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A. R. Wesserle
The New World Disorder

Charles Lutton
Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy

— Reviews —
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— Historical News and Comment —
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From the Editor

This issue of The Journal of Historical Review, the forty-fourth, completes Volume Eleven. Its two feature articles, Dr. Andreas Wesserle's passionate critique of George Bush's "New World Disorder" and Dr. Charles Lutton's survey of half-a-century's study (and evasion) of the facts beyond the December 7, 1941 "Day of Infamy," signal an advance and a return, namely to a Revisionism that looks beyond what French nationalist and populist Jean Marie Le Pen properly styled "a point of detail," i.e. the gas chambers and the Holocaust.

Not that we're abandoning our critique of the lie of the Holocaust—the non-existent Hitler order to exterminate the Jews, the fraud of "the six million," and what Louis-Ferdinand Céline called "the magical gas chambers"—not at all. Just that, with the Holocaust Lobby in full flight, as IHR associate Bradley Smith places advertisement after unanswered Holocaust-debunking advertisement in the newspapers of America's leading universities (if it be agreed that throwing a grand mal epileptic fit and shrieking for more censorship is no answer); as two American presidential candidates (Pat Buchanan and David Duke) are dogged for their alleged Holocaust Revisionism by those journalists and politicos who hearken most carefully to Their Masters' Voice; and as the conmen and crooks who promote and profit from the twentieth century's emblematic hoax thrash and drown in the life-giving ocean of historical truth (those that aren't dead before they hit the water, that is), we Revisionists, with The Journal of Historical Review in the van, resume the assault begun by Harry Elmer Barnes and associates, on the key, and not yet properly answered, historical questions of the war and peace in this century.

Dr. Wesserle's essay will surely generate controversy among Journal readers—its social-democratic, Middle-European, anti-imperialist viewpoint will stimulate and challenge Revisionists, just as it would enrage the bar-stool patriots and coffee-house cosmopolitans who sanction and support the media-consecrated, White-House-directed America-Last coalition.

Dr. Lutton has expertly and fluently reviewed, and if we may say, revived the Pearl Harbor debate, by reminding us of the solid Revisionist scholarship that skewered FDR's known (continued on page 430)
The New World Disorder

A.R. WESSERLE

*Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.*

**President Dwight D. Eisenhower,**
*Farewell Address*

As a bolt of lightning that flashes across the darkening sky is witness both to the approaching storm and to the unbearable tension which is giving birth to it, so the fires of the Gulf War have thrown a lurid light on the menacing return of a critical imbalance in world politics, and on the deep-rooted malaise—political, economical and social—in today’s America. As to the actor who holds the international and the domestic halves of our globe together, President Bush’s concern for image rather than reality has been little diminished.

Despite his inaugural pledge in 1989 of a “kinder, gentler” nation, the only “thousand points of light” the president has set ablaze are the civilian and military targets that his air force and navy, and those of his client states, destroyed with a ferocity unequalled since the Second World War. George Bush’s words—that it was not our goal to “destroy the nation of Iraq”—have been drowned out by his deeds: the total, unremitting warfare of the colossus among today’s “military-industrial complexes” against a small, Third World country, and his unabated efforts to erase that country by stoking the flames of its civil war. Iraq has been “bombed back to the stone age.” Following the war, it is expected to assume the staggering costs and reparations of a total war it did not even have the capacity to start.
The Gulf War has been "neo-colonial," or two-faced. Shorn of its "high-tech" twenty-first-century trappings, it is embarrassingly reminiscent of the imperial extermination expeditions of yesteryear, such as that conducted—with the aid of native askari—by Lord Kitchener against Abd Allah's Sudan in 1898. Revealingly, the war has also moved in the time-hallowed tradition of political Crusades, in particular those of the Puritan-Calvinist type, redolent of Manifest Destiny. Here, the American executive's efforts at mobilizing the entire civilian population for permanent war (by enlisting one and all in the propaganda levée en masse of the "Homefront") was at least as important as the military offensive abroad. Bush's 1991 State of the Union pledge of "a hundred years of peace" thus should be understood as simply another facet of his "psy-war" operations. What a desperate way of preparing his people for the sacrifices ahead!

In fine, the disregard for diplomatic compromise and the single-minded concentration on offensive ways and means—against militarily inferior countries—which have characterized the Reagan and Bush administrations have made probable, also, that the twentieth century will end even more bloodily than it began: with colonial wars (and wars over colonies) escalating into continental conflicts and, if allowed to rage on, with eruptions into world-wide conflagration, domestic and international.

The global auspices are plain. In the gathering storms between the three major economic blocs: the Americas, ruled by the Dollar; the Indo-Pacific rimlands, dominated by the Yen (an area once known as the Dai To-A Kyo-e-ken, or the "Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere"); and Europe assembled under the leaking umbrella of the Deutsche Mark, America's Establishment, goaded by an ever-worsening domestic crisis, has now let it be known that it will stop at nothing to assure its hegemony in a "New World Order" by exploiting the destructive capacity of its military and propaganda apparatus to the hilt. Thus, to paraphrase America's first wholeheartedly Imperial President, Teddy Roosevelt, "We'll speak loudly and carry a big stick."

The former Soviet Union, on the other hand, will play the role of a Global Gadfly, possibly as a reaction to the conditions of economic, social and political near-anarchy into which she has plunged herself in 1991-92. After the unsuccessful coup by
The Kremlin reactionaries (in which President Gorbachev played a murky part), Russian and the surrounding republics seem to be undergoing a replay of the March 1917 revolution. As then, the leaders and frontmen make up a volatile mix of the ancien régime (Gorbachev), the “social revolutionaries” (Yeltsin) and various Manchester Liberals who have just rediscovered Adam Smith. Will Yeltsin prove to be the new Kerensky destined to lead Russia into an even more radical upheaval, to be climaxed either by a remade proletarian Maoism or a return to Great Russian nationalism backed by the Pamyat (“Remembrance, Tradition”) or related movements? Whatever the outcome, we will not have to wait long. The end result will also depend on the state of politics and economics in America.

Some Western observers, particularly in Poland, may wish for Russia's total dissolution. Perhaps they pine for the days of that other Boris and the False Dimitrij of the Time of Troubles at the end of the Rurikid dynasty in the early 1600's. But so negative a course of action would be unwise.

Yes, the subject nations from the Baltic and the Ukraine to the borders of China must be, and are being, accorded independence and sovereignty. But, for economic reasons and as a countervailing force against an overly dominant China, we should seek to support a multicentric, yet externally strong, Eurasian Confederation to take Russia's place. Could anyone doubt the fact—even before Secretary of State Baker's official visit to Beijing in mid-November, 1991—that a strong and stable Chinese State will reclaim, by diplomacy or force, those millions of square miles of territory lost to Russia during the nineteenth century and before? It bides its time, awaiting these conditions: a) chaos in Russia sufficient to render a Chinese invasion likely of success—if diplomatic initiatives fail; b) United States overextension abroad coupled to economic-social upheaval at home; c) the nonviolent union of Mainland China with Taiwan and Hongkong. The world stands on the threshold of the stage of history when those conditions will be fulfilled.

Violence will continue to tear the social fabric of the state of east-central Europe, as ethnic and economic warfare spreads and balloons. Those cobbled together artificially by the 1919 Dictate of Versailles will suffer most. Marriages of force and convenience between disparate nations, growing out of a mosaic of minorities, they were re-established by frightful
violence at the end of the Second World War. Now, in 1991-92 and for years to come, in so-called Yugoslavia ("South Slavia") the ancient nations of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Islamic Bosnia, the Turks, the Albanians and Hungarians will battle to overthrow the armies of overbearing Serbs; in Romania, millions of the underprivileged, the Hungarians, Bulgarians, Transylvania Germans, Greeks, Armenians, et al., will struggle for their freedom; in Czecho-Slovakia, the sad repository of a history of violence and brutality exercised by the ruling Czech minority against a majority of Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ukrainians, the Slovaks and their neighbors, the Moravians, are striving desperately for national self-determination.

No doubt, these and other violent struggles for freedom might give an adventurous Russia more than one opportunity for interference, as of old. No doubt, also, the great nations of Central Europe might profitably join forces in a Rhine-Elbe-Danube Federation, as they did for 1,006 years prior to 1806.

In the Near East and in South Asia, the war against Iraq may, far from defeating aggression, have given a final push to the area's seething cauldron of interstate and internecine violence. From the Atlantic to the Aegean, and from the Jordan to the Indus, especially at the junction of the borders of Pakistan, Kashmir, India and China, the world must brace itself for ever escalating rounds of mass conflict. Nor has the Muslim world, from Mauretania to Indonesia to Washington, D.C., yet spoken its final word.

How on earth have we blundered into this mess? More important, how can we get out of it?

The tentative answers to these questions will keep us busy for the remainder of this paper, examining the power-political, military, historical and the moral-oeconomic dimensions. There can be no simple answer. But there can be an orientation: an overall view that sees the traditionalist, or partly traditionalist, majority of the societies of the earth trying desperately to survive, salvaging their most precious values, while caught in the ever tighter grip of global industry and trade, of global politics and of "modernizing" ideologies. To that end they are adopting the most powerful features of the so-called model, developed, society: arms, industry and, above all, enforced social-political cohesion. Failure to do so means loss of national independence, social and economic chaos, techno-
logicalized and unlimited mass murder carried out against the weak by the strong, and, for those *miserables* who manage to survive physically, the most thorough, the most dehumanizing enslavement devised during the last 5,500 years of human history—totalitarianism at last.

A *caveat*: it can also happen to us. Perhaps it already has.

A key word is "weakness." In the case at hand, both Iraq and the USA are weak, though in different ways. Saddam Hussein and his "Arab-Socialist" Ba'ath regime, all claims to the contrary, were in 1990 still exhausted by the eight-year war with Iran, despite carefully selective military aid from the United States, France, the Soviet Union and China. Indeed, it was this weakness, together with strong historic claims, that prodded the Iraqi leadership to take increasingly active steps against oil-rich Kuwait, with official encouragement from the U.S. More fundamentally, the Ba'athists had inherited an Iraq comprising disparate ethnic and religious communities, weighed down by poverty and inequality, riddled with illiteracy and saddled with a high rate of population growth (features most of which fit America to a "T"!). Caught in a classic situation of underdevelopment, the Ba'athists, who came to power following the 1958 Kassemite revolution, decided to modernize Iraq through social-economic reform carried out by an authoritarian regime—measures sure to keep them busy, and militarily and economically inferior relative to their rival Saudi Arabia and their enemy Israel, for decades to come.

In contrast to an Iraq that has been faced with the stark choice of modernization or death, the United States, under Presidents Reagan and Bush, has seemed intent on turning its back on even the modest social reforms enacted and institutionalized during the five decades preceding 1981, in its professed program for allegedly "recapturing" the simpler values of a nineteenth century dominated by laissez-faire capitalism and classical liberalism.

In reality, however, the United States is a classical case of a society suffering from Over-cum-Underdevelopment: the Establishment's increasing readiness to fight undeclared wars and its uncompromising commitment to world-wide trade and development have split twentieth-century America into two camps. An ever-wider societal gape between the Upper Cliquies on one hand, and the shrinking middle and burgeoning lower class on the other. The old song grows true: "The rich get richer and the poor get poorer." The former,
internationally engaged, are free to secure and expand their financial and economic domination at home, and exploit it by political superiority abroad. The middle and lowers, harried by rampaging living costs, by chronic under- and unemployment, menaced in their very lives by crime rates gone wildly out of control, and descending precipitately from social anxieties to concrete, often self-alienating, fears, have all but given up on participating in, much less exercising control over, the political processes, save in one respect: that of mouthing formulas handed them from "above" and supplied by the electronic and print media, a consumer product designated in Orwell's 1984: "prolefeed."

In the Reagan-Bush years we have seen, if anything, a rigid reinforcement, an ossification, of the already huge and rigidly bureaucratized, military-corporate behemoth. Does this picture of congealing social stratification, galloping impoverishment and the accelerated growth of a super-powerful oligarchy bring to mind Imperial Rome in the third and fourth centuries A.D.? To be sure, there are obvious differences in style. But is the nominally free citizen of today better off—as a "morally autonomous" human being—than his ancestors, the serfs glebae adscripti of the older, greater, empire?

It is only fitting that the government of a plutocracy be headed by—to expropriate a felicitous phrase of 1928—a "Cabinet of Billionaires" and businessmen, led by Bush, Quayle, Baker and Brady and ably represented in Russia by the Texas Trickster, Robert Strauss. One main reason for the appointment of this oil and gas wheeler-dealer, a former national chairman of the Democratic Party, to the post of United States ambassador in today's Russia is the leeway this affords him and his coterie for plundering the natural riches of that giant country.

Questions: Will Yeltsin and his advisors prove strong enough to resist the economic-political-military blackmail exerted by the Bush-Baker-Bobby Strauss White House? Will today's Mother Russia prove strong enough to turn her vast natural resources to diplomatic advantage? Or will the coming instabilities of the world economy—when the outcry will be: "Save himself who can!"—plunge Russian-American relations to new lows?

Now traditional sentiment has it that such enterprisers act—or should act—with grave circumspection, reckoning risks, overhead and rational chances for profit, and perhaps
even reflecting on an indeterminate entity known to previous centuries as "the common weal" (perish the thought!) bereft of rancor.

Bunk. A look at some of the motives that precipitated President Bush into the carnage of war against Iraq will teach the unbiased observer the facts of Life (that is: Death).

**Some Specific Reasons for America's War With Iraq**

1. Foreign adventurism; to distract the attention of the American people away from the crises at home and mobilize it against a Foreign Devil.

2. An alarming drop in Bush's popularity ratings before August 1990, with dire consequences for '92: the feelings against him might have been summarized by the phrase: "All show, no go."

3. A stimulus to the slumping U.S. economy.

4. The intimate ties of Bush and Secretary of State James Baker to the oil industry in Texas and the Near East.

5. Their alliance with reactionary cliques in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the other Gulf sheikdoms. These had grown increasingly alarmed at the success of Saddam Hussein's internal reforms, which reflected badly on the reactionaries' lack of political and social reform (particularly glaring with regard to the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian, Egyptian, Persian, Pakistani, etc. "guest workers" and businessmen living in those states).

6. The golden opportunity to establish hegemony over the Gulf area, and all of southwest Asia, from the Bosporus to the Indus, for decades to come, meaning the elimination of a nucleus for future Near Eastern independence as, indeed, former nuclei for native resurgence, viz., Mossadegh's movement in Iran and later the Khomeini regime, were overthrown or hamstrung through American interference.

7. After Bush's decision to destroy Saddam Hussein was made on or before the first days of August 1990, support for the parallel designs of our client state of Israel; today, this means support also for the expansionist aims of the Zionists: hegemony over the Near East from the Persian Gulf to the mouth of the Nile ("His kingdom will reach from sea to sea, from the Euphrates to the ends of the earth. The people of the desert will bow down before him . . ." Psalms 72, 8-9).

8. The panic, now nearly forgotten, produced in the White House by the success of Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives in western Europe; additionally, the worry over the liberation
of central Europe from the Elbe to the Bug Rivers, once reliably occupied by the Soviets, and, conversely, the elation over the disorder in the USSR. An Imperial Imperative was perceived: push open the “window of opportunity” and seize world rule!

Camouflage it all for the other nations (except the Russian) by passing it off as a con-dominium; call it the New World Order.

The plan worked brilliantly in 1990-91, chiefly because the then Soviet Union was too preoccupied with its own crises at home to run successful interference for Iraq. Reluctant, often financially strapped countries, such as the states of South America, the African members of the United Nations Security Council, as well as Egypt, Syria, Turkey, not to mention Israel and the USSR, were pushed and enticed over to our side, too, by showering them with promises of hundreds of billions of dollars, collectively, in aid and “debt forgiveness.”

Erratic policy, indeed, for a nearly bankrupt U.S. Government, whose citizens are expected to assume ever more crushing burdens in support of an ever smaller, ever more miserable slice of the pie, while shouldering the world-imperial predilections of the American Power Elite.

“Quo usque tandem, Catilina . . .?” How much longer will this mix of domestic shrinkage and international aggrandizement stay glued together?

No one knows. Mindful of the considerations advanced above, and drawing useful nudges from the fields of history, politics, military affairs and the human oeconomy, we shall be able to arrive at a few suggestions.

**Pacta Sunt Servanda, or: A Political History of Iraq**

Iraqi claims against all or part of Kuwait (the islands of Warba and Bubiyan), anger at Kuwaiti slant drilling in the Rumailah oil field, and the very genesis and survival of the modern state of Iraq itself are part and parcel of the often violent processes of nation-building, of modernization, which is the legacy of the twentieth century for the peoples of Latin America, of much of Europe, of Africa and Asia. Iraq has often been the victim of both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies produced and exacerbated by a) its heterogeneous society, made up, among other groups, of the Indo-European-speaking Kurds and the ethnic Turks, both Sunni Muslim, in the north; the Muslim Arabs, many of them Shi‘ite, of the
The New World Disorder

south; and the closely-knit Nestorian, Chaldaean, and Armenian Christian communities; b) successive waves of conquerors. The majority "Arab" culture of Iraq has undergone contradictory swings of frustration, reaction and accommodation vis-a-vis these tendencies.

From the beginning of recorded time, for over five thousand years, the land now known as Iraq and the sheikdom termed Kuwait have shared a common destiny. Taken together they form the central and southern portions of ancient Mesopotamia, which measure about 630 miles or 1000 km north-south, the "land between the rivers" of the Tigris, Euphrates and their confluence, the Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq, which means approximately "the roots, the rooted one," can vie for honors as the cradle of culture, politics and civilization, and Kuwait has been one of the border marches guarding its flanks against incursions from Arabia Deserta. The area has been marked and marred by vast contrasts: of climate, of untold wealth and grinding poverty, of ruler and ruled, and it lies athwart some of the most productive, and the most violently contested, routes for communication and trade on earth.

Before the First World War, when most of the Near East was under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, southern Mesopotamia, including Kuwait, had been for centuries administered through the vilayet (government district) of Basra, the largest city in southern Iraq. During the course of that war Turkish rule was supplanted by British imperialism. Then, in 1919 and 1920, in the so-called peace settlements of Paris, Sèvres and San Remo, Britain carved up the entire, huge, Pivot of Empire stretching from the Nile and the Bosporous to the Khyber Pass and the Gulf of Oman, following secret treaties concluded between His Majesty's Government, France and Tsarist Russia (the latter was eliminated from the spoils-sharing in 1917). These agreements, the most brilliant of which was the package known collectively as the Sykes-Picot treaties of 1915-1916, ran directly counter to other pacts the British concluded, such as the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which created a "national homeland for the Jews" in Palestine, and, even more glaringly, the understandings reached with the administrator of the Muslim Holy Lands, Sherif Hussein of Mecca, who was persuaded to rebel against Ottoman rule (Lawrence of Arabia!) by prospects of a united Arabia extending from the Red Sea to the upper reaches of the Tigris River. (Sherif Hussein is the ancestor of both King Hussein of Jordan
and the late King Faisal II of Iraq, who was killed during the anti-British revolution led by General Abdul Karim el-Kassem in 1958.)

Britain grabbed the lion’s share for itself. After plans for slicing up Mesopotamia were shelved in 1920 (due to its post-war role as a counter-balance to French influence in Syria, Lebanon and Turkey, as a barrier against the spread of successful nationalism beyond the boundaries of Turkey and Iran, and, not least, to the rich oil deposits of northern Mesopotamia), most of it was constituted as “Iraq,” a British dependency nominally presided over by King Faisal I, a son of the Sherif Hussein of Mecca. It was camouflaged as a “Class A Mandate” granted to the United Kingdom by the League of Nations. Be it noted that the native Arabs demanded full independence from the very start, as reported by the American King-Crane commission sent to the Near East by President Wilson, and that they were not fooled by the British maneuvers for an instant.

It is unfortunate indeed that another U.S. president—in violent contravention of President Wilson’s insistence on the right to popular self-determination—saw fit, in 1990-91, to maneuver the United Nations, successor organization to the League, into being pulled along in the wake of his attempts to crush or to dismember Iraq. “Might makes right,” but, too, “Violence begets violence,” and we may, at best, expect the subterfuges of 1991 to worsen disorder in the Middle East and around the world.

During the period between the First and Second World Wars, the British were able to combine an apparent sympathy with insistent Arab and Iraqi strivings for independence with a ready reliance on armed might, including many sorties flown against civilian populations by the Royal Air Force. British “advisors” managed the tribal sheikdoms along the Gulf, including Kuwait. The ceremonial adoption of such documents as the Organic Law of 1924 (the constitution), the 1930 treaty with the United Kingdom (which provided for a twenty-five-year “alliance” between Iraq and Britain, and—sure enough—was succeeded by the U.S.-led Baghdad Pact of 1955) and the 1932 admission of Iraq to the League of Nations did not alter the underlying realities. The relationship lasted through a series of internal Iraqi power struggles (the leaders of the various factions usually being well-subsidized by the British) until April 1941, when Rashid Ali al-Gailani estab-
lished a pro-German government, which was promptly crushed by Britain.

The politicians who dominated Iraqi society until the 1958 putsch—and the British rule which was enacted through them—were characterized by these features: a) “gradualist” approach toward emancipation from colonialism; b) a conservative attitude—to put it mildly—toward social, economic, or political reform; c) the formation of an “Arab Federation” which comprised Iraq and Jordan; d) alienation from modernist Arab thought, then dominated by the Cairo of Gamal Abdel Nasser; e) widespread corruption; f) repressive rule. General Nuri es-Said was the period’s most representative politician. Without trying to claim too much in favor of the 1958 overthrow of that ancien régime, or in favor of the “nationalist-modernizing” governments which have come to power since then (many through coups d’etat), a very clear-cut choice has emerged for the majority of Iraqis: between a corrupt, repressive, colonial regime or one which is strong, nationalist, reformist, comparatively clean and, usually, dictatorial.

A third choice might be noted, one favored by such interested outsiders as Israel, Turkey, the United States and, formerly, the USSR (each for its own reasons): national weakness, civil war, chaos and dismemberment.

If America truly is in favor of regional and world stability, an “Order” in which collective burdens (underdevelopment) and assets (human and natural resources) may be to an extent shared, then the first choice—colonialism—and the third—dismemberment—are precluded.

“Well Is a Diplomat’s Only Unpardonable Crime” (Talleyrand) or,
Nuclear Gunboat Diplomacy in the Global Village

In the twentieth century, perversely enough, the most powerful nation-states seem to have turned von Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is the continuation of politics by other means” upside down. Certainly Uncle Sam’s international behavior seems to vary according to a Law of Inverse Proportion: the more “total” the military means applied, the less interest in negotiation through diplomacy. A second relationship determines the totality of means: the weaker a U.S. president perceives himself in terms of the economy and domestic politics, the more inclined is he to opt for war. This latter
formula appears to apply to the Second World War (and to the First, with modifications), to the Korean and Indochina Incidents and to our Gulf War. As psychic distances in the realms of economics and politics shrink (the Global Village), and as America's financial and domestic situation becomes increasingly precarious, our leaders move us and the rest of the world further down the road to total belligerency. In style, Uncle Sam likely will favor the Iraqi model, or the "expanded-gunboat-diplomacy-in-Latin America" model, namely, intervention proceeding in stages of increasing violence: from embargo to blockade to all-out force in three easy steps, after which a country or a region of several countries can be reduced to international impotence, domestic strife and chaos, and thus easy manageability by Washington and Wall Street. This three-step pattern of intervention has been, in whole or in part, evidenced already during the Reagan and Bush administrations, which have targeted a succession of countries and regimes, whether "leftist" or "rightist," that dared defy Washington's wishes: Nicaragua, South Africa, Grenada, Libya, Panama, the Philippines, and lately Iraq. Whatever their systems of government, these and other countries will be described as "democratic" if they accede to the wishes of America's imperial-minded power elite, "tyrannical" or an "aggressor" if they refuse.

A Caveat

In terms of unrestricted power politics it might be "logical" for us to engage in ever more ruthless applications of our ABC (atomic-bacteriological-chemical) and our PR (public relations) capabilities. Soon, however, the crying need for reforming our domestic and international relations might lead us to wiser choices: the models of ancient Rome, ancient Egypt, ancient China, which, learning from their mistakes, elected prudently to conserve their strength and abstain from a policy of permanent expansion to the lasting benefit of mankind, and of themselves.

Professor Abbas Hamdani, of the history department of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, has analyzed the diplomatic steps taken with regard to the problem of Kuwait, before and after August 1990, in careful detail. But it is this paper's task to document the very absence of the stuff of diplomacy that has characterized recent U.S. efforts in the field (and to suggest ways toward improvement): to show the
lack of intellectual substance and the erosion of moral integrity, the failure to achieve comprehensive vision, the decay of discipline.

Who can trust a government, at home or abroad, that attempts to straddle the powder keg of the Middle East while lighting the fuse of war?

The main stages of George Bush's descent into sham diplomacy have been roughly as follows: 1. His active involvement, as vice president of the Reagan years, in the mess of the Iran-Contra affair, a series of deeply corrupt transactions which involved secret arms sales during the Iraq-Iran War to Iran through Israel and, in the western hemisphere, illegal arms shipments to the rebels in Nicaragua. Many details are still densely shrouded in secrecy, but Congressional investigators learned that Vice President Bush made secret, official journeys to Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. The climax to these seamy maneuvers, which ultimately benefited only the Zionists' deals, came with the dispatch of a bible personally signed by President Ronald Reagan to the Ayatollah Khomeini. 2. In the course of the December, 1989, invasion of the sovereign state of Panama by President Bush, the flagrant breach of international law and comity which occurred when U.S. troops stormed the extraterritorial premises of the embassies of Peru and Nicaragua, and threatened to do the same to the Vatican embassy. 3. The instructive exercises—either in duplicity or in deep ignorance—that took place when the United States ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, informed President Saddam Hussein that the U.S. viewed relations between Iraq and Kuwait as a purely "intra-Arab" affair, in July 1990, and when the official spokesmen for the U.S. Government, Kelly and Tutwiler, openly and repeatedly declared that the United States had no "security arrangements" with or security concerns for Kuwait. In light of the fact that Iraq never has recognized the independence of Kuwait, that it tried to incorporate Kuwait in 1961 and 1973, and that, in July 1990, there were obvious signs that Iraq was getting ready to occupy it, such official pronouncements must now be viewed as giving the "green light," or at least the "amber light," for action to President Hussein. 4. George Bush's bloodcurdling rhetoric in the course of fall and winter 1990-1991, of inflicting death and destruction on Iraq, his carrot-and-stick method of "persuading" the permanent and non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to issue Resolution
No. 660, and the twelve resolutions which followed, calling for the “immediate and unconditional” withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and for the unconditional return of “sovereignty” to Kuwait, and his giving the “cold shoulder” to attempts by a long series of interested parties—ranging from repeated tries by the Soviet Union; the European Community; the foreign ministers and governments of Italy, Germany, France; the chairman of the Socialist International and former German Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt; to the governments of Algeria, Iran, Pakistan and even U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez y Cuellar—to bring the Gulf dispute to a speedy end, as well as to convene a Mideast peace conference for solving the area’s crises comprehensively. 5. Disregard for the apparent willingness of the Iraqi government to cooperate with peace efforts short of “unconditional surrender,” such as the release of hostages; Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz’s conference at Geneva with Secretary of State Baker; Aziz’s proposal, again, of convening a comprehensive Mideast conference; and Aziz’s flights to Moscow to appeal for Soviet mediation prior to the start of the violent phase of the land war. 6. President Bush’s insistence on issuing unconditional ultimata followed by the application of raw force. Perhaps most serious of all, 7. President Bush’s ignoring, passing over in silence, of the comprehensive peace plan that his own Secretary of State, James Baker III, had worked out with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, which was to have been included in Bush’s State of the Union Address to the assembled houses of Congress, but was not. Apparently the timely intervention of the government of Israel, alarmed at the prospect of having to reach a just solution to the Palestinian question, sufficed to put a comprehensive treatment of the entire Middle East crisis on hold.

Lest a further discrepancy not be forgotten either: George Bush endeavored stringently to enforce Security Council Resolution No. 660 within weeks of the provocation, and at the cost of probably hundreds of thousands of lives, military and civilian, all allegedly for the independence of the small sheikdom of Kuwait. But he and his predecessors have done very little to enforce U.N. Resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967. Significantly, this document emphasizes the “inadmissibility” of territorial conquest by war, shows the need for a just and lasting peace in the area, and calls for the “just settlement of the refugee problem.”
This extraordinary concoction of confusion, ignorance, groundless fears, hunger for unrestrained power and instant readiness to exercise unlimited violence is no way to pacify a region and a globe already suffering from a surfeit of force.

To be sure, Secretary of State Baker's "exploratory" trips to the Middle East and his meeting with a handful of Palestinian leaders deserve recognition. But these initiatives will remain charades aimed at television audiences unless the root problems of expansionism, lack of national self-determination and vast inequities in the distribution of power and wealth are addressed and corrected. This holds true especially after the exploratory Madrid conference of October 1991.

Finally, George Bush far exceeded the bounds of action authorized by the United Nations resolutions, even if they did specify—under U.S. pressure—that "... all necessary means" be used to clear Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The invasion and occupation of southern Iraq by the United States, the encouragement of rebellion in the north and the south (if not an absolutely direct involvement in it), and open talk by American officials of establishing a lasting American presence and a "peace-keeping nerve center" in the Gulf region all point to Bush's aggressive regional and global intentions.

Arguably, Bush, following in the footsteps of such imperious predecessors as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, has not merely honored the non-interference principle of the Monroe Doctrine chiefly in the breach, but has stood it on its head, replacing the defunct European colonial empires with a single, neo-colonial, world power as chief global interventionist: the United States of America.

Even the most determined "psy-warrior" can bend legal instructions only so far without rupturing them. In the form of the UN Charter they prescribe:

Article 33, 1: The parties ... shall ... seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2: The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means. [Author's emphasis]

This is normative language. The use of peaceful means is not optional but mandatory. In short, George Bush has done violence to, not just the territories, the embassies and the peoples of sovereign nations, he has fractured international
comity and law, and he has acted in open contempt of those and other allegedly sacred texts which ought to govern relations between nations.

**Permanent War and the Military**

"Quoi! tu veux qu'on t'épargne et n'as rien épargné!"
(What! You expect to be spared yet you have spared no one!)
—Corneille, Octave

*There'll be no doubt that it's started. It will be massive. It'll be violent. It'll be fast. It'll be everything you ever wanted in a war and never got.*
—General Norman Schwarzkopf

Do ends, no matter how sublime they are assumed to be, justify the employment of any means in the course of war? No, they do not, not if the commander-in-chief and his generals intend to conduct “civilized” warfare as codified, in the twentieth century, by the Hague rules and the Geneva conventions concerning warfare and the roles of combatants and non-combatants in war. Alas, it seems safe to say that, in the war against Iraq, the commanders had no such intention and that those rules were honored chiefly in the breach.

To judge by the reportage of the Pentagonized U.S. “news” media, all American and allied warriors, from the top down, threw themselves into the fight with gleeful abandon. Confronted by a numerically and technologically far inferior foe, they happily indulged in an orgy of organized mass killing and destruction. (On Saturday, February 23, 1991—the official start of the land war—801,030 U.S. and allied troops faced 545,000 Iraqi soldiers, most of them draftees. At the start of the air campaign, NBC-Television reported that Saddam Hussein had merely 70 aircraft capable of night operations; apparently most of them absconded to Iran, leaving thousands of U.S. and allied war planes, from F-16’s to B-52’s, to fly hundreds of sorties per day.)

Pilots’ references to a “turkey shoot,” to “Daytona Beach on a spring break” abounded, while independent journalists somberly described the route of retreat out of Kuwait of the Iraqi divisions as “apocalyptic devastation.” Northern Kuwait and southern Iraq were a “killing ground” on which Iraqi soldiers, seemingly confused by contradictory orders and exposed to murderous air attacks, were cut down by the tens, possibly the hundreds, of thousands. Accurate numbers are unavailable.
The civilian population of Iraq fared little better. In pursuit of a policy of total war and unconditional surrender reminiscent of Franklin Roosevelt's endeavors during the Second World War and Winston Churchill and Dr. Lindemann's preoccupation with annihilating Germany by means of a strategic bombing offensive carried out by 10,000 heavy bombers, a technologically advanced space, missile, air and battleship campaign against an underdeveloped country of eighteen million (half of whom are under the age of sixteen) has wiped out Iraq's infra- and superstructure, to wit: schools, Moslem mosques and Christian churches—some of the oldest and greatest on earth—power plants, telephone exchanges, water and sewage facilities, bridges and mass transit, radio and television, as well as most other organized means of survival.

By March 1991, with no running water, sewage treatment, or electricity—even for hospitals—big cities like Baghdad, (with four million people), Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk faced widespread starvation and epidemic diseases such as cholera, with possibly hundreds of thousands, or millions, of civilian victims.

The sanctions (i.e., the total blockade) which the United Nations, under U.S. and British pressure, still enforces against Iraq, despite the ceasefire, have had to be relaxed somewhat to permit the shipment of a slight amount of medicine into the country.

As for “surgical precision” airstrikes: in Tikrit alone, a small city of about 25,000 in northern Iraq, half of the population was reportedly killed when the town was leveled by bombing. Did Tikrit suffer because it was Saddam Hussein's hometown?

There can be no doubt that, by the start of the air offensive in early 1991, the restrictive language of U.N. Security Council resolution No. 660 had been replaced, at least temporarily, by much more far-reaching objectives: 1. the removal of Saddam Hussein from office and from life; 2. the elimination of Iraq as any kind of economic or military factor in the Middle East; and therefore, 3. the occupation of a “security zone” in southern Iraq by the allies, cutting off the port of Basra from access to the sea; 4. the literal annihilation of Iraq's armed forces as an effective whole, thus depriving her of any defense against her neighbors, adjacent or more removed; and 5. United Nations sanctions to keep her weak and divided for years or decades, or ripe for dismemberment when the time comes.
A special factor needs to be mentioned, too: that of the negative “image” of the “typical Arab” created by the controlled U.S. “news” media. Particularly in times of seeming emergency, he is depicted as a vicious “terrorist,” an exact reversal of reality, for most of the manifold states and groups of the Arab world have been victims, victims repeatedly of expansionism, imperialism, mass murder and mass terrorism. It goes without saying that the “news” media and their captive audiences extend the same type of sterotypic scapegoating to all Muslims, whether Arab, Pakistani, Indian, or American. One of the many revealing cases reported during the public hysteria of the Gulf War involved a driver of an airport bus at Chicago’s O’Hare Field, who refused to pick up an Algerian businessman because he “looked Arabic.” The F.B.I. was even busier than usual investigating Arab-Americans (recall that several years ago a number of resident aliens in Los Angeles were targeted for deportation—because they subscribed to a pro-P.L.O. periodical).

The many revealing facets of military performance and propaganda in the Gulf War can scarcely be done justice to within these pages. Even the war's purely tactical questions are difficult to assess, as all sides concerned have censored the news, not least the Pentagon. Still, from the limited evidence it appears that the Iraqi forces were totally outclassed, not only by American superiority in space, in the air and at sea—despite Hussein’s handful of obsolescent, restricted-range, Scud missiles—but even on land, where the majority of abandoned tanks seemed to be 35-year-old Soviet T-55s and 25-year-old T-62s. A legacy of carefully selective Soviet arms shipments, weakness dating from the brutal Iran-Iraq war, or both? At any rate, President Saddam Hussein was a military strawman whom the Pentagon, well knowing beforehand, could savage with impunity.

By all indications, Saddam, his Western media image as a Foreign and Alien Devil to the contrary, was waging a strictly limited campaign with a limited objective, in the main by political means: the incorporation of Kuwait or, failing that, a phased retreat under face-saving but legitimate conditions, such as convening a conference to solve the Mideast’s problems, with the proviso of liberating the Palestinians from Israeli oppression.

In fact, both Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and General Schwarzkopf have agreed that, in the early days of August
1990, the Iraqi armed forces could have—and, by implication, should have—captured the Saudi supply bases located along the Persian Gulf a few hundred miles south of Kuwait, such as Dhahran, Djubail, Ras Tannura and the island sheikdom of Bahrain itself, into which U.S. supplies were pouring at a feverish pace. In those days, the Iraqis could have done so even with their antiquated equipment, since American and allied forces were few. But they abstained.

This restraint was not reciprocated by Iraq’s enemies. The Americans, the British (and their gulf protectorates), and their allies bided their time until they had amassed an overwhelming numerical and technical superiority, then launched—not a limited Blitzkrieg with a few hundred tactical aircraft—but a paralyzing, total war of extermination against Saddam Hussein, his administration (the army and the civil service), the nation-state of Iraq (or its viability as such) and, by extension, against self-determination anywhere in the Middle East. Aside from the quasi-political, final aim of unconditional surrender, politics or traditional diplomacy did not enter into the picture—again, a very Rooseveltian total, but ultimately self-defeating, pseudo-solution.

Doubtless strategists everywhere have drawn the obvious conclusions:

1. Forget about conventional diplomacy except for the purposes of blinding your own people to your real goals and fooling the adversary whom you have selected as your next victim on the road to internationalist rule (“we have global responsibilities”); 2. prepare the field for total war by total global propaganda: be sure to “satanize” your adversary; 3. when the time is ripe, having achieved surprise, destroy your foe-of-the-moment’s country or region by massive media-and-military firepower, sparing nothing and no one; 4. if there is the ghost of a chance of determined resistance, pulverize that chance ahead of time, and if need be, the entire civilian infra- and superstructure with it.

The spirit and the logical, realistic development of the lessons drawn from the war against Iraq lead directly to the possibility of a third world war against nations far more competitive with perceived U.S. interests than is Iraq. The smart bombs, the missiles and the laser deathrays of Gulf fame have concluded the post-war years (as, following today’s fashion, we look longingly back to World War II) and have, at last, ushered in the pre-war years leading up to the final global war, with
their attendant domestic as well as global ramification.

To add two more points to the Four-Point Program outlined above: 5. the destruction of rationality in Washington itself—which lately has not distinguished itself by reason or responsibility; 6. the total subversion of our political economy.

**The Moral Oeconomy**

"We have met the enemy and he is us."

—Pogo

Today, in a limited but technologizing world, in which a scarcity of human resources (i.e. "heart," "mind," "brains," "guts") is chasing a rapidly proliferating shopping list of "goals" created by the analytical intellect driven by the will to absolute power, it is the first duty of public morality to intervene actively in the resulting "chaos," in the economy of forces, in order to preserve and enhance the value priorities of the human constitution and of the natural ecology.

The first human value to be preserved is freedom, the capacity to choose rationally amongst a near infinity of goods and bads. I write this despite the excesses of "license" indulged in during such events as the French Revolution of 1789. In a society ruled by the military-industrial complex freedom is the first value to go. There, it is also the most important human property, for only freedom can power us out of such a society's culs-de-sac: megalomania, totalitarianism, internal and external war, and the type of ossification described in Oswald Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*.

Freedom has its domestic, group and individual (as it has its national, popular and international) dimensions. All are interrelated and intertwined. Today, as never before in history, all of our freedoms are in danger of being swept off the face of the earth by the technologized garrison state with its universal pretensions (perhaps disguised as a U.N. "New World Order"). Short of awaiting a natural cataclysm (such as the one that wiped out the dinosaurs) we should take heart and act according to the following insights:

"Gemeinwohl geht vor Eigennutz" ("The common good takes precedence over private gain"). This maxim, coined, though not invented, by the great organizer of rural cooperatives, Raiffeisen, if correctly understood as a good through the principle of subsidiarity, flies directly in the face of the accepted gospel truth of present-day plutocracy: the allegedly greatest
good for the greatest number through unrestrained, individual competition (society "red in tooth and claw"). The rather peculiar sort of Social Darwinism as practiced by America and in America today has but one result: the brutalization of domestic and international society (whether behind a facade of "Yuppie" conspicuous consumption and "United Nations" resolutions, or not). Raiffeisen's thought provides a timely antidote.

Too, "government of the people, by the people, for the people" should not perish from the earth, but can and should be revived.

As never before in the past, in the twentieth century the lords of mass "communications" have twisted and subverted the truth in the service of easy commercial and political manageability. We know, on the contrary, that he who shouts "Stop, thief!" the loudest actually is the thief, that those who accuse others of "shocking" misdeeds have in truth themselves perpetrated the most heinous crimes in history, physically, psychologically, morally. They are the killers of the human spirit, the murderers of freedom. They are the Enslaver. Day by day they seek to rule absolutely, through cliche and stereotype.

In brief, public morality as well as the more limited social, political and financial deeds of a commonwealth should form a Greater, a Moral Oeconomy. It might be defined, according to Webster, as the

... husbanding, the "careful management of wealth, resources (of a ... community or government); avoidance of waste by careful planning and use ..." (Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1986).

Has the U.S. government since 1981 excelled in any sense of this definition? Has it understood the basic human need for a Moral Oeconomy?

Not likely.

Indeed, the former CIA chief and U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, has characterized "Reagonomics" as "the fiscally most irresponsible policy in history"—an apt hyperbole for most endeavors, domestic or international, of the Reagan and Bush years.

We might profitably recall some of the "highlights," as the catastrophic impact of Reagonomics on the American people and on the world will be felt for decades to come.
I. “Conventional” corruption—In terms of the hundreds of billions of dollars directly or covertly misappropriated and swindled from the American people—not to mention the thousands of billions stolen from the public on Wall Street and from coast to coast by dint of encouragement and rotten example from On High—the Reagan regime has left other presidential contenders for the crown of public corruption, such as Warren Harding (Teapot Dome Scandal) or U.S. Grant's administration (during the era of the Robber Barons), wallowing in the dust. The Iran-Contra affairs, the HUD scandal and similar deeds will figure prominently in the annals of decadence, from Byzantium to Babylon. Both political parties leapt into the muck. Of the “Keating Five”—the five United States senators involved in the murky deals of the Arizona savings and loan executive—the one singled out for public blame by his colleagues was California's Senator Alan Cranston, a former Democratic presidential contender.

II. Structural and attitudinal faults—A policy of “planned obsolescence” was applied to campaign promises from the start. Reagan and Bush administrations that had pledged to extirpate the national deficit raised it instead to undreamed-of heights. “Adjusted” deficits (i.e., after more than $100 billion a year in Social Security payments—allegedly untouchable—has been “subtracted” from them) ranged from $200 billion to $245 billion annually, mostly in favor of new outlays for the military. In contrast, domestic programs were drastically slashed. Even President Bush's first, new budget proposed on January 29, 1990—a pre-Iraq budget—raised spending to an all-new $1.23 trillion, with an alleged $63.1 billion shortfall for 1991. Instead of reducing the federal bureaucracy, as pledged, President Reagan installed 10,000 new bureaucrats in the Pentagon alone, according to former Secretary of the Navy Lehman, of “600-ship-navy” fame. No wonder $3 trillion were lavished on arms during ten Reagan-Bush years. No wonder the federal and the public debts skyrocketed. No wonder that existing disequilibria in the national economy worsened and that fresh financial problems and crises arose.

Impelled by the movement toward “privatization” of the public domain launched by the White House and fuelled by the same, quasi-nineteenth-century “rags-to-riches” career that Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken typified on Wall Street and in Beverly Hills (the latter was rumored to have turned a tidy profit of $1 billion in 1988), savings-and-loan institutions, big
banks and gigantic insurance empires speculated in real estate, multi-billion-dollar loans to developing countries such as Venezuela, Brazil and Peru, and floods of "junk bonds"—all encouraged by the Reagan administration. When the developing economies defaulted on their debts and the real-estate market (particularly in office buildings) turned sour (since it was totally overextended), the bottom dropped out of the madly spiraling junk-bond boom, during the last Reagan year. The consequences will be with us for decades to come. In one field alone, the débacles in the insurance business—formerly the very bedrock of bourgeois financial respectability—will send tremors of instability throughout the economy for years.

The S & L fiascoes will saddle the American taxpayer with a millennial debt of some $500 to $1000 billion dollars (as estimated by cleanup supervisor Seidman). The bank failures—over two hundred are expected to occur in 1991 alone—will incur even huger sums, sums which the U.S. government can no longer make "liquid" unless it sells trillions of dollars worth of national assets to foreign creditors. Also, some of the shiniest names in U.S. capitalism, the Rockefeller family jewels of Citicorp and Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical Bank, and Bank of America, might follow the slide into nothingness of the Bank of New England. A severe and drastic currency-and-property reform might be the only rational solution. An easy solution is, and will be, an ever-accelerating spiral of foreign wars.

Very likely the U.S. government, led by President Bush, will try a similar approach in "solving" his other crises, such as: an urban-and-regional planning picture and a physical infrastructure that is falling to pieces; an educational system that is seventeenth in literacy in the world; a health "system" that is nonexistent for more and more middle-income Americans and for the poor, one that is in last place (alongside that of the Republic of South Africa) in providing adequate and vital health care to citizens, amongst all industrialized nations; a grave lag in basic research, outside of military applications and "SDI"; and the effects of a complete disregard for energy and environmental policy during the Reagan years. Despite lip service to a higher, more intelligent, ideal the Bush government follows in Reagan's wake. Perceived "emergencies," once more, may induce bigger and better wars.

Let us elaborate a few illustrative examples. Urban, regional, and national planning—never America's strong suit, yet a vital
function of any government that intends to endure—has been mortally neglected since 1981. The large cities that had been sliding downhill for decades under the growing burdens of blight, maladministration, poverty, a burgeoning proletariat and a murderous crime rate (in spite of rather spotty and symptom-oriented “help” from the federal government) have been cut off from any meaningful, moral, financial and administrative assistance by Reagan and Bush, and set adrift as national derelicts. In effect, the hundred million people who live in big urban centers are now considered so many “bums” on a collective skid row. Protracted, interrelated, planned efforts to reform and to clean up the nuclear industry (whether military or civilian); to build an energy policy; to rebuild the infrastructure of bridges, highways, and railroads; as well as projects to plan for new regional mass transit networks, have withered on the vine. Most of these, if carried out, would make a valuable contribution to a national environmental policy, and enable us to diminish our much-bruited dependence on imported oil.

What is indeed “the shame of our cities” is worse, even, than it was around the turn of the century, when their plight attracted the muckrakers’ attention. Philadelphia, perhaps the most historic of America’s big cities, in struggling futilely to survive physically, let alone financially, but no one in Washington raises an eyebrow. For the second time in sixteen years, there is talk of receivership for New York City, the capital of world plutocracy. As always, there will be talk of running local and municipal government “according to accepted business methods.” Nonsense. It is exactly because American cities have been treated as money-making enterprises, because the spirit in which they have been “run”—with the former exception of Social-Democratic (and German-American) Milwaukee—has been that of the unproductive, power-and-profit-mad “arbitrageur,” that their ineffectiveness and corruption have reached a low unequalled in the history of the republic.

Yes, they can be saved and they should be saved. Yet for that to happen America must recast its entire government and society in the image of a Moral Oeconomy. We must reallocate priorities drastically. No longer should a U.S. president be in a position to donate more than $13 billion toward the construction of housing for immigrant Russian Jews in Israel (reportedly to reward Israel for “staying out” of the war against Iraq)
while he allocates a mere $15 billion in federal bloc grants to all fifty U.S. states. Without a doubt, a single crisis-torn and crime-overwhelmed state such as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania or California could easily put all $15 billion in federal support to good use by itself. Additionally, George Bush has donated, or "forgiven," scores of billions of dollars to countries around the world, from Argentina to Egypt, Turkey and Poland, and—by implication—heavily subsidized the Soviet Union, all in the service of buying support for his military adventurism abroad. To top it all, he is spending, and is calculating to spend, further hundreds of billions of non-existent dollars for oppressive regimes around the world, and for the development of exotic new weapons systems—even after the huge tribute by America's client states is considered.

When will the bubble burst?

III. Skewed priorities and twisted logic—Why spend billions of dollars on expanded and "improved" armaments for the New World Order's millenial era of peace? It is indicative of White House paranoia that, instead of engaging in true, positive diplomacy to solve the root causes of crises, i.e. in the Middle East (or, alternatively, pursuing a hands-off, America First policy), in 1991 it is planning to construct a partial SDI-Star Wars directed against imaginary missile attacks on the U.S. by Third World countries, at a cost of $30, $40 or $50 billion, knowing that a full-fledged SDI directed against the Soviet Union is technically impracticable. Furthermore, after misspending trillions of dollars on armaments, including the Stealth bomber and Stealth fighter (the stealthiest aspects of which were the secrecy with which they were kept from the American public), SDI, the MX, Minuteman and Trident missiles, the Reagan and the Bush administrations have prepared to spend a minimum of 280 billion additional dollars toward the construction of brand-new weapons systems: an ATF ("advanced tactical fighter," either the Lockheed YF-22 or the Northrop YF-23), the Seawolf submarine and the LTH ("light tactical helicopter")—when well-nigh overwhelming weapons systems are more than capable of continuing into the future and were developed in the recent past at astronomical expense.

By contrast, even Bush's 1990 proposal for the 1991 budget already included $13.9 billion in cuts for domestic spending, $5.5 billion coming from a Medicare program that had previously undergone repeated slashes. One may predict with
with confidence that if George Bush's popularity in 1991 assures his reelection in 1992, he will proceed to slash Medicare and other domestic "entitlements"—not excluding Social Security—with gusto, to subsidize his growing appetite for foreign aggrandizement. Beyond the unfortunate millions of the elderly and the infirm affected, perhaps even harder hit will be those 27 million Americans without any health insurance, including 12 million poverty-stricken children. Entire regions in the "Rust Belt" of the East and the Midwest, and in the rural areas of the South and the mountain states—already suffering from chronic, unregistered unemployment and grinding poverty—will disappear by the millions into the maelstrom of misery.

These are some of the dimensions of what President Carter was accused of calling the Misery Index, the vicious consequences of what bourgeois economists term Karl Marx's Vereinigungstheorie.

They are very real, and they are growing.

**What Can We Do?**

"Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'entrate."

(Abandon all hope, you who enter) —Dante's Inferno

The growing menace of the establishment of a total "garrison state," with all that implies, at home and abroad (and it implies eventual "genocide," mass murder, at home and abroad) does not decree its inevitability. Historical determinism exists in the minds of those who preach it. However, its superficial opposite, pollyanna chamber-of-commerce sanguinism, is even more misleading, for it lends itself to mass manipulation by the corrupt. The sane fight for the rational exercise of will.

America does have choices. What are some of them?

The first might be called, somewhat misleadingly, the Max Weberian alternative to Werner Sombart. The latter had written persuasively about the successive—and more or less successful—stages of capitalism, particularly about "Late Capitalism" (a phrase which seems to denote that the wish for its demise was the father to the thought). America's behavior since the Great Depression, at home and abroad, has in many striking ways corresponded to the various phases of Spätkapitalismus; the Reagan-Bush era might be regarded as one of its ultimate stages of global panic. The "Reagan Revolution," in
other words, might be seen as a response to home and world conditions, semi-consciously homologous to the cries of: "Après nous le déluge!" and "Sauve qui peut!" from the French power elite before and during France's revolutionary crisis of the 1790's.

Yet there is an important component missing from this equation: that of global hegemony. Scientific observers note that the United States is the heir—not to the over-romanticized "Anglo-Saxon-tradition of liberty"—but, more accurately, to the institutionalized attitudes of absolute domination, conquest, power politics and plunder personified by the Norman founders of the "English" (and, fascinatingly, of the Old Russian) states. Now, a millennium after the original conquests, their descendants are facing off in their ultimate "showdown," as de Tocqueville foretold in the nineteenth century. No one believes that the U.S.-Soviet "condominium" of the world of 1990-91—a very cramped and one-sided affair—will last for more than a few years.

Today's Yankee Hot Warriors are in an enviable position geopolitically. Having conquered the Americas from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, or keeping them in a state of manifold subjection without the inconvenience of physical occupation, they are in a position to dominate all landmasses laved by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Indeed, at bottom they are not "capitalist" at all but "conquest plutocrats." They would readily shed the latter part of this label, too, continuing their expansionism even as socialists.

Yet their decision to keep strategic portions of the Persian Gulf occupied, after making the mistake of attacking it physically rather than solving the problem politically-economically, reveals a glaring mental rigidity.

How much wiser to follow the advice of Max Weber, the great social scientist, given at the time of the St. Louis World Exposition of 1904: systematically to create a rationalized, limited state through the establishment of a service bureaucracy motivated by honor, the idea of duty and the common good, and the notion of economy as "avoidance of waste by careful planning and use."

Is it too late for that now, in 1991? I admit that such a truly Prussian solution seems unappealing in the short run, perhaps anywhere in America and Europe. But in the long run, in a few decades and centuries, when the crises, catastrophes and cataclysms brought on by following the erroneous "ideal" of
Conquest Plutocracy with altogether too much ardor will have at length exhausted themselves, then any new society and government, to endure, will need to be built on rules close to Max Weber's heart.

In a political culture which de-emphasizes and punishes medium and long-range planning (even of the economic kind), the "crisis" most government leaders were concerned about in the first half of 1991 is the prevailing, moderate (at least, government spokesmen anxious to appear confident of the future call it so) economic recession. Should these conditions worsen it could mean dire things for our economy, govern-ment and society: firms and industries saddled with heavy, unproductive debts through "leveraged buy-outs" by "arbi-trageurs" find it difficult to adjust to the new, leaner economic climate. They are forced to lay off thousands, tens of thousands, indefinitely. Some firms go under. A vicious cycle develops, in which growing unemployment—unalleviated due to government inaction—fuels a worsening recession while it drains the public treasury further through passive unemployment compensation. In order to "lighten the load" of an already disastrous deficit, the government feels called upon to cut "entitlements" further, plunging millions more of the middle-class and the poor into misery, and further reducing their buying power. Unemployment payments are slashed, too. More firms fail. The stock markets, which had been extremely over-extended and buoyant in the wake of a successful war of the "foreign-adventurist" kind, turn sour. The Dow Jones average plunges 600 points in a week. In the meantime, tension spreads from coast to coast in urban regions which have lost millions of jobs over the last decade, collectively, and hundreds of thousands due to the recession. The economic picture worsens. Demagogues whip emotions to a frenzy. A single spark, in a society fractured along national, racial, and sub-caste lines, and race war erupts, tearing the fabric of society, throwing the economy into total chaos, causing trillions or more dollars in damage and killing thousands, and more, through violence, disease and exposure.

Such conditions of anomie might also provide a welcome chance for the Soviet—or Russian—elite to redress its grievances against the West and the U.S., either in step-by-step progression or, more likely, by means of a surprise attack. Thus, logically and historically, the dislocations and down-
turns brought on by the "Reagan Revolution," the late and lamentable outcome of several centuries of evolution, quite possibly will conclude with the much-dreaded World War and World Revolution. The ultimate plutocrats would then be the executors of Karl Marx's last will and testament.

In the short run, mankind might be granted a breather by the 1992 U.S. elections. Probably, President George Bush and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Allan Greenspan will pull out the stops in a last effort to create "rosier" economic conditions to achieve Bush’s re-election. After that, it will be “every man for himself.” Despite (or because of) the economic union of Europe in 1992, Germany will not be protected by its fellow Europeans but, on the contrary, will be exposed to increased levels of financial and political blackmail by the U.S., Israel, Britain, France, Poland and Russia. Added to the increased burdens of integrating the old Soviet Zone with West Germany, and denuded of any practical military defenses after the enforced concessions of 1990-91 ("The New Versailles"), even Germany may be unable to stomach the redoubled demands. Economically, socially and militarily, her downfall would plunge Europe into ballooning disorder—unless America desisted from her Divide and Conquer foreign policy and intervened diplomatically to aid her strongest ally in Europe. But, for several reasons, that is unlikely. If reelected in '92, Bush will slash domestic “entitlements” in a desperate effort to right the capsized economy. He will try to “shoulder off” some of those outlays on Germany and Japan. Too, the probable increase in domestic U.S. unrest—heightened by the chauvinism left over from the Gulf War—will make Uncle Sam regard the comparative “tranquillity” for foreign competitors with a jaundiced eye. He will seek to export his troubles, imprudently knocking out his main props.

There are already many choices in the possibilities portrayed.

Here are some more, always keeping in mind that our preferred option is to create a dialectics, a rational dialogue between the idea of “community” in politics and economics and the idea of “freedom,” with emphasis on the “legitimate self-determination of peoples” on all levels of politics, from the township to the international arena.

Internationally, how intelligent is it for the United States, for instance, in its GATT-talks (“General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”) with the European Community, to insist that the
Europeans cut their farm subsidies to the bone—while the U.S. does not reciprocate by slashing subsidies to its huge industrial "farms" in California, Florida and elsewhere? Such a move by Europeans would jeopardize the highly labor-intensive, efficient, but tiny family farm in Europe, with roots going back four or five thousand years, and would depopulate the countryside even more rapidly, adding to the urban proletariat and causing social-political crisis. After all, that's what happened two thousand years ago in ancient Rome.

Will the "New Rome" of Wall Street and Washington recognize its own interest in preserving and building communities abroad, after its total war and its victory in Iraq? There can be no "total victory."

The Bessmertnykh-Baker plan for remedying the grave problems of the Middle East comprehensively, and the Palestinian situation in particular, brooks no delay. Despite the fact that the U.S. irrationally injured its own interest in preserving the status quo in the Mideast by smashing Saddam Hussein and creating a power vacuum ready to be filled through the designs of Iran, Turkey, Syria and Israel, thus destabilizing regional and world politics, we should subject our "unique relationship" with Israel to an agonizing reappraisal. That is what President Eisenhower did in 1956 (how things have changed!) We all know that Israel is the nuclear-military superpower of the Mideast and need fear no one on earth. By means of suitable but swift diplomatic maneuvers, we should make it clear to the ruling, reactionary cliques of Israel that: America will not stand for the oppression of the Palestinians by Israel; we insist on implementing U.S. Security Council Resolution No. 242 and similar resolutions with a view toward establishing a state for the Palestinians via the PLO; and America will never accept Israeli designs on neighboring states, and on Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq in particular. What are the chances for success of such a scenario in a Bush administration?

Turkey is the tertium gaudens, far from the international limelight focused on such prime players as the U.S., Israel or Iran, yet laughing with the contented glee of a peasant who stands in the shadow of greater Powers and has struck a good bargain. The Sancho Panzaesque figure of President Torgut Ozal had only reinforced that impression.

Of course, Turkey in a geographically much larger guise, as ruled by the once great Ottoman dynasty of sultans and
caliphs (khalifa, the “successors to the prophet,” the titular heads, temporal and spiritual, of all Islam), was the declining imperial power of North Africa and the Middle East before the First World War. At its end, only the outstanding leadership qualities of General Mustafa Kemal (later proclaimed “Atatürk” or “Father of the Turk”), those of his aides, and the valor of the Turkish soldiers, combined with the squabbling of the prime imperialists: Britain, France and Italy and their tool, the Kingdom of Greece, as well as the assistance provided by the new Bolshevik regime of Soviet Russia, kept Turkey from begin ripped to shreds by the victors, preserving her from disappearing forever. A timely lesson for 1991.

The new, republican Turkey was confined largely to Anatolia and the littoral of the northeast Mediterranean. She was forced to accept the subjugation of large, centuries-old, Turkish minorities in the new states of the East, ranging from the southern reaches of the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia and all the way to northern Iraq and Iran. In 1991 her claims to some of these regions, particularly to oil-rich northern Iraq around Mosul and Kirkuk, rest in part on the existence of these minorities. Further, advancing pan-Turanian ideas, the Turks have cast their eyes on the related Turkic majorities of northern Iran and of central Asia east of the Caspian. If the U.S. after 1991 rearms her, replacing her obsolete arms with smart, hi-tech weapons systems, we can expect Turkey to play a much more aggressive role in the Mideast. In the future, she might prove troublesome to either a shrinking or an expanding post-Soviet Russia.

We need also to remember that republican Turkey has been no more lenient to her Kurdish minority than has Iraq. She will watch the masses of new refugees with eagle eyes and possibly misdirect them to advance her own aims against the Arabs. It is the tragic plight of the Iraqi Kurds to have believed the irresponsible pronouncements of an untrustworthy, and apparently irrational, Superpower.

As for the Soviet Union or, more correctly, Russia, she has been the Turks’ chief enemy since the imperial-expansionist days of the great Tsar Peter around the year 1700. Traditionally, Russia has also sought to break up, or to dominate, neighboring Persia (Iran). To the present day, her aim has been to extend her hegemony over as much of the Persian gulf region, and over Iran’s eastern flanks of Afghanistan and Baluchistan, as practicable. It has been her sad lot to see her main aim
of sole autocracy stymied, in the nick of time, by an even more powerful and even more ambitious rival from across the seas: up to 1941 by Britain and since 1946 by the United States of America. Unless Russia commits suicide, or is extirpated totally, in her present Time of Troubles—which seems unlikely—she will reassume her accustomed role in the not very distant future, with a vengeance.

When—and if—she does, she will remember three past events. Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, when Stalin invaded Finland in the infamous Winter War of 1939-1940, Britain and France went to work to prepare a two-pronged invasion of the Soviet Union: in the north, through Norwegian and Finnish Lapland, and, in the south, out of Syria and Iraq. The operation was finally shelved when Hitler pre-empted Churchill by striking north to Narvik and Norway. Today, once again, the Soviets have reason to worry about the strategic threat to their "soft underbelly," especially with Georgia's declaration of independence on April 8, 1991, and the possibility of this setting an example all along the southern boundary of the USSR from Moldavia outside Romania (the Soviets annexed it in 1940) to the Muslim nations on the borders of Afghanistan and China. Let us not imagine that the USSR, or an imperial Russia, will tolerate a strong U.S. or NATO presence in the Gulf Region for long.

By contrast, Russia cherishes her memories of the time after June 22, 1941, when the leaf of history turned and she was in a position, again, to partition Iran between herself and Britain, supported by the U.S. In those heady times Stalin dominated Teheran. His power was sufficient to enable him to carve out virtual Soviet satellite states in Azerbaijan and the Kurdish areas, and to attempt to extend his sphere of influence by encouraging the "independence" of the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. The famed Kurd leader, Mustafa Barzani, and his clan were trained in Moscow. Soviet agents infiltrated the entire region. Not until 1946 and 1947 did British and then American resistance stiffen sufficiently to make it prudent for Stalin to heed Iranian demands for withdrawal. The Soviets cleared out—but only for the time being.

A third event the Russians will bear in mind with distaste is the ill-disguised contempt they received at the hands of the Yankees before, during and after the war against Iraq, a former friend of theirs. Even though deep-seated divergences
were "papered over" at the U.N. and for the television watching publics, the U.S. made it abundantly clear that she no longer deemed the Soviet Union a serious global factor diplomatically, economically or, for that matter, militarily. It is a glaring indication of the mismatch in "clout" at the White House that the objections of Israel—a Levantine dwarf state on the face of it—prevailed over the Bessmertnykh-Baker agreement concerning a comprehensive solution to the Mideast's troubles, in which the foreign ministers of the two former World Superpowers had invested their prestige. No lip service to the "New World Order" for "a hundred years of peace" can gloss over that high-handed conduct. Not that hauteur is unrealistic, for the time being. But "realities" have a way of changing explosively, leaving those unprepared at the mercy of their panicky "flight-or-fight" response, whether inside the Beltway or at the Kremlin.

No doubt the seeming disproportion between American and Soviet power, and the sudden successes of American weaponry against the largely antiquated Soviet equipment and tactics of the Iraqis—as well as the exaggerated ruthlessness of its application—meant but one thing to a Russian leadership worried about survival: the absolute necessity of once more catching up again to and, if possible, surpassing the U.S. in the creation of weapons of mass destruction—whether "conventional" or "unconventional"—in the shortest time possible. Thus, automatically, our war against Iraq has made the Russian leaders more rigid in their outlook and in choosing their ways and means. It has produced the exact opposite of its announced intention, has injured the peace, and dealt a body blow to the concept of international "law and order." Did we want that to happen?

Naturally, when the motives of fear of the unknown, hatred for one's adversary, and ambition hold each other in approximate balance in both the White House and the Kremlin (with ambition overweening the former and fear dominating the latter) an uneasy truce could be maintained for a time. But the Warsaw Pact has dissolved itself. Except for the continued survival of their Communist parties, the USSR has lost most of its hold over its central European satellites. Yet far from reciprocating in kind, Uncle Sam is holding on tightly to his NATO allies, even readying the expansion of his force-shield to cover the former Soviet zone of Germany, which still "plays
host" to 350,000 Soviet troops.

Indeed, leaning on his two main foreign props—Japan and Germany—financially, geopolitically and propagandistically, in 1991 Uncle Sam is accelerating rather than cutting his weapons expenditures, even though the Soviet menace seems to have diminished and the Third World should not be perceived as a "foe." When a single aircraft of a single weapons system (the B-2 "Stealth" bomber) costs nearly $1 billion, and the costs of other armaments trail closely behind, one should be able to calculate the following rather accurately: 1. the time before the American economy, already unbalanced and distorted, spins totally out of control; 2. the same for Germany, Europe, and Japan; 3. the irreparable injury to the social, political, health and educational fabric, and perhaps to the national integrity, of the American people; 4. the desperate attempts by the USA and the Great Britain to re-establish the shattered "concert of nations" by force and through the United Nations Security Council, based on the far-reaching and questionable political, financial, territorial and functional dictates imposed on a sovereign state, i.e., the far-reaching precedents set by the U.N. in its subjugation of Iraq in 1991; 5. in case of failure: the rapid and unprecedentedly violent outbreak of global war.

But there are choices.

Here are some of them:

1. If America desires to establish and to strengthen stability and legitimacy in the Middle East, we need to strike a just balance between powerful, violent Israel and the multitude of militarily and socially weak Arab states. U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 242 should be implemented so that the Palestinians can at last have an independent homeland (and state) on their native soil, secure from Zionist encroachment. Equally important, the much-quoted "comprehensive solution" to the region's historic, political, social, economic and military troubles needs to put in place a lasting, insitutionalized leveling of its abysmal divergences, a "regional development plan" for all. A regional "community" of interest should be grown, like a plant, encompassing all cultures and religions, while cherishing all organically grown groupings.

Is it realistic to speak of such a modernized revival of the ancient Ottoman millet system? Only time, and a nuclear-free zone stretching from the Mediterranean to the Ganges, and far
beyond, can tell. Let's rid ourselves of the illusion that Israel is America's terrible swift sword in the desert.

2. America might choose to impose a New World Order through a superficially cordial entente with an ever-more desperate Russia. But we must face the fact that by reason of clashing global ambitions, lasting cooperation between the two is undesired by the White House, and unlikely, unless another convenient Foreign Devil, e.g. Japan or Germany, is found.

If, on the other hand, we desire to honor our loudly proclaimed “values” of freedom—infused into organic communities—and of popular self-determination, we should intelligently and actively support the independence of the anti-Communist republics of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and others, while Russia is preoccupied with its internal troubles.

Such action would incur the risk of war with the Russians. But by most accounts we could hold their feet to the fire before they rain fire down on us.

3. Above all, if, for the next several centuries, Americans wish their country to remain a nation worthy of its highest ideals, we might do worse than swear off our old Norman-Puritan habits of loot, plunder and mass destruction, as well as our immediate past of Plutocracy by conquest at home and abroad, and at last pursue a type of society and government that strives to do lasting and organized justice to the rooted human needs for community, freedom and truth, and to the cosmic demands of the ecologies of nature.

“Omnes cantant una voce tamen non est sinfonia.”

(Though all sing with one voice that still does not make a symphony)  
St. Thomas Aquinas

If we try to enforce rigid conformity at home and abroad, we shall come a cropper. Whipping up bellicose emotions, rebuilding FDR's detention camps of the Great American Desert for dissenters and engaging in global interventionism will merely multiply the crushing moral and material burdens already heaped on the sagging shoulders of the American people. How much wiser to promote community-building on all societal levels, in all political-geographic regions, a subsidiarity of responsibilities!

At home, the American people—once we have recovered our healthy sense of skepticism—might elect to undo the
Imperial Presidency, and choose to place in its stead a plural executive, a council of state patterned on Switzerland, with five to seven presidents, each to represent a major ethnic, racial or geographic constituency, with each president serving for the duration of one year. Abroad, let us shrug off the moral degradation, the abysmal functional and systematic failures of trying to be the World's Policeman! Encourage the formation, not of "pluralism," for that term has become a synonym for chaos, but of multicentricity, the building of strong power blocs on all populated landmasses, not excluding North, Central, and South America. The latter solution to the worsening crisis of the Americas was already envisioned by President Thomas Jefferson.

Let us extend the hand of friendship to the peoples of Islam. Split and weak as they may be politically and militarily, and enslaved as they certainly are by underdevelopment and neocolonialism, they are the living heirs to some of the world's most brilliant cultures: ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Hindu and Moghul India and Indonesia among them. Islam has contributed immeasurably to the growth of Europe, and it can do so again. Let the West beware lest we drive Islam into the isolation of hate, from which only organized violence will offer escape.

Once they have divested themselves of the emanations of the will to absolute power, the preoccupation with exploits and exploitation—which have their most immediate origin in the Industrial Revolution and in the unreason of the Enlightenment of the 18th century—the great nations of Europe will be able to regain their historic callings: Spain, the great central European bloc that was the Holy Roman Empire, as well as Poland and Ukraine (the Old Roś), and others, will be re-awakened to new life. The spiritual, and political-geographic center, the historic orientation, they had lost will be resurrected.

No matter what the future, the American People—the pre-eminent victim and foe of Conquest Plutocracy and the Imperial Presidency—have greatness to give. A nation incomplete, a people not yet coalesced, which has brought forth such masters and masterworks as Herman Melville's Moby Dick; Robert Frost in his almost German simple-heartedness and profundity; Joseph Campbell and his supremely Protestant hyper-individualism, his longing for the merging of self
with the Absolute (a property of "late" historical eras): such a nation—once it has sloughed off the notion of being history's Chosen People, leading a lowly flock to an earthly paradise—has much to contribute to the good of this world. By definition, we note, an earthly paradise swamps the Moral Oeconomy with the rush of an infinity of manufactured supplies, it affects to abolish all suffering, all sacrifices for the attainment of some distant, greater, good; it is totally intolerant and destructive of any other path to perfection. In fine, it is evil incarnate.

The choice is simple. Beyond all administrative reform, we must bend our hearts and minds, freely, toward creativity and responsibility, or Totalitarianism will do it for us by obliterating all mind, all hearts.

Ponder the lines of England's poet laureate, of Alfred Lord Tennyson, written in 1842:

... For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens filled with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a ghastly dew,
From the heavens's airy navies grappling in the central blue;
Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,
With the standards of the peoples plunging thro' the thunderstorm;
Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.
There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.

Alfred Lord Tennyson, *Locksley Hall*
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lies— that he, too, and his administration was taken completely by surprise, and that Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the Navy and Army commanders at Pearl, deserved censure and ruined careers for their unpreparedness—and works on, today, with exemplary fairness to establish the precise responsibility of Roosevelt and his lieutenants for the Pearl Harbor debacle.

Two long book reviews complement these two long essays. JHR Associate Editor Mark Weber, an expert witness in the second trial of Ernst Zündel, reports on Robert Lenski's substantial account of that trial. Jack Wikoff, a student of twentieth-century propaganda in word and image, contributes an assessment of S.J. Taylor's important biography of New York Times-man and Pulitzer-Prize winner Walter Duranty, who deliberately hushed up a real Holocaust, Stalin's annihilation of millions of Ukrainians and other Soviet subjects through starvation and disease, even as the Roosevelt administration hastened to recognize the mass-murderer and his regime in 1933. Thus work on another key Revisionist project picks up steam—rather than rehash the sordid crimes of Red Russia, known virtually as soon as they were committed by influential Western opinion-makers, we focus on precisely those journalists, academics, politicians, and bureaucrats who concealed, minimized or defended (in the name of "anti-Fascism") our century's real laureates of tyranny and genocide.

A new section, "Document" will attempt precisely that in this and forthcoming issues: to document from primary sources aspects of the Second World War unfamiliar to Americans schooled and spoonfed on the authorized propaganda of the "Good War." Our GI's sometimes less than scrupulous about taking prisoners? Read and weep. Or better, read and think . . .

A 1958 commentary and interview with the late Admiral Husband E. Kimmel by the late, distinguished American lawyer and educator Dean Clarence Manion (of Notre Dame Law School) moves and informs not merely for its revelations of Kimmel's views of Pearl Harbor, but for the principled, non-interventionist American conservatism that we have all but lost to the baying pack of "neo-cons" and "new rightists." Carl Hottelet says what must be said about "Holocaust education":

(continued on page 468)
Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy

CHARLES LUTTON

At 7:49 a.m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, 183 Japanese dive- and torpedo bombers, accompanied by Zero escorts, launched the first of two attacks against the American base at Pearl Harbor. A second wave of 168 Japanese aircraft arrived at 9 a.m. Eighteen operational warships, including four battleships, were sunk or heavily damaged; 188 aircraft were destroyed. 2403 Americans were killed, among them 68 civilians, and 1178 were wounded.

Although the Japanese achieved local surprise, their success was less than complete. The Pacific Fleet's three aircraft carriers were not in port. Nine heavy cruisers, all but three light cruisers, and virtually all of the destroyers remained afloat. None of the fleet's submarines was lost. And the commander of the Japanese task force, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, refused to authorize a third strike that could have led to the destruction of Pearl Harbor's naval dockyards and oil storage tanks, the loss of which would have neutralized Hawaii as a forward base for counter-offensives against Japanese moves towards the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies.

The attack solved President Franklin D. Roosevelt's most pressing problem: how to overcome the American public's opposition to involvement in the war that had been going on in Europe for the previous sixteen months (on the eve of Pearl Harbor, polls indicated that 80 per cent of the people did not want the United States to enter the war as an active participant). Roosevelt received overwhelming support when he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan. The grass-roots America First movement quietly disbanded. On December 11th, Germany and Italy declared war against the United States. American resolve to "defeat the dictators" was near unanimous.

If the public united behind Roosevelt and Churchill in the war effort, almost from the first there were serious questions
raised about the attack that had brought America into the world conflict. Who was accountable for the disaster? Was it avoidable? Why had the Japanese attacked? Had there been any American provocation? And why had Pearl Harbor's able Navy and Army commanders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter Short, been caught off guard? Why were they quickly retired under unusual circumstances?

To head off congressional and public criticism, Roosevelt hastily appointed a special commission to investigate the attack. Chaired by Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, a leading supporter of the pro-interventionist Committee to Aid America by Aiding the Allies, the President had no fear that the commission would do anything to compromise the spirit of unity that now prevailed. Justice Roberts completed his report on Friday, January 23, 1942. The Administration released it to the public in time for the Sunday newspapers. Key members of the Washington political and military establishment were absolved of any blame. The fault, they said, lay with Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

First Revisionist Critiques

But not all were convinced. In September 1944, John T. Flynn launched Pearl Harbor revisionism when he published a forty-six page booklet entitled The Truth about Pearl Harbor. Flynn argued that Roosevelt and his cronies had been plotting war against Japan at least since January 1941. The Administration continued needlessly to provoke the Japanese government throughout the rest of the year, and on November 26, 1941, delivered a diplomatic ultimatum that no government could possibly accept. Flynn also suggested that Kimmel and Short were given the wrong instructions from Washington headquarters, thus aborting the taking of effective measures at the base.

In early 1945, a thirty-year-old historian, William L. Neumann, published a brochure, The Genesis of Pearl Harbor. He reviewed the diplomatic background to the outbreak of the war and pointed out how the Roosevelt Administration had launched an economic war against Japan in the summer and fall of 1941. Neumann concluded that both sides were responsible, but that Washington could not have been surprised by the attack at Pearl Harbor, given FDR's diplomatic activities in the months and days preceding December 7th.
Army and Navy Reports Released

After VJ-Day, President Harry Truman permitted the release of the Army and Navy special investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack. The Navy Court of Inquiry, headed by Admiral Orin G. Murfin, met from July 24-September 27, 1944. They concluded that Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, had failed to provide Admiral Kimmel all of the information possessed in Washington, thereby denying the Hawaii command a more complete picture of the situation. Kimmel was exonerated. His plans were judged "sound," but were dependent on "advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected." And given his limited military resources, Kimmel had conducted long-range aerial reconnaissance appropriate to the intelligence he had been given and the number of aircraft available.

Lt. General George Grunert chaired the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which met from July 20-October 20, 1944. Evidence from 151 witnesses was collected in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Hawaii. While the Board was critical of General Short, for the first time attention was directed toward General George Marshall and the War Department. Marshall was censured for failing to keep Short fully apprised of the deteriorating state of U.S.-Japanese relations; of failing to correct Short's "sabotage alert" preparations at Pearl Harbor (U.S. aircraft were bunched wing-tip to wing-tip on December 7th, because Washington had told Short to guard against sabotage. Had he been alerted to a possible air attack, the planes would have been scattered and sheltered in revetments to guard against bomb blast); of failing to send critical information to Short on the evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th; of failing to determine if the state of readiness at Pearl Harbor was commensurate with the potential threats to the base's security. General Leonard Gerow, Chief of the Army's War Plans Division, was also reproved. He had failed, the Board concluded, to keep the Hawaiian command informed about Japanese moves that were known in Washington; of failing to make the November 27th warning clear and concise; and of failing to see that joint Army-Navy plans were properly effected.

Needless to say, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Navy Secretary James Forrestal were alarmed that blame for the success of the Japanese attack had been shifted from the local
commanders to their superiors in Washington. To supplement the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Major Henry Clausen was selected to head a one-man investigation. But no public report was released. Forrestal had Admiral W. Kent Hewitt continue to investigate Pearl Harbor. No separate report was issued, but on August 29, 1945, Forrestal announced that, on the basis of Hewitt's inquiries, "Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during the period 27 November to 7 December, 1941, failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary to exercising command commensurate with their rank and assigned duties."

The Army and Navy Reports provided fresh ammunition to the redoubtable John T. Flynn, who, in September 1945, issued a fifteen-page report entitled The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. Flynn's findings were not limited to review by a small circle of interested friends, but were given wide circulation thanks to the Chicago Tribune, which highlighted his work. Flynn concluded that Franklin Roosevelt was to blame for diplomatic mismanagement; for keeping the Pacific Fleet stationed at the insecure Pearl Harbor base; and for stripping Pearl Harbor of needed defensive equipment.

Reviewing the diplomatic prelude to the attack, Flynn explained that FDR undermined the position of Japanese moderates and so orchestrated events that General Tojo and the "War Agitators" took power in Tokyo. Despite provocations, it became clear that Germany was not going to declare war against the United States. It was at this point, said Flynn, that Roosevelt turned the screws on the Japanese.

Flynn went on to note the "Gift from the Gods" that the cracking of the Japanese diplomatic codes represented. Flynn was under the impression that the British had first broken the Japanese code and supplied Washington with copies of messages between Tokyo and its foreign representatives. He underscored the significance of the fact that Washington was aware that Japan had given its diplomats a November 25th deadline to reach an understanding with the U.S.

In a section, "The Fog at Pearl Harbor," Flynn emphasized that the commanders at Pearl Harbor were told "literally nothing" about the intercepted Japanese messages and the rapidly deteriorating state of affairs. Short was ordered to guard against sabotage and internal disorder from the large
Japanese population in Hawaii, and warned that Japanese military operations could be expected soon, but against such targets as the Kra Peninsula, Guam, Singapore, and Malaya. And Flynn re-emphasized a point that is still too often obscured in discussions of the attack, namely, "that Kimmel's fleet was not there to protect Pearl Harbor. The harbor was there merely as a fuel and supply base for it. The fleet had a task assigned to it in case of war. The protection of the base would be the duty of the Army and the base naval installations."

In his discussion of "The Night Before Pearl Harbor" Flynn charged that the story given the public about Roosevelt being surprised by the attack on Pearl Harbor was "utterly fraudulent." Based on the intercepted messages, FDR knew that hostilities were soon to commence. What "warnings" were finally sent to Hawaii were deliberately delivered by the slowest possible means, as a face-saving measure.

Flynn went on to show how blame for the disaster was cleverly shifted from Washington to the Hawaiian commanders, Kimmel and Short. He further discussed how the fleet had come to be based at Pearl Harbor over the objections of Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral Richardson, who was convinced that any ships berthed there would be an easy target.*

In his summary of the tragedy, Flynn reiterated his view that Roosevelt had decided to go to war with Japan, despite his public pledges to the American people not to make their sons fight in foreign wars, and that he had promised the British to fight long before December 7th. When the attack came at Pearl Harbor, the "amateur Commander-in-Chief" tried to place the blame on Kimmel and Short. "Now," he concluded, "if there is a shred of decency left in the American people, they will demand that Congress open the whole ugly business to the light of day.**

*As is the case today, the Pacific Fleet was based on the West coast of the United States (San Diego, San Francisco). FDR personally ordered it moved to the unprepared Pearl Harbor facility in 1940.

The Congressional Hearings

A concurrent resolution of Congress brought into being the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. The Administration hoped that the Committee, which had a majority of Democrats, would satisfy public curiosity while safeguarding the standing of the political party in power. Senator Alben Barkley (D-Kentucky) served as chairman. The five other Democrats included Senator Walter F. George (Georgia), Senator Scott Lucas (Illinois), Rep. J. Bayard Clark (North Carolina), Rep. John W. Murphy (Pennsylvania), and Rep. Jere Cooper (Tennessee), who was Vice Chairman. The Democrats selected the legal staff.

Four Republicans were on the Committee: Senator Owen Brewster (Maine), Senator Homer Ferguson (Michigan), Rep. Bertrand Gearhart (California), and Rep. Frank B. Keefe (Wisconsin). The Republican Minority were not provided with their own staff. However, John T. Flynn raised funds from private sources to permit Percy Greaves, a former associate research director for the Republican National Committee, to assist the Republican members of the Joint Congressional Committee. Without Greaves's able work, much of the Pearl Harbor story would have remained hidden from the public.

The Committee sat from November 15, 1945 to May 31, 1946. The Democratic majority managed to steer the hearings in such a manner as to deflect as much criticism as they could from the late President Roosevelt. Thanks to the persistence of Senator Ferguson, aided by Greaves, "inconvenient" testimony was extracted from a number of the witnesses, and evidence that contradicted the Roberts Commission Report was placed on the record. The evidence, exhibits, hearings, and concluding report came to some forty volumes.

The "Majority Report" concluded that Japan's brilliantly planned attack had been entirely unprovoked and there was no evidence that the Roosevelt cabinet had maneuvered Japan into launching a first strike in order to force Congress into declaring war. Indeed, the Democrats asserted that Roosevelt, Hull, and Stimson had done everything they could possibly do to avoid war with Japan. The disaster at Pearl Harbor was due to the failure of the local commanders to take adequate measures to detect a possible attack and maintain proper readiness to meet likely threats. The report did suggest that the
War Department should have notified Gen. Short that his "sabotage alert" measures were not enough. In addition, Army and Navy intelligence should have realized the significance of Japanese efforts to keep abreast of the location of U.S. warships berthed at Pearl Harbor (the "Bomb Plot" messages that military intelligence had decoded). Finally, during the forty-eight hours prior to the attack, the War and Navy Departments should have kept on a higher state of alert and notified Pearl Harbor about the impending diplomatic break that the Japanese had scheduled to take effect from 1 p.m. Washington time on December 7th.

A "Minority Report" was issued under the signatures of Senators Brewster and Ferguson. They listed some twenty "conclusions of Fact and Responsibility." President Roosevelt was held "responsible for the failure to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff (General Marshall), and the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) in evaluating information and dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated the growing imminence of war." Roosevelt was especially at fault, between Saturday night December 6th, and Sunday morning, the 7th, for failing "to take that quick and instant executive action which was required by the occasion."

Rep. Frank Keefe submitted his own "Additional Views" after having, with Republican Rep. Gearhart (who was in a tough re-election campaign) signed the "Majority Report." Keefe admitted that the "concept of an 'incident' as a factor which would unify public opinion behind an all-out war effort either in the Atlantic or Pacific had influenced the thinking of officials in Washington for a long time." As early as October 1940, Roosevelt had considered blockading Japan. Keefe also found it significant that just days before the attack on Pearl Harbor Roosevelt personally ordered the Navy to dispatch three small vessels from the Philippines into the path of Japanese warships then steaming towards Southeast Asia. The Congressman felt that this singular action was intended to provoke an "overt" Japanese attack on American ships that could serve as the incident needed to bring the United States officially into the war.
On November 22, Tokyo informed its special envoys to the United States, Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu, that if an agreement was not reached with the U.S., British, and Dutch by November 29th, "the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

In another message that Washington read, Tokyo informed its Ambassador to Berlin on November 30 that diplomatic efforts to resolve differences with the United States "now stand ruptured—broken." He was instructed to inform Chancellor Hitler "that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms... the time for the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

During the Joint Congressional hearings, Captain Laurance Safford, the Chief of the U.S. Navy's Security Intelligence Communications (Op-20-G), testified that Tokyo broadcast the "East Wind Rain" message in its overseas news broadcast of Thursday, December 4, 1941, at 8:30 a.m., Washington time. The U.S. Navy receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, intercepted the message, which was forwarded to the Navy Department in Washington. Safford informed the Congressional Committee that, "There was a 'winds' message. It meant war—and we knew it meant war." But Washington refused to pass this critical information on to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. And, as Morgenstern revealed, efforts were made to strip all files of evidence of the receipt of the "Winds" intercept and to discredit Capt. Safford's testimony.

Morgenstern made it clear to his readers that Kimmel and Short took the appropriate action, given the information and instructions they received from their superiors. But he reiterated that:

they were denied three principal categories of intelligence:

1. Knowledge of the conduct of America's side of the diplomatic negotiations, showing that Japan had been put in a box where it must knuckle under or fight.

2. Knowledge of hundreds of significant Japanese diplomatic code intercepts informing Roosevelt and his circle not only that Japan would fight, but when war was coming.

3. Knowledge of messages to and from Tokyo and its corps of spies in Hawaii, pointing precisely to Pearl Harbor as the target for attack.
By late November, Roosevelt and his inner circle knew that war was coming. Morgenstern cited Secretary of War Henry Stimson's diary entry of November 25, 1941:

He [FDR] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps [as soon as] next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning and the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.

Finally, having considered the evidence, the author took up the question of “who was guilty?” He reminded readers that Roosevelt and his defenders failed to disclose:

... the part played in bringing about the result of December 7 by its campaign of economic warfare, its secret diplomacy, its secret diplomacy, its covert military alliances, the submission of demands which Japan found “humiliating,” and its own complete abandonment of neutrality in favor of nondeclared war...

When it became apparent, a few days after Pearl Harbor, that the manifest failures which contributed to the crushing defeat at Oahu could not be blamed solely on the Japanese, Roosevelt and his associates in the civilian government and high command invented some new villains to divert the guilt from themselves. For the defeat at Pearl Harbor the blame—all of the blame, not part of it—was apportioned between Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short.

Later, as the war drew to an end and new doubts were raised, President Truman shifted blame from Washington to the American people as a whole. Said Truman, “The country was not ready for preparedness... I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.” But it was not the American people who had waged economic warfare against Japan. And it was not the public that had shipped weapons to Britain and Russia at the expense of the U.S. armed forces.

Morgenstern rejected Truman’s arrogant charge and instead directed the blame precisely where the evidence indicated that it lay:

The United States was neither informed nor alerted when Roosevelt and the men whose intentions coincided with his (because their fortunes rode with him) were warping the nation into war in 1941. The motives of these men are to this day obscure. They are even more obscure in the light of the default of all promises concerning the objectives of World War II...
All of these men must answer for much. With absolute knowledge of war, they refused to communicate that knowledge, clearly, unequivocally, and in time, to the men in the field upon whom the blow would fall. The silence in Washington can yield to no other explanation than a desire to do nothing that would deter or forestall the attack which would produce the overt act so long and so fervently sought. When the price of silence proved to be 2,326 lives, it was necessary to add two more victims to the list—Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short. . . . They failed—with calculation—to keep the United States out of war and to avoid a clash with Japan. . . . The "warnings" they sent to Hawaii failed—and were so phrased and so handled as to insure failure.

Pearl Harbor was the first action of the acknowledged war, and the last battle of a secret war upon which the administration had long since embarked. The secret war was waged against nations which the leadership of this country had chosen as enemies months before they became formal enemies by a declaration of war. It was waged also, by psychological means, by propaganda, and deception, against the American people, who were thought by their leaders to be laggard in embracing war. The people were told that acts which were equivalent to war were intended to keep the nation out of war. Constitutional processes existed only to be circumvented, until finally the war-making power of Congress was reduced to the act of ratifying an accomplished fact.

It is encouraging to report that George Morgenstern's classic account of the Pearl Harbor tragedy has at long last been reprinted (by the IHR). Despite the passage of time, and the disclosure of new evidence, Morgenstern's basic thesis remains unshaken.

**A Growing Debate**

The Revisionist case was firmly grounded in evidence made available during the Congressional Hearings and in other post-war disclosures. This did not silence the defenders of Roosevelt and the "New World Order" that had been forged at Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and San Francisco. Far from it. A stream of books defending, "explaining" and excusing Roosevelt and his chief aides rolled off the presses to the accolades of the Establishment mass media. Representative examples of this literature were The Road to Pearl Harbor, by Herbert Feis (Princeton University Press, 1950); Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor by Basil Rauch (Creative Age Press, 1950); and The Challenge to Isolation (Harper and
Brothers, 1952) and The Undeclared War (Harper and Brothers, 1953), both by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason.

If George Morgenstern's Pearl Harbor remained the best answer to the Establishment's version of the attack, other writers were taking a closer look at the New Deal and placing the Japanese attack on Hawaii within the context of American foreign and domestic policies during the Roosevelt Era. Of especial note are studies by Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities (Yale University Press, 1948); William Henry Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade (Henry Regnery, 1950); Frederick R. Sanborn, Design for War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941 (Devin Adair, 1951); and Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941 (Henry Regnery, 1952). The volumes by Beard and Tansill were especially unwelcome among the defenders of Roosevelt's policies, as Beard had been one of the pre-eminent historians of the first half of the twentieth century, while Tansill was a distinguished Georgetown University professor of American diplomatic history. All of the above-mentioned titles are still worth reading, not only from the historiographical standpoint, but also for their factual disclosures and interpretations of events.

The Barnes Symposium

Harry Elmer Barnes (1889-1968) was a scholar of immense range who had been a path-finder in World War I revisionism. Later a critic of New Deal policies, he wrote on diplomatic history and international relations and gave generous encouragement to others to explore various aspects of recent history. He saw this "quest for truth" as not a mere intellectual exercise, but as an endeavor that might help bring justice and peace to a troubled world.

In 1953, under Barnes's editorship, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (The Caxton Printers, Ltd.) appeared. Here Barnes assembled leading critics in a survey and appraisal of the development, course, and consequences of American foreign policy during Roosevelt's presidency. He was confident that the views expressed in this volume could withstand whatever rejoinder Roosevelt's defenders might deliver, observing:
There is no probability that later evidence will require any moderation of the indictment of our foreign policy since 1914, and, especially, since 1933. If there were any still secret material which would brighten the record of the Roosevelt and Truman foreign policies, we may rest assured that their court historians and publicity agents would have revealed it to the public long ere this.

The symposium opened with an introduction to “Revisionism and the Historical Blackout,” wherein Professor Barnes explained how dissident views were suppressed by the very elements which claimed to defend the First Amendment to the Constitution. Had not the small firms Henry Regnery and Devin-Adair been willing to publish Revisionist books, it is doubtful whether Morgenstern, Sanborn, Tansill and others would have managed to get their most significant work in print. In his essay “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” Dr. Tansill discussed the European background of the origins of World War II, as well as Japanese-American relations up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Frederick R. Sanborn considered the origins of Roosevelt’s interventionism and the failure of his un-neutral policies toward Hitler, in “Roosevelt Is Frustrated In Europe.” Professor William L. Neumann drew attention to “How American Policy Toward Japan Contributed to War in the Pacific.”

Two essays dealt with Pearl Harbor and its aftermath: “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” by George Morgenstern, which summarized and updated the case he had made in his full-length book, and “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” by Percy L. Greaves, Jr. Greaves took a look at the nine Pearl Harbor inquiries and showed how blame had been redirected away from the real culprits. He revealed how General Marshall was forced to make a series of damaging admissions under sharp questioning by Senator Homer Ferguson, among them how the United States had secretly initiated military agreements with the British and Dutch, directed against the Japanese, and that the agreements had gone into effect before the Pearl Harbor attack. Nevertheless, the campaign to protect those who were responsible for the Pearl Harbor debacle continued. As he observed:

Those who have participated in this great conspiracy against the American people undoubtedly believe that the end justifies the means. They probably all join the editors of Life [magazine],
who tell us in their *Picture History of World War II* that "In retrospect Pearl Harbor seemed clearly the best thing that could have happened to the U.S."

William Henry Chamberlin reminded readers that none of the stated goals that the United Nations were supposed to be fighting for were realized by war's end. In his essay, "The Bankruptcy of a Policy," he argued that the Roosevelt foreign policy was a catastrophe, the dire consequences of which would endure for decades to come. The final essay, by Professor George A. Lundberg, considered "American Foreign Policy in the Light of National Interest at Mid-Century." Here he compared internationalism and interventionism with what had been our traditional policy of continentalism before America's involvement in the First World War. Under the old policy, the United States had been safe and grew prosperous. The New Internationalism had made us less free, less safe, less secure.

Nearly forty years after they were first published, the articles in *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* have indeed withstood the test of time and are still valuable historiography. No one since Barnes has attempted, in a single volume, to cover the history reviewed therein. Regrettably, it is unlikely that such a project could be undertaken today, as there are not enough scholars working on those topics to fill a large volume of essays.

**The Admirals Speak Up**

Thanks to the Roosevelt apologists, including the biased Roberts Commission, Majority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, and the pro-Administration books, it is no wonder that the public was confused about which branch of the service was responsible for the security of Pearl Harbor (a condition that continues even today). The various investigations established that it was the Army, not the Navy, that was charged with the defense of the Pacific Fleet when it was in port. Thus, the chain of command in 1941 went through the Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to his commander at Hawaii, Lt. Gen. Short. Admiral Kimmel was supposed to cooperate with the Army, which at that time also included the Air Force (which throughout World War II was actually the Army Air Force). Kimmel's job was to take care of naval operations.
Over the decades that the debate over Pearl Harbor has raged, a number of observers have noted that, by and large, it has been Navy men who have taken an interest in seeking the truth about the attack. Gen. Short never published his own memoirs. Nor have men close to Marshall given an “inside” account of those fateful days.

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald was commander of the Pacific Fleet’s destroyers at the time of the attack and was at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Later he was commander of the Northern Pacific Force. At the time of his retirement from active duty he was Commandant of the First Naval District.

Theobald assisted Kimmel in his testimony before the Roberts Commission. After his retirement, he devoted years to studying the attack and its aftermath. The results of his research were first published in March 1954, when Devin-Adair released The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack.

It was Admiral Theobald’s impression that from the fall of France, in June 1940, Roosevelt was convinced that the U.S. must fight on Britain’s side and that the primary objective remained the defeat of Germany. On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy, and Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact, which provided that each would declare war on any third party that went to war against one of the three (this did not affect Germany and Japan’s relations with the U.S.S.R.). From this date, then, war with Japan meant war with Germany and Italy, and this came to play an increasingly important role in Roosevelt’s maneuvers.

In an effort to circumvent the American public’s reluctance to enter the war, Roosevelt took a number of steps that Theobald went into considerable detail explaining. In brief, they were:

1) He introduced a massive arms buildup;
2) He repeatedly provoked Germany through an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic;
3) He applied increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on Japan, reaching a climax in late July, 1941, when the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands froze Japanese assets. Japan lost 75 per cent of its foreign trade and 90 per cent of its oil supply;
4) In August 1941 he met with Churchill at Newfoundland, where FDR promised that any Japanese attack on British or
Dutch possessions would bring the United States into the war;

5) He had Secretary of State Hull deliver an insulting diplomatic ultimatum to the Japanese government on November 26, 1941, “which gave Japan no choice but surrender or war”;

6) He “retained a weak Pacific fleet in Hawaiian waters, despite contrary naval advice, where it served only one diplomatic purpose, an invitation to a Japanese surprise attack”;

7) He “furthered that surprise by causing the Hawaiian Commanders to be denied invaluable information from decoded Japanese dispatches concerning the rapid approach of the war and the strong probability that the attack would be directed at Pearl Harbor.”

Theobald, in his review of the MAGIC diplomatic decrypts that were available in Washington, emphasized that this vital material was not passed along, and that there had been an “almost complete denial of information, during the three months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack.” Then he posed a series of questions that Roosevelt’s defenders have yet to answer satisfactorily: “Why was such irrefutable evidence of the coming attack so withheld? Why did Washington contribute so completely to the surprise feature of that attack?” Theobald reasoned, “There can be only one answer—because President Roosevelt wanted it that way!”

_The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor_ included a review of the findings of the various post-attack investigations, and offered a point-by-point refutation of the Majority Conclusion of the Joint Congressional Committee, which he dismissed as “the last act in the attempt to preserve the Pearl Harbor Secret.”

The American moves leading up to the Japanese attack are summarized in his final chapter, in which Admiral Theobald re-emphasizes that:

... the recurrent fact of the Pearl Harbor story has been the repeated withholding of information from Admiral Kimmel and General Short ... The denial to the Hawaiian Commanders of all knowledge of Magic was vital to the plan for enticing Japan to deliver a surprise attack upon the Fleet ... because as late as Saturday, December 6, Admiral Kimmel could have caused that attack to be canceled by taking his fleet to sea and disappearing beyond land-based human ken.

Evidence placed on the record indicated to Theobald that:
Everything that happened in Washington on Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, supports the belief that President Roosevelt had directed that no message be sent to the Hawaiian Commanders before noon on Sunday, Washington time . . . Never before in recorded history had a field commander been denied information that his country would be at war in a matter of hours, and that everything pointed to a surprise attack upon his forces shortly after sunrise.

Nevertheless, Theobald was forced to concede, Roosevelt's strategy accomplished its purpose: a united people rallied behind the president's war effort. The author left it up to his readers to ponder the ethics of that statecraft.

* * * * *

Contrary to the popular impression, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were never formally charged with errors of judgement or dereliction of duty. There was never a court martial proceeding. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were relieved of their commands and, in early 1942, placed on the Retired list. Neither was afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the criticisms contained in the Roberts Commission Report.

However, during the 1944 Naval Court of Inquiry, Kimmel was permitted to retain legal counsel (Charles B. Rugg and Edward B. Hanify), to introduce testimony, and cross-examine witnesses. It was during the course of the Navy Inquiry that Kimmel learned about the MAGIC intercepts that had not been passed along to him and General Short. Thereafter, Kimmel tried to obtain as much information as he could in order to set the record straight. In December 1954, Henry Regnery Company of Chicago published Admiral Kimmel's Story.

Kimmel did not merely restate the findings of Morgenstern and Theobald. He presented his readers with a fresh perspective on why the Pacific Fleet came to be based at Pearl Harbor at the insistence of Roosevelt, and how he and General Short had tried, for many months, to remedy the serious shortcomings of that facility. There were never enough aircraft available to conduct 360-degree searches on a regular basis; the base lacked radar sets and trained personnel; the entrance to the anchorage was so narrow that warships were forced to enter and exit in single file. Kimmel's superiors repeatedly
advised him that there was no danger of torpedo attack, because, they were confident, the harbor's waters were too shallow and any airdropped "fish" would simply sink to the bottom (the Japanese solved this problem by affixing special fins to their torpedoes; U.S. Naval Ordnance did not think this was possible).

As had been brought out during the Congressional Hearings, and gone into detail in the studies by Morgenstern, Greaves, Barnes, and Theobald, Kimmel and Short were kept in the dark about the worsening diplomatic situation with Japan and were denied all of the information contained in the MAGIC decrypts. Kimmel went on to reveal that he was informed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, that an attack against Pearl Harbor was not likely and was ordered to have his fleet ready to move against the Marshall Islands upon the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific.

Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, angry citizens bombarded Kimmel with denunciations and even death threats. More than one politician publicly suggested that he should consider suicide. A sample of this vilification was included in the ninth chapter of his book.

Admiral Kimmel's Story makes for sobering reading, even today. Reflecting on Kimmel's account, it is likely that most readers will agree with Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey's judgement that, "Admiral Kimmel and General Short [were] splendid officers who were thrown to the wolves as scapegoats for something over which they had no control. They had to work with what they were given, both in equipment and information. They are our outstanding military martyrs."

Stimson's Embarrassing Diary Entry

On November 25, 1941, President Roosevelt met with Secretary of State Hull, Navy Secretary Frank Knox, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, General Marshall and Admiral Stark. Relations with the Japanese was the main topic discussed. FDR observed that the Japanese had launched surprise attacks at the outset of previous wars and that the U.S. might be under attack by the following Monday. Stimson was keeping a diary at this time and the defenders of Roosevelt's innocence have long been frustrated over the following entry from his diary, dealing with the conference of the 25th:

"The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without
allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.

After discussing the matter, Roosevelt and his closest advisers agreed that:

In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese were the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors.

Richard N. Current, a professor of history at the University of North Carolina, came up with an inventive explanation for this remarkable bit of evidence that was made public during the Joint Congressional Hearings. In Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954), Dr. Current conceded there was no denying that Stimson et al. were anticipating an attack. But, he claimed, not on United States, rather on Dutch or British, territory. Roosevelt's challenge was how to make a Japanese attack on Dutch or British territory appear to be an attack on America. I leave it to the reader to consider whether or not this is a convincing exposition.

Wohlstetter and Morison

Two books which remain standards in the pro-Roosevelt literature appeared in 1963: Samuel Eliot Morison's The Two-Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown) and Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decisions (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Both were widely, and favorably, reviewed. Morison's became a book club selection and best seller. Wohlstetter's academic reputation as a specialist on intelligence analysis and strategic decision-making was secured with the acceptance of her book.

Morison was hired by the Roosevelt Administration to write the official History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. The passage of time did little to mellow his dedication to the cause of his war-time employer. Chapter 3 of The Two Ocean War dealt with Pearl Harbor. Here, the author claimed, that "Actually, the Administration and the heads of the armed forces were doing their best to prevent or postpone a war with Japan." The various MAGIC messages that Washington failed to send word of to Hawaii simply got mixed up with other warnings of forthcoming Japanese moves against Siberia,
Peru, and other unlikely places. Morison blamed Kimmel and Short for not taking proper action, and went so far as to accuse them of “ignoring” an ambiguous “war warning” sent from Washington on November 27th. In the end, Morison chose to waffle, by claiming that, “Fundamentally, however, it was the system, the setup both at Washington and at Pearl Harbor, rather than individual stupidity or apathy, which muffled and confused what was going on.” Roosevelt, Stimson, Hull, Marshall, and Stark did not have any blame affixed to their reputations in this narrative.

Admiral Morison joined the chorus in describing Mrs. Wohlstetter’s *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, as “The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor.” More recently, Captain Roger Pineau and John Costello (who should know better), have referred to her efforts as a “scholarly study.”

Wohlstetter was not interested in assigning blame for the disaster. Rather, it was her thesis that “The United States was not caught napping . . . We just expected wrong.” Pearl Harbor was “a failure of strategic analysis” and “a failure to anticipate effectively.” Yes, in retrospect, the record indicated that Washington might well have warned Kimmel and Short. But what we had here was a “national failure to anticipate” that the Japanese would actually attack Hawaii, instead of some other target. And no, there certainly wasn’t any “conspiracy” involving Roosevelt and his cronies.

Percy L. Greaves who, by common agreement, knew more about Pearl Harbor than any man living at the time, wrote a scathing critique of Wohlstetter’s book that should have led to its being quietly removed from library shelves and consigned to the recycling plants. “The Mystery of Pearl Harbor: 25 Years of Deception,” was included with essays by Harry Elmer Barnes and Vice Admiral Frank Betty in the December 12, 1966 issue of *National Review* magazine. Later reprinted in the special “Pearl Harbor: Revisionism Renewed” edition of *The Journal of Historical Review* (Volume Four, Number Four, Winter 1983-84), Greaves noted that a first reading of her book disclosed over one hundred factual errors, “not to mention child-like acceptance of Administration releases in preference to obscured realities.” One fundamental error of assumption undermined her entire argument. Treating the intelligence phase of the story, she never learned that there was a five-hour
difference between Navy time and Washington, D.C. time. As Greaves remarked, "How valuable is a book on pre-attack intelligence that is five hours off on the timing of all Naval communications coming out of Washington? How dependable is a Naval historian who acclaims such a book the best on the subject? . . . One could go on and on for a hundred more blunders. The facts were just too much for Mrs. Wohlstetter." It says volumes about the quality of the current generation of academic historians that Wohlstetter's book continues to turn up on lists of "recommended" titles dealing with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe.

Further Contributions by Barnes

Harry Elmer Barnes continued to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor long after the publication of Perpetual War For Perpetual Peace. He not only conducted his own research, but gave warm encouragement to others, both people who had some "inside" knowledge of the events, as well as unbiased scholars who were not afraid to pursue avenues of inquiry that might lead to findings that were unpopular with the political and historical establishments.

The twenty-fifth anniversary of Pearl Harbor was marked at the Chicago Tribune with a Special Pearl Harbor Supplement. George Morgenstern organized this undertaking with assistance from Dr. Barnes. The highlight of the December 7, 1966 Chicago Tribune was an essay by Admiral Kimmel. Barnes contributed an insightful piece on General Marshall.

Commander Charles Hiles wrote the best article yet to be published concerning the "Bomb Plot" Messages. Tokyo requested specific information about the movement and location of major warships berthed at Pearl Harbor. On December 3, the Japanese consul in Honolulu, Nagao Kita, informed Tokyo that he had set up a system of codes confirming the movement of various American warships through the use of signals in windows at Lanikai Beach, which could be spotted by off-shore "fishing" boats and submarines. This vital information could then be passed on to the Japanese carrier task force. The signal system would operate through December 6th. The Kita messages to Tokyo were intercepted and decrypted by U.S. intelligence. Thus, Washington knew that Pearl Harbor was likely going to be attacked and by what date. None of this information was passed along to the U.S. Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor.
Articles by the Tribune's veteran Washington Bureau Chief, Walter Trohan, and their aviation editor, Wayne Thomis, rounded out this issue.

The following year, on December 7, 1967, Morgenstern gave front-page coverage in the Tribune to the publication of a number of documents relating to Pearl Harbor, with commentary by Barnes. Although this information was well known to those who had kept up with the debate over the years, members of the public at large found much of the material that Barnes collected shocking, and revealing a chapter of history they were ignorant of.

Harry Elmer Barnes died on August 25, 1968 at the age of 79. Less than a week before he passed away, he had completed the final draft of Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century, a 132-page summary of the entire controversy. This incisive study originally appeared in print as an entire issue of Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought (Volume IV, 1968). It has since been reprinted in its entirety by the Institute for Historical Review.

He observed that all of the careful research conducted by Revisionists had yet to alter the general public perception of this event:

"Only a small fraction of the American people are any better acquainted with the realities of the responsibility for the attack than they were when President Roosevelt delivered his "Day of Infamy" oration on December 8, 1941. The legends and rhetoric of that day still dominate the American mind."

For the last time, Barnes outlined what he felt were the policies and events which had led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Over the years, Barnes had revised a number of his own assumptions. One of these concerned Roosevelt's December 1, 1941 order to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering the immediate dispatch of three "small vessels" armed with a machine gun and deck cannon, each commanded by a U.S. Naval officer, and flying the American flag. The three little ships were directed to sail into the path of Japanese Navy convoys that Washington knew were then steaming southward. Had the American ships been attacked by the Japanese, Barnes was now confident that this would have saved Pearl Harbor. "There can be little doubt that the Cockleship plan of December 1st was designed to get the indispensable attack by a method which would precede the Pearl Harbor attack, avert
the latter, and save the Pacific Fleet and American lives," he wrote of this aspect of the mystery.

A part of the story that had hitherto been largely overlooked, even by many Revisionists, concerned the secret agreements Roosevelt had entered into with the British and Dutch and which led to America technically being at war with Japan four days before Pearl Harbor. As Barnes succinctly explained, in April 1941 the U.S., British, and Dutch agreed to take joint military action against Japan if the Japanese sent armed forces beyond the line 100° East and 10° North or 6° North and the Davao-Waigeo line, or threatened British or Dutch possessions in the southwest Pacific or independent countries in that region. The agreements were known as ABCD. Thereafter, Admiral Stark said that war with Japan was not a matter of if, but rather when and where. Roosevelt gave his approval to the attendant war plans in May and June. On December 3, 1941, the Dutch invoked the ABCD agreement, after Japanese forces passed the line 100° East and 10° North, and were thought to be headed toward Dutch territory as well as the Kra Peninsula and Thailand. The U.S. military attache in Melbourne, Australia, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, was contacted by the Australians, British, and Dutch and informed that the Dutch were expecting the U.S. Navy to offer assistance. Merle-Smith relayed this information to his superiors by coded message. It should have reached Washington in the early evening of December 4.

Like a number of other students of the period, Barnes suspected that FDR had sought a "good war" to solve the serious economic problems that persisted throughout the New Deal. Whatever his motives, it was undeniable, he concluded, that:

The overwhelming responsibility for the war and the attack was, of course, Roosevelt's deliberate refusal to settle the relations between the United States and Japan in a peaceful manner by honest diplomatic negotiations, to achieve which Japan made unusually impressive gestures and offered very reasonable terms that protected all legitimate vital American interests in the Far East.

Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century remains a noteworthy contribution to the literature on the topic. It is as good an introduction to the issues involved as is currently in print.
**Additional Pieces of the Puzzle**

In the October 1962 issue of the United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley gave his account of having been the commander of one of the "little ships" hastily ordered out of Manila to monitor the Japanese Navy in early December of 1941. Although the bare essentials of the incident had been revealed during the Joint Congressional Hearings, Tolley's article sparked much comment. Additional research resulted in the publication of his book, *The Cruise of the Lanikai: Incitement to War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973).

The *Lanikai* was a 67-ton two-masted auxiliary schooner engaged in inter-island traffic. Chartered for $1.00 by the U.S. Navy, it had a crew of five Filipino civilians, who could not speak English. Commander Harry Slocum informed a startled Lt. Tolley that "the President has personally ordered" him to set sail as soon as possible. The sailing ship was turned into a vessel of war by lashing to its deck an old 3-pounder gun left over from the Spanish-American War and two World-War I-vintage .30 caliber machine guns. The only radio available could receive messages but not transmit them. Nevertheless, he was ordered to set sail for the coast of Indo-China and told to have someone work on the radio set while they were at sea.

In the event, neither the *Lanikai*, nor the other ships ordered out, the *Isabel* and the *Molly Moore*, were able to cross the paths of the Japanese. Only after the war did Tolley fully appreciate the role intended for the *Lanikai*—that of "live bait."

Another book on this topic was *Cover Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946* by Bruce Bartlett (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978). The core of this volume was taken from his 1976 Georgetown University masters thesis in history, which explored what various interest groups hoped to gain from an inquiry into Pearl Harbor. It offers little to the student of the episode that cannot be found in other, and better, treatments. Its chief interest today is that it includes, as an appendix, a reproduction of John T. Flynn's pathbreaking pamphlet, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor*, discussed earlier in this essay.

**The Strange Case of Gordon Prange**

Gordon W. Prange served as Chief of General Douglas MacArthur's G-2 Historical Section in Japan from October
1946-July 1951. During that time he conducted numerous interro-
gations of Japanese military personnel. Upon completion of his stint in Asia, he returned to the United States, where he
taught history at the University of Maryland until his death in
May of 1980.

Prange obtained an advance (reputed to amount of $25,000)
for a book on Pearl Harbor. For whatever reasons, he never
turned in a completed manuscript, but kept on doing research
for thirty-seven years. Upon his death, two former students of
his, Donald Goldstein, an associate professor of Public and In-
ternational Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, and
Katherine V. Dillon, a former intelligence analyst, revised his
3500-page draft. Over the following eight years, four books at-
tributed to Gordon Prange rolled off the presses and onto the
“new releases” lists of the Book of the Month Club, History
Book Club, and other distributors of “safe” popular history. To
the surprise of McGraw-Hill, Goldstein and Dillon managed to
turn Prange Enterprises, as the copyright holder was called,
into a paying proposition.

The first book attributed to Prange was At Dawn We Slept:
The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1981). It is a military history of the attack as seen from the
Japanese and American perspectives. It only touched on the
larger issues of Japanese-American foreign relations, which
have always served as the backdrop for Revisionist treatments
of this topic. Prange had long felt that, “in the context of the
time,” a war between the United States and Japan was “virtual-
ly inevitable.”

In truth, about the only genuinely “untold” aspect of this
story was that Prange had failed to get his book ready in the
eyear 1950s, when it would have been “new.” Shortly before At
Dawn We Slept was at long last on its way to the printers, the
Carter Administration released a mountain of previously
classified U.S. naval records to the National Archives.
Prange’s literary heirs did not have the time to sift through this
massive volume of new material. However, this did not stop
them from adding, as an appendix, an essay entitled, “Revi-
sionists Revisited,” in which they made the astounding claim
to have made a thorough search “including all publications
released up to May 1, 1981.” While allowing that “the Presi-
dent made his mistakes in 1941, as did almost everyone else
involved in Pearl Harbor,” they went on to make the menda-
cious assertion that, “we have not discovered one word of sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor.”

Among the many records that Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon did not consult was the remarkable testimony of former Chief Warrant Officer Ralph T. Briggs, who was working at the Cheltenham, Maryland intercept station in late 1941. Contrary to the defenders of Roosevelt and his coterie, who during the various investigations swore that there had been no “East Wind Rain” message received prior to the attack, Briggs confirmed that he had intercepted the “Winds” execute and had even located a Navy memoir buried in the records, indicating that he had read the message as early as December 2, 1941. During the later investigations, Captain Laurence Safford was the only person directly concerned with this matter who had the courage to testify that there had indeed been a “winds” message forwarded to Washington before the attack. It was Safford who first alerted Admiral Kimmel to the existence of these messages. During the Congressional Hearings, Briggs was ordered by his superiors not to testify and not to have anything further to do with Safford. Briggs’s damming evidence was released by the National Archives on March 11, 1980 as document SRH-051: “Interview with Mr. Ralph T. Briggs,” which was an official transcript of remarks made to the Naval Security Group. Long before At Dawn We Slept had gone to the printers, the Briggs testimony was freely available at the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives and copies immediately began to circulate among serious students of the affair. It was reprinted, in full, in the Fall 1980 issue of the Newsletter of the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, which is an affiliate of the American Historical Association.

Prange and Company also failed to exploit new documentation available from General Marshall’s declassified files, which suggested that Kimmel and Short had in truth been made scapegoats for Washington. Nor did they refer to other records found among the Army Chief of Staff reports, documenting General MacArthur’s blundering during the Philippine campaign.

Those wishing more details about the manifold shortcomings of At Dawn We Slept should consult Percy L. Greaves, Jr., “Three Assessments of the Infamy of December 7, 1941,” The
Journal of Historical Review (Volume Three, Number Three, Fall, 1982) and Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Captain Roger Pineau, and John Costello, "And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Morrow, 1985), pp. 495-511. As Greaves trenchantly observed in The JHR, "it would take another book of 800 pages to balance, correct and refute the one-sided presentation of the book's selected 'facts' and deductions." Pineau and Costello show in their own examination of this book:

Although widely praised for its apparently exhaustive research, Prange's account did nothing to provide new understanding of what had really gone wrong in Washington. At Dawn We Slept merely served to reinforce the politically loaded thirty-five-year-old report produced by the (Democratic majority of) the congressional investigating committee.

At Dawn We Slept is still very much in print and has just been re-released in a Pearl Harbor "50th Anniversary Edition" available in hardcover from Viking for $35.00 and in paperback from Penguin for $16.95. For unwary students and the general public, this is the version of the story that is most compatible with the world view of our predominant political and historiographical regime.

John Costello's Cautious Revisionism

John Costello, a former BBC producer turned historian, had co-authored two successful books, D-Day and The Battle of the Atlantic, before turning his attention to the Pacific campaigns. Costello's manuscript was near completion when the National Archives received the vast collection of Navy files in 1980. He was able to incorporate some of the new material in The Pacific War (New York: Rawson Wade, 1981), which appeared almost simultaneously with At Dawn We Slept. His treatment reflects his basically pro-Churchill, British bias, and the first hardcover edition was marred by sloppy proofreading and careless editing. Still, it was a more honest effort than the Prange work and, in two final chapters, Costello considered some of the newly released material that, among other things, indicated that eleven days before Pearl Harbor Roosevelt received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the Japanese would attack the United States at the end of the first week of December. He also referred to John T. Briggs's important disclosures. Wrote Costello about the war:
There is every indication that a month before the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was the United States that had decided to bring about the rupture of discussions and was about to prepare for the worst. There is now evidence for believing that President Roosevelt was not only expecting war but possibly knew exactly when it would break out.

According to a confidential British Foreign Office report “the President and Mr. Hull were . . . fully conscious of what they were doing”. . . Whether such an accommodation [the modus vivendi] would have worked out in practice is less important than the fact that it was the United States which decided to abandon the modus vivendi—thereby making a Pacific War inevitable . . . In the light of subsequent events, this decision proved to have been one of the most momentous in American history.

The Evolution of John Toland

John Toland has been one of the most commercially successful writers of popular history over the past thirty years. Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for But Not in Shame (1961), he said that the Pacific war was caused by an unprovoked act of Japanese aggression. His 1970 book, The Rising Sun, reported that Pearl Harbor had been the consequence of both American and Japanese miscalculations and mistakes. However, Toland continued to explore the question of how America and Japan came to go to war. His revised view of these events was published in 1982 and created an immediate sensation. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: Doubleday) witnessed Toland’s conversion to the Revisionist position. It was now beyond question, wrote Toland, that Roosevelt and his closest advisers, including Marshall and Stimson, knew about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor before December 7th, but had withheld this information from Kimmel and Short. After the Japanese delivered their “surprise” first-strike, the Roosevelt Administration launched a massive “cover up,” that involved the suppressing or destroying of evidence, perjury, and making the Army and Navy commanders at Hawaii scapegoats. These were conclusions that Morgenstern, Barnes, et al., had reached over thirty years earlier.

What distinguished Infamy was that Toland managed to uncover additional information which lent further weight to the Revisionist case. The focus of his book was the nine post-attack investigations. This is by far the most readable account of the efforts made by various individuals, including Kimmel,
Safford, Greaves and the Republican Minority on the Joint Congressional Committee, to overcome the official roadblocks and obtain the truth about what led to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Toland went on to reveal that his own “tenth investigation” had uncovered evidence suggesting that the Dutch had passed on information to Washington about the forthcoming attack and that the Office of Naval Intelligence was also aware that a Japanese carrier task force was steaming toward Hawaii. The edition of Infamy one should consult is not the first hardcover printing, but rather the revised 1983 version, which includes an important Postscript incorporating material not available for the first printing. This recommended edition is currently in print: Infamy by John Toland (New York: Berkley Books, 397 pp., $5.50, ISBN: 0-425-09040-X). This represents an important breakthrough for Revisionism, since Toland's was the first Revisionist treatment of Pearl Harbor to be published by a major commercial house and the first to reach the New York Times bestseller list. Writing in the JHR, Percy L. Greaves described Infamy as “probably the best volume on the subject to date.”

Contributions by Martin and Greaves

For many years, this reviewer distributed copies to students of what he has long considered to be the best brief introduction to this question, James J. Martin's essay, “Pearl Harbor: Antecedents, Background and Consequences.” First published as a chapter in his 1977 book, The Saga of Hog Island & Other Essays in Inconvenient History (Ralph Myles, Publisher, P.O. Box 1533, Colorado Springs, Colorado 80901), it was later included as a chapter in a volume directed especially toward a Japanese audience, Beyond Pearl Harbor: Essays on Some Historical Consequences of the Crisis in the Pacific in 1941 (Plowshare Press, RR 1, Little Current, Ontario POP 1K0, Canada, 1981). Within the confines of seventeen pages, Dr. Martin manages to explain why Pearl Harbor has continued to be an issue provoking controversy, reviews the most important literature, and discusses what some of the results have been for the United States.

Beyond Pearl Harbor included a previously unpublished essay by Martin, “Where Was the General? Some New Views and Contributions Relative to the Ongoing Mystery of Pearl Harbor.” Marshall's role in this affair has long been a question.
As Chief of Staff, Marshall was responsible for reviewing the defense of Pearl Harbor. He had access to the MAGIC intercepts that were not passed along to General Short. He was at Roosevelt's side through the critical months preceding the outbreak of the war. And he managed to disappear from the late afternoon of December 6th, when Washington started to receive decrypts of the Japanese diplomatic messages, informing its ambassadors that the break was coming with the United States, until late on the morning of December 7th.

During the various investigations, Marshall claimed that "he couldn't recall" where he was on that fateful date. Martin was able to incorporate the sensational John T. Briggs testimony in his discussion. [The best guess is that Marshall was hiding out at the White House.] "Where Was General Marshall?" was first made available to American readers when it was included in the special Pearl Harbor issue of The JHR (Volume four, Number Four, Winter 1983-84). At the time of his death in 1984, Percy L. Greaves, Jr. had long been at work on a book on Pearl Harbor. Tentatively titled, The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor, it has never been published. Four chapters of his draft were published, with his permission, as part of The JHR Pearl Harbor special issue. Two of these chapters dealt with General Marshall and his efforts to obscure what Roosevelt and the rest of them knew about the attack. A chapter on the MAGIC intercepts explained why it was impossible to assert that Roosevelt was "surprised" by the outbreak of the war. This issue of the JHR also reprinted Greaves's article, "Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable?," which showed how, over a period of years, the Roosevelt Administration missed opportunities to reach a peaceful settlement to Pacific questions plaguing Japanese-American relations. "The Mystery of Pearl Harbor," was taken from National Review of December 12, 1966, and contains his critique of Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. The last essay by Greaves, "What We Knew," reviews the information available in Washington by the time of the December 7th attack.

**Admiral Layton's Memoirs**

On December 7, 1941, Edwin T. Layton was intelligence officer for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, an assignment he retained throughout the war. Like his superior, Admiral Kimmel, he was indeed surprised when the Japanese bombers hit the base. But he was not cashiered in the aftermath.
Following his retirement in 1962, Layton was encouraged by many people, in and out of the military, to write his own account of what had happened. Over the following years, Rear Admiral Layton collected material and wrote articles and reviews for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The publication of At Dawn We Slept provoked him to complete the work he had begun almost twenty years earlier. He found the book riddled with misstatements and distortions of fact, and was outraged that Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon had blamed Kimmel and Short for the disaster, while absolving Washington.

At the time he suffered a fatal stroke in April 1984, Layton had largely completed the first draft of his manuscript, which recounted his version of events up to the Battle of Midway. Captain Roger Pineau, who had assisted Samuel Eliot Morison with his multi-volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, and John Costello both knew Layton, and were retained to complete his book, which appeared in 1985 as “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Morrow, 596 pp., ISBN: 0-688-04883-8).

Naturally, the question arises as to just how much of this is really Layton and how much may have been “edited” by Pineau and Costello. As David Irving reminds us, the published versions of many “memoirs” often differ greatly from the original manuscripts. With that reservation in mind, this reviewer can report that Layton’s central thesis is that he and Kimmel were “short changed” of intelligence information by Washington. He confirms that Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division, failed to relay vital intelligence to Kimmel:

It should now be indisputable that the information that might have averted the disaster had been received by the Navy Department by 6 December 1941 . . . the bomb plot message, or even the eleventh-hour “lights code” message, could have alerted Pearl Harbor to the threat.

Layton thus reconfirms what Kimmel and Theobald wrote in their accounts. Other insights found in this volume include evidence that Stalin had very precise knowledge about when the Japanese were going to launch their strikes, and another report confirming that a council-of-war convened at the White House the night of December 6th.
Some Recent Scholarship

The war between Japan and the United States continues to be studied by academic historians. A book that includes eighteen essays by American and Japanese scholars is *Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War*, edited by Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 200 pp., 1990, $22.00, ISBN: 0-8248-1235-2). Japanese and American diplomacy leading up to the attack is reexamined here, with a number of the contributors disputing the still popular notion that "war was inevitable."

The symposium opens with a review of Japanese-American relations from 1900 to 1940 by Harry Wray, a former history professor at Illinois State, now on the faculty of the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Akira Iriye then looks at U.S. policy toward Japan before World War II. He makes the case that the Japanese were very reluctant to make a drive to the south and were not necessarily antagonistic to the United States. The Roosevelt Administration, he argues, lost many opportunities to reach a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues. In his essay "Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the New Deal, and Japan," Gary Dean Best, of the University of Hawaii, argues that FDR ignored the counsel of his more knowledgeable advisers, and followed his own notions, influenced by his "ancestral connections" to the China trade. Hull was a "mediocrity" who "knew nothing about foreign affairs." Roosevelt sabotaged the World Economic Conference. The New Deal was a "war waged against business and banking in the United States... By 1938 almost every industrialized nation in the world was well ahead of the United States in recovering from the depression, some of them having surpassed their pre-depression economic levels." Like Barnes and other earlier Revisionists, Prof. Best is convinced that:

The events of December 7, 1941, resulted in part from the attitudes and policies that began to direct the United States in 1933. A new President launched the United States on mistaken foreign and domestic policies that ended in the prolonging of the depression and in war, rather than in recovery and peace.

The late John K. Emmerson, a one-time U.S. Foreign Service officer assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo during Joseph Grew's ambassadorship and later a senior scholar at Stanford, points out that Grew and others familiar with Japan were not listened to. The State Department's favorite "expert," Stanley
Hornbeck, had little genuine knowledge; his “only experience is Asia had been a teaching stint in China.” It was Hornbeck who helped torpedo a proposed Pacific summit between Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye.

Ikei Masaru of Keio University and author of Gaisetsu Nihon Gaikōshi (A Survey of Japanese Diplomatic History), highlights “Examples of Mismanagement in U.S. Policy toward Japan before World War II.” He argues that a more cautious attitude on the part of Washington might have postponed or avoided war with Japan altogether. American hard-liners, such as Hornbeck, misread Japanese intentions and did not understand the psychology of the officer corps, who would not accept submission, writes Hosoya Chihiro, vice-president of the International University of Japan.

Tsunoda Jun, former professor of history at Kokushin University and editor of the eight-volume Taiheiyo no senso e no michi (The Road to the Pacific War) considers the Hull-Nomura negotiations. He considers that “there was no significant issue that would have made a war between Japan and the United States inevitable.” Konoye’s bid to hold a summit meeting with Roosevelt was completely genuine and was worth attempting.

Not all of the contributors to this volume support Revisionist positions. Michael Barnhart, associate professor of Japanese history at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, contends that Hornbeck was a realist and the United States was better off for having followed his advice. Alvin D. Coox, chair of the Japanese Studies Institute at San Diego State University, writes on “Repulsing the Pearl Harbor Revisionists: The State of Present Literature on the Debacle.” He reveals his own lack of qualifications to make an informed judgement when he avers that “the late Professor Gordon W. Prange demolished the supposed deviltry of Roosevelt and company in his book, appropriately titled At Dawn We Slept.”

For many readers, Pearl Harbor Reexamined will be their first exposure to contemporary Japanese historical analysis. Three of the American contributors to this volume share the view that Roosevelt and Hull were not very interested in Japanese peace overtures. More books of the quality of this collection of essays would make a welcome addition to the literature of other hotly debated topics.
The Role of Winston Churchill

Students of the Second World War are well aware that Roosevelt and Churchill were working together long before the United States was officially at war against the Axis. The Tyler Kent affair has shed light on the secret communications the two engaged in, even before Churchill was Prime Minister. British wartime Cabinet papers released in January 1972 disclosed that at the August 1941 Newfoundland, Canada meeting, where the “Atlantic Charter” was announced, Roosevelt promised Churchill that the U.S. would enter the war by the end of the year.

Questions have persisted: Did Churchill know about the Japanese design against Pearl Harbor? Did he pass along what information he had to Roosevelt?

At the Ninth International Revisionist Conference, British historian David Irving dealt with these and related matters in his paper, “Churchill and U.S. Entry into World War II,” which was subsequently published in The JHR, Volume Nine, Number Three, Fall 1989, pp. 261-286. While working on the second volume of his wartime biography of Churchill, Irving reported that he discovered that all British intelligence files relating to Japan during the fall of 1941 have been removed from the archives and are closed to review by researchers. His fellow British historian, John Costello, was told by the British Ministry of Defence that it is “not in the national interest” to have these files made available to the public.

In his remarks, Irving pointed out that from September 1939 the British were able to read the Japanese fleet operational code, known as JN-25 (Japanese Navy). He went on to reveal that by mid-November of 1941, Churchill knew that the United States was soon to be attacked by the Japanese and that he “probably knew” that an attack would fall at Pearl Harbor. Said Irving, “I think Churchill deliberately allowed the attack on Pearl Harbor to go ahead in order to bring the Americans in. He did everything to avoid having the Pacific Fleet warned.”

telligence and military history since his retirement. While doing work on a book dealing with signals intelligence, he encountered Captain Eric Nave, "the father of British codebreaking in the Far East." The two then collaborated to produce this volume, which discloses that the British, and very likely the Americans, too, were indeed reading the Japanese Navy operational code well before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

By their account, the British certainly knew that the Japanese fleet was going to set sail on November 26, 1941. The most likely targets were the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, or Pearl Harbor. When the Japanese were not sighted in the south, this was, by process of elimination, a further indication that they were sending units towards Pearl Harbor. On December 2, five days before the attack on Hawaii, the British intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's signal, "Climb Niitakayama 1208," meaning that an attack would commence on December 8, Tokyo time, which was December 7 in Hawaii.

They charge that Churchill must have known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked, but that he refused to pass his information to Roosevelt. Had FDR known about the impending Japanese first-strike, then "as a totally honorable President," he would have warned Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor. They conclude their narrative:

Roosevelt was thus deceived by Churchill, who took a ghastly gamble to bring America into the war in a manner that would sweep aside all opposition; and he was also badly served by his own divided and jealous subordinates. The combination of the two brought a reluctant ally into the war. Churchill's gamble paid off even if, in the process, Britain lost an empire.

Anyone familiar with the Roosevelt record can see the flaw in their conclusion, even if they are correct that the JN-25 code had been broken by the early fall of 1939. The authors completely misread Roosevelt's position. They make no mention of his commitments to the British and Dutch, and the dilemma he was placed in when the Dutch called on the U.S. to own up to its part of the bargain four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. There is no reference to Roosevelt's "live bait" ploy of sending three little ships out of Manila on a "defensive information patrol" the week before Pearl Harbor. Greaves, and others, long ago argued that while FDR may not have welcomed the loss of life at Pearl Harbor, that after the failure of his
“three little ships” gambit, and with the Dutch and British invoking their agreements that went into effect after the Japanese crossed the imaginary line in Southeast Asia, the attack on Pearl Harbor solved Roosevelt’s most pressing problem.

Rusbridger and Nave have undoubtedly uncovered additional parts of the mystery. With the reservations I have outlined, their book is of interest to students of this episode.

* * * * *

Revisionism and Pearl Harbor

Over the past half-century, Pearl Harbor Revisionism has come of age. From the first writings of John T. Flynn, to George Morgenstern’s masterful study, to the work encouraged by Harry Elmer Barnes, the testimony of participants in the events, and the latest findings of “second-generation” historians who are not satisfied merely to retell the standard accounts, this endeavor to uncover the truth has not been marked by paranoid “conspiracy theories” or reactionary “Roosevelt baiting.” What Revisionists have accomplished is a sober re-appraisal of the origins of the Pacific War, and the making of a strong case for remembering December 7, 1941 as President Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy.”
let us know if you believe this letter to a newspaper editor should be published in pamphlet form.

Last and not least, Mark Weber reports on the little-known facts of the FDR-approved plan for American bombing attacks on Japan—from China in American planes flown by American pilots (disguised as Chinese planes piloted by American "volunteers")—months before Pearl Harbor! Readers who watched ABC's recent "20/20" episode dealing with Plan JB-355 will marvel at the network's inability to integrate the documentary evidence for this plan—available at the National Archives for two decades, although ignored until very recently by historians—with the background to FDR's "back door to war" as revealed over the past 50 years by Revisionist historians.

—Theodore J. O'Keefe
BOOK REVIEWS

In-Depth Report of "Holocaust Trial" Provides Valuable Overview


Reviewed by Mark Weber

Anyone with an interest in twentieth-century history or who truly cares about the issue of free speech in a democratic society will appreciate this book. Written as a day-by-day account of the 1988 "Holocaust Trial" in Toronto of German-Canadian publisher Ernst Zündel, and illustrated with dozens of well-chosen photographs, this highly readable, balanced and yet comprehensive survey may well be the best single introduction to the Holocaust issue now available.

Zündel's troubles began in November 1983 when Jewish community activist Sabina Citron filed a complaint against him for reprinting and distributing Did Six Million Really Die?, a polemical booklet by British writer Richard Harwood (Ver-rall) that refutes the generally accepted Holocaust extermination story. Responding to complaints from Canada's Jewish community, it wasn't long before Ontario's provincial government took over the case, and in early 1985 Zündel was brought to court for "knowingly spreading false news."

He was found guilty after a highly emotional seven-week trial that attracted enormous media attention in Canada. After the verdict was set aside by a higher court, Zündel was tried again in 1988 on the same charge, and was again found guilty. The verdict is currently under review by Canada's Supreme Court.

For his part, Zündel could have made things much easier—or at least simpler—for himself if he had chosen to defend himself on narrower legal grounds. He might, for example, have simply argued that he was entitled to publish the
booklet under Canada's supposedly guaranteed right of free speech. But Zundel was determined at the outset, as he put it, to "put the Nuremberg Trial on trial," and decisively discredit the Holocaust extermination story.

The German-born defendant never intended to devote several years and enormous effort to the Holocaust issue. A passionate German nationalist, Zundel has regarded these Holocaust trials as an unintended but unfortunately necessary detour from what he sees as his mission: restoring a sense of purpose, pride and confidence to his beloved German people.

In spite of the guilty verdicts, it is now obvious that government officials and Jewish community leaders badly miscalculated when they decided to go after Zundel because—as Lenski's book makes abundantly clear—Holocaust Revisionism has been immeasurably strengthened as a result of these trials. Apparently viewing him as little more than a bigoted simpleton, his adversaries grossly underestimated Zundel's intelligence, skill and perseverance, and did not anticipate his ability to assemble and hold together a team of loyal and talented supporters.

Much of the credit for the effectiveness of Zundel's legal campaign must go to his courageous attorney, Doug Christie. In his tough and often brilliant cross-examination of prosecution witnesses in the 1985 trial, he obliged many of them to make revealing and sometimes incriminating concessions to truth. This highly intelligent, sensitive and idealistic man continued his work in the 1988 trial, ably assisted by Keltie Zubko and attorney Barbara Kulaszka. (Audio cassette recordings of Christie's eloquent banquet address at the 1986 IHR conference are available from the IHR for $9.95.)

**Free Speech in Canada**

For those who challenge the official view of the semi-sacrosanct Holocaust story, "free speech" is not quite free in Canada. Regardless of one's views about the Holocaust issue, or even of Zundel, any open-minded reader of *The Holocaust on Trial* will appreciate the significance of this trial for the issue of free speech.

Contrary to what the Canadian government has insisted all along, this was unquestionably a "free speech" case, as even the *New York Times* acknowledged in a rare American newspaper report on the trial. Alan Borovoy, a leading Cana-
dian civil liberties advocate, declared that the arcane and rarely invoked law under which Zundel was tried should be abolished. It is no exaggeration to say that the Zundel trial was one of the most important tests in many years of fundamental legal rights in North America. (As this review goes to press, Canada's Supreme Court is reviewing the Zundel case to decide the constitutionality of the law under which he was tried.)

The author of The Holocaust on Trial is an American writer in his late thirties. Robert Lenski is also the compiler-editor of Toward a New Science of Man, a collection of insightful and thought-provoking quotations on society, race, liberty and human behavior. (This 250-page work, published in 1981, is available from The Noontide Press for $7.00 plus $2.00 postage and handling). To write his Holocaust book, Lenski carefully went through every line of the official transcript of the four-month-long trial. He also took account of numerous newspaper and magazine articles, and spoke with a number of the key individuals involved in the case.

Although the author treats Zundel and Holocaust Revisionism sympathetically, this is by no means a one-sided Revisionist polemic. In fact, Lenski gives the impression of being a Holocaust agnostic. Mistakes and fumblings by Zundel's witnesses are not ignored, and telling arguments and effective points by prosecution witnesses and the Crown attorney are duly presented.

In the introduction and in the first chapter, Lenski provides essential background information and effectively sets the book's tone. He tells of the defendant's youth in Germany, his emigration to Canada, successful career as an artist, and his "political awakening." Lenski succinctly explains how Zundel became a focus of national attention during the first "Holocaust Trial" in 1985.

As Lenski relates in Chapter 2, Canada's newspapers and television closely followed the unfolding drama of that first trial. Canadians across the country were able to learn—albeit in an often sensationalized way—that there is an alternative view of the orthodox Holocaust extermination story. In striking contrast to this copious coverage, the media almost completely ignored the second trial in 1988. The role of organized Jewry in pressuring publishers and editors to curtail reporting of the second Zundel trial has been nothing less than
outrageous, as Canadian journalist Doug Collins and others have emphasized. (See Collins' essay in the Fall 1991 Journal.)

The Testimony

Lenski reviews the 1985 testimony of Raul Hilberg, a prominent Holocaust historian and author of the three-volume standard study, *The Destruction of the European Jews*. Shaken by defense attorney Doug Christie's rigorous cross-examination questioning during the first trial, the Austrian-born Jewish professor refused to return as a prosecution witness. Consequently, Hilberg's lengthy testimony was laboriously read aloud to the bored members of the jury in the second Zündel trial by prosecution attorney John Pearson.

The prosecution's main witness, American Holocaust historian Christopher Browning, was asked to comment in detail on the Harwood booklet. Lenski faithfully reports on the highlights of Browning's testimony—for which he was paid $150 (Canadian) per hour—including his most persuasive arguments and pointed criticisms of the Harwood booklet.

As a "functionalist" Holocaust historian who knows that hard evidence for the Holocaust is elusive, Browning postulates that the extermination of Europe's Jews began without a budget, central plan or even a direct order. He has speculated that Hitler may have set an enormous extermination program into motion with nothing more than a silent "nod" to subordinates.

In a relentless and sometimes brilliant cross-examination interrogation, defense attorney Doug Christie wrung numerous damaging admissions from Browning. As Lenski relates, for example, the 43-year-old university professor (who is also a member of the advisory board of the vehemently Zionist Simon Wiesenthal Center) claimed not to be aware that the Allies had used torture and threats to force German officials into signing incriminating statements about alleged German atrocities. Nor was Browning aware of the massive persecution of members of the ethnic German minority community in Poland just prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 (which was a decisive factor in Hitler's decision to attack).

Browning expressed confidence in the reliability of the postwar "confessions" of SS officer Kurt Gerstein, which have served as a major pillar of the Holocaust extermination story. But the historian did not know, for example, that Gerstein had
“confessed” that at Auschwitz alone “millions of children” had been killed by holding cotton wads of poison under their noses. (Henri Roques thoroughly discredits this key “witness” in his doctoral dissertation, The “Confessions” of Kurt Gerstein, which is available from the IHR.)

Questioned by prosecution attorney Pearson, Browning confidently cited a portion of the official wartime journal of the German governor of Poland, Hans Frank, as critically important evidence for the Holocaust extermination thesis. But under cross examination, Browning was obliged to acknowledge that he had not read the complete text of Frank’s wartime journal, and that he was ignorant of what Frank had said on this subject as a Nuremberg Tribunal defendant.

No witness testimony is overlooked by Lenski, including the following:

—Ditlieb Felderer spoke in detail about his numerous inspection visits of camp sites in Poland. He presented and commented on some 300 slides taken during those trips.

—German writer Thies Christophersen was stationed at Auschwitz in 1944 as a junior army officer. He visited Birkenau—supposedly the most important killing center—several times during the height of the alleged extermination period, and saw no sign of killings.

—Russell Barton, a British-born physician who served with British forces as a medical orderly in the infamous Bergen-Belsen camp at the end of the war, confirmed that mass deaths there were an indirect consequence of the conflict, and not of any deliberate German policy. He noted that Jewish inmates in eastern camps, including Auschwitz, were given a choice by their German captors of either remaining behind to wait for the advancing Soviets, or leaving, usually on foot, with the retreating German forces.

—Austrian-born Canadian Maria Van Herwaarden, who survived two years of internment in Auschwitz I and II (Birkenau), confirmed that conditions were generally dreadful, and that many fellow inmates succumbed to disease. At the same time, though, and contrary to widespread “rumors,” she testified that she saw no evidence of extermination or homicidal gassings.

—Joseph G. Burg confirmed that he, along with many other Jews, had been cruelly mistreated by Romanian authorities
during the war. But he emphatically rejected the allegations of a German extermination policy or program. Indeed, he testified, the Germans treated the Jews much more humanely than did the Romanians. Burg said that he inspected the Auschwitz and Majdanek camps in 1945, just months after the end of the war, but found no evidence of extermination gas chambers at either site.

—Emil Lachout certified the contents of a 1948 Austrian Military Police Service document which confirmed that numerous false claims about homicidal gas chambers were based on perjured testimony by former inmates and statements obtained from Germans by torture. (See: IHR Journal, Spring 1988, pp. 117-126.)

—In spite of a bad cold, Bradley Smith proved to be one of the more effective witnesses. The jury members seemed to be visibly impressed with the straight-forward, common-sense responses and observations of this veteran free thinker and libertarian. He held up admirably under Pearson’s barrage of badgering and often exasperatingly petty questions.

—Ivan Lagacé, a funeral director and crematorium manager from Calgary, explained in detail why widely accepted claims about cremation at Auschwitz and Birkenau are not technically possible. Allegations that SS camp officials were able to cremate Jewish corpses in just 15 or 20 minutes cannot possibly be true, he said, pointing out that even modern crematory facilities require about an hour and a half to cremate a body. Claims by Holocaust historian Hilberg and others that 4,400 bodies were cremated daily in Birkenau’s facilities are “preposterous” and “beyond the realm of reality,” Lagacé declared.

Lenski devotes most of a chapter to my testimony, which was given during five often grueling days on the stand. Christie took me line by line through the Harwood booklet, asking me to comment on the accuracy of just about every sentence. As a result, my testimony touched on virtually every aspect of the Holocaust issue, including the role of the Einsatzgruppen security police units in the occupied Soviet territories, the origins and precise nature of Germany’s wartime Jewish policy, and the Nuremberg Tribunal testimony of wartime SS prosecutor Konrad Morgen. (For more on my testimony and role in the trial, see the IHR Journal, Winter 1989-90, pp. 389-425.)
While readily acknowledging the errors and misleading statements of Harwood's booklet, I affirmed its central thesis: there was no German policy or program to exterminate Europe's Jews, and nothing like six million Jews perished during the Second World War. Like Faurisson and Irving who would testify later, I stressed that the booklet's errors are almost entirely minor, and that in any case are not critically important to its main thesis.

During his wide-ranging and detailed testimony, French professor Robert Faurisson also touched on virtually every major aspect of the Holocaust story. He focused particularly on his investigation of execution gas chambers in the United States, and the alleged extermination gas chambers at the former German camps. Europe's leading Holocaust Revisionist also further discredited the testimony of star prosecution witness Browning.

Faurisson spoke at some length about the costly and exhausting trials and other outrageous legal difficulties he has had to endure in France as a result of his statements and writings on this issue. His ordeal—which is almost unbelievable in a late twentieth century European democracy—has included nearly fatal physical attacks by bigoted thugs. (See also Faurisson's essays: "The Zündel Trials," IHR Journal, Winter 1988-89, pp. 417-431, and, "My Life as a Revisionist," IHR Journal, Spring 1989, pp. 5-63.)

Without a doubt, the trial's most important witness was Massachusetts execution hardware expert Fred Leuchter, who testified at length about his on-site investigation of the alleged extermination gas chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau and Majdanek. For some years, Faurisson had been saying that a neutral American gas chamber expert should carry out an impartial investigation of the alleged extermination gas chambers of Auschwitz and Auschwitz-Birkenau—the five sites that are the core of the Holocaust extermination story. Persuaded by Faurisson, Zündel commissioned Leuchter to carry out this history-making investigation.

Leuchter's qualifications as America's foremost execution hardware expert were well established in the Toronto courtroom. For one thing, William Armontrout, warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary, testified under oath that he had consulted with Leuchter on the design of his state's execution gas chamber, and declared that Leuchter is the only such specialist in the United States.
As is now well known, of course, Leuchter concluded that the inspected sites were never used as extermination gas chambers, and never could have been used for that purpose. Since the 1988 trial, his detailed report on his investigation has been widely circulated around the world in numerous languages, and has itself become history-making. As a result, Leuchter has become the target of a vicious campaign by the same mafia that has tried to silence Zündel.

The final defense witness was David Irving, arguably the most widely read and recognized historian in the world today. Speaking in clear and imposing language, the tall, handsome British scholar made a striking impression. Lenski’s record of his wide-ranging and often fascinating testimony alone makes this book well worth reading.

Irving’s appearance as a witness for Zündel was all the more remarkable because prosecution attorney Pearson had praised him earlier as a dissident historian who nevertheless did not “deny the Holocaust.” For some years, though, Irving had privately been disturbed by the absence of any documentary evidence for a German extermination program or policy. Studying the just-completed Leuchter Report in Toronto settled the matter. In the courtroom, as Lenski reports, Irving dramatically repudiated his earlier position and endorsed the Revisionist view of the Holocaust story. After referring to Leuchter’s report as “shattering” and “a stroke of genius on the part of the defense,” the judge forbade Irving from making any further reference to it.

Irving endorsed the central thesis of the Harwood booklet, while also conceding its obvious flaws. “I don’t think there was any overall Reich policy to kill the Jews,” he said. He pointed out the injustices of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and spoke of the persecution that invariably befalls anyone who seriously challenges the Holocaust extermination story.

Just as Zündel had intended, this legal contest became to a considerable extent a “trial on the Nuremberg trial.” As the trial progressed, the narrower legal questions of his alleged guilt and the character of the Harwood booklet became less and less relevant. Indeed, Judge Thomas complained that “this trial became a showpiece for the Institute for Historical Review.”

In his concluding chapter, “Summation, Verdict, Aftermath,” the author ably summarizes the final pleas to the
jury by attorneys Christie and Pearson. Lenski also attempts to explain the seemingly inexplicable guilty verdict, and describes some of the consequences and implications of this trial for Canada and the Western world.

In spite of claims by both prosecutor Pearson and Judge Thomas that the Harwood booklet “will likely cause racial and social intolerance unless something is done about it,” not one bit of evidence was presented to show that anyone had ever been harmed or injured as a result of Zündel's publication of *Did Six Million Really Die?*. On this point alone, an open-minded outsider might easily assume that the jury would decide to acquit the defendant. And yet, in spite of all the testimony and evidence, the jury members agreed on a guilty verdict. Judge Thomas then sentenced Zündel to nine months imprisonment.

Why did the jury members decide to convict? Lenski provides some probable but unavoidably speculative answers. For one thing, by pointing to Zündel's publication of booklets that uncritically praise Hitler and the Third Reich, the prosecution succeeded in portraying the defendant as an unrepentant Nazi—just about the most damning accusation that can be made against anyone these days.

The prosecution was also able to discredit—to a greater or lesser degree—just about every one of Zündel's witnesses. The impact of Russell Barton's helpful and enlightening eyewitness testimony about Bergen-Belsen, for example, was lost on the jury when he readily agreed with Pearson that German officials had exterminated six million Jews. It did not seem to matter that, as he admitted, this belief was derived from what he had casually read and heard from others, and was not based on any personal experience or systematic study. Robert Faurisson's trials and legal difficulties in France were cited by the prosecution attorney to cast doubt on his motives and ethics, and to portray him as a threat to social peace and public order. Similarly, Irving was portrayed as a right-winger, Felderer as mentally unsound, Christophersen as a Nazi, and so forth.

Time and time again, this trial proved that Holocaust Revisionists are held to a more exacting standard than other dissidents. Canadian authorities do not bother themselves about publications that challenge any other generally accepted view of contemporary history.
As unfair as it was, the Zündel trial points up the importance of rigorous accuracy on the part of Holocaust Revisionists. Revisionists have set themselves the great task of trying to persuade people that what they have been told by leading historians, standard reference works and governmental authorities is not true. For this reason, Revisionists have the burden of proof. It is not enough to convince those who are already inclined to doubt the Holocaust extermination story. To have any significant or lasting impact, it is essential to reach and persuade those who are understandably quite skeptical of Holocaust Revisionism—particularly intelligent and open-minded men and women of good will who influence others.

This book is not without defects. Like Sergeant Friday in the old "Dragnet" series, Lenski has given us a mostly "just the facts, Ma'am" account. The main weakness of this essentially journalistic work is probably its paucity of analysis, which would have helped the reader to make better sense of the abundant historical information.

Also, because Lenski was not in Toronto during the trial itself, his book does not adequately communicate the trial's dramatic tension. The electric atmosphere in the large and often packed Toronto courtroom easily rivaled the drama of a LA Law television showdown. Nor does the author quite capture the sense of dynamic purpose, idealism and drama that suffused Zündelhaus, the defendant's barracks-like campaign command center. Finally, Lenski's less than relevant and sometimes subjective comments about racial/social issues detract from the book's effectiveness.

But these are relatively minor defects. On balance, I heartily recommend this readable, well-organized, engaging and even fascinating account.

For those interested in what is probably the most socially and political significant historians' debate of our time, this is both an excellent introduction to the dispute and a valuable reference survey of the entire Holocaust issue. And whatever one may think of Ernst Zündel or Revisionism, the author deserves our thanks for producing this memorable account of a history-making trial with the most profound social implications.

Reviewed by Jack Wikoff

Flamboyant and opinionated, Walter Duranty represented the quintessence of the star newspaper reporter. His beat was the Soviet Union. From the Revolution to the Second World War, Duranty's dispatches were front page news.

Yet readers of The New York Times had little idea of the real Walter Duranty, who was a complex, amoral figure. S.J. Taylor's superb biography explores the dark side of Duranty's personality as well as the impact his reporting had on the world's perception of Joseph Stalin's Marxist dictatorship.

Taylor demonstrates how Duranty's character flaws influenced his reporting. Stalin's Apologist is the story of how Walter Duranty sold out for perks and privileges granted by the Stalinist elite. Abandoning any last shred of personal ethics, Duranty allowed himself to be prostituted and used to cover up the crimes of the Soviet regime.

Duranty's journalistic corruption hit bottom in the early 1930's. During the forced collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine, brutal implementation of Stalin's Five-Year Plan was achieved through a contrived famine and massive deportations resulting in up to eight to ten million deaths. Knowing full well this atrocity was taking place, Walter Duranty chose to cover up rather than report it to the world (a decision which evidently had the full approval of his bosses at the Times).

Duranty's self-indulgent, egoistic approach to living surfaced early in life. The son of a prosperous, staunchly Presbyterian English family, he attended the elite "public" schools of Harrow and Bedford, then was graduated from Cambridge. But despite his ruling-class education, Duranty despised the British aristocracy, while simultaneously evincing no sympathy for working people (or at least those who lacked power and influence).

During his adult years, Duranty rarely returned to England. His biographer succinctly describes his family relations, or lack thereof, in the following passage:
When his mother died in 1916, there was no word from Duranty. Fourteen years later, his sister died at forty-five, a spinster. Her life has been devoted to her father, who outlived her by three years. And when in 1933, plagued by senility and the diseases of old age, William Steel Duranty died, he left a personal estate valued at merely £430, besides the house his daughter had left him—a pathetic come-down from his early days of opulence and plenty. Walter Duranty's only acknowledgement of his family in all of those years was a curt document notorized in Moscow, authorizing his father's solicitors to sell the house, take their fee, and send him the proceeds.

Publicly, he solved the problem once and for all in his autobiography, Search for a Key, by killing off his parents in a railway accident and orphaning himself at the age of ten, an only child.

It put an end to any unwelcome questions.

On leaving college, he spent several years touring, coming to ground in pre-World War-I Paris, after he had squandered an inheritance left him by his grandfather.

Bohemian and roué, Duranty secured a reputation as a cosmopolitan globe-trotter through his witty conversation and fluency in several languages. Despite his short stature and lack of good looks, he was never at a loss for female companionship, even after a train accident left him with a wooden leg.

Head-up for money, Duranty persuaded Wythe Williams, head of the Paris bureau of The New York Times, to pay him to write a story about a Frenchman who was going to fly an airplane upside down. Three months later, on December 1, 1913, Duranty was hired by The New York Times.

Duranty spent his days in Paris perfecting his journalistic technique, while his nights were devoted to dissolute meddling in hobbies that are today styled "New Age." A constant companion of Duranty in the pre-war "City of Light" was the occultist and black magician, Aleister Crowley, whom the British press had dubbed "the Wickedest Man in the World." Crowley claimed other titles for himself, but preferred to be called "Beast 666."

One of Crowley's many female companions, Jane Cheron, performed the role of Scarlet Woman (as in the Book of Revelations) in Crowley's debauched rituals. Duranty was later to marry Cheron, although they rarely lived together. Marriage did not, of course, prevent him from perpetually chasing skirts, sometimes before his wife's eyes.
On December 31, 1913 Crowley began a series of 23 ritualistic “workings” of sex magic with Duranty and another partner named Victor Neuburg. Crowley was later to claim pompously that these “Paris workings” had been the “magical” cause of the First World War, a prelude to the new Aeon, the Age of Horus.¹ As for Duranty’s opinion of the Paris rituals, Ms. Taylor reports that he “would later say little, only that he no longer believed in anything.”

Aleister Crowley and Jane Cheron were lifelong heroin addicts. Duranty, too, was quite partial to alcohol and drugs, being at one time addicted to opium, although in fairness his opium habit can be traced in part to recuperation for the accident which cost him his leg.

When the First World War began in August 1914, Duranty initially covered the war for The New York Times from the French capital. When he had gained sufficient professional experience, he was promoted to war correspondent, filing many dispatches on the horrors of trench warfare based on his visits to the front.

When Duranty began work as a reporter, his writing reflected the prevalent bias of English society. At the time of the First World War, his personal prejudices were as virulently anti-German as those of most other Englishmen: in his autobiographical I Write As I Please he later admitted to having written at least one falsified WWI propaganda story.

After the war, Duranty traveled through Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states, reporting on the poverty and revolutionary turmoil besetting war-torn Eastern Europe.

In 1920, famine began to ravage the Soviet Union, a direct result of the turmoil of the Revolution. Five to six million people starved to death or died from disease, a mass tragedy of the early years of Bolshevism which was to foreshadow the far greater evil to befall the Ukraine, North Caucasus and the Lower Volga a decade later.

The Soviet leadership sought financial aid from the West, ostensibly to aid victims of the famine, but in reality to secure the Red tyranny. One of the stipulations of Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Association was that the Bolsheviks allow Western reporters into Russia. Maxim Litvonov, a Jew and prominent Bolshevik, later to become Soviet Foreign Minister, determined which journalists were granted visas. After some wrangling (he had written a few anti-Soviet articles earlier), Duranty was allowed into the Soviet Union as a reporter.
In the economic free-for-all of Lenin's short-lived New Economic Policy, Duranty was able to parlay his access to foreign currency into a house in Moscow, complete with English-style fireplace. He lived in luxury, particularly when compared to the average citizen in the "Worker's Paradise," and was able to purchase imported food, candies, cigarettes and razor blades. He owned an automobile and had a retinue of servants including a chauffeur, cleaning lady, secretary, cook, and mistress (Duranty's wife chose conveniently to live in France.)

Walter Duranty had also considerable travel privileges within the Soviet Union, and could of course leave the country for pleasure or business in Paris, New York and other world capitals. He learned to speak and read Russian, an invaluable skill for discovering what really went on in the Soviet Union. Soon enough, The New York Times's man in Moscow had many friends among the Soviet elite.

When Lenin died in January, 1924, a struggle for power ensued among the Bolshevist elite. Duranty shrewdly predicted that Stalin would come out on top. During this period many pundits were forecasting that communism would not last, yet Duranty confidently predicted the survival of the Soviet system.

Duranty was among the earliest Western journalists to praise the Soviet crash programs that forced Marxism on the Russian people. He coined the infamous slogan "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs," which he was to use frequently in his writing. Inevitably, he was seen by many as an apologist for Soviet communism, and Duranty's detractors took to calling The New York Times "the Uptown Daily Worker."

In January an all-out drive to collectivize Soviet agriculture was announced in Pravda. On a trip to Central Asia that year, Duranty managed to see a trainload of exiled kulaks. Transported in foul, wretchedly hot railroad cars with barred windows, Duranty described them as:

\[\ldots\text{more like caged animals than human beings, not wild beasts but dumb cattle, patient with suffering eyes. Debris and jetsam, victims of the March to Progress.}\]

Bolshevism was returning the peasant to a condition of servitude far more hideous than any Tsarist-era serfdom.

Seeing such magnitude of mass suffering should have
alerted Duranty to what was really happening in the Soviet Union, yet as Taylor details, Duranty quickly dismissed what he had seen, writing that he had "seen worse debris than that, trains full of wounded from the Front in France going back to be patched up for a fresh bout of slaughter."

In late 1930, Duranty was honored by being granted an interview with Stalin himself. The author of Stalin's Apologist details how with the publication of this exclusive interview with Stalin, Duranty became an international celebrity and one of the best-known journalists in the world.

Duranty won the Pulitzer Prize for best news correspondent in 1932. Special citation was made of his dispatches dealing with the Soviet Five-Year Plan. In his acceptance speech he said that he had come "to respect the Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, whom I consider to have grown into a really great statesman."

During that year a debate was raging in the United States over recognition of the Soviet Union. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, while campaigning for the presidency, invited Duranty to lunch to discuss the situation in the USSR.

While Walter Duranty was rubbing elbows with the powerful, a conspiracy of deliberate starvation was being implemented in the Soviet Union. One of the first to report the famine in Ukraine to the West was Andrew Cairns. In the spring of 1932 this young Canadian agricultural expert traveled through the grain-growing districts of southern Russia, reporting to his superiors on widespread food shortages and starvation. He was accompanied by D. Otto Schiller, an agricultural specialist attached to the German embassy in Moscow, who was fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian. Cairn's detailed letters describing the widespread suffering he had seen were made available to the highest levels of the British Government.

But Cairns's reports were never published by British authorities. J.S. Taylor reports:

Many years later, asked why he had not published the report on his own authority, Cairns would admit that he had been overly discouraged, even threatened, from doing so by powerful political figures of the Left in Great Britain whom he believed at the time could do him great harm. He named Beatrice Webb, specifically, who, with her husband Sidney, would praise the accomplishments of Stalin's Five-Year Plan in their massive, two-volume work Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?
Cairns’s employer, the Empire Trading Board, went into liquidation, and Cairns did not return to the Soviet Union. Dr. Schiller published a “devastating” report in Germany, which resulted in his being immediately expelled from the Soviet Union.

During this period the Soviets were attempting to appropriate as much agricultural produce from the peasants as possible, to sell abroad. The foreign exchange thus obtained was used to finance heavy industry. In private conversations late in 1932 with William Strang, counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow, Duranty confirmed that there was indeed a “present breakdown in [Soviet] agriculture.” Duranty told Strang: “There are millions of people in Russia, peasants, whom it is fairly safe to leave in want. But the industrial proletariat, about 10 percent of the population, must at all costs be fed if the revolution is to be safeguarded.”

Duranty filed a dispatch in December 1932 which described the situation in Soviet agriculture in negative terms. As a result Duranty was visited by powerful Soviet authorities, who upbraided him for his faithlessness. Fearful he would not be allowed back into Russia, Duranty postponed a trip to France (at this time Duranty’s Soviet mistress, Katya, was pregnant with his child).

Taylor details how, at the end of 1932, the noose was steadily drawn around the collective neck of the Soviet peasant.8 An international passport system was introduced which kept the starving kulaks from migrating to the cities. In the spring of 1933 a law was passed which forbade a peasant to leave the collective farm where he was employed “without a contract from his future employers, ratified by the collective farm authorities.” Duranty praised these measures, claiming they were designed “to purge the city of undesirable elements.”

After two American newspapermen, William Stoneman of the Chicago Daily News and Ralph Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune, filed reports on the famine, the Soviet authorities instituted a ban on travel for foreign journalists.

Malcolm Muggeridge, a young English journalist for the Manchester Guardian with pro-Soviet sympathies, arrived in Moscow in September 1932. Soon he became disenchanted with the Soviet system. By late winter, 1933, reporters in Moscow were hearing rumors that the grain crop would be totally inadequate to feed the population. Muggeridge set off on his own, without permission, to investigate the situation.
At the end of March 1933 he published a series of articles in the _Guardian_ confirming widespread famine. His reports had been delivered to England in the British diplomatic bag. Muggeridge wrote that "The famine is an organized one" and that it was "a military occupation; worse, active war." He wrote of "frequent cases of suicides and sometimes even of cannibalism ... the conditions would have been incredible to [Muggeridge] if he had not seen them with his own eyes."

The _Guardian_ played down the stories and Muggeridge accused the editors of mutilating his accounts. Muggeridge was attacked by the left-leaning British establishment and blacklisted.

Several other journalists visited the stricken regions and honestly reported what they had seen. William Henry Chamberlin sent dispatches to _The Christian Science Monitor_ and the _Manchester Guardian_. Gareth Jones traveled through the stricken area for three weeks. In a press conference in Berlin, a lecture in London, and finally in an article in the _Guardian_, Jones reported the mass starvation.

Alarmed at the publicity, Moscow applied strong pressure on Western journalists to contradict Jones' account. Duranty obligingly obeyed his masters and for the occasion again trotted out his "omelette" quote. His article was titled "Russians Hungry But Not Starving."

But—to put it brutally—you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, and the Bolshevik leaders are just as indifferent to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward socialism as any General during the World War who ordered a costly attack in order to show his superiors that he and his division possessed the proper soldierly spirit. In fact, the Bolsheviks are more indifferent because they are animated by fanatical conviction.

Throughout 1933 Duranty continued to play down the extent of the famine. He claimed "There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition ..."

In September of that year he reported that "the use of the word famine in connection with the North Caucasus is a sheer absurdity." He wrote of "plump babies" and "fat calves." Maxim Litvinov found Duranty's words useful in deflecting a letter of inquiry from an American Congressman, Herman Kopelmann of Connecticut.
Shocking proof of the discrepancy between what Duranty reported and what he knew to be the truth is revealed in a September 30, 1933 British Embassy dispatch which reads in part:

According to Mr. Duranty the population of the North Caucasus and the Lower Volga had decreased in the past year by three million, and the population of the Ukraine by four to five million. The Ukraine has been bled white... Mr. Duranty thinks it quite possible that as many as ten million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.

Newspaper readers did not get the unvarnished truth. What they got was evasion, cover-up and falsification.

Walter Duranty had reached the peak of international success and fame by selling out to a totalitarian regime and covering up one of the greatest atrocities of the twentieth century.

Malcolm Muggeridge was later to say that Duranty was “the greatest liar of any journalist I have met in fifty years of journalism. "Stuart Alsop's verdict was that Duranty was "a fashionable prostitute" and "lying was his stock in trade."

Duranty was awarded for his mendacity by the American and Soviet establishment. He received permission to accompany Litvinov across the Atlantic on the S.S. Berengaria for negotiations leading to American recognition of the Soviet Union. Duranty was present at the November 18, 1933 press conference in which President Roosevelt proudly announced that the U.S. would recognize the U.S.S.R. Duranty was also among the guests of honor at a lavish dinner for 1,500 dignitaries at New York's Waldorf-Astoria.

Stalin granted Duranty a second exclusive interview on Christmas Day, 1933.10

There were to be other occasions when Walter Duranty would conspicuously serve as apologist for the Soviet regime. In 1936 a series of show trials and purges began against alleged opponents of the Stalinist regime.

In January 1937, sixteen prominent Soviet officials were accused of conspiring with Germany and Japan to overthrow the Soviet government. Trotsky, in exile in Mexico, was absurdly accused in absentia of plotting with the Nazis.

Public confession of guilt by many of the defendants astounded the West. Ms. Taylor writes:
Predictably, Western response to this second trial was one of confusion, and there was a half-willing reluctance to believe in the guilt of the accused. If the confessions were true, the reasoning went, it demonstrated that conditions within the country were so bad that avowed and dedicated Party members would conspire with Fascists to overthrow their own government. If untrue, the trials were an indictment of the entire system in the Soviet Union.

Duranty wrote in The New Republic that he believed the confessions to be true. Outraged, Trotsky directly attacked Duranty in a speech for his "psychological divinations." In 1938, at the last and largest of the trials, Nikolai Bukharin, a former member of the Politburo, condemned Duranty from the dock.

With the coming of World War II, the New York Times began to cut back on and centralize operations. Late in 1940, the Moscow bureau was closed down. At the end of that year, Walter Duranty's twenty-five years with the New York Times came to an end.

Duranty left his mistress Katya and their seven-year-old son Michael behind in Moscow. He did not make it easy for them to contact him. In 1948 Katya managed to get a letter through to him. In awkward English she wrote:

I don't believe it is possible to forget, that here, in Moscow growing up your only the son, that we lived together nearly for twenty years, that I gave you the best years of my life... Could not you write to me something, or if you don't want to do that, for God knows what reason, you must send a letter to Mike. He is already 15 years old, he is not a child any longer and understands things very well. He wants to know and must know where his father is, why his father keeps silence for such a long time.

Although he occasionally sent a little money, Duranty never made an effort to see them again.

In the last years of his life Duranty lived in Hollywood and Florida. Until his death in 1957 he continued to write and lecture, although increasingly his political views were out of date.

Now, three and a half decades after Walter Duranty's death, the Soviet system is defunct, assigned to the garbage heap of history. What is astounding is that it managed to survive for seventy years.

J.S. Taylor's excellent book demonstrates how, in addition to Duranty, many Western journalists, "intellectuals," businessmen and diplomats ignored the crimes of Stalin and
company. The New York Times, the so-called “Newspaper of Record,” and scores of other publications suppressed the truth and spewed the Soviet line.

Nor did Western complicity in an apology for Soviet atrocities end with Stalin's death. At the 1945-46 show trials in Nuremberg, Germany, Allied apologists for Stalin worked hand-in-hand with the murderous functionaries who had created the Ukrainian famine, the show trials and the gulag. The same physical and mental torture techniques developed by Soviet commissars were used on Germans.

Even today, the “Nazi-hunting” office of Special Investigations hunts down and deports from America aged immigrants who served, often in their teenage years, as guards and other low-ranking functionaries of the Axis nations half a century ago, using information, evidence, and testimony originally supplied by the same henchmen who helped carry out Stalin's terror famine and his numerous other sanguinary crimes. Meanwhile, leading lieutenants, not infrequently Jewish, of Stalin and his successors live on untroubled, in the “post-communist” Soviet Union or in Israel and the West, to be sent off with discreet obituaries in Duranty's old paper, The New York Times, when they finally expire. Clearly, for the media which dominates today's popular (and “informed”) mentality, the duty of “memory” and the “demands of “justice” (as regards the “Holocaust”) are not to be honored for far greater, and essentially unpunished, crimes of communism.

Marxism's deadly toll of human suffering would have been impossible without the complicity of thousands of apologists for Stalin. Walter Duranty was but a single sordid example. Many more biographies remain to be written. Much more revising of the lies and evasions of the Western Establishment's “Sovietologists,” revision based on the public record of the past seventy-five years as well as the documents coming to light in Russian and other archives, lies before us.

Notes

1. Only portions of two pages in Stalin's Apologist are devoted to a description of the ritual magic employed by Crowley and Duranty. For more information see the following source material listed by J.S. Taylor: Martin Starr's Sex & Religion (Nashville, 1981), which contains a diary of the Paris workings, and John Symond's The Great Beast: The
Life and Magick of Aleister Crowley (London: MacDonald, 1971).

Additional material on the relationship between Duranty, Crowley and Neuburg can be found in Francis King's The Magical World of Aleister Crowley (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978).

The occultism practiced by Aleister Crowley appears repeatedly in the twentieth century as a sinister undercurrent of sociopolitical revolution. For a detailed, candid description of the history and method of this subversive philosophy by a knowledgeable adherent, see Peter Tompkin's The Magic of Obelisks (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pages 309 through 462.


3. The “omelette” quotation first appeared in Duranty's mediocre poem “Red Square” in a two-page spread with six photographs in the September 18, 1932, NYT (VI: p. 10). The lines containing the “omelette” quotation read:
   “Russians may be hungry and short of clothes and comfort, But you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs.”

4. The kulaks were “middle-ranked peasants” in Soviet agricultural regions. This “class” of farmer generally worked hard and owned enough land and livestock to be moderately prosperous (by Soviet standards).


8. In the acknowledgements to Stalin's Apologist, S.J. Taylor credits Robert Conquest's The Harvest of Sorrow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) as a very important inspiration for her biography of Walter Duranty. The Harvest of Sorrow is the only thorough, complete account of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, and belongs in every Revisionist library.


Mercy for Japs

The following exchange of letters was published in The Best from Yank, The Army Weekly (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1945). Yank, to quote from its editors introduction to the anthology, “was written by and for enlisted men” during the Second World War; The Best from Yank draws on material published between the summer of 1942 and the fall of 1944 in the sixteen different regional editions worldwide.

As the editors point out:

The writings, drawings, photographs and cartoons in this collection were never intended originally to please civilian tastes. They were made to order for the pages of Yank, The Army Weekly, by enlisted men on active duty in the armed forces who wanted to please other enlisted men and nobody else.

These letters would seem to indicate that the standards of American GI’s on observing the laws of warfare were somewhat more flexible than those of American prosecutors at the war-crimes trials at Tokyo, Nuremberg, and elsewhere, understandable though that may be.

Dear Yank:

As God is my witness I am sorry to read of the way two American soldiers treated the enemy on Makin Island; they shot some Japanese when they might have been able to take them alive. I don’t believe in killing unless it has to be done. I am a servant of God, so when I get into battle I hope by His help to take as many Japs alive as I can. If I am compelled to destroy lives in battle I shall do so, but when U.S. troops throw grenades into an enemy position and Japs run out unarmed we should make an effort to take them alive. I know that if I were in a dugout and forced to run out I would want mercy.

Camp Davis, N.C. 
– Pvt. Ralph H. Luckey
Dear Yank:

We just read the letter written by that servant of God, Pvt. Luckey, and wish to state that he has the wrong slant... After being in combat and seeing medics being killed trying to help our wounded makes you want to kill the bastards... Fair play is fine among sportsmen but we are fighting back stabbers!

Hawaii

*Signed by Pvt. P. Stupar

Dear Yank:

... No mercy for murderers!

On Maneuvers

— Pvt. Sam Bonanno

Dear Yank:

Brother, Pvt. Luckey better live up to his last name if goes into combat with the idea of taking Jap prisoners alive!

Port of Embarkation

— Sgt. Carl Bethea*

*Also signed by 13 others.

Dear Yank:

We are all Navy men who are suffering from combat fatigue. Many of us have been strafed by Jap Zeros while floating helplessly in the sea and have seen what the soldiers and marines have gone through in this fight. If Pvt. Luckey heeds his own call for mercy for Japs, his soul will belong to God but his body will belong to the Japs...

— Vets of World War II

Norfolk Naval Hosp., Portsmouth, VA

Dear Yank:

... If I had another chance I certainly would do the same thing those Yanks on Makin did. Shoot 'em and shoot 'em dead. I know what I'm talking about. I have been there.

Camp Blanding, Fla.

— T/Sgt. J.N. Olsen

Dear Yank:

... Please notify the FBI, G-2, anything—but have that guy locked up!

Fort Custer, Mich.

— Cpl. S. Schwartz
Dear Yank:

Has Pvt. Luckey ever seen his friends and buddies shot down by the Japs? Has he ever carried our dead out of the jungle for burial? I have—and more, during the eight months I spent on Guadalcanal. Pvt. Luckey will have no dead Japs on his conscience when they kill him.


—Pvt. C.E. Carter

Dear Yank:

. . . Luckey is out of this world and should be confined in a small room heavily padded on four sides.

Bermuda

—S/Sgt. Arthur J. Kaplan

Dear Yank:

Me and my buddies sure were mad as hell when we read Pvt. Ralph Luckey's letter. He sure shot off his mouth about our treatment of the Japs. The trouble is that he has had it nice and soft so far . . .

Trinidad

—Pfc. Edward Staffin

Dear Yank:

. . . We don't know whether to feel sorry for this guy or just laugh the thing off . . .

—M/Sgt. W.F. Hardgrove*

NC Hosp., Mitchel Field, N.Y. (South Pacific)

*Signed also by M/Sgt. R.M. Stephens (SWP); T/Sgts. L.C. Sheehan (Britain) and N. Sedorick (Britian); S/Sgts. P.F. Teraberry (Italy, Africa), R.I. Vogel (Italy, Africa), L.V. Behout (CBI), J.M. Haresign (Italy) and H.R. Garrison (New Guinea); Sgts. W.J. Polera, P. Nadzak (CBI) and J. Seginah (Britain), and Cpl. M.J. Bursie (New Guinea).

Dear Yank:

. . . Wake up, Luckey. The Jap doesn't care if God is his witness or not.


—PFC. C.J. Nichols
Dear Yank:

It's evening. We're sitting about two feet from our foxhole thinking about a letter written by Pvt. Ralph H. Luckey from Camp Davis, N.C. in a recent issue of Yank. Do you mind if we ask him a question? Pvt. Luckey, you're now living in an Army camp, just as we did. Making friends, just as we did. Friends who, in time, will be much closer, dearer, to you than you would believe possible.

We bunked together, ate together, laughed and played together, worked and dated together. Recently we fought together. During the battle, Blackie was wounded and taken prisoner. When we advanced several hours later, we found Blackie. His cheeks were punctured by sharp sticks—pulled tight by a wire tourniquet, the sticks acting as a bit does for a horse's mouth. There were slits made by a knife along the center of his legs and on his side—just as if an artist had taken pride in an act of torture well done.

We continued to move on. Do you think that we also continued to remember the niceties of civilized warfare?

Central Pacific

—S/Sgt. B.W. Milewski

This is the last of a series of GI comments in reply to Pvt. Luckey's letter. Yank has received a great number of letters on the subject, but only two readers supported the point of view advocated by Pvt. Luckey.
An Interview with Admiral Kimmel

Dean Clarence Manion

December 7. Whenever this fateful date reoccurs on the calendar, it invariably revives a flood of tragic and painful recollections. The pain of recollection will be intensified this year when you read the recently published frank, and informative, memoirs of the widely experienced and universally respected General Albert C. Wedemeyer [Wedemeyer Reports! —Ed.]. This big revealing book begins and ends with the emphatic and unequivocal assurance that the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been—and should have been—prevented, and that the United States could have—and should have—stayed out of World War II.

Says Wedemeyer, and I quote: “The Soviet colossus would not now bestride half the world had the United States kept out of war—at least until Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany had exhausted each other. But Franklin D. Roosevelt, the proclaimed champion of democracy,” continues the General, “was as successful as any dictator could have been in keeping Congress and the public in ignorance of his secret commitments to Britain, commitments which flouted the will and the wishes of the voters who had reelected him only after he had assured them that he would keep us out of the war. The fact that Japan’s attack had been deliberately provoked was obscured by the disaster at Pearl Harbor,” says Wedemeyer. “President Roosevelt had maneuvered us into the war by his patently unneutral actions against Germany and the final ultimatum against Japan.”

So much for the beginning of Wedemeyer Reports! Near the conclusion we find this, and I quote again:

“On December 4th, 1941, we received definite information from two independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. On December 6, our intercepts told us, the Japanese would strike somewhere the very next day. President
Roosevelt," he says "had ample time to broadcast a warning that might have caused the Japanese to call off the attack." "In any event," continues the General, "we should not have permitted 2,500 Americans to die in Hawaii without an opportunity to fight back."

Who, then, was responsible for the bloody surprise at Pearl Harbor? A few days after the bombs fell there, President Roosevelt made a radio speech to the American people in which he condemned the treachery that propelled us into war, and called Sunday, December 7, 1941 a day that will live in infamy. Mr. Roosevelt was never more truly prophetic than he was when he spoke those words. The infamy of Sunday, December 7, 1941 becomes increasingly notorious with each passing year. Ever more and more certainly that calamitous day is being firmly established in history as the infamous time when more than 3,000 American soldiers and sailors were sentenced to sudden and violent death by the calculated and deliberate dereliction of their own Commander-in-Chief.

Pearl Harbor was but the bloody beginning of what is yet an endless tale of woe. Down with the sacrificed sailors and soldiers went the heart and soul of our proud Pacific Fleet. But with the flotsam of this powerful and humiliating holocaust came the corrosive curse of Communism to poison the whole stream of human civilization. The bright light of freedom that was extinguished by Mr. Roosevelt's dreadful "day of infamy" may not come on again for a thousand years.

Fixing the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe has been a delayed and difficult task. In war the truth is always the first casualty. It was so at Pearl Harbor. The American people were shocked by this successful sneak attack, and enraged at the realization that it had dragged them into the foreign war from which the president had promised "again, and again, and again" to steer them clear. Popular clamor demanded appropriate scapegoats, and the president obligingly and promptly met the popular demand by nominating for disgrace two men who, respectively, commanded the United States Army and Navy forces in Hawaii on that fatal day.

The American people did not know then that the president and his top military advisors in Washington had been intercepting Japanese secret messages for many months, and that as General Wedemeyer has said, "These messages had finally indicated the time, the place, and the character of the
Pearl Harbor attack, days in advance of December 7." Neither did the American people know then that this dreadful and important information had been deliberately withheld from the men who were most entitled to know it, namely, the top commanders of the United States Army and Navy forces in Hawaii.

Ten years ago the distinguished newsman George Morgenstern wrote and published what he called Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War. The politicians saw to it that Morgenstern’s early revelation was given the silent treatment in the press of the country. But, in that book today, you can trace the long, sadistic persecution that was forced upon two great military men who were selected as the scapegoats for the day of infamy.

Namely, Lieutenant Walter C. Short and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. General Short is now dead, but Admiral Kimmel is now living in Connecticut. Three years ago, he published his own book about Pearl Harbor, which is authentic, remarkably restrained and entirely without rancor [Admiral Kimmel's Story — Ed.]. In the magazine section of the Chicago Tribune, he writes an up-date of his findings concerning the available warning that was never given to him. Admiral Kimmel happens to be my life-long personal friend. Last week I went to his home to obtain his direct answers to key questions about the Pearl Harbor attack. Here is my recorded interview with this distinguished, long-suffering man, to whom the officers and trustees of his alma mater, The United States Naval Academy, recently gave an extended testimonial for the patriotism, loyalty, ability, fortitude and devotion to duty that he displayed at Pearl Harbor, before, on and after the 7th day of December, 1941.

CM: Admiral Kimmel, for myself and the radio audience, I am very grateful for the privilege of this interview. You know, of course, that you hold the key to one of the great tragic mysteries in our country's history. What you are doing here today is a continuation of the great patriotic service to which your whole life has been dedicated.

HEK: Thank you, Dean Manion. In view of our long family friendship, I'm delighted to give this information to you, and through you, to the American people.
CM: To your present knowledge, how many people knew in advance that the Japanese planned to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7?

HEK: I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14-part message received on December 6 and December 7, 1941, knew war with Japan was inevitable. And the almost certain objective of the Japanese attack would be the fleet at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, at 1 p.m. Washington time.

CM: Who are some of these people and from what source did they get the information?

HEK: Those who saw the intercepted Japanese messages as they were received included: the President, Mr. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull; the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson; the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox; the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark; the Chief of War Plans, Army, General Gerow; the Chief of War Plans, Navy, Admiral Turner; the Chief of Army Intelligence, General Miles; Chief of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Worthington. Recorded testimony shows that all of these, except General Marshall and Admiral Stark were shown 13 parts of the 14-part message by 9 p.m. December 6, 1941, or shortly thereafter. When Mr. Roosevelt had read the 13 parts, about 9 p.m. December 6, 1941, he remarked: "This means war." All investigations of the disaster have failed to disclose where George Marshall spent the evening of December 6, 1941, or what he did. Admiral Stark, some two years after he had first been asked, finally produced evidence that he had attended the theater on that evening, though he still maintained that he had no independent recollection of where he spent the evening or what he did during the evening of December 6, 1941. In 1957, I received information, which I believe to be reliable, that the British subject serving in the Chinese government as commissioner of education and intelligence in China received on November 30, 1941, from his intelligence sources in Japan, information of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor to be launched on December 7: Where the Japanese fleet would congregate to launch the planes, the hour the planes were to be launched, the berths of the U.S. fleet in Pearl and which ships were to be bombed first. This information was sent to London in a coded message, on Sunday,
November 30, and Monday, December 1, 1941. Whether the Chinese commissioner's intelligence was transmitted from London to Washington, I do not know, but it appears highly probable that it was made available to Mr. Roosevelt. If Mr. Roosevelt did, in fact, receive the Chinese commissioner's intelligence, it was merely a detailed confirmation of the intercepted Japanese messages already available to him.

CM: In your opinion, why were you and General Short not notified well in advance that the attack was expected?

HEK: My belief is that General Short and I were not given the information available in Washington and were not informed of the impending attack because it was feared that action in Hawaii might deter the Japanese from making the attack. Our president had repeatedly assured the American people that the United States would not enter the war unless we were attacked. The Japanese attack on the fleet would put the United States in the war with the full support of the American public.

CM: Thank you, Admiral Kimmel, for this interview and for the patriotic persistence with which you have pursued and corralled the tragic facts about the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

My friends, you now have the authentic postscript on memorable day of infamy in 1941.

Seventeen years later the United States stands poised once more on the brink of shooting war. If the fighting must start again, let us demand the full truth in advance as a condition precedent to the conflict. Are we again bound by secret commitments which put the interest of other countries ahead of the interests of the United States? Are our far-flung armed forces spread around the world for our own defense, or as an assurance that we will automatically participate in every brushfire that breaks out any place on earth? The terrible truth about Pearl Harbor should galvanize our foreign policy with impenetrable armor of our own national self interest.

At long last, the finally revealed truth has revived righteous respectability of a policy that put the interest of America first.

(This interview was broadcast under the auspices of The Manion Forum in Fall, 1958.)
Holocaust Education: Cui Bono?

CARL HOTTELET

The following letter was written to the editor of the Asbury Park Press on August 20, 1991. As an answer to the question posed in the above title, it would be difficult to better.

A 14-line single-column item inserted inconspicuously into an inside page of your July 7, 1991 issue revealed to attentive readers that "Florio OKs bill to aid Holocaust education."

For the last thirty years the newspapers have been drenching us in "survivor" epics and other horror tales of the "Holocaust," while film, radio, and television have been bombarding us incessantly with the most spectacular and imaginative "Holocaust" stories. One would think, then, that nothing is less in need of further aid than is "Holocaust education."

However, Florio put it over. New Jersey's children and young people, already deficient in reading and writing, having but a vague knowledge of geography and history, practically ignorant of logic, mathematics, and the sciences, will have vital learning time stolen from them so that their minds can be numbed by "Holocaust education." How will that "education" prepare them for a productive career, to compete on an equal basis with Asians and with Europeans?

As a state governor Florio must know, if only from what is happening in another state—Illinois—that "Holocaust education" is designed to achieve aims that have nothing to do with education, but have everything to do with "diseducation." Three of those aims, summarily stated, are:

- to instill guilt-feelings in non-Jews, and to serve as a pretext for prostituted politicians to vote ever more billions of dollars for Israel, to bind America to Israel's atrocious practices, to approve tax exemption for the billions of non-
governmental, private contributions to Israel, thereby increasing the tax burden on the rest of us; to perpetuate our subservience to Israel and to Zionism—despite their numerous grave offenses against the United States.

To incite hatred, especially against Germans, though in proportionately equal degree, as it were, against Balts, Croatians, Hungarians, Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians, and other Christians, often focussing their vituperation on Pius XII, despite the asylum accorded by this saintly pope to uncounted thousands of Jews.

At the same time, while playing down, when it can't be suppressed entirely, information about Israeli atrocities in Lebanon, in Palestine, and elsewhere, "Holocaust education" seeks to generate disproportionate, some would say excessive, sympathy for Jews, to the exclusion of every other ethnic group in the country, and on the planet, and at the expense of peoples who have suffered far worse and in infinitely greater numbers. In conjunction with above, "Holocaust education" is calculated to condition Americans to submit to Jewish hegemony in our society, and to tolerate the extraordinary privileges Jews have arrogated to themselves.

"Holocaust education" intends to expunge American (and other) history from American memory, and to replace it with a new Jewish scripture. Thus, in Illinois, children are taught: "The period from 1933 to 1945 is known as the Holocaust . . ." The headline over a full-page New York Times Book Review (May 13, 1990) advertisement for the Encyclopedia of the Holocaust proclaims it to be "The Definitive Guide to the Most Important Event of the 20th Century."

For the "Holocaust educators" there was no Boer war, no Russo-Japanese War, no World War, no Bolshevist Russian Revolution, no Sino-Japanese War, no Chinese floods that drowned millions, no African, Chinese, Indian famines that killed millions; Stalin's forced starvation of the Ukrainians isn't worth mentioning; there was no World War II with its additional tens of millions of Russian and German soldier and civilian dead; of thousands of American soldiers dead, and many more mutilated since 1917—all in the twentieth century. There is only the "Holocaust."
There were holocausts. Berlin, Cologne, Dresden, Hamburg, and a hundred other German cities. Nagoya, Osaka, Tokyo, Yokohama, and a hundred other Japanese cities, until the ultimate hells of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those were British and American holocausts. No one tries any longer to deny them. Nevertheless, it has never occurred to any German, or to any Japanese, to want to force these searing events into the minds of young Americans, and that least of all under the pretense of “combatting hatred,” “fostering sensitivity,” and “promoting understanding.”

But the “Holocaust”—as we have been led to understand it—becomes more and more controversial. When the great Frenchman, Paul Rassinier, began in the 1950’s to question the stories that came out of the concentration camps, demographers, historians, scholars and scientists were moved to look critically at the assertion “Hitler ordered the extermination of the Jews” and at the “6,000,000,” the “gas chambers,” the “death factories” and the rest. No evidence to support the existence of any of these was found, and has not been found to this day.

The brilliant young Italian, Carlo Mattogno, specialist in contemporary European history, has examined, and exposed, the successive reptilian twists of the “Exterminationist” writers through edition after edition of their works. Among the first Americans to stand publicly against the “Holocaust” onslaught is Professor Arthur P. Butz, of Northwestern University. His Hoax of the Twentieth Century is the basic American text on the “Holocaust.”

The Costa Mesa, California-based Institute for Historical Review inquires into the truth of the “Holocaust.” Contributions to the IHR quarterly Journal are invited, even solicited, from all sides. Historians and scientists of every continent have been responding. In the dozen or so years of The Journal’s publication, among the hundreds of contributions that have been submitted, not one has ventured to substantiate the “Holocaust.”

Little publicity has been given the Institute’s standing offer, and challenge, to debate the question of the “Holocaust.” Even less publicity has been accorded the premature withdrawal of the very “Exterminationists” who have trumpeted their “acceptance” of the challenge.

No newspaper, and no radio or televisions station, has informed the American people that those who most strenuously,
and stridently, want—at public expense—to force the "Holocaust" dogma on them and their children refuse to debate its veracity.

Among these curious "refuseniks" are the leaders and members of the myriad Jewish organizations in the United States, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the World Jewish Congress.

Individuals who have made fortunes on the "Holocaust"—"There’s no business like Shoah business"—but shun debate on it include "Nazi-hunter" Simon Wiesenthal, hater-in-chief Eli Wiesel, and "Mr. Holocaust" himself, Professor Raoul Hilberg. Nor should the swarms of "survivors" who have profitably published their memoirs be overlooked.

The "Exterminationists," the professionals of the "Holocaust," when asked to debate their position, respond by wailing "discrimination," or "persecution," or screaming "anti-Semite," "neo-Nazi," "fascist"—but they won’t debate. Why not?

Do not the American people have the right to hear, in open debate, all sides of a question that has cost them so much blood and treasure, and threatens to cost them more still?

At least until this question is resolved fairly and democratically—not, as is being pressed now, autocratically and dictatorially—to the satisfaction of the American people, the intolerable outrage of forcing a special-interest mind-set on our children and young people should be stopped.

Roosevelt’s Secret Pre-War Plan to Bomb Japan

MARK WEBER

Several months before Japan’s December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt secretly authorized devastating American bombing raids against Japanese cities. A top secret document de-classified in 1970, but only made public a few years ago, shows that in July 1941
Roosevelt and his top military advisers approved a daring plan to use American pilots and American war planes—deceitfully flying under the Chinese flag—to bomb Japan's major cities.1

The bombers would be under the command of Claire Chennault, a former U.S. Air Corps flyer who had been in the employ of Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek since 1937. In July 1941 Chennault already headed the “American Volunteer Group” squadron of U.S. “Flying Tiger” fighter planes that fought with great success against Japanese forces in China. Chennault's colorful unit was glorified in American newspapers and magazines, and in the 1942 Hollywood propaganda motion picture Flying Tigers, starring John Wayne.

The young pilots who flew the distinctively “shark-toothed” B-40 warplanes were ostensibly mercenaries, and the AVG force had no official connection with the U.S. government. In reality, though, the squadron was secretly organized and funded by Washington—in flagrant violation of both American and international law. Set up without consultation or consent of Congress, it specifically violated the U.S. Neutrality Act, the Reserves Act of 1940, and the Selective Service Act of 1940. Chennault’s squadron was also a breach of Roosevelt's own formal declarations of U.S. neutrality in the conflict between Japan and China, which had been raging since 1937.

By aiding China, Roosevelt sought to keep Japanese forces tied up there. As long as the Japanese were fully occupied in China, he thought, they would not be a threat to British and U.S. interests in Asia. If China fell, Britain would have to divert war ships, troops and materiel badly needed in Europe.

A secret memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 17, 1940 confirms that almost two years before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Roosevelt administration was considering war against the Japanese with U.S. mercenaries organized in “an efficient guerrilla corps.” The memo also discussed a clandestine U.S. combat air operation against Japanese forces. Some months later, in May 1941, another memorandum for Roosevelt from Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander of the U.S. Asiatic fleet, began: “The concept of a war with Japan is believed to be sound,” and went on to discuss how Japan could be attacked by American-piloted bombers.2
To put such ideas into effect, Chennault pushed for the formation of a task force of American-piloted bombers under his command that would raid Japan itself. “If the men and equipment were of good quality, such a force could cripple the Japanese war effort,” he wrote. “A small number of long-range bombers carrying incendiary bombs could quickly reduce Japan's paper-and-matchwood cities to heaps of smoking ashes.”

Chennault's proposal quickly received the enthusiastic support of China's ambassador in Washington, T. V. Soong (multi-millionaire banker brother-in-law of Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek), British ambassador Lord Lothian, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and FDR's Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau.

The idea to bomb Japan was first formally presented to Roosevelt on December 19, 1940. As Dr. Duane Schultz relates in his 1987 study, The Maverick War, FDR's response was to exclaim “Wonderful,” and to immediately instruct his Secretaries of State, Treasury, War and Navy to begin working out the details of a battle plan.3

Not everyone was so enthusiastic, though. Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall expressed misgivings. Marshall cautioned that having American pilots bomb Japan using American planes with Chinese markings was a trick that would not really fool anybody, but would simply plunge the United States into a war with Japan at a time when the U.S. was still woefully unprepared.

As a result of such misgivings, the plan was temporarily shelved. A few months later, though, a somewhat modified version was revived as “Joint Army-Navy Board Paper No. 355.”4

As finally laid out in JB 355, an air strike force of 500 Lockheed Hudson bombers was to be organized as “The Second American Volunteer Group” under Chennault's command. Its mission would be the “pre-emptive” bombing of Japan. The strategic objective of JB 355 was the “destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure in Japan.” From bases about 1,300 miles away in eastern China, the American bombers would strike Japan's industrial centers, including Osaka, Nagasaki, Yokohama and Tokyo. (These air
Cover letter of official U.S. “Joint Army-Navy Board No. 355” paper authorizing American bombing raids against Japan. The top secret document is signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy, and bears Franklin Roosevelt's initials of authorization and a handwritten date, July 23, 1941—more than four months before the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor.

strikes would have unavoidably claimed the lives of many civilians. By contrast, the Japanese planes that attacked Pearl Harbor carefully avoided civilian targets.)

U.S. funds for the operation were to be provided as part of a general loan to China and channeled through a dummy corporation. The American military personnel involved were given deceptive passports. (Chennault's gave his occupation as “farmer,” and cited him as an “advisor to the Central Bank of China.”)

Secret plan JB 355 was approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and—on July 23, 1941—by President Franklin Roosevelt.
No one played a more important role in promoting and organizing this plan than Lauchlin Bernard Currie, a close Roosevelt White House adviser. Now 89 years old and living in South America, he provided details of his role in the secret operation, and of Roosevelt's support for it, in a November 1991 television interview.\(^5\) A major motive behind Currie's eagerness to get the U.S. into war with Japan, it seems, was his strongly pro-Soviet sympathies. There is even tantalizing but still inconclusive evidence to suggest that Currie was a Soviet agent.\(^6\)

When Roosevelt approved plan JB 355, Currie sent a secret cable to Chennault: "I am very happy to be able to report that today the President directed that 66 bombers be made available to China [sic] this year, with 24 to be delivered immediately."

Although it received approval from numerous high-level officials, the plan was not well conceived. In the view of Yale University history professor Gaddis Smith, the Lockheed Hudson bombers that were to carry out the raids would have been easily shot down by Japan's first-rate fighter planes.\(^7\)

Two days after approving JB 355, Roosevelt declared a crippling trade embargo against Japan, an act of economic strangulation that he knew full well would virtually assure war. (At that time, about 90 percent of Japan's oil and iron came from the United States.) And having broken Japanese codes, British and American officials learned in early July of Japan's sure intentions in the Pacific: war with the U.S. was now inevitable.\(^8\)

Understandably viewing Roosevelt's campaign as a mortal threat to their country's very existence as a modern industrial nation, Japan's leaders resolved to strike a first blow. They reasoned that by destroying the U.S. Pacific fleet in Hawaii in one decisive surprise attack, they would remove the one great obstacle to forging a self-sufficient Japanese empire in eastern Asia.

History thus intervened to thwart Roosevelt's plan to bomb Japan. Before JB 355 Japan could be put into effect, and before Japan felt the full impact of FDR's trade embargo, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor—and Roosevelt had the open war with Japan that he had anticipated. In effect, Japan beat America to the punch.

On December 11, 1941, four days after the Pearl Harbor debacle, all further action on the JB 355 plan was suspended,
and the bomber pilots who had been recruited were quickly incorporated into the regular U.S. armed forces.

Franklin Roosevelt branded December 7, 1941, as "a date which will live in Infamy." And although many millions of Americans still regard Japan's "sneak attack" as the ultimate act of international deceit and treachery, it was hardly unique. In 1801, Britain's Lord Nelson destroyed Denmark's fleet in a surprise attack on Copenhagen. In May 1846, the U.S. Army invaded Mexican territory before Congress got around to declaring that a state of war existed with Mexico. Far from feeling ashamed about it, Americans later elected as President the commander who lead the expedition, Zachary Taylor. In June 1967, Israel carried out a surprise attack against Egypt, and was widely praised in the U.S. for its adroit skill in destroying almost the entire Egyptian air force while it was still on the ground.

Just about every major power has resorted to surprise attack at one time or another, according to a study by British army officer and historian Sir Frederick Maurice. Between 1700 and 1870, he calculated, France carried out 36 surprise attacks, Britain 30, Austria twelve, Russia seven, Prussia seven, and the United States at least five.9

The long-suppressed story of FDR's plan to bomb Japan certainly deserves to be better known. As sensational as it is, though, it is only one chapter of the larger—and still largely unknown—story of Roosevelt's extensive and illegal campaign to bring a supposedly neutral United States into the Second World War.10 Indeed even before the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, Roosevelt was secretly doing everything in his power to incite conflict there.11

In the months before the Pearl Harbor attack, the American president accelerated his illegal campaign. For example, after Axis forces launched the fateful June 22, 1941, "Barbarossa" attack against Soviet Russia, he promptly began sending American aid to Stalin. On July 25, 1941, Roosevelt froze Japanese assets of $130 million in the United States, thus ending trade relations. He closed the American-run Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. In June and July 1941, he dispatched U.S. troops to occupy Greenland and Iceland. And by September-October 1941, U.S. warships were actively engaging German U-boats in the Atlantic, in flagrant violation of U.S. and international law.12
From a larger historical perspective, the magnitude of Roosevelt's undercover military operations against Japan and Germany, at a time when the U.S. was ostensibly neutral, dwarfs other, much ballyhooed, clandestine U.S. military operations in later years, such as President Reagan's help to the Nicaraguan "Contra" fighters, or the infamous Iran-Contra operation.

Notes

10. For example, the ABC television "20/20" broadcast of Nov. 22, 1991, which gave sensational treatment to the JB 355 bombing plan, failed to put the story in the larger context of FDR's ongoing campaign to bring the U.S. into war.; On FDR's campaign to bring America into war, see: George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor: The Secret War (1947 and 1991); Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 (1948); William H. Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade (1952 and 1962); Charles C. Tansill, Back Door to War (1952); Harry Elmer Barnes, Barnes Against the Blockout (1991).
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