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Finkelstein's Expose of the Holocaust Industry
The Holocaust Industry, Norman G. Finkelstein, Verso
Books, London, New York, 2000
By Ernest Sommers
A common criticism frequently
made about Holocaust revisionists is that they tend to use the debunking
of the supposed genocide of the Jewish people in World War Two as
a pretext for making comments about contemporary political reality.
There is certainly some truth to the accusation. For example, a
revisionist might present evidence indicating that there was no
planned extermination of the Jewish people, and then go on to say
that as a result Germany shouldn't be saddled with a guilt complex
today. Or a revisionist might argue that there were no gas chambers,
and that as a result the Holocaust is comparable to other mass murders
and therefore the unceasing demand for reparations should stop.
Or finally a revisionist might claim that the number of Jewish victims
was less than six million, and therefore the state of Israel has
no claims on either our pocketbook or our conscience.

The tendency of Holocaust revisionists to link their
historical analyses to political commentary is, in our opinion,
one of the main reasons why their work tends to be rejected by the
establishment. Continually connecting historical analysis with present-day
desiderata leaves revisionists wide open to the accusation that
they arrive at their views solely for the purpose of criticizing
Middle Eastern politics, or for advocating the redress of German
grievances in Europe. One of the greatest strengths of
Norman Finkelstein's
Holocaust Industry is that Finkelstein shows that it
is possible to separate contemporary political analysis from a discussion
of the Holocaust facts as such. It is an example revisionists would
do well to note.
Finkelstein, a professor of political science at
various New York colleges, is well known to revisionists. Back in
the 1980's, he authored a famous expose undercutting the claims
of Joan Peters, whose From Time Immemorial had argued
that the Israelis had no obligation to the Palestinians because
prior to the arrival of 20th Century Zionists there were no Arabs
in Palestine. A few years ago, Finkelstein emerged (or "crawled
out from under a rock" according to his critics) in order to take
apart Daniel Goldhagen's simplistic thesis, presented in Hitler's
Willing Executioners, that the reason that the Holocaust
happened was because 80 million Germans gradually became seized
with an overwhelming desire to kill all Jews. Coupled with a trenchant
analysis by Bettina Birn, Finkelstein's dissection appeared in
A Nation on Trial.
The background to The Holocaust Industry
goes back to Peter Novick's Holocaust in American Life,
which was published last summer. In that book, the University of
Chicago professor built on his reputation as a dissertation adviser
by attempting to come to grips with the fact that the Holocaust
has come to occupy a large position in the American symbolic structure,
and probably not for the best. Finkelstein reviewed Novick's book
for a leftish journal, and after fleshing it out, this slim book
was the result. The Holocaust Industry comprises three
parts which we will describe in turn.
Discovering the Holocaust
One of the central mysteries
for both Novick and Finkelstein is to explain why the Holocaust
became so prominent in American life from about the time of the
late 1960's, even though it was rarely described, and not even named,
before then. To a certain extent the mystery is an optical illusion,
because while the Holocaust was downplayed in the United States,
the image of Nazi stormtroopers ready to rampage and slaughter Jews
and Slavs was a common image not only for the nascent Jewish state
but also for most of the postwar Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
The fact that the Holocaust did not occupy an important position
in American life, but then, after twenty years, did so, suggests
that the development of Holocaust memory was not organic but was
rather either imported or developed as an "ideology."
When social scientists describe an "ideology" what
they mean is a belief system that determines the goals, values,
and parameters of conduct in a society. The classical Marxian explanation
holds that ideologies are essentially conservative, and grow out
of the existing reality of power relations, mostly economic in nature.
This should be contrasted with the usual sociological interpretation
("bourgeois" to its critics) that sees ideologies or belief-systems
having complicated roots which may in turn even affect power relations.
Novick's explanation for the Holocaust's prominence in American
life is grounded for the most part in the latter and more amorphous
approach. Finkelstein's explanation, on the other hand, takes it
for granted that the Holocaust as an idea became popular in the
United States, not because it reflected any altruistic desire among
Jews to "remember", but because it accorded well with the strategic
power interests of the United States as a whole.
The problem with Finkelstein's analysis, at least
to us, is that his assumptions about politics leads him to make
constant reference to small groups whose machinations determine
our cultural reality. Thus references to "American Jewish elites"
or even "organized American Jewry" abound in his book. Naturally,
such references are bound to bring forth nervous memories of
Protocols type conspiracy rhetoric, and Finkelstein
has been criticized for such characterizations. On the other hand
it is equally clear that these kinds of references are intrinsic
to Finkelstein's idea of how political interests shape cultural
reality, witness his repeated reference to "US interests" (that
is, not intrinsically Jewish) adopting the Holocaust for its own
purposes to support Israel as a "strategic asset" in the Middle
East.
This background on the nature of ideologies leads
to one of Finkelstein's better conceptions, in which he clearly
defines the "Holocaust" not as the manifold events suffered by the
Jewish people in World War Two but rather as an ideological representation
used for power purposes. By separating the "Holocaust" as ideological
weapon from the "Nazi holocaust" as historical fact, Finkelstein
makes it possible to devastate the former without dealing at all
with the latter, and therefore avoiding the dread charge of "Denial."
The Holocaust as Golden Goose
In the second chapter, entitled
"Hoaxers, Hucksters, and History" Finkelstein criticizes what he
considers to be the main abuses of the Holocaust today. There are
basically two issues that he develops: one, the idea that the Holocaust
is "unique" among human suffering, and two, that the Holocaust climaxed
two millennia of completely irrational gentile hatred of Jews.
The idea that the Holocaust is "unique" is familiar
to revisionists: indeed, as we indicated at the outset, one of the
main impulses to Holocaust revisionism has always been the conviction
that, whatever it was that happened to the Jews in World War Two,
it was neither unique nor incommensurable to other examples of inhumanity.
To an extent this should be simple common sense. The Jewish child,
shot into a ditch, or starved in a ghetto, deserves our pity, but
so do the German and Japanese children destroyed by allied bombs.
Of course, the general ideological excuse offered is that the German
and Japanese children had to die -- more or less by accident, one
assumes -- so that their governments could be stopped from carrying
out the supposedly methodical extermination of their enemies. In
this way one can already see how ideas are shaped to draw a veil
over our own transgressions.
Finkelstein considers the "uniqueness" argument
solely from the point of view which sees it as Israel's "prize alibi"
for its misconduct in the Middle East, or even, quoting Chaumont,
as a kind of "intellectual terrorism." According to him, the "uniqueness"
argument makes it possible for Israel to make continual moral and
financial demands on Western governments: unique evil requiring
unique compensation. Finkelstein also notes that the idea of "uniqueness"
leads immediately to the idea that the Holocaust cannot be understood
by reason, which by extension means that it cannot be understood
historically or in context. As he writes, "Rationally comprehending
the Holocaust amounts, in this view, to denying it. For rationality
denies the Holocaust's uniqueness and mystery." [45]
Again, this is an idea familiar to most revisionists,
and in fact we would argue that the idea is indebted to revisionist
work. For once one attempts to rationally comprehend what happened
in the camps, even on the assumption of a Nazi commitment to Judeocide,
one begins to see that the claims of millions exterminated, gassed,
and burned in very small areas cannot possibly be true. Indeed,
we believe that the whole idea of the Holocaust being impervious
to reason was a direct response to the perhaps hyper-rational critiques
of Butz and Faurisson in the 1970's.
The second theme Finkelstein explores concerns the
idea that the Holocaust emerged from a two thousand year old hatred
of Jews, a hatred apparently unlike any other in history, in that
it had no roots in social, economic, or cultural frictions. Finkelstein
correctly notes the Zionist roots of this idea, indeed the base
idea goes back to the Russian Jewish physician Leo Pinsker's pessimistic
belief that assimilation would never work and that therefore antisemitism
was a virus that could only be avoided by the founding of a Jewish
state. He goes on to suggest that "the Holocaust dogma of eternal
Gentile hatred has served both to justify the necessity of a Jewish
state and to account for the hostility directed at Israel" [50]
by which he means that, since Jews can never be safe living among
Gentiles, a Jewish state must exist as a future safe haven, and
second, that since all Gentiles hate Jews anyway, any criticism
of Israel will never be grounded in any rational basis but solely
in the typical Gentile hatred of Jews.
There is certainly some merit to these arguments.
One thing we note is that inter-group hatreds of all other kinds
are usually explained by historians or social scientists as being
the result of caste or class stresses in societies with considerable
resource competition. Frankly, there is no reason why antisemitism
could not be made to fit this kind of model. The classic rejoinder
is that such an explanation makes the Jews somehow the "cause" of
antisemitism, but again this is a knee-jerk response. Everyone knows,
for example, that lynchings in the Old South had a direct correlation
with economic success or competition from the Black community, but
this is not the same thing as saying that Black folk "deserved"
to be hated, or lynched. Again, the obsession with assigning blame
frequently gets in the way of understanding the dynamics of historical
events.
If anti-Jewish hatred can be explained according
to ordinary social scientific models, then contemporary data can
be used to support it. For example, there is virtually no anti-Semitism
in the United States today, even though American Jews have been
very successful here. The reasons for such an absence could be traced
to such things as the high rate of assimilation, intermarriage,
shared values, and shared interests, and the fact that the Jewish
population in America is broadly distributed through all social
classes. In this respect it is important to keep in mind that none
of these conditions obtained in Eastern Europe in the 19th Century,
which was the real flashpoint for emerging antisemitism at that
time.
Farther on in this chapter, Finkelstein then inveighs
against the literature that supports the dogmas of uniqueness and
out-of-nowhere antisemitism: the scholarship is "worthless", the
field of Holocaust studies is "replete with nonsense, if not sheer
fraud." [55]Here Finkelstein details the defects of a number of
Holocaust authors, including Jerzy Kozinski and the recently exposed
"Benjamin Wilkomirski" while saving some special barbs for Mr. Holocaust
himself, Elie Wiesel.
One of these claims deserves special notice, that
being Wiesel's claim to having read Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason at age 18 although "wholly ignorant of Yiddish grammar."
Finkelstein has ridiculed this claim due to the fact that the
Critique of Pure Reason was never translated into Yiddish
in the first place. The Wiesel damage control experts have recently
come forward arguing that Wiesel simply misspoke himself, what he
meant to say was that he read a chapter of the Critique of
Practical Reason that was translated into Yiddish in the
1930's in Warsaw. This is a rather odd excuse, because the critiques
are not in any way comparable. The Critique of Pure Reason
is one of the classics of idealist philosophy, with labyrinthine
sentences that sometimes comprise almost an entire page -- even
Goethe had trouble reading it -- and to claim that one could read
it without a knowledge of grammar is simply preposterous. In addition,
it is the Critique of Pure Reason that contains the
famous antinomies that led many to religious doubt. On the other
hand, the Critique of Practical Reason is a shorter
and more accessible ethical tract whose main contribution is simply
a dressing up of the Golden Rule (or Hillel's famous maxim) in German
philosophical dress. Yet Wiesel clearly means to imply that his
reading of Kant indicated not only his own preternatural intelligence
but also his moral confusion. As such, he could only have had in
mind the Pure Reason, and, as Finkelstein shows, he
could not possibly have read it.
Reparations Without End, Amen
By far the longest section
in Finkelstein's book involves a blow-by-blow discussion of the
attempt by American Jewish agencies to extract reparations from
the Swiss as well as the Germans, Dutch, French, and many others.
Finkelstein has a personal stake in this part of the book. His parents,
who both passed away five years ago, were Polish Jewish survivors
of the Warsaw ghetto and several German concentration camps. As
such Finkelstein has personal knowledge not only of how reparations
have been distributed since the 1950's but also about the way in
which the actual needs of survivors are met.
The background is that subsequent to World War Two
a collection of international Jewish agencies designated themselves
the "Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany" best
known simply as the "Claims Conference." This entity has been the
main agent and recipient of German reparations in cash (aside from
compensation in kind to Israel). Citing a recent study by Ronald
Zweig, who, incidentally, has attempted to distance himself from
his own conclusions since The Holocaust Industry was
published, Finkelstein shows that while the German government stipulated
that these tens of millions of dollars were to go directly to needy
survivors in fact the funds were used from the beginning for whatever
pet projects the Claims Conference had on its agenda. The long and
short of it is that the Germans paid somewhere in the neighborhood
of $1 billion to the Claims Conference, only a fraction of which
went to survivors.
Beginning in the mid-1990's, a few Jewish agencies,
no doubt intent on increasing their profile and thus their contributions,
began to supervise attacks on Swiss banks in order to recoup bank
accounts supposedly abandoned by Jewish depositors during the Holocaust.
The primary agent of this campaign was the World Jewish Congress,
including Rabbi Israel Singer, Elan Steinberg, and, occupying a
high-profile position, the billionaire failed songwriter and Napster
wet blanket Edgar Bronfman. This is by far the most controversial
part of Finkelstein's book, not only because of the naked cynicism
of the actions described, but also because of the accusations Finkelstein
levels against these agencies.
The most explosive of these claims is that the amounts
that have been "extorted" from the Swiss, the Germans, and many
other countries are not in fact going to survivors, although that
was supposed to be the whole idea. The Claims Conference, as the
self-designated legatee of the "six million" is apparently the sole
recipient of these funds, funds which they control and which they
dole out at their discretion. But at the same time, since the Claims
Conference essentially represents the dead, it cannot be expected
that there will be much interference in what it does with the money
it manages to obtain. Thus, in Finkelstein's words, a "double shakedown"
is in place: European countries are extorted, while survivors are
left with nothing. Finkelstein, grounding his indignation in his
personal observations, and in his careful readings of such studies
as the Volcker Report on the Swiss banks, concludes not only that
the Swiss in particular were held up for far more than they ever
owed, but that the survivors will never see the bulk of the money
obtained.
It has been the responses to these latter claims
that have been the most passionate, if inarticulate: Elan Steinberg
in particular has carved himself a niche in any future Bartlett's
with his succinct rejection of Finkelstein's claims which was broadcast
on German television: "Mr. Finkelstein is full of shit." Yet the
sequel indicates that Finkelstein was right: in recent days it has
been reported in the American media that a gala affair is planned
for New York's Waldorf Astoria on September 12, 2000 in order to
celebrate the fact that the recent settlements with European nations
has endowed these Jewish agencies with hundreds of millions if not
billions of dollars. The purpose of this rubber chicken extravaganza
will not only be to fete those individuals responsible for this
windfall (such as Al D'Amato, who rode the Holocaust nag in a failed
attempt at re-election) but also to tout Democratic politicians
(such as senatorial candidate Hilary Clinton as well as her husband,
whose love for the Jewish people was established by DNA analysis.)
A number of Jewish commentators have already begun
to question the appropriateness of such a celebration, and the whole
affair underlines the validity of Finkelstein's accusations. If,
as appears to be the case, the Claims Conference now has an endowment
of hundreds of millions of dollars left over, why isn't this money
going to survivors? If it isn't going to survivors, why does the
Claims Conference have the money in the first place? The sad truth,
adumbrated by Finkelstein, is that these huge amounts of money will
be channeled to pay off the lawyers, and the various expert advisors,
to build still more Holocaust museums, and endow more Holocaust
chairs in our universities, and to in general support all kinds
of superstructural bureaucracies that will make it possible for
generally undeserving individuals to make a nice living. Although
the latest reparations are supposed to be the "last act" in World
War Two payback, one can only predict what will happen when these
bureaucracies in turn run out of cash. Meanwhile, we can only hope
that a few bucks left over after the banquet will be allocated to
to the elderly Jews whose suffering made it all possible, we can
expect that at least a few aged and infirm Holocaust survivors will
be turned over in their beds in gratitude or given a hot lunch to
vary their usual penurious fare of pet food.
Conclusion
The Holocaust
Industry is a remarkable book, written with sustained indignation
and frequent biting sarcasm. It goes far beyond the more measured
arguments of Peter Novick to attack what many -- and certainly most
revisionists -- have long regarded as the abuse and "instrumentalization"
of the Holocaust for ideological purposes. The book has been widely
debated in Europe, and has been the subject of numerous reviews
particularly in Britain and in Germany. It is refreshing to see
that, while many critics maintain a politically correct stance about
the "moral lessons" of the Holocaust, and repeat guarded expressions
about the obligation never to forget what the Nazis supposedly did,
there has also been general agreement about many of Finkelstein's
points, particularly as they pertain to the reparations campaign
of the past five years.
It is to be hoped that such open discussion might
have the result of liberating the western world, and, to a certain
extent, the Jewish people themselves, from the grip of those relatively
small groups who have manipulated the Jewish catastrophe of World
War Two for their own financial gain. But that is not the only possible
positive outcome to Finkelstein's book. For by separating criticism
of the Holocaust as an ideology from the facts of what transpired
at places like Auschwitz and Treblinka, Finkelstein opens a door
for revisionists to proceed. In reality, historical facts should
not have ideological content. Discussions about whether or not there
were gas chambers, or planned extermination, or six million victims
should be simply addressed on their merits, not in terms of the
perceived consequences of such conclusions or the attributed agendas
of their authors.
If one wants to criticize the use and abuse of the
Holocaust, Finkelstein's book, following in the tradition of Alfred
M. Lilienthal and Tom Segev, offers a model for doing so. On the
other hand, if one wants to establish or correct the facts of the
Holocaust, which is the main plank of the revisionist challenge,
Finkelstein's book serves as a reminder that one can do so without
having to engage the issues of the Holocaust Industry as such. The
separation of the critique of the "Holocaust" from that of the facts
of the "Nazi holocaust" remains, in our view, the most fruitful
of all of Finkelstein's contributions.
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