which continue to be thrown at us with a persistence worthy of a better cause.

This work is only a beginning, an introduction to the subject, to establish certain points of reference. It does not treat any aspect in depth. It only gives a synthesizing account of some pressing problems as well as a chronological relation of the Legionary march in the midst of a politically hostile world ravaged by the lack of morality and by spiritual decomposition. It is, therefore, a focus on some truths.

The process of explaining the Legionary phenomenon was begun a long time ago in European countries. Important works on the question have appeared in French, Spanish, Portuguese, German and Italian. Only the Anglo-Saxon world remained closed to these awarenesses. We hope that other works will follow to complete this indispensable information.

Notes

1. Sburlati, Carlo, *Codreanu, il Capitano*, p. 63, Ed. Volpe, Rome, 1970. (Translation by authors.)
2. See: Corneliu Codreanu: *Carticica sefului de cuib*, Ed. Omul Nou, Munich, 1971 (in Romanian); Paul Guiraud: *Codreanu et la Garde de Fer*, Ed. Francisme, 1940; Faust Bradescu: *Le Nid, unite de base du Mouvement Légionnaire*, Ed. Carpatii, Madrid, 1973.
3. See: Faust Bradescu: *Les trois épreuves légionnaires*, Ed. Promethee, Paris, 1973.
4. *Mémorial Antonescu*, p. 14, Coll. Documents Politiques, Ed. de la Couronne, Paris, 1950.
5. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 38.
6. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 104.
7. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 73.
8. *Mémorial Antonescu*, *ibid.*, p. 74.

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Book Reviews

Editor's Note: *Food and hunger have, for as long as we have records, played a part in the internal and external struggle for political power. The advance to barbarism entailed in the intentional mass privation and starvation of millions of men, women and children detailed below has become an all too quickly "memory holed" part of our twentieth century heritage. The reviews of Professors' Ward and Hall are a start at illuminating this record.*

We actively solicit additional reviews and articles on all aspects of the uses of starvation as a weapon.

EXECUTION BY HUNGER: THE HIDDEN HOLOCAUST
by Miron Dolot. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1985, xvi + 231 pp. ISBN 0-393-01886-5

Reviewed by Arthur S. Ward

“**H**olocaust studies” are now being added to school curricula across the country. Yet, as syndicated columnist Joseph Sobran pointed out recently, one of the ghastliest examples in history, the Soviet’s deliberate starvation of nearly eight million Ukrainians in 1932–33, is largely overlooked.

Execution by Hunger is the first book-length account of this mass murder to be written by one who lived through these terrible events. The author, Miron Dolot (a pseudonym), is a language teacher in California, who as a 15-year-old boy, lived through the winter of 1932-33 in a Ukrainian village that became “a ghost town” that looked “as if the Black Death had passed through.”

What sets the Ukrainian famine apart from others is that it was a *politically-induced* catastrophe. Ukraine (not “the” Ukraine, anymore than China is “the” China) at one time was known as “the Breadbasket of Europe.” Ukrainians, who are not Russians and have their own language and culture, proclaimed their independence from Russia during World War I. But in 1921, the Red Army reconquered the area and a year later the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed by Lenin.

Ukraine had a history of free peasant farming. This fierce spirit of independence continued even after Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union. But in 1928 Stalin began his program of collectivizing Ukrainian agriculture. The author describes how city-dwelling Communists, who had virtually no knowledge of agriculture and exhibited utter contempt for farmers, took over rural villages and began to enforce collectivization on the hostile

populace. In the process, the deeply religious Ukrainians witnessed their churches torn down or turned into Communist Party offices, priests murdered, and religious objects, such as crosses, confiscated.

In 1930, Stalin announced a stepped-up campaign of collectivization and declared that all "kulaks" (so-called rich farmers, often paupers by comparison with American tenant farmers) were to be liquidated "as a social class." Collectivization was organized by Communist officials (with one Communist Party functionary for every six villagers) who were assisted by secret police agents and Red Army units. In Dolot's village a Comrade Livschitz oversaw collectivization and elsewhere, "strangers," as the author euphemistically dubs their non-Ukrainian taskmasters, managed the Red reign of terror. Villagers were divided into units of fives and tens, to keep better surveillance over them and root out those who were reluctant to join the collectives. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were deported for forced labor in the far northern regions of the Soviet Union.

The Stalin regime confiscated the entire 1932 crop, including even the seed grain. The borders were then sealed. Even after starvation set in, agents of the "Bread Procurement Commission" continued to conduct periodic raids on all homes suspected of holding small amounts of food. The author describes what took place:

Faced with starvation, the villagers tried everything possible to save themselves and their families. Some of them started eating dogs and cats. Others went hunting for birds: crows, magpies, swallows, sparrows, storks, and even nightingales. One could see starving villagers searching in the bushes along the river for birds' nests or looking for crabs and other small crustaceans in the water. Even their hard shells, though not edible, were cooked and the broth consumed as nourishment. One could see crowds of famished villagers combing the woods in search of roots or mushrooms and berries. Some tried to catch small forest animals.

Driven by hunger, people ate everything and anything: even food that had already rotted — potatoes, beets, and other root vegetables that pigs normally refused to eat. They even ate weeds, the leaves and bark of trees, insects, frogs and snails. Nor did they shy away from eating the meat of diseased horses and cattle. Often that meat was already decaying and those who ate it died of food poisoning.

By 1933 there were numerous incidents of cannibalism, and this despite the fact that the 1932 Fall harvest had been a good one. States Dolot, "From the very start of the harvest to the end, not a single pound of wheat had been distributed to the village

inhabitants. Nothing was left for them. We were told that all the grain had to be transported to the railroad stations. We also learned that there it had been dumped on the ground, covered with tarpaulins, and left to rot."

The Soviet-created famine in Ukraine was apparently intended to break the independent-spirit of the Ukrainians once and for all. In this effort, they seem to have failed. During the Second World War, many Ukrainians fought along side the Axis forces. Ukrainians are still persecuted in the USSR, at least in part because they retain their sense of awareness that they are indeed Ukrainians and not Russians.

It should be noted that this heart-rending account of the death of a once peaceful and self-reliant Ukrainian village is open to verification. As one who has taught Russian History at the college level, this reviewer can testify that the dates and details coincide with other records. Adam Ulam, Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, has written the Introduction to this work, and includes a concise overview of the historical context for Dolot's narrative. This is an important work, dealing with another chapter of what the distinguished Revisionist historian, James J. Martin, has chosen to call "inconvenient history."

THE POLITICS OF HUNGER: THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF GERMANY, 1915-1919. By C. Paul Vincent. Ohio University Press, Athens (Ohio) and London, 1985; pp. viii, 191.

Reviewed by Robert A. Hall, Jr.

When did the First World War end? Yes, that is a "catch-question." Virtually everybody will reply "November 11, 1918;" but, in so doing, they will be wrong. That was the date on which hostilities on land ceased. On sea, however, although there was no more combat, the Allied (chiefly English) blockade of foodstuffs and other materials continued until July 11, 1919, eight months after the Armistice was signed at Compiègne. The purpose of the blockade? — to force the new government of Germany, the "Weimar Republic," to ratify the Versailles "peace" treaty without delay. In this way, an intentionally continued and increased scarcity of food and the resultant famine was used as a militarily enforced weapon against the civilian population of Germany. Vincent's book, originally conceived as a study of the post-1918 blockade, grew into a detailed history of the entire operation and its background, from 1914 onward.

Vincent's study is divided into six chapters. In the first two, he treats pre-1918 history; in the next three, the events of 1918-1919; and in the last, the longer-range effects of the starvation that resulted from the blockade. Chapter I, "The Loss of Innocence," deals with the developments in the first year of the war that led to the establishment of the blockade. On both sides, at the outbreak of hostilities, the populations appeared to be enthusiastic about the war and in a state of euphoria which owed a great deal of its virulence to the glorification of War by the "futurists" in literature and art, as well as by the more rabid nationalists during the first decade and a half of the new century. A major factor in this now strange headlong rush into Armageddon was the widespread expectation that the war would not, in fact, could not, last more than a few months. (Your reviewer's first coherent memory is of a bright September afternoon in Minneapolis, listening to the adults deploring the outbreak of "this terrible war" in Europe, and expressing the hope that it would be over by Christmas.)

As time passed, it became evident that both sides were going to have to take drastic measures to counteract the ill effects of the excessive strain placed upon the civilian populations. Vincent points out that "the severe wartime conditions and the experiences of the English and the French on the homefront were generally matched and in many cases exceeded in Germany" (p. 15). In the following pages, Vincent analyzes the situation in Germany, with the interesting conclusion that — contrary to our prevailing folklore — the German war-effort was poorly organized, with unwise priorities given to industrial and business interests at the expense of those of civilians and farmers. Although foreign sources of food and fertilizer were cut off, the authorities "virtually ignored the [...] effects of a food shortage" (p. 30).

Matters may have been made considerably worse by the administration of the food regulations being incredibly decentralized. Under the provisions of the Prussian Law of Siege (p. 17), the procurement and distribution of the domestic food supply was administered by no less than twenty-four separate German army authorities, under generals who differed widely in their attitudes and approaches to the problem, and who often worked at cross-purposes from each other and from the overall army administration. By 1916 the German population was surviving on a "meager diet of dark bread, slices of sausage without fat, an individual ration of three pounds of potatoes per week, and turnips. Only the turnips were in abundant supply" (p. 21). By mid-1918, the army's food ration was no better, and this scarcity

contributed to disaffection among the troops. Vincent quotes (p. 23) General Ludendorff's allegation that the German defeat was due to a "stab in the back" (*Dolchstoß*, literally "dagger-stab"). True, says Vincent, at least in part, but what was not mentioned by Ludendorff was "the fact that the army had fashioned the knife" by its maladministration of the food-supply throughout the entire war.

In Chapter II, "The Blockade," Vincent summarizes the events which led up to its establishment in 1915 and its effects in Germany. These were especially severe in the terrible *Kohlrübenwinter* ("turnip-winter") of 1916-1917, "during which the collective weight (sic) of the German population plummeted sharply" (p. 45). The blockade was almost totally effective in cutting off Germany's imports of food and materiel. In 1917, with German morale nearing the point of collapse, the Kaiser decided on the now infamous policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. In so doing, Vincent argues that the German leadership committed two serious errors: "They totally underestimated the vigor with which the Allies would counter the effects of the submarine;" and "they failed to appreciate the consequence of America's potential addition to the side of the Allies" (p. 47). By November, 1918, the food-shortage in Germany had become catastrophic; the action of the Allies in continuing the blockade, after the cessation of hostilities on land, made it even worse.

Vincent's next two chapters deal in detail with the events of the eight months after November 11, 1918, primarily on the diplomatic front. He describes the November armistice as "A Conditional Surrender" (the title of Chapter III). Even before the cessation of hostilities on land, there had been ominous anticipations of coming discord among the Allies. Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points" (which included "absolute freedom of navigation" at all times) seem to have been taken more seriously by the German government and negotiators than by Foch and Clemenceau with their intense desire for unlimited *revanche*, or by Lloyd George with his stubborn insistence on undiminished British command of the seas. As a consequence, and much to the dismay of the German negotiators, the continuation of the naval blockade was made one of the conditions for the Allied granting of an armistice (hence Vincent's title for this chapter). On November 11, just before the signing, the Germans were so perturbed at the prospect of continued starvation through the continuance of the blockade that a clause was added to the armistice agreement, to the effect that the Allies "contemplated relieving the famine." This, however, as later events showed, was only an empty phrase.

"Gold, Food, Ships, and Diplomats," during the next eight months, are the topic of Chapter 5. There was a strange intermingling and clash of often diametrically opposed policies on the part of victorious Allies, so that Herbert Hoover's initial moves for humanitarian famine relief, as applied to Germany, were for months stalemated by considerably less laudable refusals on the part of the French and British to allow food to be distributed, even from stocks already unloaded in Europe. The blockade was not only maintained, but even extended. Almost wholly incomprehensible to a later generation, even German fishing rights in the *Baltic* were abrogated. The British sea lords were concerned with the continued assertion of their naval power, while the French politicians were more interested with extracting from the Germans every possible *centime* of reparations. The French government's demands extended even to the gold-reserves held by the German government which were desperately needed to pay the American farmer for the food which he had supplied. An Allied commission set up to deal with the situation, meeting at Spa, Belgium, wasted time in interminable wrangling. For three months, even eyewitness reports of the extremely bad situation in Germany failed to move either the Allied commission at Spa or the peace negotiators at Paris.

In the end, it took a violent outburst of anger on Hoover's part to persuade Lloyd George that a drastic change in Allied policy was urgently needed (pp. 110-11). On March 8, 1919, the Allies' policy was finally reversed (pp. 111-13) by the Supreme War Council, at a meeting which has been made relatively well-known by John Maynard Keynes's description of it in his memoirs (from which Vincent gives several quotations). As for the sources of French and British obstructionism during these crucial months, Vincent ascribes their behavior to several causes (pp. 115-17). These included: British desire to maintain the "very perfect instrument" of the blockade for imposing peace terms (Keynes's explanation); the ignorance of Allied diplomats as to the real situation; the Europeans' suspicion of Hoover's humanitarianism, which they interpreted (at least in part) as evidence of a presumed desire of the United States to dominate Europe; and, most important of all, French greed for German gold.

The continually worsening starvation of the German public is described in Vincent's fifth chapter, "Famine and Starvation." Not only the supplies of actual food (especially potatoes, grain and sugar), but also fodder, fats and fertilizer quickly came to be in very short supply. Not only the housewife, but the soldier and the prisoner-of-war, were affected. The resultant severe undernourish-

ment was particularly telling on the elderly, the young, and expectant and nursing mothers. Improper diet lowered resistance to or caused such diseases as tuberculosis, rickets, influenza, dysentery, scurvy, ulceration of the eyes, and hunger-edema (p. 137). The influenza-epidemic of 1918 had, therefore, a far greater effect on German mortality, which was 250 percent greater in that year, than in England (p. 141). Vincent emphasizes (pp. 146-47) the disastrous results in malnutrition, as demonstrated in many modern physiological and psychological studies, on the human brain, especially in undernourished children. Furthermore, he points out (pp. 148-50), the elementary necessity of obtaining even a barely sufficient food supply undermined traditional morality and ethical standards (pp. 148-50).

The end result of the blockade and especially of its continuation after November 11, 1918, was, as Vincent terms it in the title of his sixth and final chapter, "The Making of a Quagmire." Even while the blockade was being enforced and strengthened, perceptive observers on both sides pointed out the dangers inherent in its continuation, which could lead only to a complete breakdown of the social order. Even though the immediate situation was saved by a last-minute relaxation of the blockade on food, the longer-term results of the resultant famine were still disastrous. As Vincent observes (pp. 112):

Whether one espouses the psychoanalytical argument that childhood deprivation fostered irrational behavior in adulthood or the physiological assertion that widespread malnutrition in childhood led to an impaired ability to think rationally in adulthood, the conclusion remains the same: the victimized youth of 1915-1920 were to become the most radical adherents of National Socialism.

Additionally, Vincent observes (p. 164) "By the same wisdom, however, one cannot intellectually dismiss the important possibility that blockade-induced starvation was a significant factor in the formation of the Nazi character." His conclusion (pp. 164-65) is that:

The ominous amalgamation of twisted emotion and physical degeneration, which was to presage considerable misery for Germany and the world, might have been prevented had it not been for the postwar policy of the Allies. The immediate centerpiece of this policy was the blockade.

Two short appendices, of British reports made in 1919 on the famine prevailing in Germany, are printed on pp. 168–72. An extensive bibliography (pp. 173–82) and a not wholly complete index (pp. 183–91) finish the book. It is well-printed, with few typos. The very full references are contained in notes printed at the end of each chapter — a far better procedure than that of putting them all in one huge clump at the end of the text of the book.

Specialists in the field have, of course, known of the Allied blockade and of its results, for a long time. A major merit of Vincent's treatment is his bringing together of information from all these different sources, and welding it into a comprehensive, highly readable, and yet scholarly presentation of the whole picture of both the 1915–18 blockade and its continuation and extension in 1918–19. Your reviewer, who was brought up in an intensely Anglophile and Francophile family, but who majored in German literature as an undergraduate, was unaware (like almost all other Americans) of the nature and extent of the blockade. Vincent's book has opened his eyes to one more neglected facet of modern history. By performing this service for his readers, Vincent has made a contribution to the never-ending task of revising and refining our perception of history, which can never be one hundred percent accurate or immune to change.

THE FALCON AND THE EAGLE: MONTENEGRO AND AUSTRIA, 1908–1914 by John D. Treadway; Purdue University Press, 349 pp. \$18.00

Reviewed by W.K. v. U.-Ziechmann

Aptly titled, *The Falcon and The Eagle*, while of particular interest to the student of diplomatic history, makes absolutely fascinating reading, even for those general scanners who have but the most fleeting impression of the immediate background leading to the outbreak of war in 1914. The author, a professor of history at the University of Richmond, is thoroughly grounded in his subject, having received his doctorate from the University of Virginia, but, equally important, having studied at the University of Kiel in West Germany, as well as at the Indiana University extension in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia and the University of Belgrade. Thus, he is not merely conversant with documents in English, but also those in German and Serbian. His extensive bibliography will attest to an avid quest, à la Ranke, for source material. Particularly astonishing is his thorough searching and knowledge of the archives and

libraries in Belgrade and Cetinje, a task seldom undertaken by Western historians. Nevertheless, the wealth of documents to be found in Vienna's Hof- und Staatsarchiv (some apparently untouched until now) by far outshines and outnumbers those in Cetinje, the old Montenegrin capital, as unfortunately many of the Montenegrin documents were irretrievably lost during the course of the First World War.

Just as unfortunately, the chief formulator of Montenegro's foreign policy, the patriarchal King Nicholas, had a penchant for not committing most of the details of his policymaking to pen and paper.

Heretofore, virtually every major study of the events leading to Sarajevo, 1914, has dealt exclusively with Austro-Serbian relations, either from neglecting or ignoring Montenegro's chess game with the vast Habsburg Empire to her north. After all, the Kingdom of Serbia headquartered in Belgrade, not its rival, the tiny Serb land of Montenegro (Italian for "Black Mountain") furnished the *causus belli* that put an end to the beautiful, but catastrophic, summer of 1914. (Montenegro, which began as a theocracy under a prince-bishop [*vladik*] of the Orthodox church had become a secularized principality under Danilo II in 1852 and a kingdom [with Austrian approval] only four years before in 1910.)

Professor Treadway is not the first historian to illustrate the intrigues, great and small, which filled the vacuum created by the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It would seem that he is the first to fit Montenegro into the disparate Balkan mosaic vis-à-vis the dominating powers of Europe. Further, he demonstrates both the rivalry and the distrust between the dynasties of Belgrade and Cetinje over inheritance of the mantle of Stephan Dusan and his great Serbian Empire of the Middle Ages, an empire which had lasted until its defeat at the hands of the Turks in the 14th Century. It could be said that some 20th Century Serbians looked upon the Montenegrins as boorish louts, it should also be pointed out that Montenegro's Nicholas I of the Petrovic-Njegos family looked upon the rival Obrenovic family with outrage when the upstart, Milan, assumed the rank of King of Serbia in 1882. Yet he was hardly more enthusiastic when his own son-in-law, Peter Karadjordjevic (Karageorgevic), occupied the bloodstained throne of Belgrade in 1903. With Serbia quickly replacing Montenegro as Russia's favorite and chief agent in the Balkans, Nicholas was more prone towards rapprochement with Austria, despite ethnic and linguistic differences, than with Serbia.

Montenegro's and Serbia's relationship, kinship and feuds are

very reminiscent of those of Lebanon–Syria, although the fiercely independent Druses are more akin to the hardy mountaineers of the Black Mountain than are the denizens of either Beirut or Damascus. Yet one might be as imprudent as the other, and so Montenegro was eventually (1921) swallowed up under the Karadjordjevic standard of Greater Serbian Yugoslavism — much as their spiritual brothers of the seething Levant might well fall to a form of Greater Syrianism. The Balkans do not possess a monopoly on either intrigue or intransigence.

The cunning fox of Cetinje, Nicola of Crna Gora, descended from Herzogovinian stock, received the nickname “Father-in-Law of Europe.” The temperamental ruler’s comic penury gave inspiration to Franz Lehar’s operetta, *The Merry Widow*, as he simultaneously sought to replenish his empty coffers and extend his frontiers, often provoking and antagonizing the foreign office of his bigger and more arrogant Austrian neighbor, the Ballhausplatz, but not necessarily the more tolerant Imperial Court, the Hofburg.

In 1911, the wily Nicholas of Montenegro had remonstrated with the Austro-Hungarian Minister to Cetinje, Baron Wladimir Giesl of Gieslingen (who would serve as the minister to Belgrade at the outbreak of war):

We lack Austria’s strength, but we are a small courageous people. We, the falcons of the Black Mountain, yearn to soar ahead of Austria’s eagles.

Foolhardy and reckless abandon, of course, but in his 58 year rule (1860–1918) — only the venerable Franz Josef, with a 68 year reign (1848–1916), outdid him on the Continent! — Nicholas followed an anomalous zig-zag course, motivated by a self-defeating desire for territorial expansion. His territorial acquisitions in the Balkan Wars (1912–13) did little to alleviate economic misery at home, and probably exacerbated matters, leading to discontent, vexation and isolation.

In his meticulously written volume of maturity and incisiveness, Dr. Treadway has made a judicious contribution to both European diplomatic history and historiography in dispersing two myths: (1) that Montenegro was the servile handmaiden of Serbia and Russia, and (2) that Germany was constantly trying to goad Austria-Hungary into war.

An excellent study, of interest to both the scholar and the historical amateur.

*Historians Wrangle over the
Destruction of European Jewry*

DR. WILHELM STÄGLICH

Translated by Waltraud Martin

[Commentary on the Congress of Historians in Stuttgart, 1984]

International historical conventions dealing with the question of the "destruction of the Jews during World War II" have been rare up to now, the consensus being that such events were superfluous. On that subject, historians had fundamentally adhered to what had been pronounced as "historical fact" at the various show trials held by the victorious powers in Nuremberg and elsewhere soon after the end of hostilities. Furthermore, it was arranged that in divided Germany the same "findings" should also be ratified by German judges. This state of affairs, assuredly ideal for certain circles, appears to be gradually coming to its deserved end due to the increasing influence of historical Revisionism. As early as 1982, an international convention on the subject "Nazi Germany and the destruction of the Jews" was held at the Sorbonne University in Paris.¹ This was followed by yet another assembly of prominent historians from Germany and abroad, which convened in Stuttgart on May 3-5, 1984, dealing with the same topic. The conclusions reached were published by Professors Jaeckel and Rohwer in 1985, in the form of a book consisting of the lectures presented at the congress, augmented and annotated, as well as other edited contributions to the discussions insofar as these purported to contain new insights.²

However, one who hopes to find that the complex issues of World War II had finally been subjected to an exhaustive examination and that, in particular, the matter of the technical aspects relative to the alleged murder of several million Jews, without leaving any trace at all, has even been remotely clarified, must feel disappointment at the outcome of this expensive meeting of historians from all over the world. As Eberhard Jaeckel (Stuttgart) introductorily explained in the foreground of this congress stood the "formation of the decision as an historical problem," in other words: the question of how, when, where and, as applicable, by whom the decisions were made to kill the Jews, in which order of sequence, and by what means. However, this was

putting the cart before the horse. Still lacking is a thorough, impartial investigation as to what had become of the Jews who were deported to the East. The alleged gas chamber killings are particularly questionable in more than one respect, as numerous Revisionist works have long since shown. For that reason the complaining Jewish organizations and others were unable to refute convincingly the theses of Professor Faurisson during the Faurisson trial in France.³ Likewise, in January 1985, the "U.S. authority on the Holocaust" Raul Hilberg had to admit before a Canadian court in Toronto, that to date, "no scientific study...has ever been done to prove the existence of Nazi gas chambers." In Germany this sensational admission went largely unreported, of course. Even though the Canadian press did give an account of this event,⁴ the German historians continue to feign ignorance in the matter. Even the participants at the Stuttgart congress acted as if everything had already been clarified — with the exception of the "formation of the decision." They agreed, in essence, that the destruction of the Jews did take place consistent with the propaganda which has been broadcast day after day, year after year since the trials by the victors of the vanquished at Nuremberg. Insofar as they even mentioned it, the various lecturers repeated like trained parrots the dogma of the "gassings" in the so-called "extermination camps" without touching upon any of the relevant details.

Nevertheless, the congress did offer a surprise. For the first time the German public was made aware that the establishment historians had taken up two different positions recently, the one being described as the "intentionalist" and the other as the "functionalist" school. The previously unchallenged intentionalist school — represented at this convention by Raul Hilberg (Burlington, USA), Andreas Hillgruber (Cologne), Yehuda Bauer (Jerusalem), Wolfgang Scheffler (Berlin), and Helmut Krausnick (Stuttgart) — still continues to adhere to the "purist teaching" that was produced at the Nuremberg trials, which — to summarize briefly — asserts, that the extermination of the Jews originated exclusively from Hitler's initiative. The functionalists, however, hold the position that the alleged exterminations had occurred and progressively increased, as it were by force of circumstance. To be sure, Hitler's fanatical anti-semitism was the indispensable ingredient for this, although Hitler had issued neither a verbal, nor a written order to exterminate the Jews. The functionalists also reject the still prevailing opinion that, at the so-called Wannsee conference of January 20, 1942, a kind of general plan for the extermination of the Jews

had been formulated. According to their theory, the alleged exterminations supposedly occurred out of the local necessity, such as the critical food shortages within the Polish ghettos after the start of the deportation of Jews. It reportedly began with mass executions by the Einsatzgruppen, proceeding to its terrible climax, the "gassings" in "extermination camps," evolving progressively through a process of "cumulative radicalization" (Friedlaender) rather than on account of anything planned in detail. Thus the "extermination of the Jews" was not — as the intentionalists claim — the direct consequence of a long range plan of Hitler's, but the result of a gradual escalation of ruthlessness brought about by the desperate circumstances of the war.

At the congress, Professors Broszat (Munich) and Mommsen (Bochum) represented the "functionalist school," although they were not scheduled to present any major lectures. They could state their positions clearly only during the various rounds of discussions. It should be noted, however, that credit is due to Saul Friedlaender (Tel Aviv) who in his keynote address at the beginning of the seminar did make a serious effort to objectively portray in detail the "functionalist thesis," although he for his own part was, as were all the other Jewish participants, clearly committed to the "intentionalist school." For example, he quoted verbatim the significant conclusion of Professor Mommsen (1983).

In historical research the notion still holds that Hitler himself had considered the feasibility of the destruction of Jewry from the beginning, and had drawn up a long range plan for its implementation. The carefully chronicled remarks of the later dictator addressing this problem certainly do not convincingly support this view.

Friedlaender also referred to the thesis already formulated by Professor Broszat in 1977, that "no general all encompassing directive for the extermination had existed at all, that the 'program' for the destruction of the Jews had, until spring of 1942 beginning with individual actions rather gradually evolved institutionally and factually, acquiring its determining character after the establishment of the extermination camps in Poland..."

Such remarks closely approach the position outlined in my book *Der Auschwitz Mythos*, that any "possible killings of Jews, including those by gassings,... could have occurred only through the arbitrary actions of subordinate agencies" and "in that case, one could not speak of a 'planned' extermination of Jews."⁵ However, the functionalists have yet to draw the logical inference that the special development and technical ramifications of the various

killing actions must be scientifically clarified beyond all doubt, before they can qualify as "historical fact." To continue to rely, as do the intentionalists, essentially upon the pronouncements of sundry courts cannot be regarded as a scientifically comprehensive and conclusive clarification of the events concerned, quite apart from the questionable nature of their basis. The list of references of contemporary historical works is sufficient evidence of this, insofar as it concerns the question of the gas chambers. After all, the "gas chambers" must have been the real "instruments of genocide" (Faurisson), if one is to believe the official versions.

Thus, even if the controversy over the "formation of the decision" has changed little in the overall evaluation of the entire event, the divergences between intentionalists and functionalists reveal the rise of a certain insecurity among the historians, even at the abovementioned international Colloquium at the Sorbonne. This insecurity is based, at least partly, on the apparent absence of any discernible connection between these alleged killing operations; all previous attempts to establish and trace them back to a central directive appear to be more or less contrived. Broszat's comment, made during the discussion, is significant. He wondered, "whether the rather passionately conducted discussion with the noteworthy participation of Israeli and other Jewish scholars, might have had ulterior motives, transcending purely objective and scholarly inquiry into the facts at issue." Mommsen went even further, bluntly designating an "illusion" the assumption that "the final solution of the European or world Jewish question had been systematically discussed at any time within the higher circle of leadership."

Indeed, it is difficult to believe there could have been such direction, when one considers that the various alleged killing operations, occurring in part parallel to each other, were completely different in the manner of their implementation. In addition to the mass shootings by the Einsatzgruppen, "gas wagons," "gas showers," "gassings" by means of exhaust fumes of diesel engines and "gassings" with the insecticide "Zyklon B" in specially designated "gas chambers," as well as "phenol injections" were to have been employed as means of killing. The war propaganda alleged even more fantastic methods of killing, which were no longer discussed even at the Nuremberg trials. No doubt, a Hitler with a purpose and plan would not have proceeded in such a confused and disorderly manner. The very fact that innumerable Jews were never caught up in this alleged genocide speaks against the thesis of the intentionalists.

On the other hand, the functionalists will not, or cannot, see that at least some of the features of the alleged killings, such as the use of diesel engines for the "gassings" (Gerstein report) or the use of Zyklon B, as is described in reports of alleged eyewitnesses, seem doubtful or even impossible in their practical application. Evidence other than these alleged "eyewitness testimonies" has not been produced thus far. The effort was not even made — no doubt for good reasons — to conduct any kind of tests to ascertain the presence of any traces of Zyklon B in the ruins of the alleged gas chambers of Birkenau. At any rate, nothing was ever made public about any positive findings of any scientific tests. In recent years, non-German Revisionists have submitted well-founded doubts on the possibility of the central role of the "gassings" in the context of the alleged genocide. Thus, sooner or later, the establishment historians will be compelled to respond to the Revisionist arguments, if they do not wish to lose their credibility altogether.

Today already one thing is certain: Those judicial pronouncements which, as is the rule, have as their basis that the "planned, organized physical extermination of Jews in German occupied Europe," allegedly ordered by Hitler, is a "historical fact," a "matter of historical record," or even a "publicly accepted fact," and have rejected evidence to the contrary as inadmissible on those grounds, are misjudgements resting on misclaimed competence or incorrect opinions of admittedly biased experts. For their foundation is a state of affairs which is still, or is now in any event, in dispute. Thus the truth of an already very old admonition by Professor Ernst von Beling, the highly esteemed teacher of jurisprudence during the Weimar era is reaffirmed. Beling cautioned against a "too rash judgement on contemporary events" by means of judicial decree. He opined that it would be "presumptuous of a judge to cast himself into the role of a historical writer" and referred to, *inter alia*, the difficulties involved in historical research and the unreliability of source material. He declared further, that a historical assertion could only be treated by the courts as "publicly accepted fact" if "historical research unanimously precluded all and every doubt as to its truth."⁶ It is about time that German judges reflect upon this!

The historians, however, should at last muster up the courage to detach themselves from the previous thought patterns and begin to delve into the real causes of the deaths of those Jews who did perish during World War II, insofar as that is still possible. The declaration by Professor Helmut Diwald still holds true that the fate of the Jews who were deported to the East "is despite all literature still unclarified on central questions."⁷

Notes

1. *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 1/84, p. 18.
2. Jaeckel/Rohwer: *Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Stuttgart, 1985, 253 pp. Paperback. P. 815ff.
3. *Toronto Sun*, 1/18/85.
4. *Der Auschwitz Mythos*, p. 22, *loc. cit.*
5. *Deutsche Strafrechtzeitung* 1918, co. 199ff.
6. *Geschichte der Deutschen*, first edition, p. 165.

*Shoah: Abraham Bomba, the Barber**

BRADLEY R. SMITH

I have now seen the complete 9½ hour film documentary, *Shoah*, which purports to be an "Oral History of the Holocaust." It was produced, directed, narrated and is now being promoted by Claude Lanzmann. From the newspapers I gather Lanzmann is an assimilated French Jew who speaks neither Hebrew nor Yiddish. He is presently 60 years old. He worked as a journalist for many years in association with John Paul Sartre and *Les Temps Modernes* until 1970 when he turned his attention to making movies.

That is, Claude Lanzmann worked for 25 years in the eye of the intellectual storm that swept across France during the years following the end of World War II. As a journalist he certainly learned how to conduct professional interviews. He certainly learned, through his association with Sartre, de Beauvoir, Camus and those who criticized the great triad, how to pursue a train of thought. Considering the high-powered company he kept it's a real eye-opener to watch Lanzmann reveal his intellectual corruption in scene after scene of this shoddy movie, which he claims took ten years to complete.

My favorite interview in *Shoah* is with one Abraham Bomba, the Barber of Treblinka. I'm not alone in my fondness for Bomba either. Many critics have commented on his performance. They gave him rave reviews. George Will of ABC Television for example wrote in *The Washington Post* that Bomba's narrative was the "most stunning episode in this shattering film." Some alleged

*Excerpt from *Confessions of a Holocaust Revisionist (A Work in Progress, Part I now available)*.

eyewitnesses to "gas chamber" horrors recount stories that are so lacking in credibility that they can be dismissed out of hand. Other alleged eyewitnesses to "gas chamber" atrocities repeat stories that cannot easily be shown to be false but reveal the character of the tale-bearer to be so sniveling and shameless that one feels compromised by even listening to them. Bomba is becoming an important character in the Holocaust-survivor-eyewitness scenario in that his tales embody both of these characteristics.

The way Bomba tells the story, he had been interned in Treblinka about four weeks when the Germans announced they wanted some barbers for a special detail. Bomba volunteered, of course, then helped the SS identify 16 other Jewish barbers. All together they were taken to the "second part" of the camp where the "gas chamber" was. They were led inside the gas chamber where a kapo¹ (almost certainly a Jew) explained that the 17 barbers were to shear the hair from the women who would arrive to be "gassed."

Here Claude Lanzmann began to question Bomba about the greatest murder weapon of all time, the German homicidal "poison gas chamber."

Lanzmann: How did it look, the gas chamber?

Bomba: It was not a big room, around twelve feet by twelve feet.²

And there you have it. Claude Lanzmann is finished with his in-depth investigation of how that great horror, the Treblinka gas chamber, looked. It takes all kinds. If I had been in Lanzmann's shoes I could have thought of a few more questions to ask about "how it looked." Particularly if I had had some feelings about the stories that maybe a million of my kinsmen had been exterminated in such a room. Maybe I would have wanted to know what Bomba would say the walls of the gas chambers were made of, what the roof was made of. How would Bomba describe the ventilation system? Where exactly did the "gas" enter the room? Maybe Bomba would have remembered if the room had been illuminated or not. If it had been, how? What were the doors made of? How did they seal so that the "gas" could not escape? As the historians (incredibly) have not bothered to ask these simple questions, Lanzmann could have performed a significant service to society here.

As to whether Bomba is being honest about having seen a "gas chamber" at Treblinka consider Rachael Auerbach's description of that "gas chamber" in *The Death Camp Treblinka*.³ Auerbach is given a place of honor in this, the most comprehensive book published on the camp. As she was (she died) a permanent research staff member of the Yad Vashim Holocaust Memorial Institution in

Israel, her description of the “chamber” should not be dismissed out of hand.

...The floor of the gas chamber was sloping and slippery. The first ones in would slip and fall, never to rise again. Those who followed would topple over them.... About 25 to 45 minutes later [after the “gassing” began—*Ed.*] the chutes on the other side could be opened and the corpses tumbled out.

It would seem that while he was being interviewed for *Shoah* Mr. Bomba forgot about how “slippery” the floor is supposed to have been in his little “gas chamber.” It seems he forgot how it is supposed to have slanted rather steeply in the direction of the “chutes.” As a matter of fact, Mr. Bomba forgot to mention the supposed “chutes” as well. If Lanzmann had read even superficially in the literature he would have been aware that Bomba was leaving a few things out of his story. As Lanzmann claims he worked for ten years making *Shoah*, I’m going to guess that Lanzmann is aware of Auerbach’s description of the Treblinka “gas chamber.”

In any event, once Lanzmann’s curiosity was satisfied about how the alleged gas chamber looked, he wanted to know what happened next.

Lanzmann: Can you describe precisely?

Bomba: Describe precisely... We were waiting there...inside the “gas chamber” ... until the transport came in. Women with children pushed in to that place.... They were undressed, naked, without clothes, without anything else — completely naked...because they come from the undressing barrack...where they had undressed themselves.

Lanzmann: What did you feel the first time you saw all those naked women?

Bomba: I felt that accordingly I got to do what they...[Germans]...told me, to cut their hair...

There you have in a nutshell how these eyewitnesses to the “gas chamber” atrocities describe themselves. They did whatever the Germans or anyone else ordered them to do when they received a request to help prepare their kinsmen — and even their families as we shall soon see — to be murdered, or exterminated, or genocided, or holocausted or whatever else these fellows say, they hopped right to it. I don’t believe them, but that’s the persona they insist on projecting to the world at large. In the neighborhood where I grew up, men who behaved like Bomba says he behaved would have been spit on. In the upside-down world of Holocaust survivors however they are seen as martyrs and even heroes. It’s a peculiar psychological slant to adult behavior, to manly behavior.

Lanzmann expresses a little more curiosity about how Bomba cut his victims' (for hasn't Bomba joined himself with the Germans now through his actions? Hasn't he, according to his own story, become a working partner in the alleged genocide of his people?) hair than he did about how the "gas chamber" looked. He asked if Bomba had shaved them, if he used scissors, and if there were not mirrors available inside the "gas chamber." Bomba said he had performed the haircuts with scissors and comb, that he did not shave the women, and that the Germans had not provided the barbers with mirrors.

Lanzmann: There were no mirrors?

Bomba: No, there were no mirrors. There were just benches — not chairs, just benches...

There's an interesting note. According to Bomba the Germans had provided benches inside the little "gas chamber" for the ladies and their children to sit on. We're not told how many benches. There could have been 17 individual ones, but more likely Bomba would have said — if Lanzmann had thought to ask him — that there were maybe four or five, half a dozen perhaps. Two or more ladies or kids could have sat on each bench. No matter how you slice it, traffic is picking up. Seventeen barbers, the benches for 17, and now the 17 women and kids are all there together inside the little "gas chamber," which is about the size of a small bedroom in the rear of a small house. But we're not finished yet. Hear this!

Lanzmann: You said there were about sixteen... [*Ed.* Lanzmann forgets that Bomba makes the seventeenth]...barbers? You cut the hair of how many women in the same room at one batch?

Bomba: In one day there was about, I would say, going into that place between sixty and seventy women in the same room at one time.

You might think that Claude Lanzmann is about to express some doubt about how Bomba is blocking out this scene for him. Sixty to seventy naked women in the 12 by 12 foot room, their kids, the benches and the 17 barbers. Lanzmann isn't going to express doubt about anything told to him by a "survivor." Lanzmann is a Holocaust Fundamentalist. The role of the fundamentalist in any cult is to accept with absolute certainty the testimony of those who claim to have been "eyewitnesses" to the original sacred event. Once the original story is made to fly, the most elegant minds can elaborate on it endlessly in good faith.

Lanzmann urged Bomba to say something more about how he felt as supposedly he went about shearing the women and their "children" before the Germans supposedly exterminated them. Something more perhaps than the homely: "I felt that accordingly I got to do what they told me, to cut their hair..."

Bomba: I tell you something. To have a feeling about that...it was very hard to feel anything...your feeling disappeared, you were dead. You had no feeling at all.

This is the almost universal response by "eyewitnesses" to the alleged "gas chamber" murders. The claim Bomba makes that his feelings were "dead," that he had "no feeling at all" resembles the "temporary insanity" claim murderers use to diminish their responsibility for their behavior in the eyes of the State. The ordinary murderer claims that his mental processes were so diminished at the time he murdered that he was not responsible for his act. The "eyewitness" to the alleged "gas chamber" murders claims that his sensibilities were so diminished while he worked as a link in the murder process that he was not responsible for his behavior. The murderer was out of his "mind," while "gas chamber eyewitnesses" ran out of "feeling." When Bomba describes himself as being inwardly "dead" he is saying he cannot be judged guilty of being a "accomplice" to mass murder. He can accuse Germans of whatever he likes, participate in the crimes he accuses them of, yet remain forever innocent while Germans remain forever guilty. It's a nice set-up.

In the film Bomba goes on to illustrate how "dead" he was inwardly while working for the Germans at Treblinka. He describes how he sheared the hair from women he knew personally from his home town, from his own street: "...and some of them were my close friends." They would ask Abe: "What's going to happen to us?" but Abe would hold his tongue. With Abe it was just snip, snip, snip. "What could you tell them?" he asks Lanzmann. "What could you tell?"

Snip, snip, snip.

Now Bomba relates to Lanzmann the story that reviewers have remarked on more than any other in *Shoah*.⁴

Bomba: A friend of mine worked as a barber — he was a good barber in my hometown — when his wife and his sister came into the gas chamber...I can't. It's too horrible. Please.

Lanzmann: We have to do it. You know it.

Bomba: (holding back tears) I won't be able to do it.

Lanzmann: (very quietly) You have to do it. I know it's very hard. I

know and I apologize.

Bomba: (struggling) Don't make me go on, please.

Lanzmann: Please. We must go on.

Bomba: (unable to control tears, leaving the frame for a moment, returning) I told you it's going to be very hard. They were taking that ... (hair)... in bags and transporting it to Germany.

Lanzmann: Okay, go ahead. What was his answer when his wife and sister came?

Bomba: They tried to talk to him and the husband of his sister. They could not tell them this was the last time they stay alive, because behind them was the German Nazis, SS men, and they knew that if they said a word, not only the wife and the woman, who were dead already, but also they would share the same thing with them. In a way, they tried to do the best for them, with a second longer, a minute longer, just to hug them and kiss them, because they knew they would never see them again.

To tell the truth, this is my kind of story— simple and lurid. There's also some new information in it. In addition to the 60 to 70 women and their barbers and the benches there were also "SS men" inside the alleged 12-foot by 12-foot "gas chamber." We don't know how many, but as Bomba speaks in the plural he must mean that there were at least two. And then there is the welcome news that the SS would allow the barbers to "hug and kiss" certain of the naked women inside the "gas chamber." Bomba speaks only of married couples. We ought to ask perhaps how the SS were able to identify which of the naked women were married to which of the barbers? It must be doubtful that the women entered the "gas chambers" carrying their marriage certificates. Maybe the barbers had previously petitioned the SS to keep their own copies of their marriage certificates on the chance that just such a reunion would take place. On the other hand maybe the SS took the barber's word for who was married and who wasn't. If they did, it would betray a generosity of spirit that is not usually ascribed to the SS by the Jewish survivors.

Imagine trying to visualize this scene from the wife's point of view. Try imagining what could have gone through her mind at the moment she spied her husband. The hope that must have leaped in her heart. Then what her thoughts were as her husband sheared off her hair without speaking to her. Imagine what she must have felt as he held her silently for a minute or so, then turned to the next woman with his scissors and comb. Did his wife run her fingers over her skull and think:

"Ah, I've always known what kind of man you were. A schmuck when I married you and a schmuck today."

There are a number of observations that can be made about my

presentation of Lanzmann's presentation of Bomba's testimony. It could be observed that while Rachael Auerbach's research suggests that Bomba is inventing his "gas chamber" story out of whole cloth, it can still be claimed that we are left with Auerbach's scholarly outline of the horror of the alleged Treblinka gas chambers. Therefore, while Bomba's inventions may destroy his own credibility as a witness, the Treblinka gas chamber story itself remains as it was, an extensively documented story of a weapon used to annihilate a million or so Jews. To give you a quick fix on Ms. Auerbach's scholarly instincts and even-handed objectivity, I will quote a typical paragraph from her famous essay *In the Fields of Treblinka*.

As I read such passages in Rachael Auerbach's ignorant and twisted essay I take the trouble to remind myself that after the war she was "one of the first active members of the Jewish Historical Committee in Poland;" that after immigrating to Israel she became a "permanent research staff member of the Yad Vashim Holocaust Memorial Institution," and that this in-the-field-of-Treblinka garbage was thought worthy of reprinting as recently as 1979 by *The Holocaust Library* which was founded and is managed by "survivors" themselves, and is distributed by a major Jewish publishing house, *Schocken Books*.

Elie Wiesel, of course, Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Commission, is on *The Holocaust Library* advisory board. Elie Wiesel lends his name as a matter of course to the virulence, bigotry and anti-German hate propoganda regularly published by institutions such as *Holocaust Library*. Here is Auerbach:

Polish people still talk about the way soap was manufactured from the bodies of Jews. "Sent away for soap!" was the expression the Poles would use when they spoke of transports to Treblinka, Belzec and Sobibor. The discovery of Professor Spanner's soap factory in Langfuhr near Danzig proved that their suspicions had been well-founded. Witnesses tell us that when the corpses were burned on the pyres, pans would be placed beneath the racks to catch the fat as it ran off, but this has not been confirmed. But even if the Germans in Treblinka or at any of the other death factories failed to do this, and allowed so many tons of precious fat to go to waste, it could only have been an oversight on their part. They were fully capable of doing things like that. It was entirely in keeping with their proclivities. Only the newness of this branch of manufacturing was to blame for this omission. If the Germans ever would make another drive across Europe, they would not make this mistake again.

Parenthetically it should be pointed out that "Professor Spanner's soap factory in Langfuhr near Danzig" was apparently an invention of active members of self-proclaimed Jewish historical committees in Poland and its memory has been kept alive by research staffs of Holocaust memorials around the world.

Polish Jews such as Rachael Auerbach witnessed the Germans destroying their culture and destroying their neighborhoods. They witnessed the Germans tearing their families apart in the titanic, brutal resettlement programs. Polish Jews and European Jews everywhere can be forgiven some of their blind hatred for Germans. American who suffered nothing of what Jews suffered however have little right to indulge themselves with it. The historians, the journalists, the sleazy bureaucrats who pretend to have a right to believe everything Jews accuse Germans of, simply because Jews are Jews and Germans are Germans, are contemptible.

This brings me to Mr. George Will, *Washington Post* columnist and ABC Television commentator. I'm willing to accept Mr. Will's assessment of himself. He is a brilliant and principled man. I disagree with some of his viewpoints, particularly his obsessive attachment to the State of Israel, but I can't show that attachment to be wrong. He's better educated than I am and better informed. As luck would have it Mr. Will has written a column about *Shoah* where he makes a remarkable observation:

The most stunning episode in this shattering film lasts about five minutes and involves "only" the talk of a barber now in Israel. While he clips the hair of a customer he talks, never needing to raise his voice to be heard over the small sounds of a familiar ambience. He describes his duties in Treblinka, cutting hair from naked women on the threshold of the gas chamber, and the day a fellow barber saw his wife and sister enter the room.⁵

Remarkable, eh? Cutting hair from naked women on the "threshold" of the gas chamber, eh? See it? To my mind "threshold" is the place directly below the door to a room. A doorsill perhaps. An *entrance* or a *doorway*. According to Mr. Webster it is a "place or point of beginning." Taking Mr. Will's own obvious assessment of himself, he is the proud owner of a formidably organized intellect. A man who always distinguishes carefully between similar but different points of fact. While doing so enrages those lesser men who cannot do it themselves, it gives Mr. Will a lot of pleasure, which is why he does it so regularly. That being so, what

am I to make of the fact that Mr. Will has changed the wording of Mr. Bomba's testimony?

Lanzmann: Excuse me. How did it happen when the women came into the gas chamber? Were you yourself already in the gas chamber?

Bomba: I said we were already *in* the gas chamber, waiting over there for the transport to come *in*. *Inside* the gas chamber — we were already *in*. (emphasis supplied)

If Mr. Bomba swears that he was *inside* the gas chamber at that particular time, why does Mr. Will write that he barbered those naked women on the "threshold" of the gas chamber? Mr. Bomba can be seen on film saying that he was inside the gas chamber when he did it, and in the text of the film published by Mr. Lanzmann, Mr. Bomba again insists he was inside the thing. What happened to Mr. Will's brain as he wrote "threshold" rather than "inside" or "in?" Is it possible that Mr. Will found Mr. Bomba's story ludicrous? He wouldn't want to say so publicly of course as Mr. Will is one of our brightest and best Holocaust Fundamentalists. Nevertheless, having the kind of relentlessly rational mind that he does, something at the bottom of it might not have bought Mr. Bomba's story the way Mr. Will would have preferred to buy it. Maybe a single wire got crossed in the depths of Mr. Will's brain, out of the millions that are twisted around in there. Maybe Mr. Will wanted to express some doubt about Mr. Bomba's story but could not bring himself to do it. He may have been in that peculiar place where writers sometimes find themselves — where they are smart enough to know that something needs to be said but haven't got enough character to go ahead and say it. When this happens it causes a psychological malfunction described cravenly as writer's block; he's got the habit of full production, but if he wasn't going to spill the beans he had to turn *somewhere*. He turned to invention. I supposed in the moment it was easy enough for a man wired the way Mr. Will is wired to invent a threshold image and use it to replace the one Mr. Bomba invented. You can judge how much more intelligent Mr. Will is than Mr. Bomba when you compare the rationality of the two opposing visualizations.

Now that Mr. Will had Mr. Bomba on the "threshold" of the gas chamber rather than "inside" it, Mr. Will could go on indulging his fantasy about Mr. Lanzmann's *Shoah*. As the "threshold" to an exterior door not only leads inside, but turning about, leads to the great outdoors and indeed to the rest of the planet surface, there would be enough space out there for Mr. Bomba's barbers to ply their trade comfortably for the SS, and for all the naked ladies Mr.

Bomba and Mr. Will together can conjure up. Mr. Will can indulge his other fantasy as well — that no serious criticism can be made of the testimony of any of that handful of alleged eyewitnesses who claim to have actually seen a “poison gas chamber.” In this scenario, as the eyewitness testimony is not allowed to be challenged, the genocide theory can’t be challenged either, and if that is so, then European Jews had every right to conquer Palestine and the U.S. Government is morally obligated to protect forever the State of Israel. That’s the line of thought programmed into the American citizenry. Mr. Will’s threshold caper is a small example of how Holocaust Fundamentalists use invention on the one hand and suppression and censorship on the other to bolster U.S. foreign policies and cover up hypocrisies and ethnic chauvinism of the largest part of organized Jewry here and abroad.

What could be plainer than that the world-wide Jewish community is being betrayed by this nonsense? Jews are being betrayed by their own leadership, and they’re being betrayed by Gentiles like Mr. Will who profess to be friends and allies of the Jewish community but who in reality are merely allies of a disastrous Zionist leadership trapped within its own rhetoric, too ashamed to reveal the immense fraud upon which so much of its influence has been built.

Notes

1. *Kapo: German for trustee.*
2. *Shoah: An Oral History of the Holocaust* by Claude Lanzmann, Pantheon Books, New York, 1985. Unless otherwise noted, all the passages quoted in this chapter are from this *Pantheon Books* edition, pp. 111–117.
3. *The Death Camp Treblinka*, Ed. by Alexander Donat, Holocaust Library (New York, 1979). See Rachael Auerbach’s contribution, *In The Fields of Treblinka*.
4. The parenthetical descriptions of Bomba’s reactions here are not in the published text. I have added them from memory. While I watched the film I could not help but be touched by Bomba’s sincere distress. His tears brought tears to my own eyes. At the same time I was aware of what a laugh I thought his story is. A nice irony for the psychotherapists.
5. *The Washington Post* (15 Nov. 85).

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In 1921, Neilson became an American citizen and devoted much of his writing and energy to opposing war both in principle and practice. He wrote for the *Freeman* under the guidance of Albert Jay Nock, who also wrote the introduction to the first edition of *How Diplomats Make War*. Neilson also contributed to H.L. Mencken's *American Mercury*.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, Neilson started what was to be his magnum opus: *The Tragedy of Europe*. It is a daily account of every phase of the War and its causes. In five large volumes it is a veritable treasure-house of Revisionist material; it numbers 3,503 pages and can truly be called a monumental work.

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—Francis Neilson from his autobiography, *My Life In Two Worlds*.

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—Charles Callan Tansill (author of *Backdoor To War*) from his introduction to the third volume.

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