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The last twelve months have been among the busiest ever at the IHR, with a staggering number of projects either completed or underway. A major project now in the "completed" column is the 12th Revisionist Conference, which took place over Labor Day weekend (September 3–5) here in southern California. Conferences are a major undertaking for the IHR, and once again, the staff pulled it off with nary a hitch, prompting many attendees to proclaim this the best Conference ever. Although there is nothing that can replace the experience of attending an IHR Conference in person, video- and audi-tapes of the Conference will be available, and the texts of the presentations will appear in this Journal. A complete report on the 12th IHR Conference will appear in the next issue of the Journal.

In this issue of the Journal, we look at an important tradition that once was a major feature in the political landscape of the west, a tradition reviewer Andrew Clarke calls "a significant intellectual-political movement that was suppressed and is now all but forgotten." This tradition, while called "right-wing" in nature, is not to be confused with modern-day conservatism, which seems preoccu-pied with turning back the clock, not to correct mistakes in recent policy but rather to make these same mistakes at a more deliberate pace. What might, for lack of a better term, be called authentic conservatism rejects this approach, these goals, and even the foundations of the modern conservative movement (foundations shared with its so-called opponents, the liberals). This tradition nearly disappeared as a result of the Second World War and the Cold War that followed. Now that the Cold War is over, this tradition is again relevant, and its reemergence would dramatically change the political spectrum.

A surprising number of people have asked about sending messages to the IHR through e-mail (electronic mail). If you have a computer, a modem, telecommunications software, and Internet access, you may send e-mail to the IHR at: greg.ihr@kai-wan.com.

If none of this makes any sense, don't worry: an article dealing with revisionism and the "information superhighway" is in preparation for a future issue of the Journal.

— G.R.
Following the aftermath of the cataclysmic defeat of Germany and her Axis partners in the Second World War, exhausted Europe came under the hegemony of the victorious Allied powers — above all the United States and Soviet Russia. Understandably, the social-political systems of the vanquished regimes — and especially that of Hitler's Third Reich — were all but completely discredited, even in Germany.

This process also brought the discrediting of the conservative intellectual tradition that, to a certain extent, nourished and gave rise to National Socialism and Hitler's coming to power in 1933. In the intellectual climate that prevailed after 1945, conservative views were largely vilified and suppressed as "reactionary" or "fascist," and efforts to defend or revitalize Europe's venerable intellectual tradition of conservatism came up against formidable resistance.

Those who defied the prevailing "spirit of the times," maintaining that the valid "Right" traditions must be accorded their proper and important place in Europe's intellectual and political life, risked being accused of seeking to "rehabilitate" or "whitewash" Nazism. Germans have been especially easy targets of this charge, which is nearly impossible to disprove.

One of the most prominent writers in German-speaking Europe to attempt this largely thankless task has been Armin Mohler. As German historian Ernst Nolte has observed, this job has fortunately been easier for Mohler because he is a native of a country that remained neutral during the Second World War.

Born in Basel, Switzerland, in 1920, Mohler worked for four years as secretary of the influential German writer Ernst Jünger. He then lived in Paris for eight years, where he reported on developments in France for various German-language papers, including the influential Hamburg weekly Die Zeit.

In his prodigious writings, including a dozen books, Dr. Mohler has spoken to and for millions of Europeans who, in defiance of the prevailing political-intellectual order, have sought to understand, if not appreciate, the intellectual heritage of Europe's venerable "old right."

Mohler's reputation as the "dean" of conservative intellectuals and as a bridge between generations is based in large part on the impact of his detailed historical study, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932 ("The Conservative Revolution in Germany, 1918–1932"). Based on his doctoral dissertation at the University of Basel, this influential work was first published in 1950, with revised editions issued in 1972 and 1989.

In this study, Mohler asserts that the German tradition of the Reich ("realm") in central Europe (Mitteleuropa) incorporates two important but contradictory concepts. One sees Mitteleuropa as a diverse and decentralized community of culturally and politically distinct nations and nationalities. A second, almost mythical view stresses the cultural and spiritual unity of the Reich and Mitteleuropa.

The main current of radical or revolutionary conservative thinking is expressed by such diverse figures as the Russian writer Fedor Dostoyevsky, Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, American poet and social critic Ezra Pound, American sociologist Thorstein Veblen, and English novelist C. K. Chesterton. This intellectual movement began at the close of the 19th century and flourished particularly during the 1920s and 1930s. Sometimes also called the "organic revolution," this movement sought the preservation of the historical legacy and heritage of western and central European culture, while at the same time maintaining the "greatest [cultural and national] variety within the smallest space." In Germany, the "Thule Society" played an important role in the 1920s in this European-wide phenomenon as a kind of salon of radical conservative intellectual thought. It stressed the idea of a völkisch (folkish or nationalist) pluralism, underscoring the unique origins and yet common roots of a European culture, setting it apart from other regions and geopolitical groupings around the globe.

Ian B. Warren is the pen name of a professor who teaches at a university in the midwest. This interview/article is the third in a series.
In Mohler’s view, the twelve-year Third Reich (1933–1945) was a temporary deviation from the traditional conservative thinking. At the same time, the conservative revolution was “a treasure trove from which National Socialism [drew] its ideological weapons.” Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany were, in Mohler’s judgment, examples of the “misapplication” of the key theoretical tenets of revolutionary conservative thought. While some key figures, such as one-time Hitler colleague Otto Strasser, chose to emigrate from Germany after 1933, those who decided to remain, according to Mohler, “hoped to permeate national socialism from within, or transform themselves into a second revolution.”

Following the publication in 1950 of his work on the conservative revolution in Europe, Mohler explored in his writings such diverse subjects as Charles DeGaulle and the Fifth Republic in France, and the Technocracy movement in the depression-era United States. In 1964 Mohler was appointed Managing Director of the prestigious Carl-Friedrich von Siemens Foundation, a leading scholarly and research support institute in Germany. In 1967 he began a stint of several years teaching political science at the University of Innsbruck in Austria. That same year, Konrad Adenauer honored Mohler for his writing with the first “Adenauer Prize” ever bestowed.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Mohler was a frequent contributor to Criticcon, a scholarly German journal whose editor, Caspar von Schrenk-Notzing, has been a close friend of the Swiss scholar and a major promoter of his work. In 1985, Dr. Mohler produced a collection of writings to commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Siemens Foundation. The volume contained contributions from the writings of Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Konrad Lorenz, Hellmut Diwald, H.J. Eysenck, and Julian Freund.

Mohler is a leading figure in the European “New Right,” or “Nowelle Droite.” (For more on this, see Prof. Warren’s interview with Alain de Benoist, another major figure in this social-intellectual movement, in The Journal of Historical Review, March–April 1994, pp. 28–37.)

Year after year, political leaders, educators and much of the mass media take care to remind Germans of their important “collective responsibility” to atone for their “burdensome” past. This seemingly never-ending campaign has become nearly a national obsession — manifest recently in the enormous publicity and soul-searching surrounding the Spielberg film “Schindler’s List.” In Mohler’s view, all this has produced a kind of national neuroses in Germany.

Mohler has written extensively on the particu-
there will be bad times for Germany.

The generation that is coming into its own now is better because they are the sons and the daughters of the permissive society. They know that money is not everything, that money does not represent real security. And they have ideas. Let me give my description of this generation. For 20 years people like me were on the sidelines and barely noticed. But for the past six or seven years, the young people have been coming to me! They want to meet and talk with the "Old Man," they prefer me to their fathers, whom they regard as too soft and lacking in principles.

For more than a hundred years, the province of Saxony — located in the postwar era in the Communist "German Democratic Republic" — produced Germany's best workers. Since 1945, though, they have been lost. The situation is a little bit like Ireland. Just as, it is said, the best of the Irish emigrated to the United States, so did the best people in the GDR emigrate to western Germany. After 1945, the GDR lost three million people. With few exceptions, they were the most capable and ambitious. This did not include the painters of Saxony, who are far better than their western German counterparts. (Fine art is one of my special pleasures.) Moreover, many of the best who remained took positions in the Stasi [the secret police of the former GDR]. That's because the Stasi provided opportunities for those who didn't want to migrate to western Germany to do something professionally challenging. In a dictatorship, a rule to remember is that you must go to the center of power.

Recently, in an interview with the German paper Junge Freiheit, I said that trials of former Stasi officials are stupid, and that there should be a general amnesty for all former Stasi workers. You must build with the best and most talented people of the other side — the survivors of the old regime — and not with these stupid artists, police and ideologues.

Q: Are there any viable expressions of the "conservative revolution" in German politics today?

M: You know, I'm a friend of Franz Schönhuber [the leader of the Republikaner party], and I like him very much. We were friends when he was still a leftist. He has a typical Bavarian temperament, with its good and bad sides. And he says, "you know, it's too late for me. I should have begun ten years earlier." He is a good fellow, but I don't know if he is has the talents required of an effective opposition political leader. Furthermore, he has a major fault. Hitler had a remarkable gift for choosing capable men who could work diligently for him. Organization, speeches — whatever was needed, they could carry it out. In Schönhuber's case, however, he finds it virtually impossible to delegate anything. He does not know how to assess talent and find good staff people.

Thus, the Republikaner party exists almost by accident, and because there is so much protest sentiment in the country. Schönhuber's most outstanding talent is his ability to speak extemporaneously. His speeches are powerful, and he can generate a great deal of response. Yet, he simply doesn't know how to organize, and is always fearful of being deposed within his party. Another major weakness is his age: he is now 70.

Q: What do you think of Rolf Schlierer, the 40-year-old heir apparent of Schönhuber?

M: Yes, he's clever. He clearly understands something about politics, but he can't speak to the people, the constituents of this party. He is too intellectual in his approach and in his speeches. He often refers to Hegel, for example. In practical political terms, the time of theorists has gone. And he is seen to be a bit of a dandy. These are not the qualities required of the leader of a populist party.

Ironically, many of the new people active in local East German politics have gone over to the Republikaner because people in the former GDR tend to be more nationalistic than the West Germans.

Q: What about Europe's future and role of Germany?

M: I don't think that the two generations I have been describing are clever enough to be a match for the French and English, who play their game against Germany. While I like Kohl, and I credit him for bringing about German unification, what I think he wants most sincerely is Germany in America, where much concern is expressed about German domination of Europe. And yet you think that the French and the English will predominate?

M: Thus far, they have not. Kohl hopes, of course, that he can keep power by being the best possible ally of America; but that is not enough.

Q: Do you think that the influence of America on German identity is still important, or is it diminishing?

M: Yes, it is still important, both directly, and indirectly through the process of "re-education," which has formed the Germans more than I had feared. Where have the special German qualities gone? The current generation in power wants to be, to borrow an English expression, "everybody's darling," particularly to be the darling of America.

Those of the upcoming generation don't like their parents, whom they see as soft and lacking in
dignity. In general, I think that younger Germans are not against Americans personally. They will be better off with Americans than with the English or French. In this I am not as anti-American as Alain de Benoist. The “American way of life” is now a part of us. And for this we have only ourselves to blame.

For my own part, I see a great affinity between Germany and America. When I was visiting a family in Chicago a few years ago, I felt right at home, even if it was a patrician family, and I am from the lower middle class. I felt something. For example, if I were to have an accident, I would prefer that it occur on the streets of Chicago rather than in Paris or London. I think that Americans would be more ready to help me than people in France or England.

During my travels in the United States, I encountered many taxi drivers, who were very friendly if they had an idea that I was from Germany. But when I would tell them that I am Swiss, they didn't respond in this positive way. In the case of Black taxi drivers, there is always the same scenario when they converse with Germans. They say, “you treated us as human beings when we were there.”

Some would talk about those death camps on the Rhine for German prisoners run by Eisenhower, where American soldiers had orders not to give water or food to the Germans. (You know, Eisenhower ordered that those who gave food or water to the Germans in those camps would be punished.) Blacks gave them water, though, and that had a great impression on them. To German soldiers they said: “We are in the same situation as you.”

Q: You are saying that there is a camaraderie among victims?

M: Yes.

Q: How is it possible to throw off this domination, this cultural occupation, as it were?

M: I had the idea that we must have emigration — as the Irish have had — to make Germans more spontaneous. I have written on three different occasions about Ireland in Criticon.

It was not fair of me to judge Ireland during that first visit, because I did not know the country’s history. Then I dug into the subject, and especially the 800-year struggle of the Irish against the English. I relied on the best study available, written by a German Jew, Moritz Julius Bonn. An archivist at the University of Dublin had given Bonn access to all the documents about the English colonization of Ireland.

In my second Criticon article I boosted Ireland as an example for the Germans of how to fight for their independence. I said that it was a war of 800 years against the English. At last they won. And the English genocide was a real genocide.

During my first visit to Ireland, I felt that there was something really different, compared to Germany. Last year, after two decades, I returned to Ireland. Writing about that trip, I concluded that I had been deceived earlier, because Ireland has changed. Europe has been a very bad influence. Every Irishman, when he saw that I was from Germany, asked me, “Do you vote for Maastricht?” (referring to the treaty of European unification). When I replied that the German people are not allowed to vote on this matter, they seemed pleased. And to me, the Irish now seem very demoralized. Twenty years ago, when I arrived in a little Irish town in Castlebar, it was a quiet little town with one factory and some cars, some carts and horses. Now, all the streets were full of cars, one after the other. “Is there a convention in town,” I asked. “No, no, it’s normal.” I then asked, “Are these cars paid for?” “Ah, no,” was the answer I received.

Every person can have three days off a week, and then it’s Dole Day on Tuesday. Their mountains are full of sheep. They don’t need stables for them, because it’s not necessary. The owners are paid a sum of money from the European Union for each sheep. Their entire heroic history is gone! It’s like the cargo cult [in backwoods New Guinea]. For the Irish, the next generation will be a catastrophe.14

Q: Returning to an earlier question: what does the future hold for German-American relations?

M: On one occasion when I was in America doing research on the Technocracy movement, I recall being the guest of honor at a conference table. At my side was a nationally prominent American scientist who was also a professor at a west coast university. Also with us was an internationally prominent Jew, a grey eminence in armaments who had an enormous influence. He was treated like a king by the president of the university. And at the other end of the table I sat next to this west coast professor, who told me that he didn't like the cosmopolitan flair of the East Coast. “You should come to western America,” he said to me. “There you will not always hear stupid things about Germany.” And he added that in his profession — he works in the forests and woods — are people who are friends of Germany. So I remember this fraternization between a visitor from Germany and someone from the American west coast.

Q: Are you suggesting that if it were not for the influence of certain powerful academic or political elites, there would be greater recognition of the compatibility of German and American values?

M: You see, this difficult relationship between Germans and Jews has had an enormous influence on public opinion in America. Jews would be stupid not to take advantage of this situation while they can, because I think Jewish influence in America is somewhat diminishing. Even with all the Holocaust
museums and such, their position is becoming even more difficult. This is partly due to the "multicultural" movement in the United States. Actually, the Germans and the Jews are a bit alike: when they are in power, they over-do it! New leaders in each group seem recognize that this is dangerous.

***

Dr. Mohler also spoke about the Historikerstreit ["Historians’ dispute"], which he sees as a critical milestone on the road of enabling Germans to consider their own identity in a positive way. (For more on this, see Prof. Warren's interview with Dr. Ernst Nolte in the Journal, Jan.–Feb. 1994, pp. 15–22, and the review of Nolte’s most recent book in the same issue, pp. 37–41.)

He expressed the view that many European leaders — particularly those in France and Britain — welcome an American President like Bill Clinton who does not seem expert at foreign policy matters.

With regard to developments in Germany, Mohler explained that he speaks as both an outsider and an insider, or as one who is "between stools" — that is, born and raised in Switzerland, but a resident of Germany for most of his adult life.

"With the Germans," he said, "you never know exactly what they will do the next day. You may become so involved in what is true at the moment that one thinks things will last for an eternity. People thought this about [Foreign Minister] Genscher." In a closing comment, Dr. Mohler declared with wry humor: "In politics everything can change and the personalities of the moment may easily be forgotten."

Notes

1. Mohler’s most important work, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932, was first published in 1950 in Stuttgart by Friedrich Verwerk Verlag. Second and third editions were published in Darmstadt. The revised, third edition was published in Darmstadt in 1989 in two volumes (715 pages), with a new supplement.


4. As one German intellectual puts it, "The renaissance of Mitteleuropa is first of all a protest against the division of the continent, against the hegemony of the Americans and the Russians, against the totalitarianism of the ideologies." Peter Bender, "Mitteleuropa — Mode, Modell oder Motiv?"


8. The movement known as Technocracy began in the United States and was especially active during the 1930s. It focused on technological innovation as the basis for social organization. Among other things, Technocracy held that major social-economic issues are too complicated to be understood and managed by politicians. Instead, society should be guided by trained specialists, especially engineers and scientists. While rejecting the Marxist theory of "class struggle," it sought to create unity among workers, notably in the industrial heartland of the United States. Much of the popularity of Technocracy derived from widespread disgust with the obvious failure of the social-political order in the international economic crisis known as the Great Depression (approximately 1930–1940). See: Armin Mohler, "Howard Scott und die "Technocracy": Zur Geschichte der technokratischen Bewegung, II," Standorte Im Zeitsstrom (Athenaum Verlag, 1974).


14. Mohler recounted an anecdote about a German company that considered building a factory in Ireland. As the chief of the Irish branch of this company explained, "I can’t run a factory with people about whom I can't be sure if they will arrive at 8:00 in the morning or 11:00 in the morning or if they arrive at all."

15. The fall from power of Hans-Dietrich Genscher came suddenly and precipitously in the wake of the unification of the two German states in 1989. Mohler admits here to suspicions that a number of West German Social Democratic party leaders may have been clandestine East Germany agents, whose national allegiance may have been mixed with some loyalty to international Marxism.

September / October 1994
Few nations have made more impressive contributions to political and social thought than Italy — one need only mention names such as Dante, Machiavelli, and Vico. In the twentieth century as well, the contributions of Italians have been of the highest significance. Among these are Gaetano Mosca’s theory of oligarchical rule, Roberto Michels’ masterful study of political parties, Corrado Gini’s intriguing sociobiological theories, and Scipio Sighele’s investigations of the criminal mind and of crowd psychology.1 One of the most widely respected Italian political theorists and sociologists in this century is Vilfredo Pareto. Indeed, so influential are his writings that “it is not possible to write the history of sociology without referring to Pareto.”2 Throughout all of the vicissitudes and convulsions of the twentieth-century political life, Pareto remains “a scholar of universal reputation.”3 Pareto is additionally important for us today because he is a towering figure in one of Europe’s most distinguished, and yet widely suppressed, intellectual currents. This broad school of thought, which includes such diverse figures as Taine, Burckhardt, Donoso Cortés, Nietzsche, and Spengler, stands in staunch opposition to rationalism, liberalism, egalitarianism, Marxism, and all of the other familiar offspring of Enlightenment doctrines.

Life and Personality

Vilfredo Federico Damaso Pareto was born in Paris in 1848.4 Of mixed Italian-French ancestry, he was the only son of the Marquis Raffaele Pareto, an Italian exiled from his native Genoa because of his political views, and Marie Mattenier. Because his father earned a reasonably comfortable living as a hydrological engineer, Pareto was reared in a middle-class environment, enjoying the many advantages that accrued to people of his class in that age. He received a quality education in both France and Italy, ultimately completing a degree in engineering at the Istituto Politecnico of Turin where he graduated at the top of his class. Thereafter he worked as a civil engineer, first for the state-owned Italian railway company and later in private industry.

In 1889 Pareto married Dina Bakunin, a Russian who preferred a very active social life. This clashed with Pareto’s own love of privacy and solitude, and after twelve years of marriage Dina abandoned her husband. His second wife, Jane Régis, joined him shortly after the collapse of his marriage, and the two remained deeply devoted to one another throughout the remainder of Pareto’s life.

During these years Pareto acquired a deep interest in the political life of his country, and expressed his views on a variety of topics in lectures, in articles for various journals, and in direct political activity. Steadfast in his support of free enterprise economics and free trade, he never ceased arguing that these concepts were vital necessities for the development of Italy. Vociferous and polemical in his advocacy of these ideas, and sharp in his denunciation of his opponents (who happened to be in power in Italy at that time), his public lectures were sufficiently controversial that they were sometimes raided and closed down by the police and occasionally brought threats of violence from hired thugs. Making little headway with his economic concepts at the time, Pareto retired from active political life. In 1893 he was appointed Professor of Political Economy at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland), where he established his reputation as an economist and sociologist. So substantial did this reputation eventually become that he became known, by both adversaries and admirers, as “the Karl Marx of the Bourgeoisie” or “the Karl Marx of Fascism.”5 In economic theory, his Manual of Political Economy6 and his penetrating critique of Marxist socialism, Les Systèmes socialistes,7 remain among his most important works.

Pareto turned to sociology somewhat late in life, but he is nonetheless widely acclaimed in this field.

James Alexander is the pen name of a West coast writer on political and historical topics. His articles and reviews have appeared in a variety of magazines, newspapers and scholarly journals. His review essay about the life and work of British historian J.F.C. Fuller appeared in the May–June 1993 Journal.
which have come and gone up to the present day. All revolutionaries proclaim, in turn, that previous revolutions have ultimately ended up by deceiving the people; it is their revolution alone which is the true revolution. “All previous historical movements” declared the Communist Manifesto of 1848, “were movements of minorities or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority.” Unfortunately this true revolution, which is to bring men an unmixed happiness, is only a deceptive mirage that never becomes a reality. It is akin to the golden age of the millenarians: for ever waited, it is for ever lost in the mists of the future, for ever eluding its devotees just when they think they have it.

Dynamic Sentiment

One of Pareto's most noteworthy and controversial theories is that human beings are not, for the most part, motivated by logic and reason but rather by sentiment. This idea appears repeatedly in Les Systèmes socialistes, and in its most fully developed form in Pareto's vast Treatise on General Sociology. In his Treatise, Pareto examined the multitudes of human actions that constitute the outward manifestations of these sentiments, classifying them into six major groups or “residues.” All of these are common to the whole of mankind, Pareto comments, but certain “residues” stand out more markedly in certain individuals. Additionally, they are unalterable; man's political nature is not perfectible but remains a constant throughout history.

Class I is the “instinct for combinations.” This is the manifestation of sentiments in individuals and in society that tends towards progressiveness, inventiveness and the desire for adventure. Class II residues have to do with what Pareto calls the “preservation of aggregates,” and encompass the more conservative side of human nature, including loyalty to society's enduring institutions such as family, church, community and nation, and the desire for permanency and security. Following this comes the need for expressing sentiments through external action, Pareto's Class III residues. Religious and patriotic ceremonies and pageantry stand out as examples of these residues, and are manifest in such things as saluting the flag, participating in a Christian communion service, marching in a military parade, and so on. In other words, human beings tend to express their feelings in symbols. Next comes the social instinct, Class IV, embracing manifestations of sentiments in support of the individual and societal discipline that is indispensable for maintaining the social structure. This includes phenomena such as self-sacrifice for the sake of family and community, and concepts such as the hierarchical arrangement of societies. Class V is the quality in a society that stresses individual integrity and the integrity of the individual's possessions and appurtenances. These residues contribute to social stability, systems of criminal and civil law being the most obvious examples. Finally, Class VI is the sexual instinct, or the tendency to see social events in sexual terms.

Foxes and Lions

Throughout his Treatise, Pareto places particular emphasis on the first two of these six residue classes, and to the struggle within individual men as well as in society between innovation and consolidation. The late James Burnham, writer, philosopher, and one of the foremost American disciples of Pareto, states that Pareto's Class I and II residues are an extension and amplification of certain aspects of political theorizing set down in the fifteenth century by Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli divided humans into two classes, foxes and lions. The qualities he ascribes to these two classes of men resemble quite closely the qualities typical of Pareto's Class I and Class II residue types. Men with strong Class I residues are the “foxes,” tending to be manipulative, innovative, calculating, and imaginative. Entrepreneurs prone to taking risks, inventors, scientists, authors of fiction, politicians, and creators of complex philosophies fall into this category. Class II men are “lions” and place much more value on traits such as good character and devotion to duty, than on sheer wits. They are the defenders of tradition, the guardians of religious dogma, and the protectors of national honor.

For society to function properly there must be a balance between these two types of individuals; the functional relationship between the two is complementary. To illustrate this point, Pareto offers the example of Kaiser Wilhelm I and his chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Wilhelm had an abundance of Class II residues, while Bismarck exemplified Class I. Separately, perhaps, neither would have accomplished much, but together they loomed gigantic in nineteenth-century European history, each supplying what the other lacked. On the other hand, seen from Pareto's standpoint, the regime of French emperor Napoleon III was a lopsided affair, obsessed with material prosperity and dominated for almost 20 years by such “foxes” as stock-market speculators and contractors who, it is said, divided the national budget among themselves. “In Prussia,” Pareto observes, “one finds a hereditary monarchy supported by a loyal nobility: Class II residues predominate; in France one finds a crowned adventurer supported by a band
of speculators and spenders: Class I residues predominate." Even more to the point, whereas in Prussia at that time the requirements of the army dictated financial policy, in France the financiers dictated military policy. Accordingly, when the "moment of truth" came in the summer of 1870, the vaunted Second French Empire fell to pieces and was overrun in a matter of weeks.20

**Justifying "Derivations"**

To rationalize their essentially non-logical, sentiment-driven actions, Pareto observed, people often employ ostensibly logical justifications (or what he called "derivations"). Pareto named four principle classes of derivations: 1) derivations of assertion; 2) derivations of authority; 3) derivations that are in agreement with common sentiments and principles; and, 4) derivations of verbal proof. The first of these include statements of a dogmatic or aphoristic nature, for example the saying, "honesty is the best policy." The second, authority, is an appeal to people or concepts held in high esteem by tradition. To cite the opinion of one of the American Founding Fathers on some topic of current interest is to draw from Class II derivations. The third deals with appeals to "universal judgment," the "will of the people," the "best interests of the majority," or other similar sentiments. And, finally, the fourth relies on various verbal gymnastics, metaphors, allegories, and so forth.

An understanding of Pareto's outlook provides fresh insights into the paradox of human behavior. His theories of "residues" and "derivations" are a direct challenge to rationalism and liberal ideals in that they illuminate the primitive motivations behind the sentimental slogans and catchwords of political life. Pareto devotes the vast majority of his *Treatise* to setting forth in great detail these observations about human nature, and to demonstrating the validity of his observations by citing examples from history. His legendary erudition in fields such as Greco-Roman history is reflected throughout this massive tome.

**Natural Equilibrium**

"Residues" and "derivations," Pareto argued, are mechanisms by which society maintains its equilibrium. He viewed society as a system, "a whole consisting of interdependent parts. The 'material points or molecules' of the system ... are individuals who are affected by social forces which are marked by constant or common properties."21 When imbalances arise, a reaction sets in whereby equilibrium is again achieved. Pareto believed that Italy and France, the two modern societies with which he was most familiar, were grossly out of balance, and that "foxes" were largely in control. Lengthy are his lamentations in the *Treatise* about the effete ruling classes in those two countries. In both instances, he held, revolutions were overdue.

As we have already noted, when a ruling class is dominated by men possessing strong Class I residues, intelligence is generally valued over all other qualities. The use of force in dealing with internal and external dangers to the state and nation is shunned, and in its place attempts are made to resolve problems or mitigate threats through negotiation or social tinkering. Rulers in such societies routinely seek to justify their timidity with false humanitarianism.

**Misguided Charity**

In the domestic sphere, the greatest danger to a society is an excess of criminal activity, with which Class I types attempt to cope by resorting to various supposedly charitable gestures, such as efforts to "rehabilitate" criminals. The inevitable result, as we know only too well, is a country awash in crime. With characteristic sarcasm Pareto comments on this phenomenon:22 Modern theorists are in the habit of bitterly reproving ancient "prejudices" whereby the sins of the father were visited upon the son. They fail to notice that there is a similar thing in our own society, in the sense that the sins of the father benefit the son and acquit him of guilt. For the modern criminal it is a great good fortune to be able to count somewhere among his ancestry or other relations a criminal, a lunatic, or just a mere drunkard, for in a court of law that will win him a lighter penalty or, not seldom, an acquittal. Things have come to such a pass that there is hardly a criminal case nowadays where that sort of defense is not put forward. The old metaphysical proof that was used to show that a son should be punished because of his father's wrongdoing proves unavailing, whereas his father's wrongdoing was neither more nor less valid than the proof used nowadays to show that the punishment which otherwise he deserves should for the same reasons be either mitigated or remitted. When, then, the effort to find an excuse for the criminal in the sins of his ancestors proves unavailing, there is still recourse to finding one in the crimes of "society," which, having failed to provide for the criminal's happiness, is "guilty" of his crime. And the punishment proceeds to fall not upon "society," but upon one of its members, who is chosen at random and has nothing whatever to do with the presumed guilt.

Pareto elucidates in a footnote:23 The classical case is that of the starving man who steals a loaf of bread. That he should be
allowed to go free is understandable enough; but it is less understandable that “society’s” obligation not to let him starve should devolve upon one baker chosen at random and not on society as a whole.

Pareto gives another example, about a woman who tries to shoot her seducer, hits a third party who has nothing to do with her grievance, and is ultimately acquitted by the courts. Finally, he concludes his note with these remarks:24

To satisfy sentiments of languorous pity, humanitarian legislators approve “probation” and “suspended sentence” laws, thanks to which a person who has committed a first theft is at once put in a position to commit a second. And why should the luxury of humaneness be paid for by the unfortunate victim of the second theft and not by society as a whole?... As it is, the criminal only is looked after and no one gives a thought to the victim.

Expanding on the proposition that “society” is responsible for the murderous conduct of certain people, with which viewpoint he has no tolerance, he writes:25

In any event, we still have not been shown why people who, be it through fault of “society,” happen to be “wanting in the moral sense,” should be allowed freely to walk the streets, killing anybody they please, and so saddling on one unlucky individual the task of paying for a “fault” that is common to all the members of “society.” If our humanitarians would but grant that these estimable individuals who are lacking in a moral sense as a result of “society’s shortcomings” should be made to wear some visible sign of their misfortune in their buttonholes, an honest man would have a chance of seeing them coming and get out of the way.

Foreign Affairs

In foreign affairs, “foxes” tend to judge the wisdom of all policies from a commercial point of view and usually opt for negotiations and compromise, even in dangerous situations. For such men profit and loss are the prime determinants, and though such an outlook may succeed for some time, the final result is usually ruinous. That is because enemies maintaining a balance of “foxes” and “lions” remain capable of appreciating the use of force. Though they may occasionally make a pretense of having been bought off, when the moment is right and their overly ingenious foe is asleep, they strike the lethal blow. In other words, Class I people are accustomed by their excessively-intellectualized preconceptions to believe that “reason” and money are always mightier than the sword, while Class II folk, with their native common sense, do not nurse such fatal delusions. In Pareto’s words, “The fox may, by his cunning, escape for a certain length of time, but the day may come when the lion will reach him with a well-aimed cuff, and that will be the end of the argument.”26

“Circulation of the Elites”

Apart from his analyses of residues and derivations, Pareto is most celebrated among sociologists for the theory known as “the circulation of the elites.” Let us remember that Pareto considered society a system in equilibrium, where processes of change tend to set in motion forces that work to restore and maintain social balance.

Pareto asserts that there are two types of elites within society: the governing elite and the non-governing elite. Moreover, the men who make up these elite strata are of two distinct mentalities, the speculator and the rentier. The speculator is the progressive, filled with Class I residues, while the rentier is the conservative, Class II residue type. There is a natural propensity in healthy societies
for the two types to alternate in power. When, for example, speculators have made a thorough mess of government, and have outraged the bulk of their countrymen by their corruption and scandals, conservative forces will step to the fore and, in one way or another, replace them. The process, as we have said, is cyclical and more or less inevitable.

Social Opportunity

Another aspect of this theory of the circulation of elites should be noted. According to Pareto, wise rulers seek to reinvigorate their ranks by allowing the best from the lower strata of society to rise and become fully a part of the ruling class. This not only brings the best and brightest to the top, but it deprives the lower classes of potential leaders of talent and ability who might one day prove to be a threat. Summarizing this component of Pareto's theory, a contemporary sociologist observes that practicality, not pity, demands such a policy:

A dominant group, in Pareto's opinion, survives only if it provides opportunities for the best persons of other origins to join in its privileges and rewards, and if it does not hesitate to use force to defend these privileges and rewards. Pareto's irony attacks the elite that becomes humanitarian, tenderhearted rather than tough-minded. Pareto favors opportunity for all competent members of society to advance into the elite, but he is not motivated by feelings of pity for the underprivileged. To express and spread such humanitarian sentiments merely weakens the elite in the defense of its privileges. Moreover, such humanitarian sentiments would easily be a platform for rallying the opposition.

Few aristocracies of long standing grasp the essential nature of this process, noted Pareto, short-sightedly preferring to keep their ranks as exclusive as possible. Time takes its toll, and the rulers become ever weaker and ever less capable of bearing the burden of governing:

It is a specific trait of weak governments. Among the causes of the weakness two especially are to be noted: humanitarianism and cowardice — the cowardice that comes naturally to decadent aristocracies and is in part natural, in part calculated, in “speculator” governments that are primarily concerned with material gain. The humanitarian spirit ... is a malady peculiar to spineless individuals who are richly endowed with certain Class I residues that they have dressed up in sentimental garb.

In the end, of course, the ruling class falls from power. Thus, Pareto writes that “history is a graveyard of aristocracies.”

Pareto and Fascism

Pareto frequently expressed boundless contempt for the pluto-democratic governments that ruled Italy throughout most of his life. As Arthur Livingston writes, "He was convinced that ten men of courage could at any time march on Rome and put the band of 'speculators' that were filling their pockets and ruining Italy to flight." Consequently, in October 1922, after the Fascist "March on Rome" and Benito Mussolini’s appointment by the King as Prime Minister, "Pareto was able to rise from a sickbed and utter a triumphant 'I told you so!'" Yet Pareto never became a member of the Fascist Party. Well into his seventies, and severely ill with heart disease, he remained secluded in his villa in Switzerland.

- Years before the “March on Rome,” a youthful Mussolini had attended Pareto's university lectures in Lausanne, listening to the famed professor with rapt attention. "I looked forward to every one," he later recalled, "for here was a teacher who was outlining the fundamental economic philosophy of the future." After his elevation to power, Italy's Duce sought immediately to transform his aged mentor's thoughts into action:

In the first years of his rule Mussolini literally executed the policy prescribed by Pareto, destroying political liberalism, but at the same time largely replacing state management of private enterprise, diminishing taxes on property, favoring industrial development, imposing a religious education in dogmas ...

During the final months of his life, Pareto was accorded many honors by the new Fascist regime. Mussolini designated the Pareto as delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, made him a Senator of the Kingdom, and listed him as a contributor to his personal periodical, Gerarchia. Although he was obliged to decline many of these honors due to the state of his health, he remained favorably disposed towards the Fascist regime, exchanging letters with Mussolini, and offering advice in the formulation of economic and social policy.

Even more than his economic theories, Pareto's sociological views influenced the policies of the Fascist state. His "Sociologia generale has become for many Fascists a treatise on government," noted one writer at the time. Furthermore, there was conspicuous agreement between Pareto and the new Fascist government at the most foundational level. His theories of rule by elites, his authoritarian proclivities, his uncompromising rejection of the liberal
concept of “economic man,” and his belief in an aristocracy of merit are all signal components of the Fascist credo. Without question, the Fascist movement was greatly indebted to the illustrious sociologist for much of its own political theory.

Some writers have speculated that had Pareto lived he would have found many points of disagreement with the Fascist state as it developed. While it is true that he expressed his disapprobation over limitations placed by the regime on freedom of expression, particularly in academia, it should be noted that it was in Pareto’s nature to find fault with nearly all regimes, past and present. It should therefore not be surprising that he found reason occasionally to criticize the Fascists.

Neither Pareto nor Mussolini, it should be pointed out, were rigid ideologues. Mussolini once declared, perhaps a bit hyperbolically, that “every system is a mistake and every theory a prison.” While government must be guided by a general set of principles, he believed, one must not be constrained by inflexible doctrines that become nothing more than wearisome impediments in dealing with new and unexpected situations. An early Fascist writer explained, in part, Mussolini’s affinity with Pareto in this respect:

“To seek!” — a word of power. In a sense, a nobler word than “to find.” With more of intention in it, less of chance. You may “find” through a coincidence, and you may “find” something that is false; but he who seeks goes on seeking increasingly, always hoping to attain to the truth. Vilfredo Pareto was a Master of this school. He kept moving. Without movement, Plato said, everything becomes corrupted. As Homer sang, the eternal surge of the sea is the father of mankind. Every one of Pareto’s new books or of the new editions of them, includes any number of commentaries upon and modifications of his previous books, and deals in detail with the criticisms, corrections, and objections which they have elicited. He generally refutes his critics, but while doing so, he indicates other and more serious points in regard to which they might have, and ought to have, reproved or questioned him. Reflecting over his subject, he himself proceeds to deal with these points, finding some of them specious, some important, and correcting his earlier conclusions accordingly.

Though Italian Fascist rule came to an end with the military victory of the Anglo-Americans in 1945, that mighty upheaval has not seriously diminished Pareto’s influence. New editions of his works, and new books about his view of society, continue regularly to appear. That his ideas endured the catastro-

phe of the war virtually without damage, and that they are still discussed among and debated by serious thinkers, suggests their universal vitality and timelessness.

Notes


5. Pareto’s Marxist opponents called Pareto “the Karl Marx of the Bourgeoisie.” During the 1920s and ’30s it was commonplace to call him “the Karl Marx of Fascism,” an appellation often proudly bestowed on Pareto by the Fascists themselves.


10. This term, “equality of opportunity” is so misused in our own time, especially in America, that some clarification is appropriate. “Equality of opportunity” refers merely to Pareto’s belief that in a healthy society advancement must be opened to superior members of all social classes — “Meritocracy,” in other words. See C. H. Powers, Vilfredo Pareto,
pp. 22–3.
18. V. Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology (New York: Dover, 1963), 2455. Instead of page numbers, citations from this work are identified by section or passage numbers. Citations are thus uniform in all editions.
19. V. Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology (New York: 1963), 2462. This work is henceforth referred to as V. Pareto, Treatise.
25. V. Pareto, Treatise, 1716n.
26. V. Pareto, Treatise, 2480n.
28. V. Pareto, Treatise, 2474.
29. V. Pareto, Treatise, 2053.
30. V. Pareto, Treatise, xvii.
31. V. Pareto, Treatise, xvii.
37. F. Borkenau, Pareto (1936), p. 18; In a letter to Mussolini written shortly before his death, Pareto cautioned that the Fascist regime must relentlessly strike down all active opponents. Those, however, whose opposition was merely verbal should not be molested since, he believed, that would serve only to conceal public opinion. "Let the crows crow but be merciless when it comes to acts," Pareto admonished Mussolini. Quoted in: Alistair Hamilton, The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism (New York: 1971), pp. 44–5.

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Search for the truth is the noblest occupation of man; its publication is a duty.  
— Mme. de Stael
On Conservatism, Liberalism, and History

Revilo P. Oliver

(This sampling of Prof. Oliver’s writing is taken from America’s Decline, pages 1–4, 79–83, 182–183, 187–189.)

Conservatism

Conservatism, when that word was first used in a political sense, correctly implied the maintenance of existing governmental and social institutions and their preservation from all undesirable innovation and substantial change. In Europe and the United States, however, the term has now acquired a quite different and linguistically improper meaning: it implies the restoration of political and social institutions that were radically changed and subverted to produce the governmental and social institutions that now exist.

Strictly speaking, therefore, “conservatism” has come, paradoxically, to mean reaction, an effort to purge the nation’s social and political organization of deleterious accretions and revolutionary changes imposed upon it in recent times, and to restore it to the pristine state in which it existed at some vaguely or precisely defined time in the past. The persons who now call themselves conservatives, if they mean what they propose, are really reactionaries, but eschew the more candid word as prejudicial...

I began as an American conservative: I wished to preserve the American society in which I grew up, not because I was unaware of its many and gross deficiencies, but because I saw it threatened by cunningly instigated agitation for changes that would inevitably destroy it and might ultimately result in a reversion to total barbarism. And with the euphoria of youth, I imagined that the existing structure, if preserved from subversion, would, under the impact of foreseeable and historically inevitable events, accommodate itself to the realities of the physical and biophysical world and perhaps give to the nation an era of Roman greatness.

Over the years, as the fatal subversion proceeded gradually, relentlessly, and often stealthily, and was thoughtlessly accepted by a feckless or befuddled populace, I became increasingly aware that “conservatism” was a misnomer, but I did entertain a hope that the current of thought and feeling represented by the word might succeed in restoring at least the essentials of the society whose passing I regretted. And when I at last decided to involve myself in political effort and agitation, I began a painful and very expensive education in political realities.

Since I have held positions of some importance in several of what seemed the most promising “conservative” movements in the United States, for which I was in one way or another a spokesman, and I was at the same time an attentive observer of the many comparable organizations and of the effective opposition to all such efforts, friends have convinced me that a succinct and candid account of my political education may make some contribution to the historical record of American “conservatism,” should someone in an unpredictable future be interested in studying its rise and fall ...

I think I may claim without immodesty that I always saw reality more clearly than anyone in the motley procession of self-appointed “leaders” who, inspired by illusory hopes and imagined certainties, arose to “save the nation,” fretted out their little hour on the darkling state of an almost empty theater, and vanished, sometimes pathetically, into the obscurity from which they came. What I dare not affirm is that I ever saw reality as clearly as some of the shrewd men who cynically exploited—and exploit—the residue of patriotic sentiment and the confused instinct of self-preservation that remains in the white Americans who still respond to one or another variety of “right-wing” propaganda ...

... An explicit warning ... This book may come into the hands of readers for whom it is not intended. I do not propose to entertain with anecdotes or to soothe by retelling any of the fairy tales of which Americans seem never to tire. If these pages are worth reading at all, they deal with a problem that is strictly intellectual and historical, and they are therefore addressed only to the comparatively few individuals who are willing and able to consider such questions objectively and dispassionately, thinking exclusively in terms of demon-
strable facts and reason, and without reference to the personal wishes and emotional fixations that are commonly called "faith" or "ideals." It is not my purpose to unsettle the placidity of the many who shrink from unpleasant realities and spare themselves the discomfort of cogitation by assuring themselves that some Savior, most commonly Jesus or Marx, had promised that the earth, if not the whole universe, will soon be rearranged to suit their tastes. As Kipling said of the fanatics of his day, they must cling to their faith, whatever the cost to their rationality: "If they desire a thing, they declare it is true. If they desire it not, though that were death itself, they cry aloud, 'It has never been'."

Persons who are not capable of objectivity or are unwilling to disturb their cerebral repose by facing displeasing facts should never read pages that cannot but perturb them emotionally. If they do so, they must blame the curiosity that impelled them to read words that were not intended for them. The reader has been warned.

**Liberalism**

"Liberalism" is a succedaneous religion that was devised late in the Eighteenth Century and it originally included a vague deism. Like the Christianity from which it sprang, it split into various sects and heresies, such as Jacobinism, Fourierism, Owenism, Fabian Socialism, Marxism, and the like. The doctrine of the "Liberal" cults is essentially Christianity divested of its belief in supernatural beings, but retaining its social superstitions, which were originally derived from, and necessarily depend on, the supposed wishes of a god. Thus "Liberalism," the residue of Christianity, is, despite the fervor with which its votaries hold their faith, merely a logical absurdity, a series of deductions from a premise that had been denied.

The dependence of the "Liberal" cults on a blind and irrational faith was long obscured or concealed by their professed esteem for objective science, which they used as a polemic weapon against orthodox Christianity, much as the Protestants took up the Copernican restoration of heliocentric astronomy as a weapon against the Catholics, who had imprudently decided that the earth could be stopped from revolving about the sun in defiance of Holy Writ by burning intelligent men at the stake or torturing them until they recanted. Pious Protestants would naturally have preferred a cozy little earth, such as their god described in their holy book, but they saw the advantage of appealing to our racial respect for observed reality to enlist support, while simultaneously stigmatizing their rivals as ignorant obscurantists and ridiculous ranters.

The votaries of "Liberalism" would have much preferred to have the various human species specially created to form one race endowed with the fictitious qualities dear to "Liberal" fancy, but cultists saw the advantage of endorsing the findings of geology and biology, including the evolution of species, in their polemics against orthodox Christianity to show the absurdity of the Jewish version of the Sumerian creation-myth. The hypocrisy of the professed devotion to scientific knowledge was made unmistakable when the "Liberals" began their frantic and often hysterical efforts to suppress scientific knowledge about genetics and the obviously innate difference between the different human species and between the individuals of any given species. At present, the "Liberals" are limited to shrieking and spitting when they are confronted with inconvenient facts, but no one who had heard them in action can have failed to notice how exasperated they are by the limitations that have thus far prevented them from burning wicked biologists and other rational men at the stake.

It is unnecessary to dilate on the superstitions of "Liberalism." They are obvious in the cult's holy words. "Liberals" are forever chattering about "all mankind," a term which does have a specific meaning, as do parallel terms in biology, such as "all marsupials" or "all species of the genus Canis," but the fanatics give to the term a mystic and special meaning, derived from the Zoroastrian myth of "all mankind" and its counterpart in Stoic speculation, but absurd when used by persons who deny the existence of Ahura Mazda or a comparable deity who could be supposed to have imposed a transcendent unity on the manifest diversity of the various human species. "Liberals" rant about "human rights" with the fervor of an evangelist who appeals to what Moses purportedly said, but a moment's thought suffices to show that, in the absence of a god who might be presumed to have decreed such rights, the only rights are those which the citizens of a stable society, by agreement or by a long usage that has acquired the force of law, bestow on themselves; and while the citizens may show kindness to aliens, slaves, and horses, these beings can have no rights. Furthermore, in societies that have been so subjugated by conquest or the artful manipulation of masses that individuals no longer have constitutional rights that are not subject to revocation by violence or in the name of "social welfare," there are no rights, strictly speaking, and therefore no citizens — only masses existing in the state of indiscriminate equality of which "Liberals" dream and, of course, a state of de facto slavery, which their masters may deem it expedient, as in the United States at present, to make relatively light until the ani-
mals are broken to the yoke. "Liberals" babble about "One World," which is to be a "universal democracy" and is "inevitable," and they thus describe it in the very terms in which the notion was formulated, two thousand years ago, by Philo Judaeus, which he cleverly gave a Stoic coloring to the old Jewish dream of a globe in which all the lower races would obey the masters whom Yahweh, by covenant, appointed to rule over them. And the "Liberal" cults, having rejected the Christian doctrine of "original sin," which, although based on a silly myth about Adam and Eve, corresponded fairly well to the facts of human nature, have even reverted to the most pernicious aspect of Christianity, which common sense had held in check in Europe until the Eighteenth Century; and they openly exhibit the morbid Christian fascination with whatever is lowly, proletarian, inferior, irrational, debased, deformed, and degenerate. Their maudlin preoccupation with biological refuse, usually sicklied over with such nonsense words as "underprivileged [1]," would make sense, if it had been decreed by a god who perversely chose to become incarnate among the most pestiferous of human races and to select his disciples from among the illiterate dregs of even that peuple, but since the "Liberals" claim to have rejected belief in such a divinity, their superstition is exposed as having no basis other than their own resentment of their betters and their professional interest in exploiting the gullibility of their compatriots.

In the Eighteenth Century, Christians whose thinking was cerebral rather than glandular, perceived that their faith was incompatible with observed reality and reluctantly abandoned it. A comparable development is taking place in the waning faith of "Liberalism," and we may be sure that, despite the cult's appeal to masses that yearn for an effortless and mindless existence on the animal level, and despite the prolonged use of public schools to deform the minds of all children with "Liberal" myths, the cult would have disappeared, but for the massive support given it today, as to the Christian cults in the ancient world, by the Jews, who have, for more than two thousand years, batten on the vulnerability, credulity, and vices of the races they despise. In 1955, however, the extent and pervasiveness of their power in the United States remained to be determined.

There is one crucial fact that we must not overlook, if we are to see the political situation as it is, rather than in the anamorphosis of some "ideology," i.e., propaganda-line, whether "Liberal" or "conservative." The real fulcrum of power in our society is neither the votaries of an ideological sect nor the Jews, clear-sighted and shrewd as they are, but the intelligent members of our own race whose one principle is an unmitigated and ruthless egotism, and implacable determination to satisfy their own ambitions and lusts at whatever cost to their race, the nation, and even their own progeny. And with them we must reckon the bureaucrats, men who, however much or little they may think about the predictable consequences of the policies they carry out, are governed by a corporate determination to sink their proboscies ever deeper into the body politic from which they draw their nourishment. Neither of these groups can be regarded as being "Liberal" or as having any other political attitude from conviction. The first are guarded by the lucidity of their minds, and the second by their collective interests, from adhesion to any ideology or other superstition.

**History and the Historians**

A conservative is essentially a man who is willing to learn from the accumulated experience of mankind. He must strive to observe dispassionately and objectively, and he must read from his observations with a full awareness of the limitations of reason. And he must, above all, have the courage to confront the unpleasant realities of human nature and the world in which we live. That is why history, the vast record of human trial and error, is a discipline for conservatives. It necessarily lies beyond the emotional and intellectual capacities of children, savages, and "liberal intellectuals," who instinctively flee from reality to live in a dream-world in which the laws of nature can be suspended by the intervention of fairies, witch-doctors, or "social scientists."

History is a high and arduous discipline in which it is always necessary to collect and weigh complex and often elusive data, and in which, as in so many other fields of research, we must frequently content ourselves with a calculation of probabilities rather than a certainty. And when we try to extract from history the laws of historical development we find ourselves calculating the probability of probabilities — as difficult and delicate a task as the human mind can set for itself.

Fortunately for us, in the practical affairs of this world prudence and common sense (though somewhat uncommon qualities) are an adequate guide and do not depend on answers to the great questions of philosophy. A man may learn not to buy a pig in a poke without finding solution to the epistemological problem that Hume posed so clearly and that yet remains unsolved. We can learn much from history without answering the ultimate questions.

Our minds, however, by their very nature desire a coherent philosophy that will account for the
whole of perceived reality. And we live in a time in which we are constantly confronted by claims — some obviously mere propaganda but others seriously and sincerely put forward — that this or that development must take place in the future because it is "historically necessary." Furthermore, we live in a time in which all but the most thoughtless sense that our very civilization is being eroded by vast and obscure forces which, if unchecked, will soon destroy it utterly — forces that we can identify and understand only if we can ascertain how and why they are shaping our history. And here again we are often told that those forces represent a destiny inherent in civilization itself and therefore irremissible and inescapable.

That is why the development of a working philosophy of history is the most urgent, as well as the most difficult, task of Twentieth Century thought...

**Greece and Rome**

History as the reasoned reporting of political and social change was the product of the Greek mind. Indeed, it could be argued that the capacity for history in that sense is the exclusive property of the Western culture that the Greeks created and we inherited — but it would be a fairly long argument. We cannot indulge ourselves in it here, any more than we can undertake a survey of ancient historians. But we should observe that the two basic conceptions of the historical process between which the modern mind must choose were both formed in Classical antiquity. I merely mention two historians who illustrate the contrast.

If we consider his almost superhuman dispassion and objectivity, the intellectual power that enables him to extract the essential from great masses of detail and so write concisely of highly complex events, and his lucid presentation of the evidence included by theory of thesis, we must regard Thucydides as the great historian of all time. With perfect precision he tells us what happened and how it happened; he sees reality with an eye that is never blurred by a tear for his country's fate; and the implacable lucidity of his intellect is no more perturbed by a theory to be demonstrated than it was perturbed by the temptation, which no other writer could have resisted, to add at least a few words to explain or defend his own conduct as a general or to mention his own misfortunes. We cannot read Thucydides without deep emotion, but the emotion is ours, not his; we cannot read him without pondering the lessons of history, but they are lessons that we must draw from the facts, not accept ready-made from the writer.

The future will always resemble the past because human nature does not change; men will always be actuated by the same basic desire and motives; the limitations of human reason and of human willingness to reason constitute a kind of fatality, but the events of history are always the result of human decisions, of wisdom or folly, in dealing with matters that can never be calculated with certainty in advance because the result will to some extent depend on chance — on factors that cannot be predicted. Nations, like men, must suffer the consequences of their own acts — consequences often unforeseen and sometimes unforeseeable — but there is no historical force which compels them to decide how they will act: they are subject, therefore, to no fate, other than that inherent in the limitations of their physical, mental, and moral resources. History is tragic, but it is tragedy in the strict sense of the word, the result of human blindness.

That conception of history contrasts strongly with another, with may be described as either more cowardly, since it does shift responsibility, or more profound, since it tries to account for decisions. The elder Seneca, writing his history of the Civil Wars after the fall of the Roman Republic and the establishment of the Precipitate, was certainly influenced by the Stoic conception of a universe that operates by a strict mechanical necessity in vast cycles from one ecplerosis to another, endlessly repeating itself. Seneca saw in the Roman people an organism comparable to a man and undergoing, like men, a kind of biological development. Rome spent her infancy under the early kings; adolescent, the nation established a republic and, with the indefatigable vigor of a growing organism, extended its rule over the adjacent parts of Italy; with the strength and resolution of maturity (iuventus), Rome conquered virtually all of the world that was worth taking; and then at last, weary and feeling the decline of her powers, unable to muster the strength and resolution to govern herself, she in her old age (senectus) resigned herself and her affairs into the hands of a guardian, closing her career as even be certain how strictly he applied the fatalism of Classical civilization as a whole, but this analogy anticipated the essentials of what we now call the organic, or cyclic, conception of history.
The Modern Dilemma

Modern history begins with the Renaissance, an age which thought of itself, as the name indicates, as a "rebirth" of Classical antiquity. For a long time, men's energies were concentrated in an effort to ascend to the level of high civilization represented by the great ages of Greece and Rome. The most common metaphor described cultural change in terms of day and night: Civilization had reached high noon in the age of Cicero and Virgil; the decadence of the Roman Empire was the gloaming that preceded the long night of the Dark Ages; and the revival of literature and the arts that began with Petrarch was the dawn of a new day — the return of the sun to illumine the earth and rouse the minds of men. This metaphor was intended to mark contrasts, not to draw an analogy. Culture did not come to the world as the sun rises and sets, independently of human effort; on the contrary, literature, philosophy (including what we now call science), and the arts were the products of the highest and most intense creativity of the human mind. It followed, therefore, that civilization was essentially the body of knowledge accumulated and maintained by the intellect and will of men. This sense of constant striving precluded a cyclic or deterministic conception of history, while the awareness that the thread of civilization had been all but broken during the Dark Ages precluded a facile and unthinking optimism.

From the dawn of the Renaissance to the early years of the Twentieth Century men thought of the history of civilization as a continuum that could be reduced to a line on a graph. The line began at the bottom somewhere in pre-history before the time of Homer, rose steadily to a peak in the great age of Athens, dipped a little and then rose again to the Golden Age of Rome, fell steadily toward zero, which almost reached in the Dark Ages, rose a little in the later Middle Age, and with the Revival of Learning climbed sharply toward a new peak. History thus conceived divided itself into three periods: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern.

That linear conception of history was simply taken for granted by historians. Guicciardini, Juan de Mariana, Thuanus, Gibbon, and Macaulay differ greatly from one another in outlook, but they all regard the linear conception as apodictic ...

Misgivings

The Nineteenth Century brought to the West the assurance of military superiority over all the other peoples of the world. It seemed certain that the white man, thanks to his technology, would forever rule the globe and its teeming populations. And from this confidence sprang a mad-cap euphoria — a bizarre notion that progress was inevitable and automatic; that civilization, instead of being a precious and fragile creation that men must work very hard to maintain and even harder to improve, had become self-perpetuating and self-augmenting; and that the line on the graph, having risen higher than the highest point attained in antiquity, was destined to move upward forever and forever. That childish fancy, to be sure, did not impose on the best minds of the century (e.g. Burckhardt), but like a heady wine it intoxicated many writers (e.g. Herbert Spencer) who passed for serious thinkers in their day. And it did serve to suggest to reflective minds the question whether or not there was a destiny inherent in the nature of the historical process itself as distinct from the wisdom or folly of decisions made by men.

Toward the end of the century, deep misgivings that could no longer be repressed found expression in such works as Théodore Funck-Brentano's La civilisation et ses lois, Brooks Adams' The Law of Civilization and Decay, and Henry Adams' The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma. No one thought of doubting the supremacy of the West or its perpetuity, but men began to wonder whether civilization was not falling to a lower level. And to find an answer, they sought to establish a "science of history" — what is now called historionomy in English and métahistoire in French — which would ascertain the natural laws that govern the development of civilization.

On the eve of the First World War, a few remarkable minds, prescient of the coming catastrophe, formulated the historical question in more drastic and fundamental terms: Was the civilization of the West mortal and already growing old? Would a traveller of some future and alien civilization meditate among the moldering ruins of New York and London and Paris as Volney had meditated among the ruins of Babylon, Baalbec, and Persepolis — and perhaps, like Volney, soothe himself with illusions that his civilization could endure, although all its predecessors had left but heaps of broken stone to attest that they had once existed?

Power in the World

We must understand that the grim question thus posed was at that time, and remains even today, entirely a question of internal decay — of a sickness or debility of the Western mind and will. It was not then, and had not yet become, a question of strength relative to the rest of the world. The power of the nations of the West was, and is, simply overwhelming.

In 1914, men debated whether or not Russia was part of the Western world. Assuming that it was not, it was obvious that there were only two non-Western nations on earth that possessed the military
and industrial capacity to offer serious resistance to even a medium-sized nation of the West. And neither Russia nor Japan could have hoped to defeat a major western power except by forming an alliance with another major power of Europe or America. And despite all the efforts of the west to destroy itself in fratricidal wars and by exporting its technology and its wealth to other peoples, that remains in large part true today.

The retreat of the West has been self-imposed, and we must not permit the screeching of “liberals” to distract our attention from that obvious and fundamental fact. Great Britain, for example, was in no sense compelled to relinquish India as a colony. During the great Indian Mutiny of 1857, fifty thousand British troops cut their way through the whole of the India subcontinent, and in little more than a year reduced to complete submission its population of more than one hundred million. And this, nota bene, was done at a time when the only basic weapon of warfare was the rifle, so that a man with a rifle on one side was the match of a man with a rifle on the other side, except insofar as discipline and individual intelligence might make some difference in the use of the common and universally obtainable weapon. In 1946, Great Britain, with all the weapons that are by their very nature a monopoly of great nations, could have snuffed out in a few weeks the most formidable revolt that Nehru and his gang could conceivably have instigated and organized.

The power is still ours. The greater part of the globe lies open for our taking, if we as a nation resolved to take it. Despite all the frenzied efforts in Washington to sabotage the United States for the past thirty years, it is still beyond doubt that if we were so minded, we could, for example, simply take the whole continent of Africa, exterminate the native population; and make the vast and rich area a new frontier for the expansion of our own people. No power on earth — certainly not the Soviet that we have so diligently nurtured and built up with our resources — would dare to oppose us. To be sure, there are good reasons for not annexing Africa, but if we are to think clearly about our place in the world, we must understand that lack of power is not one of them.

That the Western world, with it virtual monopoly of the instruments of power, should slavishly cringe before the hordes for which it felt only contempt when it was less strong than it now is, is obvious proof that our civilization is suffering from some potentially fatal disease or decay that has deprived us — temporarily or permanently — of the intelligence and the will to live. Every philosophy of history, or, if you prefer, every system of historionomy, is simply an effort to diagnose our malady — to tell us, in effect, whether the debility and enervation of the West is the result of a curable disease or of an irreversible deterioration ...

**Historical Understanding**

The social and political questions of our day are all primarily historical problems. To think about them rationally, we must begin by consulting the record of human experience in the past. And we soon realize that if only we knew enough about history — and understood it — we should have the answers to all our questions.

Unique events are always incomprehensible. And every change is unique until it has been repeated often enough to be recognized as forming part of some intelligible pattern. We could not identify even so simple a sensation in our own bodies as hunger, had we not experienced it a thousand times and observed that a good meal invariably abolished it — for a while.

No man lives long enough to behold with his own eyes a pattern of change in society. He is like the midge that is born in the afternoon and dies at sunset, and which, therefore, no matter how intelligent it might be, could never discover, or even suspect, that day and night come in regular alternation. Unlike the midge, however, man can consult the experience of the comparatively few generations of his species that have preceded him during the comparatively brief period of about five thousand years in which human beings have had the power to leave records for the instruction of their posterity.

That, unfortunately, is not enough history to give positive and indubitable answers to many of our questions — but it is all that we have. The historian today is often in the position of the Greek philosophers who tried to decide whether the solar system was geocentric or heliocentric, and could not reach a definite conclusion simply because there was not available in the world a record of sufficiently exact observations recorded over a sufficiently long period of time. The modern historian who tries to explain the rise and fall of civilizations may possibly find the right explanation; but if he does — and if he is really a historian — he knows that, at best, he is in the position of Aristarchus, who first systematized and formulated the heliocentric theory, and who must have known that the theory could not be proved during his own lifetime or for many years to come. (I.e. not until the annual parallax of at least one fixed star had been determined. This was first accomplished by Bessel in 1838 — three centuries after Copernicus.) What Aristarchus could not anticipate, of course, was that the level of civilization would so fluctuate that it would be twenty-one centuries before men could be certain that he had been right.
The historionomer, though aware that his hypothesis must remain a hypothesis in his time, can draw an analogy in terms of a historical certainty. When civilized mankind lost interest in the problem that Aristarchus tried to solve with his unverifiable theory, it was headed toward a Dark Age in which men forgot facts that had been ascertained — an age so stultified that men forgot that they had once known that the earth was a globe, and so relapsed to the primitive notion that it was flat.

"The future will always resemble the past because human nature does not change."

"The social and political questions of our day are all primarily historical problems. To think about them rationally, we must begin by consulting the record of human experience in the past. And we soon realize that if only we knew enough about history — and understood it — we should have the answers to all our questions."

— Revilo Oliver

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The Holocaust and
The Myth of the Past as History

Howard F. Stein

In a letter commenting on my paper, "Judaism and the Group-Fantasy of Martyrdom: The Psychodynamic Paradox of Survival Through Persecution,"1 Lewis Brandon [pen name of David McCalden, the first editor of this Journal] posed the question:

I wonder how far you would go along with our view that it is not just the history of the Holocaust which is sanctified, but that the very "Holocaust" itself is a group-fantasy?

This article is an attempt to reply to Brandon's thoughtful question. My remarks are based on a decade of psychohistorical/anthropological research into ethnicity, nationalism, American culture, and Judaica.2

My point of departure is the simple observation that between 1933 and 1945 some awesomely terrible things took place in Europe — to everyone. It is, however, another matter to view the entire sordid era through the eyes of a single group — the Jews — and to accept this interpretation as the only valid one. Yet the very essence of "history" is its ethnocentrism.3 One ubiquitous function and purpose of having a sense of history, both individual and group, is to replace the reality of the present and past with a defensive myth of the past through which distorting filter we perceive the past. Were it not one's need to falsify retrospectively by distorting, we would now have no need for a "revision" of sacred historical orthodoxies. Only by stepping outside the cozening ignorance of our tribal caves do we have that perspective which compels us to revise our cherished errors. Should we wonder why the "Holocaust" is excluded from open scholarly debate — save for those "safe" disputes within the boundary of the permissible — we need only note that the violation of any taboo in a "primitive" society is followed by censure, ostracism, punishment, or death. "History" is socially sacred knowledge. One is duty-bound to revere, and never to question, that knowledge.

But that presses us to other questions. What does each group select to enshroud in ineffable mystery? Why, for Jews, the Holocaust? What, in sanctifying the Holocaust, do Jews not want to know about that grim era? Whatever the "facts" of the Holocaust, it is experienced as a necessity, as part of a recurrent historic pattern. Reality must be made to conform to fantasy. Whatever did happen in the Holocaust must be made to conform to the group-fantasy of what ought to have happened. For the Jews, the term "Holocaust" does not simply denote a single catastrophic era in history, but is a grim metaphor for the meaning of Jewish history. The "Holocaust" lies at the heart of the Jewish experience of time itself. One is either anxiously awaiting persecution, experiencing persecution, recovering from it, or living in a period that is a temporary reprieve from it. "Holocaust" is thus the timeless fabric into which the 1933–1945 period is woven. Enslavement in Egypt under Pharaoh Ramses II, the two Exiles in Biblical times, pursuit by the Amalekites in the desert on the journey to the Promised Land, the medieval Crusades, expulsion from Spain during the Christian reconquista from the Moors, the uprising of the Ukrainian and Polish peasants in 1648 under Bogdan Chmielnicki, are all inseparable parts of the chain in Jewish history from which per-
spective the National Socialist period is perceived. Thus the “reality” of the Holocaust is inextricably part of the myth in which it is woven — and for which myth it serves as further confirmatory evidence for the timeless Jewish theme that the world is in conspiracy to annihilate them, one way or another, at least eventually.

The tormented and phantasmagoric Franz Kafka is perhaps this century’s most pure distillation of the Jewish persecutory world. “Every obstacle smashes me,” he writes to Max Brod. His is a world ruled by an inaccessible, implacable “High Command”; his is a godless theology of father-Gods, personified by the Bureaucracy, who are remote, unappeasable, overbearing, capricious, formidable. There is No Exit from history; there is No Respite. Philip Rahv writes hauntingly:

... The clue to The Trial is in the reflection that “only our concept of time makes it possible for us to speak of the Day of Judgment by that name; in reality it is a summary court in perpetual session.” And in the same sequence of reflection we find the perfectly typical sentence: “The hunting dogs are playing in the courtyard, but the hare will not escape them, no matter how fast it may be flying already through the woods.” The identification here is plainly with the hare; and with the hunting dogs, too, insofar as they represent the hare’s longing for self-punishment, his inner wish to be cornered, to be hurt, to be torn to pieces so as to atone for the guilt that fills him from top to bottom. In this one short sentence about the hare and the hunting dogs you have the gist of the typical Kafka narrative, the obsessive theme, the nuclear fable concerning the victim of an unappeasable power to which he returns again and again, varying and complicating its structure with astonishing resourcefulness, and erecting on so slender a foundation such marvelous superstructures as that of the myth of the Old Commander in In the Penal Colony, the myth of the Law in The Trial, and of the celestial bureaucracy in The Castle.

Here, “art” is both history and prophecy about what would become history in World War II.

Myth truly generates reality in its own image. “History” is more than a group projective myth of the past, a screen on which we see what we need to see in order not to encounter reality. The sense of history not only dictates perception of the past, but is a template for the future which will “repeat” the past. Not unexpectedly, Yasir Arafat is often referred to by Israelis as a contemporary exterminationist-Hitler, the Palestine Liberation Organization and El Fatah as Nazis, Brownshirts, SS, and the like. If past, present, and future merge into gauzy sameness, no authentic change can be expected (even though it might be fervently wished): holocausts, walls, ghettos, trials, judgments, punishment are part of the plight of the spectral Ahashueras who is condemned to wander the earth, to be redeemed from history only by death. Now as in the past, historical partners will be found who will only too willingly complement the suicidal wishes of Jews or Israelis. Projected self-hatred returns as provoked hatred. The unofficial Israeli policy of resettlement of Jews on the West Bank; the fanaticism of the Gush Emunim (“Bloc of the Faithful”) who have zealously “occupied” the West Bank; the Israeli claim to the entire city of Jerusalem; the Israeli claim to the West Bank based on “historical” entitlement (Judea/Samaria Biblically — one can manipulate history such that one can justify virtually any claim!); and the overseas financial and moral support given to these adventures by American diaspora Jewry: these together are unconscious provocations against the Arabs for the war of annihilation which Israelis not only expect but seek in order that the masochistic fantasy come true. Both in the Jewish religious tradition and in secular Israeli nationalism, any awaited-for redemption and resurrection will be heralded by a preceding era of unfathomable cataclysm and bereavement.

Journalist Martin Woollacott writes of the Israelis that: “Refuge is taken in the future, a future in which new outbreaks of anti-Semitism will blast the diaspora. A young and able official, a supporter of the Begin government, knowledgeable and even liberal, said: ‘There will be another disaster in world Jewry. It could come in South Africa. It could come in America itself.’”6 In the same essay, another Israeli is quoted as saying that “America is the Jewish national home ... Israel is the Jewish national graveyard.”7 These fears of inevitable death are not the product of lone voices, but the litany of Jewish tradition that traces biblically to the prophetic threat of imminent Yahwistic punishment for the commission of sins. But what “sins”? As Gonen has observed, these sins are in fact wishes for the possession of the land (mother), Zion, which is god’s Biblical bride.8 Psychohistorically, Zionism and Israeli nationalism have achieved in reality what is taboo: usurpation of the power of the father-God, the claim upon the mother-land by the son. What remains is the group-fantasy of retribution in which history replays in this third Zionade (return to Zion) the drama of Jewish guilt and punishment.

It turns out that in group history, just as in individual history, an overblown fear camouflages an underlying wish (a point made by Freud eight decades ago). Wim van Leer, an insightful retired
Israeli industrialist, writes: "Hatred became an indispensable prop for the maintenance of Jewish cohesion and identity, for whenever the cold eye of ostracism was mellowed by a kindly glint, whenever humanism and liberalism reared their ugly heads, Jewish identity melted away in the warm bath of assimilation."9 Furthermore, "Provoking this hatred for Israel is one of the few areas where Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government has been a resounding success. A useful tool had been the Gush Emunim ... We revel in our ostracism and, instead of advancing arguments to justify our actions, we reply to criticism with ever more provocative and oppressive actions."10 Van Leer's article repeatedly uses "provocation," "defiance," "fanaticism," "dogmatic determinism," and "intransigence" to characterize Israeli actions that once again make Jews into an isolated, emotionally ghettoized people, and which will once again occasion the very (next) Holocaust that is as much expected as it is dreaded. We are thus face to face with the terrible psychohistorical truth that Jews must survive in order that they be persecuted.

The scientific discipline of history — indeed, of all behavioral science — ought rightfully to occupy itself with the search for the "facts." Correcting facts is one thing. But to understand the intractable need to edit reality and thereby distort the facts is an equally important matter. Historical myth is one type of "fact" that must be decoded as well as courageously doubted. For, as we know only too well, the myth of the Holocaust has for forty years been more compelling — not only for Jews — than reality. It is this resistance to testing and accepting reality that we must also explain.

Thus, while we constantly struggle to separate myth from fact, we need also to accept the fact that people adhere tenaciously to their mythic worldviews in order that they not be compelled to come painfully face to face with the world as it is and the repressed world of their childhood. Collectively as well as individually, we remember in order to forget. In the process, our defenses remove us even further from reality so that the world to which we adapt is hopelessly tangled by our projections and displacements. Jews cling to their history of persecution so that they need not look at their own role in the process (both the act of persecution and the perception of the act). Greatly simplifying what I have written at length elsewhere,11 this is to say that so central is the Holocaust in that condensation of Jewish history/ folklore/myth/world-view, and the like, that it is unimaginable to be a Jew (or even an ideologically anti-"Jewish" Israeli) without it. I would go so far as to say that one who comprehends the Jewish meaning of "Holocaust" (and I encompass some five thousand years here) has understood the Jewish experience of life: fear of punishment, expectation of punishment, inevitability of punishment, and, finally, unconscious conviction that punishment is deserved (from Yahweh through Hitler through Arafat). Of course, all this is massively defended against — not unsurprisingly, by projecting and displacing the wish and fear onto outer sources of rejection and extermination, and by distorting the reality of history so that it conforms with the myth of history. It is utterly catastrophic for reality-testing when a group-myth, fueled by narcissistic trauma of childhood, family, and unresolved past, finds mirroring "confirmation" in current events.

It is precisely at this point that the Holocaust as sacred symbol collides with a scientific approach to the Holocaust as a fact to be analyzed. The magic of "numbers" has long played an almost hypnotic role in any discussion of the 1933—1945 period. To most Jews, and to many non-Jews, the Holocaust is defined exclusively in terms of the "six million" Jews who perished. Little mention is made of non-Jewish Slavic peoples, or non-Axis peoples of western Europe, who perished. To Jews, the Holocaust, it must be remembered, interweaves two elements of the doctrine of Chosenness: (a) election as moral superiority, and (b) election to suffer. What ethnocentric persecution mania accomplishes is to omit the suffering of non-Jewish victims. It is to say in essence: "Our suffering has more meaning than yours."

At present, one can notice the same process at work in the Mideast negotiations on the "Palestinian" problem or on the political status of Jerusalem. Those two to three million Palestinian refugees and their children living in Arab lands are, from the point of view of pure fact, exiles in no sense different than were the Jews in Europe and Islamic lands who emigrated to Palestine/Israel. Yet, in religious Zionist and secular Israeli nationalist ideology, Arab exiles are an Arab problem, not an Israeli one; secondly, because Palestine/Israel was envisioned from the outset as a Jewish state and homeland (Der Judenstaat, published in 1896, the title of Theodor Herzl's manifesto), Arabs would either have to accommodate to the new ethno-nationalist hegemony or leave; and finally, although Jerusalem is a holy city to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faiths alike, Israelis rationalize their greater entitlement to the whole of it because of ancient historic precedent.

Narcissistic self-preoccupation knows no empathy for others outside the self or group-self. This has been the fate both of primitive ethnocentrism and rabid nationalism. "We" (Jews) are good; "they" (Gentiles) are evil. What is more, because "we" are Chosen (if not by God, then at least by the duty-bound guilt of the world's nations), the fate of our
people is of greater consequence than that of those who oppose us. With the same taunting arrogance of those whom they fled in Europe, Israelis assert, in essence, that “The future belongs to us.” What matters, in ethno-nationalist terms, is not the enormity of the “numbers,” but whose they are: who counts and who is discountable. The expansive claim by Jews and Israelis on land in the Mideast as “atonement” exacted from the world for historic injustices visited upon them is one powerful expression of the narcissistic principle of entitlement. Vengeful demand for restitution underlies the seemingly idealistic contemporary principles of “human rights” based on ethnic, national, or religious grounds.

Let me take this a step further. If Jews feel that their suffering is more significant and historically memorable than that which was inflicted on non-Jewish victims of the Nazis, what then, are we to make of the suffering of the Germans during the same period? How are we to understand their role in modern European history? Do we not need also to “revise” the great mythology of the West (one held by Russia as well) which holds that psychogeographically, Germany is the perpetual “bad boy” and menacing nemesis of the West, a people who must be kept under vigilant watch (although their economy supported!), and who must remain divided (symbolized by that simple yet sinister wall in Berlin) lest their inherent evil be once again unleashed?

Part of the West’s myth of Germany is its denial of flagrant atrocities committed against Germany in the name of democracy. The infamous bombing of Dresden is the most conspicuous example in Europe. (The use of the atomic bomb on Japan is the parallel on the Asian front.) In warfare there is invariably a double-standard: what “we” do against the enemy is justified, what “they” do against us is “criminal,” “barbaric,” and the like. Not the deed itself, but who perpetrated it, is our fatuous relativistic argument! Psychologically, the process is disarmingly simple: we fight in our enemies what we hate in ourselves and conveniently locate in then. We fight a disowned part of ourselves in them; in killing them, as symbolic embodiments of our evil, we cleanse ourselves of that evil — at least temporarily, until the next need for purging through war arises.

The core of revisionism must be the re-humanization of all participants, whatever their role, in the Second World War. The consequence, I propose, will be a discovery of a systemic irrationality in which Germany cannot be singled out for blame. “Holocaust” will acquire a far more encompassing meaning in which the drama of the “family” of nations transcends any easy distinction between villains and victims. Let me cite a brief poignant example offered by Professor George Kren:

I vividly recall a trip in a bus from a psychohistorical conference to the airport where I had suggested that I had considered learning to fly a light plane so that I could fly to the various conferences without the hassle of airports and reservations. One of the members of our party, a psychiatrist, indicated that he had been a pilot in the Second World War and described to us in detail his participation in the bombing of Dresden. He was clearly nostalgic. He analyzed the technical problems of getting that many planes into the air so that they would not collide, and then enthusiastically described how the American methods of coming over the target were so much more destructive than the British ones. There appeared an almost erotic infatuation with the technical destructive apparatus. Yet by contemporary psychiatric and for that matter social standards that person was and is totally normal.

A psychohistoric revisionism leads to a radically new interpretation not only of international conduct during the War, but of the very causes of the War itself. Psychohistorian Henry Ebel observes that “Nazism was not only a German but a world event — and that to see the Nazi movement entirely within the German context is to distort its meaning.” The regnant myth in the West is that xenophobic, paranoid, self-aggrandizing, anti-Semitic German nationalism was an exclusively indigenous event whose rabid, cancerous spread had to be stopped by nations “allied” to preserve freedom — nations free of the blemishes that tainted Germany.

Here, quite plainly, projection onto Germany plays a dominant role in the creation of the myth of German uncontrollably, invincibility, and the like. We fight the enemies we first make, enemies we need in order that we be “complete” — at a distance. As psychoanalyst and anthropologist George Devereux writes: “A common defense against the thought that one is psychologically disturbed consists of an attempt to represent the disturbance as peripheral to the self.” That is: my problem is you! Until now, most students of World War II have focused on German projection onto Jews. Conspicuously absent have been studies of stereotypes about Germany which made Germans appear as monsters beyond the pale of humanity. What we are discerning, however, is a far more complex complementary system of projection in the international family, one in which the Jews were a single sub-system. What could not be tolerated in the “democratic” nations of the West was located exclusively in a supposedly venomous German “national character” that had its roots fifteen centuries earlier in the barbaric invasion by the Goths. If nations wanted Germany to act out aggressively, how then could they be expected to
stop Germany before Germany was allowed first to wage war? In a process identical to that of a family with a "deviant" or "sick" member, likewise within the international "family" of nations, "specific members take on specific roles that serve distinct roles for all the other members of the family." Indeed, one member of the "family" cannot change without threatening the stability of the entire family.

The emotional role of "aggressor" that the West "assigned" to Germany was first observed by British historian A.J.P. Taylor in The Origins of the Second World War — a work for which he incurred the odium theologicum of the scholarly community, not to mention the accusation of being a Fascist sympathizer. What this early "Revisionist" Taylor noted was simply that from the mid-1930s the statesmen of the West were giving Hitler cues to indulge his madness, giving him latitude to flex his muscles, turning away their heads as he continuously tested his limits and found no obstacle in his path.

Today we would say that the complementary pathology of those "normal"-appearing nations of the West was the very thing which permitted Hitler to dare even further. What is true for pathological family systems is equally true for pathological international (group) systems. The officially "normal" are able to mask their sickness and shore up their stability only as their designated deviants do their mischief for them.

Very briefly, for instance, consider the role of France in the late 1930s. According to the myth in the West, vulnerable France was victim to the unstoppable Blitzkrieg that Hitler unleashed mercilessly in 1939. Yet, in some recent psycho-historic work, Jacques Szaluta and Stephen Ryan turn this interpretation of the fall of France upside down (likewise, David Beisel reinterprets the Munich "mistake" as based on the West's passivity and denial of reality, beneath which lay an encouragement for Germany to press even further). Szaluta and Ryan link the fall of Republican France to a French fear of and wish for abandonment, expressed in fantasies of defeat, suicide, homosexual surrender, punishment, and the need to pay for pleasure with pain. How could a France which felt feminized possibly feel strong enough to repel Germany's penetration? Likewise, how could Marshall Pétain, leader of the Vichy government, resist the Germans when his own heightened conflicts over abandonment led him, like his countrymen who followed him, to abandon France to Germany? Psychologically, what the French felt they deserved they allowed to happen — with their passive complicity. Fantasy, in other words, so powerfully affected the perception of reality that it helped bring about the very reality which was as much sought as it was consciously repudiated.

It was the West's fantasy about Hitler's and Germany's virility (masculinity) that gave the Nazis the time and space and practice to perfect their fantasy in reality. Were it not for this deadly combination of admiration, envy, passivity, and delegation of the "aggressor" role, the West would not have given such license to German impudence. Not only did Hitler believe his propaganda, but his later adversaries were paralyzed by it because they also wanted to believe it.

In fact, rather than fantasy, Hitler was ill-prepared for war in September 1939. Yet it was the shared, complementary, fantasy, rather than military fact that prevailed — and which allowed the Germans to translate their group-fantasy (reversal of the trauma of 1918; the resurrection of the "betrayed" Siegfried into superhuman heroism) into fact. Ebel notes that

Sixty percent of the German artillery, in 1939, was still being pulled by horses, and to accomplish the Blitzkrieg invasion of France he had to skim the armored units from a great number of divisions and fling them into the center of France. Had the French refused to panic at the sight of those flags moving across the map, and vigorously counterattacked, they might well have won. Instead, they could not bring themselves to believe that any world leader might be willing to bet on the potency of his theatrical fantasies — and they allowed themselves to be intimidated into surrendering. Afterward, there were French commentators who declared that defeat was inevitable in view of the greater "virility" of the German uniforms and the German military panache.

The Triumph of the Will was a joint venture between the victor and the vanquished. Ebel writes further:

The fact that the Western powers, before the Second World war, seemed to be sending out encouraging signals to Hitler — including encouragements for his anti-Semitic policies — is perfectly understandable, however, once we acknowledge the extent to which Hitler and Nazism were "acting out" their [the Western powers'] own suppressed impulses; indeed, the extent to which they were able to suppress those impulses only because he was acting them out.

Finally, writes Ebel,

In its anger, its militarism, its aggressiveness, and its rituals of triumph and national purpose, Germany was serving as a delegate of all the other nations, acting out the materials that their own citizens were not prepared to
acknowledge — directly and openly — as being “their own.” The enemy, as always, was also oneself...

Viewed in this perspective, the Germans were every bit as much victims — both of their own national psychology, mythology, and of their role in the international family — as were the Jews. It was the fatal symbiosis of nations that resulted in a Holocaust in the wake of whose unprecedented fratricide (not reducible to “genocide”) only Death was victor. So long as we persist in viewing and debating the “Holocaust” as though it were primarily a Jewish or Jewish/German event, we will miss its tragic enormity for all who participated in it.

It is thus proper that a paper which began with a discussion of the Jewish myth of the Holocaust, concludes with the preliminary formulation of a revision of the entire Western myth of the 1933-1945 period. No single group can claim that period as its private property. In the earlier part of this paper, I briefly explored the meaning of the Jewish claim on the Holocaust. In the final section of the paper, I have argued that to over-focus on the fate of the Jews is to join rather than analyze the truly inter-national group-fantasy of World War II: it is to postpone insight into what was a Holocaust for all humanity.

Notes
22. H. Ebel. Same source.

The Enemy Struggles as a Legend Dies

Two years ago we said that the Germans’ “Holocaust” nightmare was almost over, and predicted it had another two years to run.

If that milestone has so far proved illusory it is because our worldwide Traditional Enemy has pulled every dirty trick he can — short of doing a Tonya Harding to every single revisionist writer — to breathe a few more years of life into the rotting corpse of his profitable legend. To the uninitiated outsider, the events of the last months must seem baffling — indeed quite inexplicable. In a world beset by AIDS, starvation, unemployment, tribal and inter-racial strife, and a rising tide of crime, legislatures around the globe have found their timetables clogged with the enactment...
of meaningless new litigation including laws:
— making it a crime for forensic scientists to challenge the prevailing details of the “Holocaust;”
— making it an offense for historians to question the crimes as defined at Nuremberg in 1945;
— Making it mandatory in several states across the United States, where religious education as such is now outlawed, to inflict compulsory “Holocaust” lessons on innocent schoolchildren in perpetuity.

If it were not such a tragic waste of government and legislative resources, there would be something almost comical in the antics of our opponents as they twist and writhe, struggling to avoid actually debating with the “Holocaust deniers.”

Yet there is a lesson in it for us all: the dying throes of the “Holocaust” legend prove once again how mighty is the traditional enemy of the truth — how his tentacles extend into every crevice of government and the law, and how he will stop at nothing to get his way. It has been a fifty-year lesson to us all.


Searching for Purpose in the “Post-Modern” World

VACLAV HAVEL

There are thinkers who claim that if the modern age began with the discovery of America, it also ended in America. This is said to have occurred in the year 1969, when America sent the first men to the moon. From this historical moment, they say, a new age in the life of humanity can be dated.

I think there are good reasons for suggesting that the modern age has ended. Today, many things indicate that we are going through a transitional period, when it seems that something is on the way out and something else is painfully being born. It is as if something were crumbling, decaying, and exhausting itself, while something else, still indistinct, were arising from the rubble.

Periods of history when values undergo a fundamental shift are certainly not unprecedented ... The distinguishing features of such transitional periods are a mixing and blending of cultures and a plurality or parallelism of intellectual and spiritual worlds. These are periods when all consistent value systems collapse, when cultures distant in time and space are discovered or rediscovered. They are periods when there is a tendency to quote, to imitate and to amplify, rather than to state with authority or integrate. New meaning is gradually born from the encounter, or the intersection, of many different elements.

— Vaclav Havel is president of the Czech Republic. This is excerpted from an address he gave on the occasion of receiving the Liberty Medal at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on the Fourth of July, 1994.
technological civilization. It is the first civilization in the history of the human race that spans the entire globe and firmly binds together all human societies, submitting them to a common global destiny.

It was this science that enabled man, for the first time, to see Earth from space with his own eyes, that is, to see it as another star in the sky.

At the same time, however, the relationship to the world that modern science fostered and shaped now appears to have exhausted its potential. It is increasingly clear that, strangely, the relationship is missing something. It fails to connect with the most intrinsic nature or reality, and with natural human experience. It is now more of a source of disintegration and doubt than a source of integration and meaning. It produces what amounts to a state of schizophrenia: man as an observer is becoming completely alienated from himself as a being.

Classical modern science described only the surface of things, a single dimension of reality. And the more dogmatically science treated it as the only dimension, as the very essence of reality, the more misleading it became. Today, for instance, we may know immeasurably more about the universe than our ancestors did, and yet, it increasingly seems they knew something more essential about it than we do, something that escapes us. The same thing is true of nature and of ourselves. The more thoroughly all our organs and their functions, their internal structure, and the biochemical reactions that take place within them are described, the more we seem to fail to grasp the spirit, purpose, and meaning of the system that they create together and that we experience as our unique "self."

And thus today we find ourselves in a paradoxical situation. We enjoy all the achievements of modern civilization that have made our physical existence on this Earth easier in so many important ways. Yet we do not know exactly what to do with ourselves, where to turn. The world of our experiences seems chaotic, disconnected, confusing. There appear to be no integrating forces, no unified meaning, no true inner understanding of phenomena in our experience of the world. Experts can explain anything in the objective world to us, yet we understand our own lives less and less. In short, we live in the post-modern world, where everything is possible and almost nothing is certain ...

The abyss between the rational and the spiritual, the external and the internal, the objective and the subjective, the technical and the moral, the universal and the unique constantly grows deeper.

These questions have been highlighted with particular urgency by the two most important political events in the second half of the 20th century: the collapse of colonial hegemony and the fall of Communism. The artificial world order of the past decades had collapsed and a new, more just, order has not yet emerged. The central political task of the final years of this century, then, is the creation of a new model of coexistence among the various cultures, peoples, races, and religious spheres within a single interconnected civilization. This task is all the more urgent because other threats to contemporary humanity brought about by one-dimensional development of civilization are growing more serious all the time.

Many believe this task can be accomplished through technical means ... But such efforts are doomed to failure if they do not grow out of something deeper, out of generally held values.

This, too, is well-known. And in searching for the most natural source for the creation of a new world order, we usually look to an area that is the traditional foundation of modern justice and a great achievement of the modern age: to a set of values that — among other things — were first declared in (Independence Hall). I am referring to respect for the unique human being and his or her liberties and inalienable rights, and the principle that all power derives from the people. I am, in short, referring to the fundamental ideas of modern democracy.

The idea of human rights and freedoms must be an integral part of any meaningful world order. Yet I think it must be anchored in a different place, and in a different way, than has been the case so far. If it is to be more than just a slogan mocked by half the world, it cannot be expressed in the language of a departing era, and it must not be mere froth floating on the subsiding waters of faith in a purely scientific relationship to the world ...

A modern philosopher once said: "Only a God can save us now." Yes, the only real hope of people today is probably a renewal of our certainty that we are rooted in the Earth and, at the same time, the cosmos. This awareness endows us with the capacity for self-transcendence. Politicians at international forums may reiterate a thousand times that the basis of the new world order must be universal respect for human rights, but it will mean nothing as long as this imperative does not derive from the respect of the miracle of being, the miracle of the universe, the miracle of nature, the miracle of our own existence. Only someone who submits in the authority of the universal order and of creation, who values the right to be a part of it and a participant in it, can genuinely value himself and his neighbors, and thus honor their rights as well.

It logically follows that, in today's multicultural world, the truly reliable path to coexistence, to peaceful coexistence and creative cooperation, must start from what is at the root of all cultures and what lies infinitely deeper in human hearts and
minds than political opinion, convictions, antipathies, or sympathies: It must be rooted in self-transcendence. Transcendence as the only real alternative to extinction.

The Declaration of Independence, adopted 218 years ago in this building, states that the Creator gave man the right to liberty. It seems man can realize that liberty only if he does not forget the one who endowed him with it.

Holocaust Hate Propaganda Targets Germans

An important component of the seemingly perpetual Holocaust media campaign is the promotion of ugly and hateful images of Germans. A good example is the cartoon shown here. It appeared in the April 1, 1994, issue of the Jewish Press, an influential Brooklyn, New York, weekly with a claimed circulation of 160,000.

Such hate-mongering is not confined to papers such as the Jewish Week. Jewish writer Elie Wiesel, who has been honored by American presidents, wrote in one widely circulated work, Legends of Our Time: “Every Jew, somewhere in his being, should set apart a zone of hate—healthy, virile hate—for what the German personifies and for what persists in the German.” Similarly, Steven Spielberg’s widely acclaimed motion picture “Schindler’s List” depicts Germans as brutal, corrupt, evil and mindless. The only exception is the main character, Oskar Schindler, who is portrayed positively only in so far as he helps Jews.

Even US government officials contribute to the bigotry. During the March 20, 1994, “60 Minutes” broadcast, Michael Berenbaum, an official of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, blamed “the Germans” for killing millions of European Jews during the Second World War.

So acceptable is such anti-German defamation in American newspapers, books, motion pictures and television that examples such as these rarely provoke even the slightest murmur of protest, even by groups such as the powerful Anti-Defamation League, which hypocritically claims to be concerned for the dignity of all.

— M. W.

Our Savaged “Living” Constitution

Joseph Sobran

Most Americans are taught, and assume, that we still live under the Constitution of the United States. We are even told that the Constitution improves with age—that it’s a “living document” whose full potential has only been realized in modern times thanks to the interpretations of the Supreme Court.

Thanks to the Court, we now know that the First amendment protects obscenity, but forbids prayer in public schools. We know—again thanks to the Court—that we have a constitutional right to “privacy,” which means that a woman may have her child aborted without consulting or informing the father. We know that the abortion laws of all 50 states, even the most permissive, had been in violation of the Constitution.

We know, in short, that many of our moral and religious traditions are “unconstitutional”—in the eyes of our ruling elite. It seems to make no difference that most of us had no inkling that we were acting unconstitutionally until the modern Court announced the fact to us.

On the other hand, the court finds nothing unconstitutional about the countless new powers constantly claimed by the federal government, even when these clash directly with the Bill of Rights. The Court upholds federal gun control laws, even though the Second Amendment says plainly "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

So the Court can create "rights" that are nowhere mentioned or implied by the Constitution; and it may set aside rights that are explicitly listed in the Constitution.

It is all, of course, nonsense.

This is what the idea of a "living document" comes down to: The Court is not bound by the plain meaning of the words it interprets. It may assign unsuspected new meanings to those words, disregarding history, tradition, and the dictionary.

The Constitution was not "dead" before the modern Court went to work on it. It had been amended five times in the two decades before Franklin Roosevelt sought to change it by stealth during the New Deal. That was the fastest rate of amendment since the adoption of the Bill of Rights.

Far from being dead, the Constitution proved capable of being changed by the people themselves through the amending process the Constitution provides for in Article V. It didn't have to be subtly twisted by clever jurists bent on reading their pet notions into it.

There is no need to rehearse all the details of the great change that has occurred since Roosevelt filled the Court with his cronies. In fact, many learned constitutional scholars know the details without seeing the pattern those details form: they don't grasp that the Constitution has been stood on its head.

The clear purpose of the Constitution is to distribute power very carefully. Most powers of government are reserved to the states and the people; this is implicit throughout, but it is affirmed expressly by the Tenth Amendment and is clear from all the ratification debates of 1789. A very few powers, carefully listed and defined, are delegated (key word!) to the federal government. These few powers, in turn, are divided among three branches of government, one of which (Congress) is further divided into two houses.

In granting new powers to the federal government, then, the framers of the Constitution were anxious to prevent power from being centralized, or (in their fearful word) "consolidated." The idea of trusting any single man, group, or branch of government with all power was the very opposite of what they had in mind.

It is worth noting that a close modern synonym of the word "consolidated" is "fascist." Centralization of power is the fascist — as well as the "socialist and communist" ideal. And elements of all three systems, which were sweeping Europe and Russia, helped inspire and form the New America of the New Deal.

The champions of consolidated government knew that the old Constitution was the great obstacle to their designs. They wanted to preserve the outward forms of constitutional government while emptying those forms of content, because an openly revolutionary government could not command the allegiance of the American people. So they developed the strange idea of a "living" or "evolving" Constitution that somehow became the opposite of itself, and actually reversed its meaning with the passage of time.

Today the plan and original meaning of the Constitution exists only on paper, and in the minds of a shrinking number of Americans who still understand the heritage they have been robbed of. We live in what might be called post-constitutional America, where the arbitrary and purposeful misinterpretation of the Constitution has turned ours into a government of men, not laws. The doctrine of the "living document" really makes the Constitution a dead letter, a law without effect.

Does this sound gloomy? There is no need to despair: By recognizing the idea of a "living document" for the nonsense it is, we can restore the Constitution and reclaim the liberty our ancestors earned for us.

The First World War and American intervention therein marked an ominous turning point in the history of the United States and the world. Unfortunately, there are relatively few persons who recall the days before 1914 ... All kinds of taxes were relatively low. We had only a token national debt ... Inflation was unheard of here ... There was little or no witch-hunting and few of the symptoms and operations of the police state which has been developing so rapidly here during the last decade ... Enlightened citizens of the Western world were then filled with buoyant hope for a bright future of humanity ... People were confident that the amazing developments of technology would soon produce abundance, security and leisure for the multitude. In this optimism no item was more potent than the assumption that war was an outmoded nightmare ... The great majority of Americans today have known only a world ravaged by war, depressions, international intrigue and meddling; the encroachments of the police state, vast debts and crushing taxation and the control of public opinion by ruthless propaganda.

Classic Critique of "The Revolution That Was" Traces America's Road from Republic to Empire and Explores Legacy of the Roosevelt New Deal Revolution


Reviewed by Andrew Clarke

Every once in a very long while, a book comes along which throws a reviewer into a quandary: Is it possible to do the book justice? While taking the risk of seeming slavishly uncritical, I must state up front that Burden of Empire is such a book. Among the many turgid works of political analysis that have published in recent decades, this classic shines as a diamond in the sludge of American political literature.

Garet Garrett writes with a grace and clarity that verges on the lyrical.

Yet, the most striking feature of the book is its prescient and penetrating political analysis. Garrett's book has been characterized as "the most radical view of the New Deal" available, but perhaps it would be better described as the most insightful of existing critiques.

Originally published in 1953 under the title The People's Pottage, this book is composed of three separate essays: "The Revolution Was," which was first published in 1938, "Ex America" (from 1951), and "Rise of Empire" (1952). The first two focus on the Franklin Roosevelt era and the consolidation of the welfare state during his twelve-year presidency. The final essay documents the transformation of America from republic to empire, as the last vestiges of the Old Republic were squashed by the Leviathan government of perpetual warfare and welfare. In a timely introduction to this attractive new edition of Garrett's trilogy, Journal review editor Theodore J. O'Keefe provides useful background material about Garrett as well as a damning critique of the neglect of his work by our contemporary "conservative" apologists for the welfare-warfare state.

The opening of the first essay, "The Revolution Was," provides a synopsis of its main theme, as well as a sample of Garrett at his stylistic best:

There are those who still think that they are holding the pass against a revolution that may be coming up the road. But they are gazing in the wrong direction. The revolution is behind them. It went by in the Night of Depression, singing songs to freedom.

There are those who have never ceased to say very earnestly, "Something is going to happen to the American form of government if we don't watch out." These were the innocent disarmers. Their trust was in words. They had forgotten their Aristotle. More than 2,000 years ago he wrote of what can happen within the form, when "one thing takes the place of another so that ancient laws will remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have brought about the revolution in the state."

This notion of "revolution within the form" aptly characterizes Garrett's view of the New Deal. While the American Congress has never been disbanded, and the US Constitution remains encased in glass, a fundamental change had occurred in the relationship between the American people and their government. Garrett's first essay explains how and why this fateful metamorphosis took place.

Implemented "by scientific technique," Garrett suggests that this "silent revolution" was intentionally prepared from the outset to institute domestic socialism, the depression crisis being used as a pretext to achieve that end. Whenever President Roosevelt and his New Deal administrators were confronted with a choice about how next to proceed politically, they chose the step that would "ramify the authority and power of the executive," "strengthen its hold upon the economic life of the nation," "extend its power over the individual," "degrade the parliamentary principle," "impair the great American tradition of an independent, Constitutional judicial power," "weaken all other powers," and "exalt the leadership principle." In other words, FDR's New Deal engineered a massive transfer of power from the people to the central state — a radical realignment that turned the American political system on its head.

Andrew Clarke is the pen name of a recent graduate of the University of Pennsylvania. Born in South Carolina, he was raised in Missouri, upstate New York and New Jersey.
Most of "The Revolution Was" is devoted to tracing the steps needed to implement a revolution within the form, and to showing just how this was done in the New Deal. So utterly convincing is Garrett's presentation that the reader is bound to re-read this essay to commit to memory the dynamics of the surreptitious revolution.

A sense of gloomy finality pervades Garrett's conclusion:

Like the hag fish, the New Deal entered the old form and devoured its meaning from within. The revolutionaries were on the inside, the defenders were on the outside. A government that had been supported by the people and was so controlled by the people became one that supported the people and so controlled them. Much of it is irreversible.

Unless one understands the central implication of "The Revolution Was" — that the Constitutional Republic of 1787 no longer exists — no meaningful understanding of contemporary politics is possible. Those who seek to "preserve" our constitutional system are, at best wasting their time; at worst, they are misleading others into misdirecting their talents as well.

In contrast to the theme of "The Revolution Was," Garrett's second essay in this collection deals at length with the consequences of the revolutionary changes that have taken place in the American form of government. Complementing the first essay, "Ex America" completes the picture of America's domination by the welfare state.

It begins with a memorable description of America's role in world politics. Garrett castigates this country's self-destructive foreign policy with a harsh depiction of the spectacle of carping client-states sucking up American hand-outs. Because it contains a short rebuttal of European charges of American imperialism, one is left with the feeling that Garrett had not yet fully developed his own blistering critique of US imperialism when he wrote this essay in 1951. All the same, "Ex America" is not primarily about international affairs — it is about the shackling of a free people, a precondition for the establishment of a full-fledged imperium.

Garrett links the growth of government and diminution of domestic liberty with the ability of the state to seize the wealth of the people: "No government can acquire power and put it forth by law and edict. It must have the means ... In the modern case, means will be money." More specifically, money without the "conventional limits" of hard currency, generated by inflation, government debt, and confiscatory taxation.

A key event in the establishment of the modern American state was the introduction of the federal income tax. Writes Garrett:

The first great turning was accomplished with the ease of a Pullman train passing from one track to another over a split-point switch. The landscape hardly changed at all for a while, and then gradually, and when people found themselves in a new political region, there was no turning back.

The event was the amendment of the Constitution in 1913, giving the Federal government power to impose a progressive tax on all incomes. The idea was not only European, it was Marxian, one of the cardinal points of the Communist Manifesto. President Wilson disarmed opposition by saying the Federal government would use this power, if at all, only in time of emergency and yet, as we now know, the obsequies of limited government ought then to have been performed. Only the intellectuals knew what it meant. Nobody else dreamed, least of all perhaps President Wilson, that the Federal income tax would be used not for revenue only, which was until then the only kind of taxation Americans knew, but for the purpose of re-distributing the national wealth from the top downward, according to European ideas of social amelioration.

Another radical change in American political life has been the transformation of the role of the Supreme Court. Writing in 1951, Garrett anticipated the even greater usurpations of power that would come in the decades to follow:

By a series of reinterpretations of the Constitution, the reformed Supreme Court has so relaxed the austerities of the supreme law as to give government a new freedom. It this process it has cast itself in a social role. Formerly its business was to say what the law was, according to the Constitution; if people did not like the law they could change it, only provided they change it in a lawful manner by amending the Constitution. Now the Supreme Court undertakes to say what is justice, what is public welfare, what is good for the people and to make suitable inflections of the Constitution. Thus law is made subordinate to the discretions and judgments of men, whereas the cornerstone of freedom was that the government should be a government of law, not of men.

As Garrett reminds the reader, the men who founded the American republic were aware of the dangers of the powerful central state with which we must contend today:

The founders of the American government knew history. As far back as they could see all governments both good and bad, no matter in what form they appeared, had certain features
in common, such as a natural appetite for power, a passion to act upon peoples' lives, a will to live, resources of self-perpetuation and longings for grandeur — with always the one sequel, that they abused their power and fell and were succeeded by government that did it all over again, as if by some kind of inner compulsion.

Garrett largely avoids the tendency of most political ideologues to act as uncritical apologists for the economic system that fortuitously fits their preconceived worldview.

The most impressive part of "Ex America" is the discussion of New Deal monetary policies, and the strength of this critique rests in Garrett's penetrating look at economic reality. Capitalism, he suggests, is the most desirable alternative in an imperfect world, not an ideal economic system. In the decades since the New Deal, America's political elite — including "supply side" conservatives — has consistently supported Keynesian economic policy in one form or another. Garrett puts the Keynesian vision of perpetual debt and inflation in perspective:

... Inflation as the New Deal planned it was bound to be popular. Many were enriched and few were impoverished. Those who have been enriched could afford to pension or assist the few who have been impoverished, and if this could be arranged, and if it could go on forever, what a world this would be! The government would never have to balance its budget, debt would be a myth, and nobody ever again would have to worry about money.

Has that the sound of fantasy? Nevertheless, it is the pure logic of inflation.

Given a policy that refuses to confront economic reality, Garrett contends that only method of maintaining stability is by continuously bolstering the state's power over the economy, and, consequently, the people.

When he first published "Rise of Empire" in 1952, Garrett was a lonely voice speaking out against the Cold War consensus, and its program of "perpetual war for perpetual peace." In this final essay of the trilogy, Garrett returns to the theme of "revolution within the form," focusing on the changes in the American form of government as manifest in international relations.

"Rise of Empire" is divided into three sections. The first draws comparisons with Rome, as it was quietly transformed from republic to empire. For Garrett, the fatal change in the American system occurred when the executive branch took from Congress the power to initiate war. "The question is: Whose hand shall control the instrument of war? It is late to ask, for when the hand of the Republic begins to relax another hand is already putting itself forth."

Garrett's description of America's transition to imperialism is not as radical as it may first appear. Others have offered earlier dates for this transition. Sociologist William Graham Sumner, for example, believed that the Spanish-American War marked the turning point from republic to imperial power. [See "The Fateful Year 1898: The United States Becomes an Imperial Power," The Journal of Historical Review, July–August 1993, pp. 4–13.] Today, of course, even Garrett's more restrained view is anathema to the establishment Right.

In the second section of "Rise of Empire," Garrett spells out the characteristics of empire, defining what he means and citing US policy examples. So well does he present his case that even the most recalcitrant reader is likely to be convinced that the United States has indeed become an aggressive imperial power. In the final section Garrett somewhat hopefully suggests that the American empire is not necessarily permanent and inviolable.

Throughout "Rise of Empire," Garrett implicitly rejects the often repeated contention that imperialism is an inevitable manifestation of capitalism. According to this familiar Leftist argument, capitalist states endemically over-produce, and are therefore driven to constant intervention in foreign lands to open new markets for their surplus products. (This was supposedly manifest, for example, in America's "Open Door" policy toward China.) With one line in "Ex America," Garrett deftly dismisses this simplistic argument: "It was nonsense to say that we could not have used [the 'surplus' production] ourselves, if not in the same forms in which it was distributed abroad, then in other forms, since wealth is a thing which can assume other forms." Whatever the flaws of a market economy, an impetus toward imperialism is not one of them. One of the great virtues of this book is its straightforward debunking of such popular notions.

Taken as a whole, Burden of Empire is a devastating indictment of the legacy of the New Deal and American policy during World War II. It shows the close and inevitable relationship between the rise of a powerful US central government and an American apparatus of international power. Perhaps the greatest value of this book is its exposition of the demise of the Old Republic. Given the validity of Garet Garrett's analysis, which calls into question the very legitimacy of the current US government, perhaps it is high time to heed Gore Vidal's advice: decide on the shape and form of the next American republic.
New Work Examines Suppressed Conservative Political-Intellectual Heritage


Reviewed by Andrew Clarke

Much attention has been given in recent years to ideological quarrels among factions of the American Right. Traditionalists, nationalists, and libertarians are feuding with internationalists and neo-conservatives. Charges that the forces of the Old Right are threatening to drag conservatives into the fever swamps are countered with accusations of treason and takeover by social democratic interlopers. The casual observer might assume that political movements are simply given to internecine rhetorical squabbling, and that nothing of consequence is really at stake here. Reclaiming the American Right is a useful antidote to such a faulty conclusion.

Justin Raimondo, a San Francisco writer and veteran libertarian activist, has written a timely and very worthwhile, yet sometimes problematic, revisionist history of the American Right. In contrast to conventional treatments of American conservative ideology and politics that begin with the post-war period, this book begins with a focus on the period between the two world wars, and continues through to the present.

Raimondo's polemical book is directed primarily to the reader who is already sympathetic toward, or even involved in, right-wing politics. Yet, this ambitious and often radical reinterpretations of the history of the "conservative movement" demands a somewhat more detailed and scholarly examination, one that is beyond the scope of a work of this kind. As a result, Raimondo sometimes needlessly confuses issues of philosophical subtlety with substantive political disputes.

This book attempts to address a critical problem of late twentieth century American conservatism: the American Right today has revealed itself as a flaccid and relatively inconsequential political force. Writes Raimondo:

After taking over the Republican Party in the sixties, and then capturing the White House in 1980, conservatives are baffled to discover that the power of the federal government to tax and regulate, and invade every aspect of our lives, has not lessened but increased over the last decade. Bewildered, frustrated, and demoralized, the men and women of the Right are asking themselves: What went wrong?

Raimondo lays out the root of the problem in his introduction. The Right, he contends, was beset with three waves of defectors from the political Left: ex-communists who gathered during the 1950s around the young Bill Buckley and his National Review; liberals and Social Democrats who were repelled by the isolationism and counter-culture of the New Left, and defected from the Democratic Party in the late-1960s to become "neo-conservatives"; and an array of "neo-con" think-tanks and publications that arose during the 1980s. As a result of these "three invasions from the Left, loosely grouped along generational lines," the conservative movement was detached "from its moorings in American political culture" and was transformed from an isolationist and laissez-faire movement into a globalist crusade to crush Communism by any means necessary, including the imposition of totalitarianism at home. In several chapters, Raimondo carefully examines the Right prior to these invasions — that is, the Old Right that had formed in opposition to the New Deal and American entry into World War Two. After focusing on the remnant of the Old Right that managed to survive during the Cold War, he follows with an analysis of the contemporary political scene. He concludes his book by considering the development of an effective opposition to the welfare-warfare state.

Raimondo's analysis of the leftist incursion and injection of universalist and internationalist ideologies into the conservative intellectual body during the 1950s is one of the best and most useful on the subject. It is rigorous and yet accessible to even the casual reader.

In his treatment of these three "invasions," Raimondo traces their roots on the far Left to their positions of influence on the Right. His description of the messianic opposition to the Soviet Union by the ex-Leftists at National Review as a quasi-religious quest is quite accurate, as an afternoon perusal through back issues of that magazine at any good library will confirm. In his description of the intellectual evolution of neo-conservatives "from Trotsky to Shachtman to Reagan" Raimondo brings to light information hitherto unavailable in a single source. Regrettably lacking is any mention of the influence of German emigré Leo Strauss on the contemporary neo-conservative worldview, which might be interesting in light of the claim of some neo-cons that Strauss provides a coherent philosophical basis for what often seems to be a loose collection of political positions or, less generously, sheer opportunism.

The only serious flaw in Raimondo's examina-
tion of the role of ex-Leftists in the American conservative movement during the formative postwar period (particularly after 1955 and the founding of *National Review*) is his gross misinterpretation of James Burnham as political theorist.

Raimondo presents Burnham as a prototypical neo-conservative, an enthusiast of the rising managerial class, and a man obsessed with power. While this description may satisfactorily summarize the typical neo-conservative, it does not apply to Burnham. However wrong-headed some of his political prescriptions may have been, a fair evaluation of Burnham's intellectual career is in order here.

James Burnham began his life in politics as a member of Leon Trotsky's Fourth International, which (theoretically) offered Marxists an alternative to the "bureaucratic deformations" of Stalinism. After a number of crises involving the historical record of the Soviet Union and Trotsky's insistence on defending the Soviet "worker's state" against the Stalinists, and in spite of the Stalinists," Burnham broke with Trotsky and, indeed, with orthodox Marxism.

In 1941, Burnham published *The Managerial Revolution*, a work that analyzed the past from a historical perspective similar to the dialectic of the Marxists. However, Burnham identified the postcapitalist system not as one of liberating socialism, but as a new method of exploitation: rule by a rigid managerial elite that choked out all hopes of liberation and possibility of freedom. He identified this trend in the Soviet Union, in Europe's fascist or authoritarian regimes, and in New Deal America. He was particularly sagacious in incorporating a description of the concurrent rise of managerial dominance in the private economy, fueled by a growing trend toward separation of business control from business ownership. Burnham would eventually drop the flaw of dialectic (George Orwell criticized him for "predicting the continuation of anything that is happening"), and concentrate on the essential nature of the new elite in his analyses.

Raimondo is simply incorrect in imputing to Burnham a partisanship for the managerial class. He claimed agnosticism on this point in his major work, and it is clear that he regarded the new class as exploitative by its nature. Raimondo goes so far as to quote Burnham making this precise point: "I am not writing a program of social reform, nor am I making any moral judgment whatever ..." Further, Burnham's analysis is rooted in the observations of earlier thinkers as diverse as Max Weber and Simone Weil, neither of whom is usually associated with totalitarian politics. In addition, Burnham's critique of the managerial class has been taken up by Samuel Francis, whom Raimondo praises, and, at least by implication, the Frankfurt School critics in their assessment of the domination of society by the emergent "New Class."

Raimondo's excoriation of Burnham as a partisan of raw power is another spurious characterization. Burnham was a "Machiavellian" in that he believed that politics must be understood in terms of power struggles. He almost certainly misapplied this in over-estimating the Soviet danger, but it is unfair to contend that Burnham was obsessed with whomever appeared to be most powerful simply because he utilized a methodology that attempted to elucidate the underlying realities of political conflicts.

Contrary to the portrayal provided by Raimondo, Burnham was actually an early critic of the neo-conservatives. Raimondo's disdain of Burnham is likely rooted in Burnham's early, fervent support for the Cold War, a position that typically also meant support for curtailment of domestic liberties as part of the effort to expand the garrison state of the emerging American empire.

Aside from his mischaracterization of Burnham, it should be emphasized that Raimondo's basic point about how the American Right was co-opted by one-time Leftist intellectuals who continued to adhere to key Leftist premises is essentially correct. Hence, the modern Right seeks "liberal ends through conservative means." Thus, a "conservative" such as Jack Kemp may claim to reject liberal programs to, for example, equalize the economic status of different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, he will support ostensibly "conservative" programs to achieve this same goal. By contrast, the traditional or "paleo-" conservative rejects both the goal and the means, recognizing that social hierarchies are natural and desirable in any healthy society.

Given that both the contemporary Left and Right accept the egalitarian premises that prevail in today's society, the paleo-conservative view is now widely castigated as simply beyond the pale of allowable discussion. Pointing up the essential similarity between establishment Left and Right was the allegedly conservative "Reagan revolution," which, in spite of dark mumblings of some liberal critics, was led by a geriatric actor who proudly, and skillfully, presented himself as a political heir to Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Much of this can be explained by the Cold War establishment consensus that developed in America in the aftermath of the Second World War. An essential feature of the Cold War anti-Communist American Right was its collaboration with Cold War liberalism. As a result of this alliance, conservatives largely failed to challenge the basic philosophical underpinnings of American liberalism. (Recent scholarship, particularly that of Elizabethtown College professor Paul Gottfried, verifies Raimondo's
Avoiding any detailed explanation of the final neo-conservative split with the far Left, Raimondo focuses instead on neo-conservatives as liberal critics of capitalism and as democratic internationalists. Underlying this break, which came in the late 1960s and was initiated by the concerns mentioned above, was a specifically Jewish consciousness and self-identification of many (and perhaps most) neo-conservatives. Recognizing this self-identification is important, as it has played a major and possibly essential role in shaping neo-conservative political positions, as well as serving as a pretext to denounce conservative opponents of neo-conservative positions as “anti-Semitic.” (Columnists Patrick Buchanan and Joseph Sobran, and the late scholar Russell Kirk, come to mind.)

Paul Gottfried, a prominent critic of neo-conservatism (and himself Jewish) emphasizes this point in his thorough study, The Conservative Movement:

Among the factors that led [Norman] Podhoretz and many other neo-conservatives to disengage with the Left, their Jewishness was certainly significant. From 1969 on, Commentary [edited by Podhoretz and published by the American Jewish Committee], included strongly worded polemics that presented the [anti-establishment] “Movement,” particularly black radicalism, as a danger to American Jews. Critics like Earl Raab and Nathan Glazer stressed the inevitable anti-Jewish character of the policies advocated by the New Left and its liberal followers.

An analysis of the neo-con break from liberalism is interesting because it sheds some light on the ongoing conflict between neo-conservatives and paleo-conservatives that have raged in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Communism and the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. These intramural “conservative wars” (discussed in the last section of the book) stem not, as some neo-cons would have the public believe, from dislike of Jews per se, but from two competing worldviews that are contending — as the glue of anti-Communism dissipates — for hegemony on the Right: one largely rooted in Jewish identity and interests, and another strongly emphasizing a Christian European and Anglo-American historical-cultural tradition.

In the next section of the book, Raimondo provides an informative examination of the Old Right that is particularly important because it introduces to a new generation of Americans a significant intellectual-political movement that was suppressed and is now all but forgotten. The American “Old Right” is not only significant as an important part of an American conservative and right-wing tradition (that includes, for example, Southern Agrarianism), but it is also relevant because it provides a timely and damning critique of the political structures that support the welfare-warfare state with which America has been saddled since the New Deal era.

In addition to well-done treatments of such “Old Right” stalwarts as H.L. Mencken, Albert Jay Nock, Frank Chodorov, and the Old Right Chicago Tribune, Raimondo devotes separate chapters to two once very influential journalists, Garet Garrett and John T. Flynn. In these chapters (three and four), Raimondo explores the life, work and impact of each man.

Garet Garrett was a widely published journalist who specialized in writing about financial affairs. In 1915, The New York Times assigned him to cover the war in Europe. After the war, he published his first novel, and went on to write on a range of subjects. He envisioned America as an independent republic of free men. Garrett opposed immigration on racial and cultural grounds, and opposed the inflationary Federal Reserve System, recommending instead a 100 percent gold standard currency. (An interesting feature of his outlook was simultaneous support for both laisser faire and autarchy in economics.) It is no wonder, then, that when Roosevelt initiated his attack on domestic liberties and began to move America toward war in Europe, Garrett was among his most eloquent critics.

After World War II, Garrett remained an active critic of “New Deal” America. He published The People’s Potage, a famous collection of essays (recently reissued by the Noontide Press under the title Burden of Empire). Before his death in 1954 he finished The American Story, an ode to the uniquely American way of life. Raimondo captures well the life and spirit of Garrett, combining a biographical overview with a good analysis of his writings. Flynn receives similar treatment.

In the years following World War I, John T. Flynn was a “liberal,” which meant that he was an isolationist and a supporter of laisser-faire economics. He had a prolific career, with scintillating essays and books ranging from attacks on Franklin Roosevelt (The Roosevelt Myth) to works on the fate of the republic (The Decline of the American Republic and How to Save It). Raimondo’s provides a thorough and particularly interesting discussion of Flynn’s important role as a member of the national committee of the non-interventionist America First Committee (1940–1941). He goes on to trace Flynn’s active life through the Korean War and beyond. As Raimondo summarizes “Flynn ended his career in 1960, at the age of seventy-nine ... He died in 1964 as Buckley and his followers were eradicating the last remnants of the Old Right, his works largely forgotten.”

As Raimondo goes on to explain in his treatment
of the Old Right during the 1950s and 1960s, during this period anti-Communist globalists headed by William Buckley effectively expelled libertarians, "Objectivists," John Birch Society adherents, and others, from the "official" conservative movement. All the expellees, Raimondo points out, seemed to have one thing in common: opposition, at least residual, to the growing American welfare-warfare state that was being justified by the alleged threat of the Soviet Union.

Because he seems largely indifferent to the Soviet Union as a real military and political threat, it is surprising that Raimondo makes no mention of the body of scholarship — loosely described as "Cold War revisionism" — initiated by William Appleman Williams in his *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Other Cold War revisionists of note include Ronald Radosh and Gabriel Kolko, whose *Politics of War* deserves particularly close attention. [Radosh's *Prophets on the Right* is available from the IHR for $5.95 plus $2 shipping.] The political disposition of these revisionists was decidedly to the Left; in fact, many were associated with the 1960s New Left, which may account for their omission from this study of conservative politics. At one point, Cold War revisionism was widely recognized as an important historical trend, portraying the US as aggressively imperialistic, a view foreshadowed by Garrett, Harry Elmer Barnes and others.

*Journal* readers will appreciate Raimondo's sympathetic discussion of revisionist historians, including Harry Elmer Barnes, Charles A. Beard, William Henry Chamberlin, Charles Callan Tansill, and George Morgenstern. Given the reflexive, implacable hostility by today's academic and media establishment toward Second World War revisionism of any kind, Raimondo's treatment is welcome. In this brief section — entitled "The Revisionists: Getting the Truth Out" — he focuses primarily on revisionist works that indict Franklin Roosevelt for maneuvering the United States into war.

In chapter eight, Raimondo provides some original and noteworthy revelations about Ayn Rand. According to Raimondo, "the overwhelming mass of evidence" shows that Rand was strongly influenced by, and probably borrowed stylistic and thematic elements from, a book by Garet Garrett in writing her well-known novel, *Atlas Shrugged*. Although she claimed not to owe any philosophical debts — a claim which shows either patent dishonesty or sheer stupidity — Rand apparently was also influenced deeply by Isabel Paterson, whose classic book, *The God of the Machine*, is touched on by Raimondo.

Raimondo's final section deals with the political prospects for today's paleo-conservatives, whom he regards as upholding the spirit of the Old Right. While it is true that the paleo-conservatives have much in common with the Old Right as a matter of political interest, many "Old Right" personalities actually had much in common with the tradition of eighteenth century liberalism. Among today's paleo-conservatives, this tradition is largely non-existent.

Chris Woltermann, in the Winter 1993 *Telos*, describes paleo-conservatism as a modern phenomenon, tracing its roots to such twentieth century European conservative theorists as Bertrand de Jouvenel and Eric Voegelin. There is also a tendency among many paleo-cons to employ sociobiological arguments, which are clearly of contemporary origin. At the same time, though, they emphasize an understanding of history — a perspective that includes a thorough-going skepticism about human nature that has its roots in classical thought. Also characteristic of paleo-conservatism is a distrust of the doctrine of human rights and the corollary role of the state as protector. With decentralist tendencies and a distinct distrust of supranational agencies, they prefer instead to see power removed from government hands.

The political positions derived from such a worldview are clearly similar, if not identical, to those advocated by the Old Right. Indeed, Raimondo quotes a passage from paleo-conservative Thomas Fleming that echoes Garet Garrett's critique of post-war America: "There is not much left of the Old Republic, which has bloated into a cancerous and swollen empire that threatens to devour all life and energy that still exists." Yet after endorsing this view, Raimondo's most ambitious recommendations are support for Patrick Buchanan as a presidential candidate and the recapturing of the conservative movement under the inspiration of the Old Right. However praiseworthy these goals may be, a much more radical political program than Raimondo outlines here would seem necessary to dismantle the enormous welfare-warfare state he decries.

Despite some oversimplification, *Reclaiming the American Right* deserves a wide readership. The issues it treats are vitally important, both on an intellectual-ideological plane, and politically. For any effective right-wing movement to achieve even tentative success, its roots must extend back into the American political-intellectual tradition much further than 1950. Despite new and destructive trends since the New Deal, such as the "Civil Rights" revolution, an effective movement will need to come to terms with the Old Right critique of the welfare-warfare state, which is the center of the malignancy that penetrates the American body politic. Unless that is dismantled, America will never again be healthy.
“European New Right” Study Warns Against Universalism and Egalitarianism


Reviewed by William Saunders

This important and regrettably little-known book has a twofold purpose, the author tells us in his introduction. The first part “describes resurgent conservative movements in Europe and their intellectual heritage.” Here Dr. Sunic is concerned with the relationship between the Continental European New Right of today and its mentors, including Carl Schmitt (1888–1982), Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) and Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), the most lucid of these being Pareto. But these are just three chosen by Sunic from among many other forerunners of the New Right (see pp. 40–41). These thinkers clearly saw the disastrous consequences of the trend toward universalism that was already well underway in the decades before the Second World War.

In the second part of his book, Dr. Sunic presents a reasoned attack against egalitarianism, liberal capitalism, “economism,” and socialism — in short, the “Revolt of the Masses” in the well-known formulation of Ortega y Gasset.

The author is a Croat, with a good knowledge of German and French, and a reasonably good knowledge of English (having lived in the United States for many years). He received his Ph.D. in political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and for a time taught at Juniata College in Pennsylvania.

The European Right is, and was, a reaction against Communism, egalitarianism, welfarism and the social uniformity of liberal societies. But at the same time, it embraces some of the ideas previously associated with the Left. The basic message is that egalitarianism leads inexorably to totalitarianism. The reason for this, I would add, is because equality does not exist in nature and so it must be imposed if it is even to be approached.

Dr. Sunic notes the tendency of theorists on the European Right to present a wide variety of ideas, not all of them compatible by any means. But these ideas help to decompose the stereotype of the “fascist” with a small “f” and get the theorist of the Right off the hook, so to speak. Still, it is clear that intellectuals of the Right have had much more freedom to express their ideas in France than in Germany, or even Italy. The media campaign to force the French to “come to terms” with the Vichy regime is inspired by the fear that intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist (the foremost theorist of the European New Right) may be getting away with too much. [See the interview with de Benoist in the March–April 1994 Journal.]

Sunic is at great pains to emphasize the difference between the European New Right and the American equivalent: “The message of the New Right is simple: egalitarianism, economism, and universalism, when left unchecked, set the stage for most horrendous form of totalitarianism — communism.” Well, it is the American Declaration of Independence that enshrines Jefferson’s absurd principle that “all men are created equal,” while modern America has reached the culmination of economism in the form of consumerism, and actively promotes the creation of a culturally undifferentiated multi-racial biomass.

But communism has collapsed, and for a reason explained by Friedrich von Hayek. When I say “communism,” I do not mean the anarchist millennium of communism, when the state has “withered away,” but the communist reality, particularly in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, which was oppressive state socialism. Hayek explained that it had to collapse because it fixed prices. Even if fixed prices are correct at the moment of being fixed, they will tend to be either too high or too low within a short time. This leads to a black market in under-priced goods (sausages in Moscow, for example) and a glut of over-priced goods (such as matrioshka dolls). While Hayek — one of the Austrian Economists — is very little known in Europe, he is studied with reverence at a number of American universities.

European New Right theorists see Americanism as an even more dangerous enemy than communism. In The End of History, a much-discussed book written after the collapse of communism, Francis
Fukuyama claimed that Americanism would take over the world. Many Europeans feared that he might be right. But the argument does not hold water. In fact, the US and USSR were each able to control large areas of the earth because together they were able to maintain a potential balance of terror. Now that one of the protagonists has fallen flat on his face, the other is likewise left face down, like a playing-card that had been held up by another one leaning against it. That is why official representatives of the American and British governments are unwilling to condemn “fascist” members of the Italian government. After all, they were democratically elected, right? (I can think of other like-minded persons who, half a century ago, were similarly democratically elected!)

Besides, a diseased system produces its own antibodies if it is to survive, and it is Americans who are the most effective critics of their own system. To make a point in favor of the US Constitution, the First Amendment permits Americans to air views that in Europe are forbidden by law. It harks back to the powerful arguments in favor of the free clash of ideas expressed in Milton’s *Areopagitica*. Without this free clash of views, historical revisionism would be in a poor way indeed. Sunic admits (p. 41) that “even the United States” has produced a number of “conservative revolutionaries,” and cites Lothrop Stoddard, Madison Grant, Francis Yockey, and James Burnham as examples. One should not judge American conservatism by the Christian Fundamentalists or the neo-cons.

Sunic is good on the *Nouvelle Droite* in France, with its rejection of communism, liberalism and the Judaeo-Christian heritage, and its attachment to Europe’s pagan, pre-Christian past. He shows that some of its ideas, such as the dismantlement of the Western Alliance, are those of the Left. I fear that continental New Right’s emphasis on how “a sense of community must invariably preside over individualistic and economic self-interests” (sic) — that is, that the political must always take precedence over the economic — also means that it sides with the Left in the matter of taxes. In this respect it parts company with the Anglo-American Right, which has a long and honorable anti-tax tradition. But note that continental right-wing political leaders such as Mogens Glistrup (former leader of the Danish anti-tax party) and Jean-Marie Le Pen (leader of France’s *Front National*) have suggested doing away altogether with income taxes. What is more, Le Pen acknowledges his debt to the American right. When de Benoist talks about “soft” American totalitarianism air-conditioning hell and killing the soul, while creating “happy robots”, he does not acknowledge his debt to Aldous Huxley and his *Brave New World*.

A great deal depends on how we interpret the attacks of de Benoist and his friends on the Anglo-American concern for “economic utility and efficiency.” If by this is meant mass production methods and the lowest-common-denominator advertising, then it is obviously pernicious. Subsidiarity, as defined in the papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* and restated by the present Pope, is the watchword if we want to promote the quality of life. But economic efficiency can (and should) be redefined to take account of such necessary concerns as the environment and customer satisfaction. Just as Sunic shows how Jewish elements in France have diabolized, caricatured and vilified the *Nouvelle Droite*, so the *Nouvelle Droite* is in danger of doing the same to right-wing Anglo-Americans who might easily be their allies. On the other hand (p. 27), some of de Benoist’s most vicious critics, such as Georg Wolf (of the German weekly *Der Spiegel*) and Maurice Duverger (a former disciple of Jacques Doriot), not to speak of Paul de Man (of Deconstructionist fame) are, or were, fascists.

A very important chapter, “Gramsciism of the Right,” refers the need for the Right to go on a “long march through the institutions,” in imitation of Antonio Gramsci’s left-wing disciples. However, Sunic’s chapter on “The Pagan Right” fails to emphasize the essential difference between the Judeo-Christian spirit, which is essentially moralistic, and the Greek spirit, which was essentially aesthetic:

“Beauty is truth, truth beauty” — that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

Not till the ugly, degenerate twentieth century did the metaphors of the poets cease to draw on the riches of Greek mythology. Still, this chapter contains some very fine insights, as when Sunic quotes Ernest Renan on Judaism’s essential monotheism deriving from the desert (p. 74), or when he contrasts the heroic spirit of paganism with the guilt tradition of Judeo-Christianity (p. 78), and contrasts the pagan notion of eternal recurrence with the Jewish notion of progression towards a final millennium (p. 76). (The same could be said of Islam.) Catholicism, on the other hand, as de Benoist says, owes its manifestations of the sacred to its absorption of pagan traditions.

The second part of Sunic’s book, on “The Egalitarian Mystique,” contains a great many insights from the author’s wide reading in history, anthropology, ethnology, philosophy, and economics. It deserves to be read with thought and attention to detail.

Modern computers contain spelling checks that offer alternatives to obvious mistakes and would enable the author to avoid such typological errors as
“Mastering” Germany’s Difficult Past


Reviewed by Mark Weber

Armin Mohler, the Swiss-born author who has lived for many years in Germany, begins this well-written revisionist look at the Third Reich and its historical legacy by telling the fascinating story of his experiences as a 22-year-old in wartime Berlin. Following the German-led military attack against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the youthful author — then a student at the University of Basel — shared the enthusiasm of many Europeans of his day for the “European crusade” against Bolshevism. So intense was his passion that in early February 1942 he illegally crossed the border into Germany with the intention of volunteering for service in the Waffen SS. Mohler’s “romantic break out” failed. He was not accepted into the SS, and after his return to Switzerland about a year later, was tried and sentenced to six months imprisonment. (Others were much less fortunate. A number of Swiss citizens who had acted similarly, Mohler reports, were shot by the Swiss authorities for their “treason” on behalf of the Third Reich. Others had to endure years in Swiss prisons.)

Although not permitted to serve in the German armed forces, he was allowed to live for a time in Berlin. In addition to study at the Prussian state library there, he thoughtfully observed the rhythm of life in wartime Germany.

Mohler writes convincingly about how people lived in National Socialist Germany during its third year of war. “The Third Reich was not as I had expected,” he recalls. Life in wartime Germany was much more complex and multifaceted than is portrayed by the official propaganda image put out by the Allies during the war, and since then in the western mass media. (p. 91)

Mohler was struck, for example, by the self-confident style and attractive, even rather erotic appearance of Berlin’s women, who bore little resemblance to the dowdy “Gretchen” types portrayed in Allied wartime propaganda.

In contrast to the heavy-handed effort in Stalinist Russia to mold a uniform “new Soviet man,” no such effort was ever attempted in the Third Reich. Berliners very much retained their well-known sarcastic wit and spirited individuality.

Even membership in the National Socialist party did not imply a uniformity of thinking and behavior, as many today assume. “A Party member might be a pagan or a pious Christian; he was free to agitate for a free market economy or for state control of the economy. He was not even obliged to support racist views — Hitler’s contempt for popular racist views was well known ...” (p. 67)

“The greatest surprise for me was the intensity of the intellectual disputes ... Conversations were much more free than I had expected.” Indeed, Mohler contrasts the vitality of intellectual discussion in wartime Germany with the “monotone” character of discourse in Germany today. (pp. 95–96)

Mohler was impressed by the perseverance and toughness of the Berliners in the face of the privations and sacrifices of war. “In this century,” writes Mohler, “the Germans have accomplished something that is unique in modern history: in the space of three decades — first for four years, and then for almost six years — they waged war against practically the entire world.” (p. 61)

Most Germans, Mohler explains, supported the regime. “The [Third Reich] leadership could count on two things from the great majority of the Germans: first, the basic feeling that ‘life goes on,’ and second on a consensus [of support] that went far beyond National Socialism ...” This consensus, writes Mohler, was never officially laid out, but could be determined from numerous conversations. It included almost universal rejection of the democratic “system” of the pre-Hitler Weimar period, and, a common feeling that the war must first of all be won, and that all problems and disputes would be peacefully and fairly worked out afterwards. This basic consensus, within which Germans could and did disagree on a wide range of issues, held up until the end of the war. (pp. 66, 70–71)

During the final years of the war, Mohler notes, a new generation of younger men and women assumed control of Germany's administrative and military apparatus. It was this tough and capable generation, which had come to maturity during the Third Reich's pre-war years (including "incubation" in the Hitler Youth), that re-built Germany after the
defeat of 1945, and was responsible for the postwar "economic miracle."

During his stay in wartime Germany, Mohler once attended a summer camp of about 150 representatives of youth groups from various European countries, including Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, and Finland. Curiously, there were even three youths from Britain and Canada. These young nationalists, he recalled, shared a passionate idealism for a united Europe of fraternally-linked nations. Although Germany's wartime leadership encouraged this spirit of idealism, it never sincerely cultivated it. As a result, writes Mohler, many young non-German Europeans felt let down by the National Socialist regime.

Mohler's year in wartime Germany, "impressed me so much that, more than ever, I was not able to fit in to the 'self-satisfaction' of Swiss society." He anticipated that Germany would play a decisive role in his future. (p. 90)

Most of this book is devoted to a forthright, dissident treatment of the highly emotion-laden issue of Germany's burdensome Third Reich legacy. Mohler argues persuasively that the seemingly endless emphasis on Nazi crimes, and on German efforts to "atone" for collective "sins," is perverse, unjust and ultimately dangerous.

He cites a public opinion poll conducted some years ago, in which Germans selected at random were asked: "Who was guilty of the German-Hungarian war of 1893?" A decisive majority readily answered "the Germans," confessing collective guilt for a conflict that, in fact, never took place. Only a small minority responded with "the Hungarians" or "don't know."

"The legend of the 'singularity,' the uniqueness, of the German [warpine] crimes," he writes (p. 245), "is today's expression of hatred of Germany." In fact, he goes on (p. 252),

World history consists of many pasts that have not been 'overcome.' The Germans must live with their victims just as the Americans must live with their exterminated Indians, and the English must live with their ravished Irish, not to mention the Russians, the Turks, the Serbs, the Iranians and the Cambodians.

To point up the injustice and primitive sensationalism that characterizes so much of the hunt for "Nazi war criminals," Mohler devotes 16 pages to the case of Ilse Koch, the wife of a concentration camp commandant who was castigated in the American media as the "bitch of Buchenwald." She became internationally infamous for supposedly helping to make lampshades from the skins of murdered camp prisoners. Her husband, Buchenwald commandant Karl Koch, had been found guilty of murder and corruption by an SS court, and executed. (Mohler relies heavily on a book about the Koch case by California historian Prof. Arthur L. Smith, Jr. See also: M. Weber, "Buchenwald: Legend and Reality," The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1986-87, pp. 405-407.)

A remarkable feature of Der Nasenring is the author's objective treatment (pp. 226-229) of the history-making findings of American gas chamber expert Fred Leuchter, Jr.

(On the basis of his 1988 on-site forensic investigation of the supposed "gas chamber" killing facilities at Auschwitz, Birkenau and Majdanek, Leuchter concluded that these facilities were never used, and could never have been used, to kill people as alleged. For more about Leuchter, his work and his impact, see the Winter 1992-93 IHR Journal.)

At least one German author has credited Mohler for being the first to bring the Leuchter Report to his attention. (See: Ernst Gauss, Vorlesungen über Zeitgeschichte, pp. 163, 203, and the Nov.-Dec. 1993 issue of this Journal, p. 26.)

Mohler insists (p. 252) that this process of "overcoming the past," as it is practiced today, must come to an end because it hampers [worthwhile] policies and makes them impossible. Above all, the Germans themselves must bring this process to an end ... Most Germans living today were not alive during the Third Reich era (or only as children) ... It won't be possible to play out this same game for all eternity, portraying the German as singularly guilty, contrasted against the supposed normality of all others.

As part of this seemingly endless process of "overcoming the past" — which, as Mohler points out, was imposed on defeated Germany by the victorious Allied powers in the aftermath of the Second World War — not only is the Third Reich simplistically diabolized, but along with it all "conservative" virtues, including order, honor, morality, homeland, loyalty, decency, are defamed and discredited as "fascist" or even "Nazi." (p. 192)

The things that will destroy America are prosperity-at-any-price, peace-at-any-price, safety-first instead of duty-first, the love of soft living and the get-rich-quick theory of life.

— Theodore Roosevelt
Mattogno is a learned man in the mold of his ancestors of the Renaissance. He is meticulous and prolific . . . in the first rank of Revisionists.

—Prof. Robert Faurisson

Jean-Claude Pressac’s *Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers* was published in 1989 to resounding worldwide media hosannas. It was followed in 1993 by his second opus, *The Crematoria of Auschwitz: The Machinery of Mass Killing*.

Pressac’s principal volume, more than 500 pages with hundreds of illustrations, promised conclusive evidence of the existence and use of homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz. Headlines proclaimed that the revisionists were finally vanquished, that Pressac had proven what the immense resources of the Holocaust industry had failed to prove in more than 40 years.

But in the mad rush to herald the news, the pundits hadn’t bothered to read the book, presuming that the French pharmacist had accomplished what his publisher—the Klarsfeld Foundation—claimed he had. He hadn’t.

So Pressac’s second volume was published, promising, in his own words, “the definitive rebuttal of revisionist theories.” This dog wouldn’t hunt, either.

As you read *Auschwitz: The End of a Legend* you’ll find out why. Here, Italian documents specialist Carlo Mattogno demolishes the boldest attempt to date—Pressac’s back to back volumes—to answer the revisionist critique of the Auschwitz extermination story.

Mattogno shows how Pressac misinterpreted his own data in such a way as to assist not his fellow exterminationists, but the very revisionists he had set out defeat.

Mattogno demonstrates that Pressac’s confused arguments confirm his ignorance of the structure and functioning of crematory ovens and gas chambers, and of the nature and use of the disinfectant Zyklon B; that Pressac’s use of available statistics was arbitrary and largely fanciful, resulting in a down-sizing of the number of alleged victims; and that where information did not exist, Pressac simply invented it, often with mutually contradictory arguments in different parts of his thesis.

Mattogno’s relentless deconstruction of Pressac’s assertions and interpretations not only reveals the Holocaust Lobby hero’s incompetence, it’s a case study of the pathetic sloppiness the media can be counted on to overlook in the crusade against Holocaust Revisionism.
Just a brief note to let you know how very much I enjoyed the entire conference. I am a seasoned "conventioneer" and have had my share of high-caliber events, both as a speaker and as an attendee. I have never seen such scholarship and class! Thoroughly enjoyable conference! —I. Rimlaud

Thank you for all the work each of you did to make the Twelfth IHR Conference the intellectual event of the year. . . . [It] was my third — and the best! . . . Each [speaker] was excellent! —P. Mayer

I wish to thank you for an excellent IHR conference in Irvine, California. The conference speakers were excellent. Everything seemed to be better organized and more relaxed and friendly. —J. Bishop

I found the conference deeply interesting. I just arrived home determined to redouble my efforts on behalf of revisionism. —A. Thomas

The depth and breadth of the topics [and] the quality of the presentations [made this conference] one of the best I've ever attended. —H. Becker

This weekend was a wonderful opportunity to meet honest historians from around the world. Their enthusiasm and professionalism in spite of political persecution was inspiring! —G. Cetton

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Video #V108  IHR Director TOM MARCELLUS, IHR editor and conference M.C. GREG RAVEN, and Journal of Historical Review editor MARK WEBER. Weber dedicates the Twelfth Conference to American historian William Henry Chamberlin, and gives a rousing keynote address entitled Further Progress and New Challenges (audiotape #A134).

Video #V109  Engineer FRIEDRICH P. BERG explains in fascinating slides how 500,000 wood-burning gas vehicles produced in Germany during the war would have made ideal "gas chambers," but were never used as such (audiotape #A137). Aerial photography expert JOHN BALL reveals new forensic evidence showing that wartime CIA reconnaissance photos of the German camps were altered to fit the Myth (audiotape #A135).

Video #V110  Swiss revisionist activist JÜRGEN GRAF discusses the Three Pillars of the Holocaust Story, prefacing his talk with a report on the Third World minority invasion of Europe (audiotape #A136). Italian documents scholar CARLO MATTOGNO, author of Auschwitz: The End of a Legend, demolishes exterminationist Jean-Claude Pressac's second attempt to answer the revisionists (audiotape #A141).

Video #V111  IHR media director BRADLEY SMITH describes the astounding success of the "Campus Project" in placing full page revisionist ads in college papers across America. He also tells side-splitting anecdotes about his run-ins with anti-revisionist heavyweight Deborah Lipstadt (audiotape #A139). Independent documentary film producer DAVID COLE reports on his on-again, off-again intellectual affair with editor and publisher of Skeptic Magazine, Dr. Michael Shermer (audiotape #A143).

Video #V112  Brilliant, controversial English historian and international bestselling author DAVID IRVING thrills the audience with an update on his worldwide Campaign for Truth in History. In part two of his talk, Irving reveals the most telling entries from Goebbels' long-suppressed personal diaries (audiotape #A138).

Video #V113  France's peerless revisionist ROBERT FAURISSON delivers a humorous lecture entitled The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum: A Historical Fiasco. The professor toured the museum just days before the conference (audiotape #A142). International revisionist emissary ROBERT COUTTESS explains his unique methods for Getting Out the Word (on audiotape #A139 with Bradley Smith).

Video #V114  Canadian revisionist activist ERNST ZÜNDEL, barred by the U.S. State Department from attending three previous IHR conferences, pays tribute to fellow revisionists around the world, tells of his trials and ultimate victory in Canada's Supreme Court, and describes his recent trip to Russia, where he met with leaders to introduce historical revisionism (audiotape #A140).

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