The outbreak of war in 1939 gave Soviet dictator Stalin a long-awaited opportunity to begin putting into effect his plan for a war of conquest against Europe. This did not escape Hitler's notice, who responded by planning a preventive strike against the Soviet colossus. In this thoroughly documented study, Dr. Hoffmann proves Stalin's aggressive intentions, shows how Soviet propagandists incited Red Army troops to ferocious hatred against everything German, details the Red Army's horrific treatment of German prisoners of war, and shows how the Soviets used unimaginable violence to force their unwilling troops into battle. Finally, this book documents the Red Army's orgy of mass murder, looting, arson, rape and torture across central Europe, and especially in eastern Germany. As Hoffmann shows, Stalin's war was, in truth, a war of extermination both against Germans and the peoples of the Soviet Union. It was not before 1948 that the US government realized that it fought against the wrong enemy in Europe during WWII. The author, for years a historian with a leading German government history institute, is one of the world's foremost experts on the titanic German-Soviet conflict. This critically acclaimed book has been a big success in Germany, in spite of efforts by leftists to ban it and punish its author.
On the cover: German rescue workers using (then) sophisticated technology to search for survivors under the rubble after an Allied air attack.

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FROM THE EDITOR

FIRST WORD OF THE ATTACKS on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon reached us at the Institute for Historical Review shortly after 7 a.m. (PST), September 11. As we followed the breaking news on our radios and over the Internet, our initial consternation was quickly followed by an awareness of the possible implications of these events for revisionists.

Would the Institute be exposed to new pressures? Would IHR's revisionist associates abroad be vulnerable to further harassment by their governments and to additional attacks from Jewish "activists"?

Over the years, the IHR has been the target of terrorist assaults on its employees and premises. These have included the vandalizing of our vehicles; physical attacks; shots fired into our offices; and firebombings culminating in the July 4, 1984, destruction of our offices and stock. Those responsible for these criminal acts have never been identified, let alone apprehended, but there is little doubt that they are part of that international Zionist terror apparatus so often ignored by our leaders, law enforcement agencies, and media.

These efforts to terrorize the Institute not only failed, they have had as their effect increased security measures and a heightened vigilance against all comers. Thus we were prepared for anything from governmental snooping in the name of "security" to cutoffs in Internet service due to "business decisions," and even "demonstrations" mounted by what's left of the Jewish Defense League. Thus, too — need it be said? — we were able to dismiss any consideration of muzzling the Institute's voice, whether out of timidity or "patriotic" piety, and to renew our resolution to confront our leadership with its mistakes, past and present, as revealed by painstaking and nonpartisan review of the historical record.

The decision to devote this issue of the Journal of Historical Review to the fast brewing, though undeclared, "war on terror," was an obvious one. As the lead editorial makes clear, the conflict arises out of causes and factors that revisionists have long warned of, from America's infatuation with Israel to our short-sighted, selfish meddling in the Islamic world.

Despite the existence of a growing Arab and Muslim lobby, the Institute and its journal are uniquely qualified to inform the American, and world, publics of the facts and implications of our leaders' Middle Eastern policy mistakes. As the IHR's quick response to the September 11 attacks, written by director Mark Weber, demonstrates, the Institute has no organizational rival in its ability to express the facts reasonably, effectively, and without concession to the political shibboleths and historical taboos which cripple so many other attempts to explain events.

News of an important, though little noticed, libel trial in Israel, and a brief account of the longstanding Zionist campaign to smear an eminent Palestinian nationalist as an accomplice to the "Holocaust," signal a trend toward more material about the Middle East in coming issues of the JHR. No one can question the critical need for this focus; and this issue's reports on the troubled historiography of Israel's 1948 ethnic cleansing and on the propaganda frame-up of Haj Amin al Husseini relate closely to the Journal's traditional revisionist concerns.

In their attempts to provide context for the September 11 disasters, the best that most commentators could do was to evoke the Battle of Britain. A rather more illuminating comparison, perhaps, is offered by the vast sufferings of German civilians and the selfless struggles of German emergency personnel through five years of Allied terror from the air, as detailed by Samuel Crowell in "Defending against the Allied Bombing Campaign: Air Raid Shelters and Gas Protection in Germany, 1939-1945." This essay, although written several years ago (for the Committee on Open Debate of the Holocaust's website at www.codoh.com), is more timely than ever. Crowell's measured tone and absence of direct censure for the authors of the attacks that claimed in excess of 600,000 civilian lives make his article's unspoken indictment of the unpunished attackers — Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and their underlings — all the more effective.

Mark Weber assesses David Irving's long anticipated middle volume of his wartime biographical trilogy on Churchill. This new volume, in its exposé of the weakness that lay beneath Churchill's bluster, is timely for its implicit warning against the intellectual obtuseness and moral blindness that threatens America today. While the United States, unlike Churchill's Britain in the last world war, is nobody's junior partner, we may well profit from Churchill's legacy, that of a man who, in six years, fumbled away his country's imperial past and blighted its national future, bequeathing in their stead a handful of empty phrases and grandiloquent gestures.

— Theodore J. O'Keefe
Our Mission and the New War

AFTER AN IMPERIAL CENTURY ABROAD, America has suffered, on its home soil, an attack on its citizens unprecedented in its history. As so often in the past six decades, whether at Dresden or Hiroshima, Beirut or Baghdad, terror came from the sky. At this writing, the United States is once again waging an undeclared war on an ill-defined enemy. To date, our government has failed to acknowledge the stated grievances of those it considers the attackers, to clarify the underlying causes of the war, or to specify what the nation hopes to win.

We at the Institute for Historical Review shared, with hundreds of millions of Americans and friends of America around the globe, first the emotions of shock and disbelief, then those of sorrow and anger. Each of those feelings was reinforced by the terrible, surreal images of the destruction, and by the news of the great toll of lives among the helpless, and among the brave men who had gone to their rescue.

The civilian deaths from the attacks of September 11, while certainly far short of the “collateral damage” in civilian losses inflicted by U.S. forces in military operations during the past quarter century — including those in Iran, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Serbia, and Afghanistan — easily outnumber all our military dead since 1975. The devastation here, among the dead, the injured, and the bereaved, recalls to us American revisionists, at least, things that we as a nation had inflicted, but until September 11, 2001, not endured.

As revisionists, we are suspicious of official explanations, and wary of appeals to patriotism. If the admonitions of America's Founding Fathers to avoid entanglements abroad, above all those arising from sentimental (or venal) attachments to foreign nations and causes, were not enough, we would need only recall how our leaders have inveigled our country into one war, “conflict,” or “peacekeeping operation” after another since 1898. Today's slogans, in echo of yesteryear’s “Remember the Maine!” and “Remember Pearl Harbor!” should serve not so much to summon to a vengeance that may well be largely misplaced, but to remind that our imperial victories over Germany and Japan have sent us stumbling into quagmire and defeat in Asia, and to the brink of mutual nuclear devastation with our former Soviet ally.

Crusade or Coalition?

A month after the attacks, American bombs were still falling on Afghanistan, and the alleged mastermind of the terror, erstwhile CIA protégé Osama bin Laden, was still at large. For all the frenzied jingoism directed at the shadowy Saudi — archetype of Asiatic villainy, in the mold of Tipu Sahib and Fu Manchu, that he has become — the vital interests of Americans hang on the nature of the larger American response, strategic and diplomatic, that continues to take shape as of this writing.

Political realities indicate two possible courses of action. The first is for the United States to lead a broad coalition, including Muslim nations, with its goals not merely to punish the specific attackers, but to impose a just and workable solution of the Palestinian question, and to scale back the massive American military presence in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The alternative is for America to embark on an open-ended jihad against Islam, on the pretext of rooting out “terrorism,” that would threaten the lives and liberties of its citizens as never before. Taking the first course would likely benefit not only the United States, but also the civilized world, including the Muslim nations. Choosing the second would serve only two kinds of fanatics: those radical Muslims who evidently seek an expanding, escalating war against the alleged enemies of Islam, and those Zionist fanatics in the West as well as in Israel and its patently illegal colonies who have already done so much to unleash Armageddon on their neighbors, on themselves, and on the rest of the humanity.

Set in this stern context, President Bush's first fumbling pronouncements did not reassure. The president quickly managed to affront potential Muslim allies by calling for a “crusade” against the attackers, then seemed to usurp the Almighty by dubbing the planned retaliatory strike “Operation Infinite Justice.” Omitting all mention of our long and partisan involvement on behalf of Israel, or of our numerous recent sallies against Islamic countries, Bush informed the American people that the terrorists’ entire motivation had been blind hatred of our freedom and our goodness.

The president’s initial ineptness, together with the general haste to legislate and to decree without debate, the strident demand for “unity,” and the baying chorus of pundits and yahoos in support of instant attacks on Israel’s enemies, all made it seem, in the first fortnight.
after September 11, that America was being rushed to war against nebulous foes, and that a government clampdown on civil liberties might follow.

Then President Bush, clearly heralding to the advice of the American wing of his administration, began to give promise of charting a measured response to the attacks. To the disgruntlement of the pro-Israel forces, the United States sought the cooperation of Muslim countries, including such “radical” states as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, as well as “moderate” Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The president scaled down his original calls for a quixotic, worldwide war against terrorists and those who “harbor” them; redubbed the military operation, somewhat less grandiosely, “Enduring Freedom”; and even expressed care to minimize civilian casualties. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who earlier in the month had ordered a U.S. delegation to exit an international conference on racism in solidarity with Israel against the world, now took steps to rein in Israel and to urge a viable statehood for the Palestinians.

This turn in American policy was abetted by the intransigence and incompetence of such influential Israelis as Binyamin Netanyahu, the former prime minister, who initially hailed the murderous attacks on New York and Washington as “very good” for Israel, and the current foreign minister, Shimon Peres, who called for the United States to lead an anti-terror crusade — that Israel would sit out. Then it was the turn of Israel’s prime minister, Ariel Sharon, whose cumulative brutalities — unchecked by his American patron — have done more than anything else to bring the Middle Eastern cauldron to its present boil. When Sharon discovered that a more sensible policy seemed to be taking shape in Washington, he insultingly invoked the old “appeasement” canard, wailing that Israel was being sold out, as Czechoslovakia allegedly was at Munich in 1938. Instead of being truckled to, however, Sharon was quickly put in his place by President Bush’s Jewish spokesman, Ari Fleischer.

Despite all the indications that U.S. intentions might be to limit its military action to reasonable objectives, the prognosis remained cloudy as this issue of the JHR went to press. The powerful Zionist lobby is still in place, and is bringing great pressure to widen the war to include attacking Iraq and other Israeli bugbears with no provable links to the events of September 11. And to date the United States has made no observable moves to end Israeli aggression against the current Palestinian territories, which continue to be besieged and invaded by Israeli troops with American ordnance.

The Task of Revisionism

Few longtime readers of the Journal of Historical Review can have been surprised to learn that the attacks of September 11 stemmed from America’s failed policies in the Middle East, above all from its unconditional support for Israel. The revisionist critique of these policies has been a vital component of the Institute’s work since its founding nearly a quarter century ago. During the past twenty-five years the IHR has welcomed such learned critics of our nation’s Middle Eastern mistakes as Alfred Lilienthal, Robert John, the late Ivor Benson, former Congressman Paul McCloskey, and the Palestinian scholars Sami Hadawi, Issa Nakhleh, and Ibrahim Alloush to its conferences and the pages of the JHR.

As we of the Institute know, to understand the origins of the present Middle East quagmire requires grounding in the central object of revisionist study: an unbiased accounting of the origins, conduct, and outcome of the twentieth century’s world wars. It was during the First World War that Great Britain, to enlist international Jewry’s power of the purse and the press on behalf of the Entente, issued the Balfour declaration promising the Jews a homeland in (then Turkish-ruled) Palestine; among the postwar settlements was the League of Nations mandate whereby the Zionists began laying the basis for a Jewish state in Palestine, and for the dispossessing of the land’s Arab inhabitants.

After helping secure American entry into the Second World War on the side of England and the U.S.S.R., Jews — many of them Zionists — played an increasing part in charting policy, during and after that war, that began America’s tilt away from its traditional Mideast policy toward one of recognition, friendship, and eventually support for Israel. Just as the Jewish “homeland” was implemented under the authority of the League of Nations, so too is Israel a creature of the United Nations (for all its subsequent defiance of UN resolutions). And when Palestine’s Arab inhabitants were dispossessed in 1948, they were replaced largely by Jews who had emigrated from war-wracked Europe.

Even more striking than the diplomatic antecedents has been the Zionists’ exploitation of propaganda themes developed during the world wars. Israel is an embattled “democracy” ever menaced by “aggression” from its enemies, always vulnerable to “appeasement”
by its allies (as its prime minister has just sought to remind us). Above all Israel is threatened by another “Holocaust,” a dubious danger which Israel’s increasingly sophisticated and potent international lobby has nonetheless parlayed into a bugbear, a fundraising operation, an excuse for censorship, and a means of moral blackmail unrivaled in the annals of persuasion. Few things testify to the relatedness of Middle East and world war revisionism than the manner in which Israel’s conflicts served to crystallize the obsession of Jews with the alleged “Holocaust” in the 1970s, and to subsequently inflate that to full-blown Holocaustomania among Jews and gentiles alike.

Only the IHR, among opponents of America’s unconditional support for Israel, has properly grasped the nexus between that support, the Holocaust cult, and the other myths from the Second World War, or understood why the “good war” (as its Jewish chroniclers lovingly call it) must never be allowed to end, and the Holocaust never fade. Like other critics, IHR has been blacked out by the major media and the academy: in the estimation of the Israel lobby, our arguments and positions, presented to the American people, would be irrefutable. Even so, by using the new and still uncontrolled medium of the Internet, and by reaching out to new constituencies, including the Institute’s rapidly multiplying contacts in the Muslim world, we can capitalize on the growing urgency of the revisionist message at speeds that round the globe in minutes.

Whatever revisionists’ grasp of the past, we cannot foresee the future. What kind of war our country will eventually make this, against whom, and on behalf of whom, is hardly clear now. If, however, America wages the sort of war Israel and its American backers desire, then it is, alas, likely that many more innocent Americans will have cause for sorrow — and the blank check on U.S. dollars that we long ago handed the Israelis will be followed by another one, on American lives. How long, in that case, will it be before the great majority of our fellow citizens are able to join Alfred Lilienthal and the IHR in asking, “What price Israel”?

For American revisionists this is a time for calm, for
clarity of purpose, for strength of will, and for civic engagement to the maximum of our capabilities. We at the Institute know that our voice is small. Nonetheless we are able to speak truths that few others dare whisper — and we are willing, as so many of our associates have been, to pay the price for speaking the truth. We revisionists possess a powerful method. With that method — historical revisionism — we have, despite our censors, torn the veil of deception from our enemies’ holy of holies. Today it is our duty, to the nation and to humanity, to put that method, and the knowledge it has won us, to work against the hidden makers and mongers of Middle East war — the Zionists and their accomplices — and for the attainment of a just and lasting peace, at home and abroad.

A Brief Chronology of the ‘Special Relationship’

1948: U.S. recognizes Israel; Israeli forces occupy territories assigned to Palestinians by U.N. partition plan; massacre at Deir Yasin by forces commanded by Menachem Begin; other massacres, expulsions by Israeli forces create unsolved Palestinian refugee problem; U.N. mediator Folke Bernadotte murdered on orders of Yitzhak Shamir; President Truman authorizes initial U.S. economic aid to Israel, which reaches an estimated $90 billion by 2001

1953: Israeli army unit commanded by Ariel Sharon attacks West Bank village of Kibya, dynamiting numerous homes, killing over 50 civilians

1954: Israeli agents bomb American installations in Egypt in an attempt to rupture U.S.-Egyptian relations

1956: U.S., under Eisenhower, condemns Israeli invasion of Egypt, pressures Israel to withdraw from Sinai in the next year

1967: Israel invades and occupies parts of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria
annexes, for all practical purposes, East Jerusalem; U.N. Resolution 242 calls for Israel's withdrawal from these territories; Israeli aircraft attempt to sink U.S.S. Liberty, monitoring Israel's impending attack on Syria, murder of Egyptian POWs (34 Americans killed, 171 wounded), as President Johnson orders U.S. fighters sent to relieve the Liberty back to carriers; Washington facilitates cover up of Israel's responsibility

1969: Jewish Defense League, U.S.-based pressure group, comes under operational control of Yitzhak Shamir, former operations director of Israeli spy agency Mossad; JDL begins murderous terror campaign against Soviet diplomatic and cultural activities in the U.S.

1970s, 1980s: Nuclear materials and know-how smuggled from U.S. help Israel to become an atomic power, defying American-backed international strictures against nuclear proliferation; Israel's atomic arsenal remains a political taboo in the U.S.

1967: Israel invades Egypt and Syria to regain occupied territories; massive U.S. arms airlift enables Israeli victory; Arab states begin oil embargo; Senator William Fulbright states “The Israelis control the policy in the Congress and the Senate.”

1974: U.S. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, reveals Israeli emissaries pressure Pentagon for arms, promising: “Don't worry about the Congress. We'll take care of Congress”; Sen. Fulbright defeated in Arkansas primary after heavy donations from Jewish contributors to his rival, the first of several Congressional critics of U.S. Mideast policy to be targeted and defeated by Zionist fundraisers

1975: Seventy-six senators sign a petition warning President Ford not to diminish support for Israel

1978: Prime Minister Menachem Begin launches invasion of Lebanon in reprisal for Palestinian attacks; Egypt and Israel reach accord over occupied Sinai at Camp David, Maryland

1981: Israeli air force destroys Iraq's nuclear reactor; Israel annexes Golan Heights, seized from Syria in 1967; Begin condemns President Reagan's weak condemnation as treating Israel like a "vassal state," calls Reagan administration "anti-Semitic" for proceeding with sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia

1982: Israel invades Lebanon after wounding of its ambassador to Britain; Israeli bombing and shelling of Beirut kills 20,000, mostly civilians (Israel flouts U.S. law by employing munitions supplied only for use against attacking armies); evacuation of PLO forces to Tunisia; U.S. military intervention; after assassination of Palestinian premier, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon facilitates massacre, by Lebanese Christian faction, of over a thousand unarmed Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps

1983: U.S. embassy (80 dead) and Marine barracks (260 dead) blown up in separate terrorist attacks

1985: Israelis retreat from Lebanon, but continue to employ mercenary force in the south; Israeli air force bombs PLO headquarters in Tunis with heavy loss of life; Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew employed by U.S. naval intelligence, is arrested as a spy for Israel, subsequent investigation revealing vast security damage and probable passage of data from Israel to the U.S.S.R.

1987-1991: First intifada — Palestinians riot against three decades of Israeli military rule; Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin orders Israeli troops to break bones of youthful demonstrators; hundreds of Palestinians are shot dead for trivial offenses

1990: Israeli troops kill 17, wound hundreds of Palestinians protesting Jewish zealots' laying of temple cornerstone near Muslim shrines in Jerusalem

1993: Accords reached between Israeli PM Rabin and PLO chairman Arafat at Oslo provide for Palestinian recognition of Israel, Palestinian self-rule on West Bank, Gaza strip; Israel continues to build and expand settlements on Palestinian territory

1995: Rabin assassinated by Zionist fanatic with links to the Israeli security service

1996: Israelis open tunnel under Muslim mosques in Jerusalem, triggering riots in which 70 Palestinians die
Learning from the September 11 Attacks

IHR director Mark Weber’s response to the events of September 11, circulated via the Internet, has elicited more response, nearly all of it favorable, than any other such writing in the history of the Institute for Historical Review. To date “Learning from the September 11 Attacks” has resulted in three hour-long guest appearances on U.S. radio programs, as well as an interview by Iran’s English-language shortwave radio service. It is also being distributed in Arabic and German translations.

With thousands of victims and riveting images of death and destruction, war has come home to America with terrible, devastating suddenness. Together with our fellow citizens, we mourn the many victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building. But beyond the feelings of grief and fury must come clarity and understanding.

President George W. Bush said on national television that “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” The next day he said that “freedom and democracy are under attack,” and that the perpetrators had struck against “all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world.”

But if “democracy” and “freedom-loving people” are the targets, why isn’t anyone attacking Switzerland, Japan or Norway? Bush’s claims are just as untrue as President Wilson’s World War I declaration that the United States was fighting to “make the world safe for democracy,” and President Roosevelt’s World War II assurances that the U.S. was fighting for “freedom” and “democracy.”

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, speculation has been rife about who the perpetrators may have been. That itself is an acknowledgment that so many people hate this country so intensely that one cannot easily determine just who may have mounted these well-organized attacks of suicidal desperation.

These shocking attacks were predictable. In 1993 Islamic radicals set off a bomb at the World Trade Center that claimed six lives. In August 1998 the United States carried out missile attacks against Afghanistan and Sudan, strikes that senior Clinton administration officials said signaled the start of “a real war against terrorism.” In the wake of those attacks, a high-ranking U.S. intelligence official warned that “the prospect of retaliation against Americans is very, very high.” (The Washington Post, Aug. 21, 1998, p. A1)

Our political leaders and the American mass media promote the preposterous fiction that the September 11 attacks are entirely unprovoked and unrelated to United States actions. They want everyone to believe that the underlying hatred of America by so many around the world, especially in Arab and Muslim countries, that motivated the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks is unrelated to this country’s policies. It is clear, however, that those who carried out these devastating suicide attacks against centers of American financial and military might were enraged by this country’s decades-long support for Israel and its policies of aggression, murderous repression, and brutal occupation against Arabs and Muslims, and/or American air strikes and economic warfare against Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq and Iran.

America is the only country that claims the right to deploy troops and war planes in any corner of the globe in pursuit of what our political leaders call “vital national interests.” George Washington and our country’s other founders earnestly warned against such imperial arrogance, while far-sighted Americans such as Harry Elmer Barnes, Garet Garrett and Pat Buchanan voiced similar concerns in the 20th century.

For most Americans modern war has largely been an abstraction — something that happens only in faraway lands. The victims of U.S. air attack and bombardment in Vietnam, Lebanon, Sudan, Libya, Iraq and
Serbia have seemed somehow unreal. Few ordinary Americans pay attention, because U.S. military actions normally have little impact on their day-to-day lives. Just as residents of Rome in the second century hardly noticed the battles fought by their troops on the outer edges of the Roman empire, residents of Seattle and Cleveland today barely concern themselves with the devastation wrought by American troops and warplanes in, for example, Iraq.

Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Attorney General, has accused the United States of committing “a crime against humanity” against the people of Iraq “that exceeds all others in its magnitude, cruelty and portent.” Citing United Nations agency reports and his own on-site investigations, Clark charged in 1996 that the scarcity of food and medicine as a result of sanctions against Iraq imposed by the United States since 1990, and U.S. bombings of the country, had caused the deaths of more than a million people, including more than half a million children.

Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State in President Clinton’s administration, defended the mass killings. During a 1996 interview she was asked: “We have heard that half a million children have died [as a result of sanctions against Iraq]. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima … Is the price worth it?” Albright replied: “… We think the price is worth it.” (60 Minutes, May 12, 1996).

President Bush is now pledging a “crusade,” a “war against terrorism” and a “sustained campaign” to “eradicate the evil of terrorism.” But such calls sound hollow given the U.S. government’s own record of support for terrorism, for example during the Vietnam war. During the 1980s, the U.S. supported “terrorists” in Afghanistan — including Osama bin Laden, now the “prime suspect” in the September 11 attacks — in their struggle to drive out the Soviet invaders.

American presidents have warmly welcomed to the White House Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, two Israeli prime ministers with well-documented records as terrorists. President Bush himself has welcomed to Washington Israel’s current prime minister, Ariel Sharon, whose forces have been carrying out assassinations of Palestinian leaders and murderous “retaliatory” strikes against Palestinians. Even an official Israeli commission found that Sharon bore some responsibility for the 1982 massacres of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

Jewish and Zionist leaders, and their American servants, have predictably lost no time exploiting the September 11 attacks to further their own interests. Taking advantage of the current national mood of blind rage and revenge, they demand new U.S. military action against Israel’s many enemies.

In the weeks to come, therefore, we can expect the U.S. government, supported by an enraged public, to lash out violently. The great danger is that an emotion-driven, reactive response will aggravate underlying tensions and encourage new acts of murderous violence.

What is needed now is not a vengeful “crusade,” but coherent, reasoned policies based on sanity and justice. In the months and years ahead, most Americans will doubtless continue to accept what their political leaders and the mass media tell them.

But the jolting impact of the September 11 attacks — which have, for the first time, brought to our cities the terror and devastation of attacks from the sky — will also encourage growing numbers of thoughtful Americans to see through the lies propagated by our nation’s political and cultural elite, and its Zionist allies, to impose their will around the world. More and more people will understand that their government’s overseas policies inevitably have consequences even here at home.

In 1948, as the Zionist state was being established in Palestine, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, along with nearly every other high-level U.S. foreign affairs specialist, warned that American support for Israel would have dire long-term consequences. Events have fully vindicated their concerns.

Over the long run, the September 11 attacks will encourage public awareness of our government’s imperial role in the world, including a sobering reassessment of this country’s perverse “special relationship” with the Jewish ethnostate. Along with that, rage will grow against those who have subordinated American interests, and basic justice and humanity, to Jewish-Zionist ambitions.

For more than 20 years the IHR has sought, through its educational work, to prevent precisely such horrors as the attacks in New York and Washington. In the years ahead, as we continue our mission of promoting greater public awareness of history and world affairs, and a greater sense of public responsibility for the policies that generated the rage behind the September 11 attacks, this work will be more important than ever.
Oblivion in the Land of Memory

The massacre at Deir Yasin, the Palestinian village near Jerusalem where Menachem Begin’s Irgun and Yitzhak Shamir’s Lehi slaughtered over two hundred fifty Palestinians on April 9, 1948, has long symbolized the ruthlessness with which the Zionists seized the Holy Land and killed or displaced so many of its inhabitants. Strange to say, the notoriety of Deir Yasin may have served to obscure as many as forty similar slaughters by Israeli forces in 1948, despite the labors of an increasingly able Palestinian historiography, and of an Israeli revisionism that has re-examined the expulsion and flight of three quarters of a million Arabs from their homes during the “war of independence.”

A recent issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies (20, no. 3, spring 2001), by way of a report on the fate of a master’s thesis in history devoted to one such massacre, throws needed light on Israel’s past and present.

The author of the thesis, Teddy Katz, a committed Zionist studying the history of Israel’s 1948 war at the University of Haifa, was investigating the “microhistory” of Jewish expulsions of Arabs around Haifa when he stumbled across a mass shooting of unarmed inhabitants of Tantura, a fishing village twenty miles south of Haifa, by Israeli regular troops immediately following their capture of village on May 22-23, 1948.

Since the written record was slight and elliptical, Katz recorded several dozen interviews with surviving villagers, and with veterans of the Israeli army’s Alexandroni brigade, the military unit involved. Katz’s findings, culled from the interviews, amplified by additional written accounts, revealed that Israeli forces shot over two hundred Palestinians after they had been disarmed. The killings took place in two stages, the first a rampage by the Israeli infantry immediately after Palestinian resistance had ceased, the second the cold-blooded and systematic shootings of suspected Arab soldiers by Israeli intelligence. The details included the shootings of sons in the presence of fathers, fathers in the presence of sons, rapes, and other horrors.

Katz’s thesis, which received high marks, might have remained unnoticed except for an article in Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv in January 2000, which was quickly followed by a libel suit by Israeli veterans of the Alexandroni brigade who had taken part, including some who had been interviewed by Katz. In the trial, which began in December 2000, the plaintiffs were able to show only minor discrepancies in Katz’s references.
Teddy Katz suddenly aborted the trial by retracting his master's thesis with a published apology that brings to mind confessions in the old Soviet Union, or (more to the point) the apologies of certain Jewish revisionists of the Holocaust who have come under duress. The attack on the Katz thesis and its author's integrity by Israeli academics, including those from his own university, reminds, too, of the long campaign to strip Holocaust revisionists of their academic degrees, including those earned for work which had no relation to their subsequent revisionist activities.

Israeli professor of history Ilan Pappé, who graded Katz's thesis at Haifa, provides a judicious account of the affair in the JPS, including a nuanced consideration of the validity of oral testimony in this case and in general. As Pappé notes, the libel suit against Katz is so far the only instance in which any of Israel's 1948 massacres of Palestinians has ever been subject to investigation in an Israeli court.

The Mufti and the Holocaust

AMONG THE MANY TART INSIGHTS in Robert Novick's Holocaust in American Life (reviewed in JHR 20, no. 1 [January-February, 2001]) is his brief consideration of the part that Haj Amin el Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, has played in Zionist and Holocaust propaganda. As Novick notes, Husseini, the leading Palestinian nationalist leader from the 1920s through the 1940s, plays a "starring role" in the four-volume Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (edited under the auspices of Yad Vashem by Yisrael Gutman):

The article on the Mufti is more than twice as long as the articles on Goebbels and Göring, longer than the articles on Himmler and Heydrich combined, longer than the article on Eichmann — of all the biographical articles, it is exceeded in length, but only slightly, by the entry on Hitler.

There is much more to Zionist distortions of the mufti's wartime role than its vast overemphasis in the Encyclopedia of the Holocaust. In fact, accusations that the mufti (the title given a judge of Islamic law) was not only privy to, but deeply involved in the alleged genocide of the Jews have been a staple of Zionist propaganda since 1945.

To be sure, Husseini was no friend of Israel. Of a prominent Palestinian family, the young ex-Ottoman officer was appointed mufti of Jerusalem, at British behest, early in their mandate over Palestine. Any hopes that Husseini would prove a colonial tool were dashed when he led the resistance to Britain's pro-Jewish policies, culminating in the Arab revolt of 1936-1939. After he fled Palestine, the onset of war and his role in an unsuccessful rising against the British in Iraq drove Husseini to Axis Europe in 1941.

There, according to objective historians, the mufti helped the Germans with propaganda and recruiting among his fellow Muslims, steadfastly opposing any German actions that would facilitate Jewish emigration to Palestine (which National Socialist policy had earlier supported).

Those verifiable grievances have never been enough for Zionist publicists, however. The earliest accusations seem to stem from the circle of Rudolf Kastner, whose Zionist "rescue" operation dickered with Adolf Eichmann for Jewish emigration in return for trucks and other supplies in Budapest in 1944. Shortly after the war Kastner submitted an affidavit to British authorities in which he claimed that Eichmann's subordinate Dieter Wisliceny had told Kastner he was convinced that the mufti had "played a central role in the decision to exterminate the Jews." Rather than indict Husseini at Nuremberg, the British dismissed this and other charges as Zionist propaganda. (Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem [NY: Columbia University Press, 1988], pp. 105-107)

In another early postwar smear effort, Simon Wiesenthal, in his 1947 Grand Mufti — Grossagent der Aehse (Grand Mufti — Axis Agent Extraordinary), related that Husseini had visited Auschwitz and Majdanek, paying close attention in both camps to the efficiency of the crematoria, and praising personnel particularly conscientious at their grisly work. (Joseph Schechtmam, The Mufti and the Fuhrer [NY: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965], p. 160)

Shortly after Israeli agents kidnapped Adolf Eichmann and spirited him to his show trial in Israel, the once prominent journalist Quentin Reynolds was hired by the Israelis to do a hatchet job on Eichmann. Based on material supplied by the Zionists, Reynolds's Minister of Death claimed that the mufti had been a close confidante of Eichmann, and had displayed an avid interest in the extermination machinery. Reynolds quoted the mufti as telling friends "the Palestine problem will not be solved in a diplomatic conference but by other means — simple and radical like the gas cham-
bers," and reported that “[h]is green turban was seen many times in Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Majdanek.” Yet the author offered no sources for any of these claims, which were published by Harold Guinzburg’s respected Viking Press in 1960.

Following the deaths of Kastner (in 1957) and Eichmann (in 1961), the need to displace the charge of collaboration from Zionists to Palestinians grew less urgent, and Zionist writers retreated from the more brazen charges to innuendo. Thus Joseph Schechtman’s 1965 Mufti and the Führer: “It is hardly accidental that the beginning of the systematic physical destruction of European Jewry by Hitler’s Third Reich roughly coincided with the Mufti’s arrival in the Axis camp,” and Zvi Elpeleg: “It is impossible to estimate the extent of the consequences of Haj Amin’s efforts to prevent the exit of the Jews from countries under Nazi occupation, nor the number of those whose rescue was foiled and who consequently perished in the Holocaust.” (The Grand Mufti, London: Frank Cass, 1993, p. 72)

While the more scrupulous Zionist writers have fallen back on weasel words, and the mufti goes unmentioned in such orthodox versions of the Holocaust as Hilberg’s and Reitlinger’s, the diabolization of the Palestinian freedom fighter by the Holocaust lobby continues. The website of the tax-supported Simon Wiesenthal Center’s, carrying on its namesake’s libels, profiles the mufti as follows: “He supported the Nazis, and especially their program for the mass murder of the Jews. He visited numerous death camps[,] encouraged Hitler do [sic] the extend the ‘Final Solution’ to the Jews of North Africa and Palestine.” (at http://motlc.wiesenthal.org/pages/t031/t03148.html) Any search of the Internet will reveal many similar accusations.

As Palestinians and other Arabs discover the revisionist challenge to orthodoxy on the alleged Jewish Holocaust, they are taxed by Zionists with wielding “denial” as a weapon against Israel. Yet long before most Palestinians had ever heard of the Holocaust, they were being smeared for complicity in it, thanks to lies about one of their greatest leaders, Haj Amin al Husseini, mufti of Jerusalem.

Doug Collins Dies at 81

Doug Collins, award-winning journalist, staunch defender of freedom of speech, and friend of historical revisionism, died on September 29, 2001, after a brief illness. He was eighty-one. He is survived by his wife, three adult sons, and seven grandchildren.

From 1984 until his retirement in 1997 his regular column in the North Shore News of Vancouver, British Columbia, was one of paper’s most popular features. In more than 1,400 essays, Collins laid out well-informed, commonsense views on Canada’s most heated issues, including immigration, the status of Quebec, and special privilege “rights.” Collins delighted his readers with provocative, irreverent writing that was reminiscent of H. L. Mencken — adroitly taking aim at cant, bigotry, sophistry, and double standards in prose that was unfailingly clear, witty, and vigorous.

Few North American journalists have come under more sustained attack for their views. His detractors castigated him as a bigot, a racist, and a Hitlerite anti-Semite. At the same time, he was widely admired as a rare and defiant voice for Canada’s “silent majority.”

The column that got Collins into the hottest of hot water was a March 1994 essay, “Hollywood Propaganda” (reprinted in the May-June 1994 Journal), that skewered the much-hyped motion picture Schindler’s List. Collins referred to it as “Swindler’s List” and “hate literature in the form of films.” He also wrote that “the Jewish influence is the most powerful in Hollywood,” and dismissed the fabled “six million” Holocaust figure as “nonsense.”

The Canadian Jewish Congress responded with a legal complaint in July 1994 against Collins and the North Shore News, charging that the “Hollywood Propaganda” column violated British Columbia’s Human Rights Act. Collins became the first Canadian journalist to be tried for infringing “human rights,” and his defense of freedom of opinion before the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal attracted nationwide attention. In November 1997 the tribunal rejected the CJC complaint, finding that the column, although “deliberately provocative and insulting,” did “not itself express hatred or contempt” in violation of the provincial “anti-hate” law. A subsequent complaint based on the “Hollywood Propaganda” column was upheld by the tribunal, and was being appealed when Collins died.

Until just days before his death, Collins continued turning out essays that were distributed via the Internet. As he wrote a few months before his passing: “I defended freedom in the 1940s when Hitler was on the loose, in the 1970s when the federal hate laws were passed, and in the 1990s when those idiots in Victoria
passed their misnamed Human Rights Act, and that I shall go on defending freedom until the day I die.”

**Distinguished Career**

Collins was born in England on September 8, 1920. During the Second World War he served in the British Army. A sergeant in the infantry, he was captured in 1940 at Dunkirk. He was later awarded the Military Medal for bravery during that campaign.

During his four years as a prisoner of war, he made no fewer than ten escape attempts. He was able to escape from a German POW camp in Silesia and stealthily made his way to Hungary. After being captured there, he made another daring escape, this time making his way to Romania. There he was imprisoned once again, but when Romania capitulated in 1944, he was freed and returned to Britain, serving in combat with British forces in northwest Europe during the war’s final months.

In 1952 Collins moved to Canada, where he began a distinguished career in journalism that spanned four decades. It included work as a reporter and commentator for three major daily papers: the *Calgary Herald*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Vancouver Province*. He also worked for Canada’s CBC television network, and for a time hosted an open-line radio talk show in Vancouver.

Doug Collins was the recipient of two of Canada’s most coveted awards for journalism, the National Newspaper Award (1953) and the MacMillan Bloedel Award (1975). In 1993 he was awarded the Commemorative Medal for the 125th anniversary of Canada’s Confederation, given to persons “who have made a significant contribution to their fellow citizens, their community, or to Canada.”

Collins was the author of four books, including his wartime memoir, *POW: A Soldier’s Story of His Ten Escapes from Nazi Prison Camps* (1968), and *Here We Go Again!,* a collection of one hundred of his *North Shore News* columns, including the notorious “Hollywood Propaganda,” published in 1998.

Over the years numerous articles about, and essays by Doug Collins have appeared in this *Journal*. He addressed the IHR’s tenth conference in 1990. His presentation, “Reflections on the Second World War, Free Speech, and Revisionism,” was published in the fall 1991 *Journal* (and is also available on audio- and videotape from the IHR).

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**Correction**

In JHR 20, no. 3 (June-July 2001), “To the Mannheim Jail: Justice and Truth in Contemporary Germany,” p.36, the amount of bail reported in the sentence: “The judge rounded this down to ten months, and then set bail at sixty thousand marks” should read “six thousand marks.”
In this headline-making work, a prominent French scholar delivers one powerful blow after another to the pernicious historical myths cited for decades to justify Zionist aggression and repression, including the Israeli legend of a "land without people for a people without land," and the most sacred of Jewish-Zionist icons, the Holocaust extermination story.

For financial gain, as an alibi for indefensible policies, and for other reasons, Jews have used what the author calls "theological myths" to arrogate for themselves a "right of theological divine chosenness." The wartime suffering of Europe's Jews, he contends, has been elevated to the status of a secular religion, and is now treated with sacrosanct historical uniqueness.

This readable, thoroughly documented study examines the brutal dispossession and mass expulsion of Palestine's Arabs, exposes the farce of the Nuremberg victors' show trial, and shows that the notorious German "final solution" term referred to a "territorial" program of resettlement, not extermination. Founding Myths details the secret collaboration of prominent Jews with the young Nazi regime, and the 1941 offer by some Zionists, including a future Israeli prime minister, to join Hitler's Germany in a military alliance against Britain. The author presents a frank assessment of the powerful Jewish-Zionist lobby in the United States, showing how it effectively controls US policy regarding Israel, and plays a crucial role in shaping American public opinion.

For decades Roger Garaudy was prominent in the French Communist Party, making a name for himself as a Communist deputy in the French National Assembly, and as a leading Marxist intellectual and theoretician. Later he broke with Communism, eventually becoming a Muslim.

When Founding Myths first appeared in France, it touched off a storm of controversy among intellectuals and a furious uproar in the media. Soon Garaudy was charged with violating France's notorious Gayssot law, which makes it a crime to "contest" the "crimes against humanity" as defined by the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945-46. A Paris court found him guilty and fined him $40,000. His trial and conviction for Holocaust heresy prompted wide international support, above all from across the Arab and Muslim world.

Relying on a vast range of American, Soviet, American and German source references, this well-documented study is packed with hundreds of eye-opening quotations, many by prominent Jewish scholars and personalities.

Here, at last, this important work is available in a handsome, professionally edited English-language edition, with a valuable foreword by Theodore J. O'Keefe.
Defending Against the Allied Bombing Campaign: Air Raid Shelters and Gas Protection in Germany, 1939-1945

SAMUEL CROWELL

RECENTLY THE ARGUMENT HAS BEEN ADVANCED that each of the crematoria at Birkenau was equipped with a gastight bomb shelter. The argument was first made in the summer of 1996 by Arthur R. Butz, with respect to Crematoria II and III in his Vergasungskeller article.1 In the spring of 1997 the concept was extended to cover all of the crematoria in Birkenau in my article “Technique and Operation of German Anti-Gas Shelters in World War Two” [hereinafter, “Technique”].2

Although the identification of these spaces as gastight bomb shelters was corroborated in “Technique” by extensive reference to contemporary German civil defense literature, public acceptance of the thesis has been slow. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that the “Bomb Shelter Thesis” contradicts the work of Jean Claude Pressac and others, notably, Robert Jan van Pelt.3 In addition we must recognize that the thesis, in either the Butz or Crowell variant, seems at first glance both unusual and even extraordinary.

But the argument for bomb shelters in the Birkenau crematoria seems extraordinary only because the scope of the German civil defense program is so little known. Hence, when the crematoria are identified as having had gastight bomb shelters the first reaction of the skeptic will be, “Why would there be alterations for the crematoria to serve as air raid shelters? Why not other buildings?”, without recognizing that similar shelters were quite common in Germany, and, we believe it possible to show, also in the concentration camp system and Auschwitz-Birkenau in particular. So it should be clear that the argument for gastight bomb shelters in the Birkenau crematoria is strengthened to the extent that analogous structures can be shown to have existed both in the concentration camp system as well as in German cities.

The present article is an attempt to carry the argument for comparison and corroboration forward, in this case by supplementing the contemporary civil defense literature cited in “Technique” with secondary studies of German civil defense in the Second World War, comprising both recent German studies as well as U.S. government studies prepared in the immediate postwar period. The result will be the broader realization, widely recognized in the secondary literature, that gastight bomb shelters were a common feature on the wartime German civilian and concentration camp landscape.

We will begin by reviewing the rules and recom-

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1Samuel Crowell is the pen name of an American writer who describes himself as a “moderate revisionist.” At the University of California (Berkeley) he studied philosophy, foreign languages (including German, Polish, Russian, and Hungarian), and history, including Russian, German, and German-Jewish history. He continued his study of history at Columbia University. For six years he worked as a college teacher.
mendations for German civil defense, and will find that the precautions the Germans took for bomb and gas attacks were extensive. A review of the actual types of structures will show a wide array of constructions, including adaptations of natural geologic formations, existing structures for secondary bomb shelter use, covered trenches for concentration camp internees, and a particular emphasis on aboveground structures, all of which were designed to defend against both bombs and gas attacks. Provisions for gastight doors, including those that would lock from the outside, reinforced concrete roofs, including those with brick ventilation shafts, and gas-filtering ventilation systems will be shown to have been quite common, according to both the documentary evidence and the oral testimony of the men, women, and children who took part in the large civil defense network. In addition, we will note the particular emphasis placed on chemical decontamination facilities, which would usually be sited in only a few dual-purpose locations in a city, and which, along with the specially trained decontamination crews, would also be used to combat vermin and the spread of infectious diseases, including typhus.

In the course of such a review we cannot pass by the opportunity to describe some of the circumstances whereby the Germans used this civil defense apparatus to maximum advantage, overcoming terror, destruction, and massive casualties to survive and endure. For if the story of the civil defense precautions in the concentration camp system is little known, so too has the German people's battle for survival in the Allied bombing campaign been largely ignored.

Civil Defense in Germany

Regulations. It was generally accepted after the First World War that aerial bombardment would be a feature of any future war, and that civilian populations would be targets. “Strategic” bombing in this sense was a kind of indirect warfare, meant to rupture the enemy’s economy or demoralize its population so that the enemy army would be forced to capitulate. Such indirect warfare is a classic feature of siege warfare as well as naval blockade. The last circumstance may explain why Great Britain became the leading practitioner of strategic area bombing in the Second World War. A famous expression of Britain's point of view was made by Stanley Baldwin in the House of Commons on November 10, 1932:

I think it is well for the man in the street to real-
and the program had to be worked into any urban development programs. The Code gave preference to aboveground shelters, because underground shelters were costlier. In addition, it specified various details, such as the number of gas locks for entry (preferably two), the width of entries, the size of the staircases, the need for washrooms, first aid rooms, and so on.

If the Code underlay Germany’s civil defense approach, the LS-Führerprogramm of November 1940 stressed the same points with greater detail and greater urgency. By the time of its issuance, Germany was reconciled to a long air war; therefore the details of the program were meant to be comprehensive and prescriptive, as a listing of some of its provisions shows:

1. For buildings (municipal buildings, dwellings, lots) which up to now have either inadequate air raid shelters, or none at all, do-it-yourself air raid measures will be adopted.
2. Existing or newly constructed streets or transportation paths (e.g., subways and tunnels) are to be adapted for the construction of underground and bombproof air raid shelters.
3. The openings to the outside in existing air raid shelters are to be removed and at the same time connections are to be made [to other shelters] with collapsible fire walls.
4. New public air raid shelters are to be constructed, and existing air raid shelters are to be made as bombproof as possible.
5. All new constructions, particularly in buildings for the armaments industry, are henceforth to be equipped with bombproof air raid shelters. Such shelters are to have the same priority as the structure being built itself. [S23f, N327ff]

A few clarifications to the program are necessary. “The openings to the outside” that needed to be closed has to do with the demonstrated insecurity of some emergency exits; this would lead eventually to the filling in of emergency exit passages with sand, or boxes of gravel, or even the filling in with a narrow wall. Second, the Brandmauerdurchbruch, or collapsible fire wall, was meant to connect a series of buildings, such as one would find in large cities. Such an expedient would of course be useless in situations where a building was isolated. The most striking thing about the LS-Führerprogramm, aside from the extensive construction that followed after it was issued, is the fact that it was global:
all buildings, new or old, were to be equipped with bomb shelters.

Civil Defense in Cities. The organization for civil defense in Germany was extremely widespread. The Reichsluftschutzbund (hereinafter, RLB)\textsuperscript{3} numbered 12 million members by 1939 [B13], and it is only reasonable to assume that its numbers swelled as the war continued. Each city had a complicated hierarchy of positions and departments whose functions were clearly marked out.

The basic structure was the Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst (SHD) (Security and Auxiliary Service), which was further subdivided. The Sicherheitsdienst (S-Dienst) functioned as security and police in the event of air raids, the Feuerlöschdienst (F-Dienst) were the firefighting crews, the Instandsetzungsdienst (I-Dienst) were charged with technical and emergency repairs, including bomb disposal and the rescue of bombing victims, and the Sanitätsdienst (San-Dienst) worked closely with the Red Cross and the municipal health authorities in handling all problems of health, emergency care, and hygiene that grew out of the bombing raids. There was even a special department devoted to veterinary care, with emergency stations for the care of draft animals and pets. [N46-143]

The final division of the civil defense forces was the Entgiftungsdienst, or Decontamination Service. The decontamination workers were normally attached to the firefighters, and indeed in Nuremberg they were amalgamated with the firefighters in 1940, so that the gas protection function of the E-Dienst became auxiliary. [N77] By 1939, Nuremberg, with a population of about 450,000, had 15 decontamination squads with 15 NCOs and 300 men; in addition, there were 56 gas testers (Gasspürer) attached to the central authority. [N48] The role of the gas testers was to follow up on any suspicions of gas usage and take samples to one of 25 gas testing labs. Other fixed sites related to the work of the Decontamination Service included five decontamination centers with 5 NCOs and 20 men, and five centers for the decontamination of materials (Sachenentgiftungsanstalten), also divided among 25 personnel. The location of these stations is difficult to establish today but it is clear that they made use of existing locations that featured laundries and public bathing facilities. [N78, CD164] It seems probable also that the municipal disinfection centers (several German cities possessed these) were earmarked for dual purposes.\textsuperscript{6} The example of the city of Nuremberg can safely be extrapolated to Germany at large, not least because of the global nature of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey’s report, which covers German gas protection measures in detail.[CD164f]

The members of the Decontamination Service throughout Germany were issued special protective clothing, including rubberized suits and boots, and, like other important personnel in the Civil Defense Program, had higher quality gas masks (some 12 million gas masks in all were distributed). [CD153,CD164] The U.S. Strategic Survey Final Report considered it significant that the production of this anti-gas warfare gear continued until the end of the war.[CD164]

In addition, the members of the decontamination squads received special training: of the 150 hours of instruction for these auxiliary firefighters, no less than 25-1/2 hours were devoted to chemical warfare.[N78] On the other hand, in order to reduce anxiety, the average citizen received only about a half hour of chemical warfare instruction. [CD165] In addition to the decontamination squads, gas testers, the various fixed sites and their work crews, gas protection also included trucks and even ships equipped with cleansing apparatus, and chemicals and decontamination equipment, including trucks and supplies held in reserve to be sent to afflicted areas.[CD164f]

As to the application of gas protection features to air raid shelters, it was a given that bombproof also meant gasproof, as one author remarks: “Particular attention had to be given to the entrances to the bunkers. Each bunker had to have at least two entrances and each entrance had to be equipped with a gas-lock. It was understood that bombproof meant proof against gas bombs!” [S40] The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey corroborates: “All buildings and public shelters constructed or modified to house air-raid protection activities were gas proof.” [CD164] Further evidence of the pervasive nature of gas protection in Germany can be found in “Technique.”

Shelters and Equipment. Secondary sources pertaining to the civil defense procedures of individual cities are a good source of information on the types of shelters erected. But an extremely useful summary of such structures can also be found in an essentially contemporary publication of the U.S. government, the Civil Defense Division Final Report, issued in its second edition in January 1947.

The most basic shelter was the home shelter, or do-it-yourself shelter (Behelfsmässige Luftschuttraum), such as one would find in private homes or apartment buildings. Since some 22 million Germans lived in 58
cities of 100,000 or more [H128], and there were 104 cities with priority civil defense classification (i.e., Luftschutzort I) [S15], we can imagine that there must have been literally hundreds of thousands of cellars that were fitted out with at least minimal bomb and gas protection. Here, the numerous “how-to” articles in periodicals such as Gasschutz und Luftschutz indicate the extent of the preparation. According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, such shelters were subject to inspection and approval by the local authorities [CD155] and had to meet the following specifications:

1. at least rudimentary gas-proofing,
2. at least one emergency exit (usually to an adjoining cellar through a Brandmauerdurchbruch, or collapsible fire wall),
3. the sealing of all other openings to the outside, and
4. in some cases rudimentary struts of wooden beams or brick. [CD155]

The costs of such private shelters were frequently subsidized by the government [CD155]: a wise move, as during the heavy raids the line between private and public shelters was frequently erased. As can be imagined such basic basement shelters provided only marginal support in the heaviest raids, but the insistence on gas proofing is certainly significant in evaluating the importance and pervasiveness of anti-gas measures.

A secondary category involved semi-public shelters, which included schools and other municipal buildings. These were probably the most numerous of the various dual purpose shelters that served a public function; the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey specifies that they were equipped with gastight steel doors. [CD156] The problem with such converted shelters is that in some parts of the country, notably in the east and south, the building of communal shelters was delayed until late in the war, precisely at the point when building materials were most difficult to obtain. For example, Bavaria was long called the “Air Raid Shelter of Germany” on the understanding that it would not be bombed because of its distance from Britain. This assumption also led to the “Kinder Land Verschickung,” a program in which children were evacuated from the north and west to the south. [U.S.214] But from 1943 onwards all parts of the country would be bombed, and this probably explains the variability in the children’s death toll, ranging from 10 percent in places like Hamburg and Nuremberg to 30 percent in cities like Darmstadt (see discussion below) because the children in the latter locations would not have been evacuated. Acceptable bomb and gas protection seem to have been widely available in converted shelters, as we shall see, but given

the nature of the firestorm raids from 1943 onwards these would be of little help; cities such as Munich, Augsburg, and Dresden were seriously affected by a lack of preparedness.

Of the dedicated public shelters, there were several types. Probably the most numerous of these were the trench shelters, such as one would find in the labor camps and concentration camps (these will be discussed in more detail later). Stollen, essentially semicircular tunnels bored into a hillside, were also found, although often downtown underground bunkers would mimic the structure of Stollen. Since the vertical protection would depend on the height of the hill being bored into, we can imagine that they were quite secure. The main problem with such shelters was that they could only be built where the lay of the land would support them. And there were occasional design lapses: one Stollen in Stuttgart, designed to hold 1,000, was notorious for lacking any restrooms. [S99]

Another common shelter, particularly in the cities, was the large Luftschutzbunker. Sometimes building these involved the expansion of existing basements, or the digging of sub-basements. The floor plans for some of these shelters are mind-boggling in size: one that was inspected could hold 10,000 people. [CD157] Although priority was given to aboveground shelters, the Germans ended up building many under ground because of the lack of space, particularly in the centers of cities.
Bomb shelters were needed to safeguard Germany's cultural treasures as well as to protect its people. Here, an underground bunker for the storage of artworks, in Nuremberg. There proved no way to defend Nuremberg's incomparable cityscape of medieval and renaissance buildings, however, and much of the city's architectural splendor perished forever under American and British bombs.

These were usually long, flat structures with flat roofs of reinforced concrete. Forced ventilation was standard, with standard Schutzaumbelüfter, operated by electricity or by hand. Air intakes (Entlüftungsrohre) would usually be equipped with a gastight flap, as drawings indicate. Sometimes the air intake would have a large and heavily sloped brick chimney, which, due to the slope, would occupy a mass many times greater than the aperture. It was apparently not unusual to use vent pipes for camouflage purposes.

The large Hochbunker (or aboveground bunker) was a German innovation that had no counterpart among the Allies. They were usually large concrete blocks built aboveground and designed, like the Luftschutzbunkern, for multiple use: for people, important documents, artworks. Eventual peacetime use was envisioned for the Hochbunker: indeed, in Hamburg many of these would be converted to office blocks after the war. They could be classed in various categories, including those that were provided with false roofs and painted-on windows that looked like gigantic chateaux, others that resembled squat skyscrapers with bricked-in windows, still others that were round and faced with brick, like the keep of a castle, and still others that looked like tapered towers.

Although aboveground shelters would seem particularly vulnerable because they were exposed, in practice they seem to have worked quite well. Since they were of concrete, they did not catch fire, and since they were detached from other buildings they were not as directly affected by other burning buildings; hence the effects of heat or gases would not be as great. In the Hamburg raids of late July 1943, the second to last of which created the famous firestorm, only 100 people in aboveground shelters perished, largely as a result of two direct hits on smaller structures. Considering that more than 50,000 people were killed that night and that over
A messenger boy in Hamburg who didn’t make it through the firestorm. Very little remains of his body except a partial skeleton.

eleven hundred tons of high explosives were expended, that seems a remarkably low total.

Perhaps one of the most unusual public air raid shelters was the Parkhöhle in Weimar. The Parkhöhle is a long jagged series of caves that lie beneath the city, several hundred meters in length, caused by water cutting through the rock formations. Long a tourist attraction, the Parkhöhle was converted to bomb shelter use late in the war, with some brick strutting done, as well as the provision of some other equipment. Because of its size, it was not felt necessary to ventilate its long corridors. The caves were also the site of extensive archaeological work by Johann Wolfgang Goethe and his son: the ethnographic museums of Weimar today still display their finds of ancient bones and other materials from the Old Stone Age. [P19ff, 49]

As already noted in the discussion in “Technique,” ventilation in the air raid shelters was a problem insofar as it had to provide sufficient air per person (11 cubic feet per minute), had to provide temperatures in the acceptable range (24°C to 17°C), and provide for humidity control. [CD158] In addition, the more secure shelters would be flooded with refugees in the event of severe raids. Overcrowding was always a problem.

It is difficult to reconstruct the number of shelters or the types of shelters built before and during the war, but various indications from the secondary literature provide a number of clues. It is known, for example, that Hamburg had over 2,000 public shelters for about 500,000 persons, out of a population of over 1 million. [G69] Wuppertal, with a population of 400,000, built or converted over 100 shelters. [S98] Since Hamburg was one of the better-prepared cities in the Reich, it is a safe inference that the rest of the residents were distributed in smaller home shelters and LS-Kellern, the colloquial name for the cellars of apartment buildings adapted for bomb shelter use. [N442] Dresden, on the other hand, had no dedicated public shelters, and only a few converted public shelters, yet home and apartment protection appears to have been up to standard. [D166f]

A detailed study of the city of Siegen provides information that can be extrapolated to the rest of the Reich. Under the LS-Führerprogramm, over 10 million RM was spent in the construction of 17 large public shelters,
another 6 million for 8 Stollen, and close to another million in the conversion of 100 or so existing buildings to semi-public shelters. For a total outlay of over 17 million Reichsmarks, Siegen was able to provide adequate public shelter for about 20 percent of its population of 60,000, the rest falling back on home and cellar shelters. [S866]

There is also the case of Nuremberg. Early in the course of the LS-Führerprogramm, four shelters were designed for a cost of 3.6 million RM, even though the city began the war with dozens of public shelters. [N385] In 1943, the budget called for 52 new public shelters, the improvement of 294 old shelters, and the strutting and splinterproofing of 3,600 home shelters for a cost of one and a half million RM. [N450] But neither in Nuremberg, nor in any other city, was funding, principally by the government, ever lacking — “Geld war genug da” — the money was there. [N385] Further data on Nuremberg indicates that in 1942 there were 13,500 Kellerräume, that is, shelters for home and apartment dwellers. [N446]

Considering that there were over 12 million in the Luftschutzbund in 1939, that over 22 million Germans lived in 58 cities highly vulnerable to air attack (over 75 cities were essentially leveled by the RAF alone) [H374f], we can easily arrive at the conclusion that the program built thousands of dedicated public shelters, tens of thousands of semi-public conversions, and hundreds of thousands of home and cellar shelters at a total cost of billions of marks.

**German Civil Defense in Practice.** The test of the German civil defense system came when the bombs started to fall. In spite of the careful planning, many precautions would not function in firestorm conditions. Then survival became a matter of luck, desperate courage, or strong leadership among the RLB Feldwebln (sergeant majors) and fire wardens.

Under normal conditions the system seemed to operate well enough, with the usual precautions functioning normally. Thus one man would recall his boyhood experiences:

I was a Hitler Youth messenger. As such, I was stationed at an air raid shelter bunker built both aboveground and underground. When an air raid alarm sounded, we had to be there on time and open the bunker with the “block leader,” a party official who was responsible for the street. We had to care for the children, give them milk, and so on, if the alarm lasted a long time. […]

The block leader or the women from the Nazis’ women’s organization sent around and handed out toys to the children and light sedatives to the adults. And the louder the attack got outside, the quieter it got in the bunker.

The underground shelters were more like “tube bunkers.” When you came through the steel door, fitted with rubber around the edges to make it airtight, you entered a diagonal hallway. This hallway was joined by three or four tube-like hallways perpendicular to it. Each of these, in turn, was a separate bunker. Air was pumped through each tube by machines which we Hitler Youth operated. That was one of our jobs. My duties also involved running messages from one bunker to another if the telephones went dead. We were outfitted with gas masks, steel helmets, etc. We had to go out at all times, even when the bombs were falling. I was 13 years old at the time. [V211]

The above not only indicates the ordinariness of underground shelters, gastight steel doors, and hand-cranked ventilators, but also the integral role that women and children played in civil defense. One woman, in Dresden, describes surviving the American daylight raid after the famous firestorm:

Normally, there were only 20 to 25 of us down in the cellar. But now, with many people off the street, including those who’d stopped over at our house, there were about 100 of us. Nevertheless, no one panicked — we were too numb and demoralized from the night before. We just sat there. The attack rolled closer, and then a bomb hit. It was like a bowling ball that bounced, or jumped perhaps, and at that moment the lights went out. The whole basement filled with dust. When the bomb carpet reached us, I crouched in a squatting position, my head between my legs. The air pressure was immense, but only for a moment. The rubber seals on the windows and the steel doors probably helped to absorb some of the impact. Someone screamed, and then it was quiet. Then a voice shouted, “It’s all right, nothing’s happened.” It was the shelter warden. [V231]

The above quote is informative in a couple of ways. It describes the typical gastight seals on steel doors and windows. Such fixtures appear to have been common, even in Dresden, where, instead of specially built bomb
A few of the tens of thousands of German civilians who perished in Hamburg during a week of Allied air attacks in 1943. The British and American bombers, aided by the first extensive use of chaff to foil German radar defenses, dropped incendiaries and high-explosives to create the first firestorm known to human history.

shelters, existing facilities were used for virtually all large public shelters. [S99f,D166f] In addition, the role of the shelter warden in maintaining calm in the shelters is suggested. Indeed, it appears in several cases that the survival of thousands if not tens of thousands depended on the leadership and resource of the Feldwebeln (sergeant majors), Branddirektoren (fire wardens), and the roving rescue squads of the SHD. The experiences of Sergeant Major Schäfer and Fire Warden Bey of the Hamburg RLB, as related to Gordon Musgrove for his Operation Gomorrah, are both typical and extraordinary. [G71f,73f,91f]

Schäfer was bombed out of his own apartment the day before the firestorm and had moved down the street to take up residence. When the firestorm raid began, he withdrew to the shelter of his new building, along with about 400 others. Over the course of the next half hour or so, he was led to make several trips out of the shelter into the flames, in order to determine the extent of the damage, from which he determined very early on the need for immediate evacuation. And here we encounter a common theme in shelter rescues: the need for forceful and even brutal leadership to save lives.

In Schäfer's case, his shouted demand for evacuation was greeted with fear and apathy, a reaction often cited in the air war literature. Schäfer's response was immediate: he grabbed the first two people near the exit by the scruff of their necks, dragged them up and out into the flaming street, and took them down to the corner to point out the way to safety in a nearby park. He repeated this exercise several more times, leading out by force a number of women and their children, which in turn brought everyone else out. When everyone had exited the shelter, he followed behind. On the way, he broke into a building that was not yet in flames, rescuing another party there, then made several dashes into the street to save women whose clothing had caught fire, passed out and was revived by some his people, retreated to the park with them, found temporary relief from a water tower, and finally, after several hours, was rescued with his full complement several blocks further away. There seems little doubt that without Schäfer's energetic leadership his party would not have survived, for the building from which they escaped collapsed minutes after his departure. What makes his self-con-
More than fifty years ago, the bombing and the shooting ended in the most total military victories, and the most annihilating defeats, of the modern age. Yet the war lives on, in the words — and the deeds — of the politicians, in the purposeful distortions of the professors, in the blaring propaganda of the media. The establishment that rules ordinary Americans needs to keep World War II alive — in a version which fractures the facts and sustains old lies to manufacture phony justifications for sending America's armed forces abroad in one senseless, wasteful, and dangerous military adventure after another.

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But _Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace_ is more than just a history: it's a case history of how politicians such as FDR use propaganda, outright lies, and suppression of the truth to scapegoat patriotic opposition to war, to incite hatred of the enemy (before they're the enemy!), and to lure foreign nations into diplomatic traps — all to serve, not America's national interest, but international interests.

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- Inspired insight into how wars will continue to spring from the internationalist impetus that led us from World War II — through the “Cold War” (and the hot wars we fought in Korea and Vietnam with our WWII Communist “allies”) to the “New World Order,” Bosnia, and Afghanistan — until Americans, armed with the truth, force their leaders to return to our traditional non-interventionist foreign policy.

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War That Never Ends

- Continuing persecution of aged “war criminals”;
- Grandiose new “Holocaust” museums;
- Ever more billions in “aid” and “reparations” to the State of Israel;
- Non-stop scapegoating of Germans and Europeans;
- Ceaseless wars and interventions justified as “rejecting appeasement,” “stopping aggression,” “standing up to a new Hitler”;
- And now, a new world war for Israel, against Islam?

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Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, first published in 1953, represents revisionist academic scholarship at its full and (to date) tragically final flowering in America's greatest universities — just before America’s internationalist establishment imposed a bigoted and chillingly effective blackout on Revisionism in academia.

Its republication by the Institute in 1983 was an event, and not merely because IHR's version included Harry Elmer Barnes' uncannily prophetic essay on “1984” trends in American policy and public life (considered too controversial for conservatives and anti-Communists in the early 50's). It was hailed by the international Revisionist community, led by Dr. James J. Martin, the dean of living historical revisionists, who wrote:

It is the republication of books such as Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace which does so much to discommode and annoy the beneficiaries of the New World Order.

Discommode and annoy the enemies of historical truth and freedom of research it did — virtually the entire stock of Perpetual War was destroyed in the terrorist arson attack on the Institute's offices and warehouse on the Orwellian date of July 4, 1984.

Today, the Institute for Historical Review is proud to be able once more to make this enduring, phoenix-like classic available to you, and to our fellow Americans. It can silence the lies about World War II, and thus the bombs and bullets our interventionist rulers plan — for our own American troops no less than the enemy — in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia, or wherever else the interventionist imperative imposed by World War II may lead us.
trol and presence of mind even more remarkable is that the last person to leave his shelter was his wife, and as she did so she handed him their three-month-old child.

At this point it is necessary to pause and understand why there would be so much reluctance to leave the shelters. Most of the city raids were fire-raisers and several culminated in firestorms. Outside one had to contend with exploding bombs (including delayed action bombs), bomb splinters, falling masonry or entire buildings, and wooden roofing and construction beams that would fly around in the storm winds like matchsticks. In addition, all commentators make reference to a kind of continual shower of sparks, using metaphors like “swarms of fiery bumblebees,” or “blizzards of red snow”: these sparks could not only burn and blind but could also set one’s clothes on fire. Finally, being forced to breathe off the pavement during the raids sometimes one finds the comment “the air just wouldn’t come” and similar sentiments. (U.S.22) One warden, standing outside his shelter, was seized with a terrifying premonition of his own death, and not long after, suddenly passed out. Mercifully, he was right outside of a Hochbunker, and was dragged back in to safety. (G98) Another survivor describes falling to the ground and being forced to breathe off the pavement during the firestorm, burning his lips and mouth in the process. After an hour and a half the crisis had passed. Dead people were lying all around him. (G111f) In the Dresden raid, a survivor described a group of young girls who finally took the risk to dash across a courtyard and open a gate that would allow them to escape from the fires. Yet, as they were struggling with the gate, a building nearby collapsed, killing all of them. (D170) Seeing or hearing of such situations no doubt led many, and particularly women, women with children, and the elderly, to forsake the frightening uncertainty outside for what they believed would be the comparative security of the bunker. These people rarely survived.

The leadership and professionalism of the air raid crews were of particular importance during firestorms, for here the elaborate systems of precaution frequently broke down. Collective protector ventilation systems might start billowing smoke; emergency exits and shutters might crash in from the impact of bombs and offer no more protection; fire walls might be broken down in an effort to escape, only to allow in lethal fire and smoke. Here again the human element made the difference between life and death.

Fire Warden Bey was another air raid leader in Hamburg. When the firestorm raid on Hamburg began, he was walking around the block, gathering up stragglers, but he too was soon forced to retreat to his shelter. Within a matter of minutes the street was ablaze and the shelter was becoming overcrowded with people from outside or from other shelters that had failed. Some of them wore clothes which had already begun to smolder, others had ripped their clothes off to avoid the flames. The ventilation system soon broke down and the lighting soon failed; and, while he had no real hopes of fixing it, Bey made a shrewd display of instructing a few men to work on it, hoping that that would placate his anxious crowd and give them hope. Meanwhile, Bey and one of his NCOs went out on a number of patrols looking for help or safety. No clear escape route was found, nor did they find any of the emergency squads, which were roaming the blazing city in trucks, but they did find some water, which they carried back to the bunker, by now extremely overcrowded. A series of cracks made in the connecting walls with other cellars did not lead to safety either, but brought even more dazed survivors into the shelter.

Going out into the street one more time, Bey finally flagged down a major of the SHD with a rescue party and organized an evacuation. Returning to his shelter, Bey found that his people had given up all hope, but finally he was able to coax a few to follow him out so that he could explain the plan. No sooner had he stepped onto the street to encourage the others to join him, when two adjoining buildings collapsed, knocking him down and covering him with dust and debris. Meanwhile, his observers panicked and dashed back to safety. Bey got to his feet and returned to the shelter, and finally succeeded in goading and hectoring his people into the street. One by one the people from the shelter stepped out, encouraged by an exhausted Bey, forming a human chain down two streets and into a park. After inspecting the shelter one last time, he followed behind where he found all of his people in safety. Clearly the tenacity and perseverance of Fire Warden Bey was instrumental in their survival, but so too were the roving squads of the SHD, who abandoned their role of fire monitoring and fire fighting early on in order to save as many lives as possible. In this particular case, the lives of more than 700 were spared.

A particularly harrowing example of rescue concerns the city of Braunschweig, which was bombed on October 15, 1944. Here the breakdown concerned what in retrospect would seem both foolish and tragic: the
tendency of some shelter doors to be locked and bolted from the outside to prevent panicked civilians from rushing outside prematurely. The raid began at 2:30 in the morning and developed a minor firestorm in the city center within 45 minutes. But this same area contained eight large bunkers and public shelters which housed 23,000 people. It was impossible to get through because of the firestorm, and thus the rescue of these people depended solely on the ingenuity of the firefighters.

By 5 AM they were ready. Hoses were leapfrogged forward group by group, throwing up a “water alley” of protection for the next group that would detach its hoses, move forward, reattach, and create the next segment of the alley. Overcoming numerous complexities and failures, the firefighters finally got through to the bunkers at 7 o’clock the next morning, and “As the doors were unbarred and unlocked the rescuers heard the sound of ‘many people talking quietly but nervously under their breath.’”[D64f] Then the survivors were led back to safety in an enormous human chain under the canopy of water.

There is a tendency when discussing war to expect the greatest demonstrations of leadership on the battlefield, and to view civilian victims as mere passive statistics, whose numbers are then manipulated for political purposes. Yet the narratives that have been recounted here remind us otherwise. The leadership, courage, and devotion to duty demonstrated by Sergeant Major Schäfer, Fire Warden Bey, and the Braunschweig firefighters — along with many others — were in the finest traditions of any military organization. They were charged with saving as many lives as possible. At great personal risk, they accomplished that mission.

The Number of Victims. Yet it must be said that hundreds of thousands died. A usual figure for dead German civilians in the air war is about 593,000 — most round up to 600,000, others tend to argue for a lower figure, 300,000 to 400,000. [H11,DD171n] Rudolf Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz, insisted in his memoirs that “the total number of victims of the air war will probably never be found. In my estimation there were probably several million. The casualty figures
were never made public. They were top secret.” [DD171] But the value of Höss’ estimation is only a problem for those who consider him reliable in other areas.

The 593,000-600,000 figure, in turn, accepts a low estimate for Dresden, about 35,000. But it is doubtful that the figures for Dresden were so low. Hamburg, with a population of 1.2 million, suffered about 50,000 in the firestorm of July 29, 1943. But this was during the third of several attacks, and we should expect that many had fled from the city by the time of the third attack (the overall reduction in Hamburg’s population was 43 percent). [G162] We know that the population of several cities was reduced as a result of air raids: Nuremberg’s population of about a half million had been halved by late in the war. [N445] In addition, Hamburg suffered its terrific casualties even though it was well equipped with thousands of shelters.

On the other hand, Dresden, with a pre-war population of 600,000, had been swelled with hundreds of thousands of refugees from the east, fleeing the Soviet army: its population at the time of the raid was probably comparable to Hamburg’s at that city’s zenith. Dresden was also struck by a firestorm: but it lacked almost all of the safeguards present in Hamburg. There were no large Hochbunkern in Dresden where people could wait out the storm. Death from asphyxiation would seem to be guaranteed.

Additionally, the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the city would have no way of orienting themselves or knowing how to escape: we can assume panic among many of them, and desperate retreat into overcrowded underground converted public shelters that would ultimately become death traps. Moreover, since Dresden had never before been seriously bombed, the population had neither fled, nor been reduced in number, nor were they likely well versed in procedures that would save their lives: and only one, evacuation, would save them in the firestorm. On top of this, the second wave of British bombers was designed to bomb the center of the city at precisely the time when the maximum amount of aid would be in the streets trying to save the lives of the victims from the first wave: that percentage of losses must also be considered. Finally, the third blow by the Americans, next day, doubtless brought its casualties, along with the P-51 Mustangs which, according to some accounts, strafed survivors. [D182, SF180]

Finally, there is the matter of accurate counting due to the problems of cleaning up the destruction. It is well known that tens of thousands were burned on pyres in the center city, but bodies were still being recovered when the Soviets took over the city on May 8, 1945. And, as in the case of other cities, the recovery of dead bodies was not the highest priority: bodies were recovered when possible, and there were several cases after the war when the bulldozing of previously impassable rubble turned up human remains. [G167] Hans Voigt of Bielefeld, whose diary was employed by David Irving in his famous study of the Dresden raid, described his job in the gathering, identification, and disposal of remains: his final estimate was 135,000. [D208ff] While Hamburg is usually conceded to have caused 50,000 deaths, it is well to keep in mind that at the time the death toll was given out as between 30,000-40,000 [G167]: therefore, for people to assume similar casualties at Dresden would have seemed normal at the time. However, the conditions were definitely much worse in Dresden, for the reasons given, and therefore it seems likely that the casualty figures were much higher than those of Hamburg. In that case, Hans Voigt’s projection seems reasonable, which would mean that the overall loss of life in the air war was in the neighborhood of 700,000.

Of the 15,802 bodies that were identifiable after the Hamburg firestorm, 6,072 were men, 7,995 were women, and 1,735 were children (children usually meaning pre-teenage). The percentages are thus 38.4 percent men, 50.6 percent women, and 11 percent children. [G167] For Darmstadt, which also experienced a firestorm but which was not as well prepared as Hamburg, there were 936 military deaths, 368 POW deaths, and 492 foreign laborer (i.e., forced laborer) deaths. Of 6,637 identifiable civilian dead (twice that many died) 1,766 were men, 2,742 were women, and 2,129 children. The percentages are thus 26.6 percent men, 41.3 percent women, 32 percent children. [H325f] Other raids show similar breakdowns, from which we conclude that the Allied campaign directed at German civilian morale killed mostly women and children.

There is a melancholy footnote to the Dresden raid, which, whatever its final counting, was surely the worst air raid in the European theater. As is well known, Churchill proceeded with the raid because he wished to make a demonstration of British might on the continent to the Soviets. [D148,D214] In the event, however, the raid, which was promised to hold up communications and transport for the front, and thus abet the Soviet offensive, was a failure: within three days, the marshalling yards were back to limited operation, and the city was not taken until after the war was over. [D177f] It is interesting to note that Churchill, in his memoirs, describes his determined effort to ensure that
Eisenhower not capture the city. [D232] One can suggest a number of reasons for this; certainly the Americans crossed the Elbe at several other points. Popular perceptions of Dresden continue to be informed by Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse Five*, a tremendously popular and widely read novel that describes the raid as "the greatest massacre in European history." [SF101] In opposition, we have the occasional little-read book which assures us that the bombing of Dresden was not a crime. As Vonnegut might say, so it goes.

After the Raids. The morning after the raids was the time for cleanup and rescue, although even before the raids were over the people would be out in the street; women putting out fires, boys working water pumps for the firefighters, members of various crews and civilians organizing ad hoc rescue operations. The first priority was locating and rescuing survivors, as well as treating the injured, who, as in a real battle, would far outnumber the dead. Doctors had been privately informed that the threat of carbon monoxide poisoning was high, even in open areas: therefore they were told to give priority to unconscious victims ahead of those who had been buried, burned, or suffered broken bones. [U.S.24f] In Hamburg alone 37,439 were injured seriously enough to be counted, including many amputees and those with severe and lifelong burns. [G167]

Locating the living had its problems, because if they were in shelters their location might have been covered by tons of brick and masonry. To help orient the crews, underground cellars were supposed to have white paint markings several meters up the side of their buildings pointing down to the air raid shelter. [N495,N540] The I-Dienst was equipped with listening equipment, which consisted of a console from which highly sensitive microphones were led and then placed in piles of rubble. A photograph from the period shows two members of a rescue crew, one gesturing for silence, as they listen intently for the sound of breathing. [N538,N79-105] Everyone was involved in rescues, including forced laborers and prisoners of war, who would be trucked in or marched in from local camps. Naturally, the prisoners and laborers did not have much choice, but it appears that in the immediate aftermath of a raid the political hatreds that had inspired it were forgotten and the common denominator of humanity took over. Irving relates how British POWs threw themselves into rescue work after Dresden, improvising listening devices, running pipes down into the debris to provide air to those below, putting themselves at risk to save lives. [D183,D194] It was probably the same after all of the raids.

The center of the bombing zone was usually marked off, and the people were forbidden access. As Vonnegut described it, "Germans were stopped there. They were not permitted to explore the moon." [SF213] Then the work crews, supplemented by POWs and camp internees, would turn to the grisly task of recovering the dead. After the Kassel firestorm of 1943, the police president issued suggestions on the things that would be required by the rescue crews, including protective suits, rubber gloves, goggles, disinfectants, and also tobacco (probably to defeat the sense of smell), alcohol (to encourage the workers), and shears and bolt cutters to cut off the fingers of the dead wearing jewelry, which would later be used to identify the victims.[H320] Buckets of rings were recovered from the Dresden dead in this fashion. [D208] In Dresden, the devastation had been so great that there were no rubber gloves available; an American POW describes how they improvised:

The guard pointed at the corpse as one I should remove. He indicated I take a belt off another body and put it around the one I was to remove. It's surprising how much could be communicated by hand motions. I put a belt around the neck of this man and started to drag it towards the ramp, but [the body] broke in half. That was too much for me. I sort of lost it for a bit. I began to scream, yell and dance around. I tried to go out but they wouldn't let me. They got me quieted down, pointed to one of the bottles on the table and insisted I have a few swallows. That was the first I ever tasted liquor of any kind. [A408]

While it was understood that the decontamination squads would work as firefighters until needed for special purposes, it should be obvious that their protective clothing, equipment, and training made them perfectly suited for such activities as corpse handling, as well as in the disinfection of shelters, where for example "corpse water" (Leichenwasser) was found. [N77]

At that point the decontamination squads would be subordinated to the Sanitation Service (about one third of the Nuremberg decontamination personnel were so assigned)[N135], whose duties involved not only medical care but also water purification, corpse handling, garbage disposal, pest control, and disease control. [N77f,N123f,N298ff] In fact in Nuremberg, in the last years of the war, the municipal disinfection center was used not only for the combatting of rats and flies but also for the delousing of city residents. [N123f]
Victims in Hamburg. Because their clothing is intact, it is probable that they succumbed to the intense heat, rather than the flames, generated by the firestorm.

The reward for these levels of sanitation prophylaxis was that German cities were untouched by epidemics throughout the war, despite the intensive destruction. One doctor, writing for the U.S. Strategic Air Survey after the war, was “incredulous” at this fact, which he initially considered “inconceivable.”[U.S.82] His explanation focused on three factors: first, the German people had high standards of personal cleanliness and orderliness even under the most extreme conditions; second, the RLB aggressively pursued a program of education on personal hygiene, for which citizens were required to attend six lectures each quarter throughout the war; and finally the cooperation (Dr. Enloe calls it “docility”) [U.S.82] of the population in such measures as boiling water after an air raid or in laying out traps during designated rat extermination campaigns.

Nevertheless, there were some outbreaks of disease, including typhus fever, which did not appear until after “foreign laborers” had been imported from Eastern Europe, where the disease was endemic (it is assumed that these foreign laborers were largely Soviet POWs and Eastern Jews).[U.S.30] Although the foreign workers and POWs were inspected, and one assumes, deloused, twice on entering Germany [U.S.30f, cf. SF86], Dr. Bauer believed that the conditions of the labor camps, including overcrowding and lack of sanitation, contributed to the outbreaks; so, too, did the air raids, in which the civilian population came into contact with the internees in the shelters, or during evacuations. He also cited the extension of working hours and the lack of soap as contributing factors. Another likely influence was the fact that the firefighting crews frequently wound up using raw sewage in combating fires.[U.S.63]

That the gas decontamination squads would become involved in such activities (corpse handling, disinfection, vermin control, and delousing) creates a number of powerful associations that point to multipurpose roles in situations where facilities or personnel are scarce. To put it another way, the decontamination paradigm of treatment, featuring undressing, washing, and dressing in clean garments, is also the model for the handling of infectious material, including the disposal of the dead, as well as for the municipal disinfection stations, and the delousing stations in concentration camps.

Most descriptions of the cleanup procedures contain not only wrenching but also seemingly fantastic descriptions, particularly when dealing with the recovery of the dead. Thus one reads of an “undulating layer of gray ash” that is supposed to represent firestorm victims [D45], or reductions of people to puddles, or multicolored corpses, and so on. But unlike other fantastic descriptions that have emerged from the war, such descriptions have a strong documentary, forensic, and even photographic basis. After the war the United States published studies that were based on the extensive reports prepared by German doctors for the secret use of the German government. These attest to, and explain, the reality of these fantastic descriptions.[U.S., 14, 16, bibliography p. 29]

The discoloration of corpses is one feature that even historians do not seem to clearly understand. Thus, David Irving, who describes corpses that are blue, orange, and green, seems to think that carbon monoxide poisoning was somehow responsible [D48], while Max Hastings, who even cites the color purple, seems to think that the discoloration was due to pyrotechnics.[H319,H315] In short, the descriptions are not understood, so the authors have simply projected explanations onto the situation. This is human nature: confronted with sights and sounds that we do not understand, we project onto the reality an explanation that accords either with what we have been taught, or what we expect, or simple guesswork.
Corpse discoloration also accounted for similar projections by the German people during the course of the war. A particular case concerns the city of Kassel after the raid of October 22, 1943. This raid, which raised a firestorm, killed fewer than 8,000 out of a population of 228,000, and it appears that the extensive precautions of the RLB were a major factor. But when many of the dead were found in their shelters days after the attack, the brilliant hues their bodies had assumed brought forth the charge of poison gas usage.

To stabilize the situation, doctors conducted extensive postmortems; part of their report, dated November 1, 1943, reads as follows:

Five of the corpses selected by the chief Police-doctor in Kassel, Herr Senior Staff Police-doctor Fehmel, were dissected at the cemetery. The corpses concerned, of people killed during the terror-raid on Kassel on 22.10.43, had been recovered from basements after several days. Closer particulars are not known. Two corpses were of the male sex and about 18-20 years old; three were of women, of which one was between about 50 and 60 years old, the other two about 30 years old. There were no external injuries manifest on the corpses, which were in a condition of high-degree putrefaction. [...] The skin was partly colored a uniform red as a result of the hemolysis which had set in, but in extensive areas it was already colored green. This green coloring is attributed to the action of the ammonium sulphide with the reduced hemoglobin, which had, of course, permeated the skin as a result of the hemolysis that had preceded it. This green coloration, the analysis of which had been specially stressed in the conferences in Kassel, is as such purely a post mortem manifestation of corpses, cannot be connected with any particular poisonous chemicals which might have been employed by the enemy during the terror-raid. [emphasis in original, D 235f]

The issue is confirmed also in mortuary literature, which clarifies the details of the Kassel report:

The first sign of putrefaction is a greenish skin discoloration appearing on the right lower abdomen about the second or third day after death. [...] Both color and smell are produced by sulphur containing intestinal gas and a breakdown of red blood cells.

Under normal conditions, the intestinal bacteria in a corpse produce large amounts of foul-smelling gas that flows into the blood vessels and tissues. It is this gas that bloats the body, turns the skin green to purple to black, makes the tongue and eyes protrude, and often pushes the intestines out through the vagina or rectum. The gas also causes large amounts of foul-smelling blood-stained fluid to exude from the nose, mouth, and other body orifices. [I421

This last is no doubt a reference to the “Leichenwasser” (or corpse-water) described above, which occurs as the internal organs liquefy [I 43], as well as a confirmation of such descriptions as “The bottom steps were slippery. The cellar floor was covered by an eleven- or twelve-inch deep liquid mixture of blood, flesh and bone.” [D194]

The Kassel report, supplemented by the mortuary literature, is important in several respects. In the first place it makes it clear that putrefaction could engender a wide variety of hues and it is possible that fire and heat even extended this palette. [H315] Thus the claim of multi-colored corpses is strikingly confirmed. Second, the mere issuance of the report indicates not only a widespread ignorance of the discoloration that attends dead bodies, but also the widespread, if not paranoid, assumption that discolored corpses must have been killed with poison gas. This will be, I believe, an important factor to consider when evaluating Allied reports from the last days of the war. But finally, the fears of the populace with regards to the danger of poison gas were in a sense justified: although the fact was not publicized at the time, many of the victims had died from poisoning by carbon monoxide, which is, after all, a poison gas.
Another Hamburg casualty, this one literally roasted to death.

Firestorms and Carbon Monoxide. Carbon monoxide deaths were usually brought on by the fires set by the Allied bombers' incendiary bombs. To grasp the widespread nature of such deaths, we must first explain the nature of firestorms, which, in turn, will not only explain the high incidence of carbon monoxide poisoning but also some other seemingly fantastic reports pertaining to the victims of air raids.

Firestorms are caused when a number of small fires converge into a single blaze, creating a huge conflagration which in turn sucks in oxygen at high speeds and at very high temperatures. In Hamburg, the conflagration eventually enveloped 4-1/2 square miles, developed 100 mph winds [G110], and reached temperatures of at least 600 to 800 degrees Celsius [U.S.19] (other firestorms have been said to generate temperatures of 1,500 to 2,000 degrees Celsius). [H314]

By way of comparison it should be noted that startup temperatures for crematoria are between 600 and 700 degrees Celsius. [I262]

Under such conditions “flash overs” or incidences of spontaneous combustion were not uncommon. [G103]

Several testimonies refer to people in the street or in apparent safety in a park whose clothing would suddenly burst into flames with no apparent trigger by way of a spark. The same conditions could be found in the cellars, many which were too hot to excavate until weeks after the raid: when a cellar was reopened, it was not uncommon for the inrush of oxygen to cause the remains of victims, or coal and coke supplies, to burst into flames. [U.S.23,G167]

Carbon monoxide gas played a major role in the fatalities, particularly in incendiary raids, which were the type usually employed against population centers. Although this development was unexpected, it was soon recognized as the typical cause of death for those found in underground cellars or bunkers. [U.S.24f] It was also a frequent cause of death in aboveground casualties, because the concentrations of the gas were so great in the streets and because heart attacks and other pathologies could result from exposure to less than lethal levels. [U.S.24f] In Wesermünde, for example, of 210 people killed in a fire caused by an air raid, 175 perished from carbon monoxide poisoning. [U.S.24]

Of the victims of the Hamburg raid, 70 percent were poisoned with the lethal gas. [U.S.24] It should be noted that carbon monoxide was generated not only from incomplete combustion but also by exploding bombs: gas from a high explosive shell contained 60 percent to 70 percent carbon monoxide. [U.S.24] The Germans attempted to develop a number of tests that would test carbon monoxide hemoglobin in corpses even after putrefaction. The indications are simply astonishing: while CO levels of .5 percent can kill, some bodies found in bomb shelters contained concentrations of up to 95 percent. [U.S.25]

Aside from forensic tests, the influence of the poisonous gas could usually be detected by inspecting the posture of the remains. Because carbon monoxide is odorless, tasteless, and invisible, it is possible to inhale a lethal dose without knowing it and then simply fall into a deep sleep. As a result most carbon monoxide victims showed a relaxed and unthreatened posture when found: death was painless and came without premonition. [U.S.25] The results of their surveys presented the authorities with a dilemma, because there were no effective preventive measures to take. As a result, the secret of the CO poison gas threat was concealed from the public. [U.S.25] The Strategic Bombing Survey would report after the war:

In all the cities visited, carbon monoxide poisoning was regarded as the primary cause of death or injury, sometimes reaching to as much as 80 percent of all incendiary raid casualties. [U.S.28]

As already suggested, cleanup after the raids was a daunting proposition. Many of the dead would be found lying naked in the streets; it is known that many of these had stripped down to their shoes to avoid flashover.

Initially, the corpses would swell, but after a few hours “the bodies shrunk to small objects with hard
brownish black skin and charring of different parts, and frequently to ashes and complete disappearance.' [U.S.22] This description, from the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, shows three photographs of shelter dead who have been between 50 percent to 80 percent cremated — the presence of hair and even clothing indicates that the destruction was achieved through high heat alone, and not through exposure to flame. [U.S.17-21, cf. figs. 8,14-16]

Access to the shelters could take months, and this would affect not only the body counts but also the appearance of the remains. In the absence of testing, the lack of escape movements indicated carbon monoxide poisoning. [U.S.25] The odor of putrefaction was a frequent clue to the location of the dead, except in cases where total cremation had occurred. [U.S.23] Bodies were often found "lying in a thick greasy black mass which was without doubt melted fat tissue." [U.S.23] The systematic shrinkage, probably caused by the burning, which removed the water mass, led the Germans to call such victims Bombenbrandschrumpfleichen, or "fire bomb-shrunken bodies." [U.S.23] "Many basements contained only bits of ashes and in these cases the number of casualties could only be estimated." [U.S.23] Of course, given the temperatures that are known to have been achieved in the course of a firestorm, none of these characterizations should be surprising. As Gordon Musgrove, a highly decorated pilot for Bomber Command, has noted:

The enormous heat seems to have turned the cellars and underground shelters into crematoria. The exits and emergency exits were surrounded by fires; steel doors, specially installed as a safety precaution, became red-hot or jammed; ceilings, weakened by excessive heat, collapsed under the weight of falling masonry; and even when they were not actually invaded by fire, many rooms were made untenable by smoke or fumes. [G94]

Musgrove was at least half right. The inhabitants of the shelters found themselves in the abnormal situation of hiding in their basements while their buildings burned above them. As the intense heat dried them out and turned their faces puffy and red before heat stroke set in, the deadly concentrations of carbon monoxide would slowly and silently kill them. The cellars and underground shelters were both crematoria and gas chambers combined.

Civil Defense in the Camps

Three documents should be kept in mind when we try to evaluate the role of civil defense in the concentration camp administration. The first is the LS-Führerprogramm of November, 1940, which stipulated that all existing structures had to be modified for air raid shelter use and that all new structures, particularly in the armaments industry, had to have bomb shelters.

The second document is an order from Oswald Pohl, head of the SS economic administration, dated October 25, 1943, and marked Secret (Geheim!) to nineteen concentration camp commandants, including Rudolf Höss at Auschwitz, concerning the care and feeding of prisoners. The importance of this document for our purposes lies not in the fact that Pohl goes into pedantic detail about how the prisoners should be clothed and fed, even to the point of emphasizing that hot meals should not be overcooked, but in the reasons given for the document. Pohl begins:

In the past two years the labor in the concentration camps on behalf of the armaments industry has become a factor of decisive importance for the war.

The claim is specific; the prisoners are, and have long been, necessary for the armaments industry. Therefore it is not only natural that they would eventually fall under the rubric of the Führerprogramm but also that the camps would eventually be targeted for air attack, as indeed they were. Thus raids on the Buchenwald complex (including Nordhausen) killed thousands of prisoners in April 1945; after the camp was liberated days later, photographs of these dead were interpreted by many as further evidence of Nazi atrocities. [Z222, 223, n13]

The final document, whose existence could be inferred from the above, is an order issued by Heinrich Himmler on February 8, 1943. The order enumerates a number of measures that are to be carried out in the concentration camp system to prevent mass escapes in the event of air raids. Thus, no later than early February 1943, there was a heightened awareness at the highest ranks of the SS that the concentration camp system was vulnerable to air attack. It should also be noted that it was precisely at this time that the construction office of Auschwitz Birkenau began to receive a flurry of work orders for gastight fixtures. The conclusion, absent presuppositions, would seem to be obvious.

Developing the idea of bomb shelters in the concentration camp system is not easily achieved today. Many
of the records for the camps are not widely available and most records for the eastern camps are still in Russian or Polish archives. But there is still a variety of ways in which we can uncover clues to the existence of bomb shelters in the concentration camp system, above and beyond the documentation already noted.

In the first place, we can inspect the documents that are available and look for objects and descriptions of objects that correspond to materials in the civil defense literature. For example, references to “gastight doors” or “gastight windows” as well as “Blenden” or “Holzblenden” correspond to common civil air defense terms. At the very least, Jean Claude Pressac should be credited with unearthing no fewer than thirty-nine documents that provide strong documentary evidence that each of the Birkenau crematoria was equipped with a gastight bomb shelter.9

A second method would be to inspect the physical evidence, most often through photographs. For example, a number of the small “gastight” doors for Crematoria IV and V were photographed, and there is no doubt that these are identical to the wooden shutters that are discussed extensively in such periodicals as Gasschutz und Luftschutz. [ATO426ff, ibid.]

Perhaps the strongest example of such correspondence concerns a steel door to a medium-sized room at Majdanek concentration camp. Equipped with the characteristic round peephole with perforated steel cover, this is unambiguously a bomb shelter door, although it has never been recognized as such. Instead, it is usually claimed as the door to a delousing chamber [ATO557], and yet, in spite of this, a replica of this door was later made and is currently on display at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, where it sits as a representation of a door to an extermination gas chamber.

The same method can be applied to still other gastight fixtures. For example, a number of photographs of gastight doors with peepholes from Auschwitz-Birkenau have survived; these closely match diagrams for such doors in the contemporary literature, although, here again, such doors are usually said just to its left, from which we may safely conclude that the cellar to this building had been converted to air raid use.

Another example concerns the so-called delousing chamber to Block 1. The bricked-in window with a smaller bricked-in aperture is very similar to the outside window indentations of ordinary aboveground shelters, and the gastight door parallels the kind found in the literature.

Yet the fact that this space has been described as a delousing installation makes us cautious about identifying this space as a bomb shelter, and reminds us that photographic analysis on its own is not always conclusive. On the other hand, there is a handful of work orders, which, in their abstracts from Jan Sehn’s court, make reference to gastight fixtures, and these not only appear to cover the additions to Block 1 but make other references to materials which, while adequately explained in a bomb shelter context, are inexplicable in an extermination context. [ATO456f, ATO27ff]

For example, work order #516 for June 17, 1943, makes reference to the fittings for a gastight door, which was completed 10/6/43 [sic!]. But under either date the door makes no sense in terms of the claimed operation of the extermination gas chambers.

Another work order, dated July 12, 1943, contains a number of misspellings. Again, in the Polish transcript it reads: “1 Schlüssel. für Gaskammer/Melden bei H.stuf der Apotheke im 44-Revier.” Pressac has made the assumption that the “44” is a misspelling for “SS” in its runic form, and therefore translates it as follows: “1 key. for gas chamber. Report to SS captain of the SS-hospital [i.e., SS-Revier] pharmacy.” But this translation seems inadequate. In the first place, while Revier
Probable bomb shelters at Birkenau. From their configuration they must have been meant for inmates as well as German camp personnel.

can mean hospital, it can also mean “district,” or “area,” in civil defense terminology. “SS-Revier” therefore is ambiguous, and if we are going to interpolate spellings for “44-Revier” we could just as easily interpolate “LS-Revier,” which makes perfect sense, this being a common term for a civil defense district. “Gaskammer,” by the same token, could be a bracket form for “Gas[schutz]kammer,” a common civil defense term. Furthermore, neither delousing chambers nor “gas chambers” have keys: but gastight bomb shelter doors, if and when they were locked from the outside, were supposed to have a key inside a locked glass box nearby. [CD153f] It is perhaps also relevant that medical supplies in air raid shelters were usually kept in a small cabinet called a “Schutzraumapotheke.”

The final work order appears to be directly relevant to Block 1. It reads, again in the Polish transcript, “Entwesungskamer [sic!] Die Beschläge zu 1 Tür, luftdicht mit Spion für Gaskammer, 2/1 Lattentür” (i.e., “Disinfection Chamber. Fittings for 1 door, airtight with peephole, for Gaskammer, 2/1 lath door”) The first thing we note is that Entwesungskammer has been misspelled: this is chronic in the Polish transcripts. Now it is supposed that Block 1 was at one time a disinfection chamber (Entwesungskammer), yet the order refers to an airtight door with peephole for a Gaskammer. But why the use of two distinct terms for what was supposedly the same operation? It is true that Gaskammer can also be used to describe disinfestation facilities — the drawings for BW 5A and 5B are very clear about this — and we stress that no one has ever claimed homicidal gassings in any of these locations: thus, there is nothing sinister about the word “Gaskammer” per se. But one possible explanation would be that the Entwesungskammer, superseded in its use by other facilities, was being converted to a gastight air raid shelter, i.e., Gas[schutz]kammer. In this respect the bricked-in window, and the smaller shutter-sized aperture inside to serve for emergency exit or ventilation, along with the gastight door with peephole (which required bricking in below the old door’s lintel), tend to support the bomb shelter thesis. As for the opposite interpretation, there has still been no convincing explanation for the need for a peephole in the gastight door of a delousing facility.

To sum up the issue with respect to Block 1, the inference that it was converted to bomb shelter use has significant corroboration, but not proof. To put it another way, the bomb shelter thesis explains Block 1, its physical features and its relevant work orders. The gas chamber thesis, which holds that references to gastight fixtures usually have a sinister connotation,
holes is exposed to potential breakage from inside. Finally, these steel doors can be opened from inside or outside [Cole, op. cit.], and appear to have latching mechanisms both inside and outside [ATO, 557]: Michael Berenbaum's The World Must Know (p. 138) provides a reverse image of one of these chambers (Room “B”), and there is apparent smudging precisely at the points on the door where the latching mechanisms would be visible.

Finally, and returning now to Birkenau, there is a further characteristic of Morgue 1 in both Crematoria II and III which is significant. Morgue 1 of Crematorium II has a vertical passageway along its western wall which features a concrete lid and metal rungs.

While Pressac describes this as a sewer, it is unclear why a sewer entrance that would allow people to climb in and out would be necessary next to Morgue 1.[ATO228,229] According to the bomb shelter thesis, this would be an emergency exit. It should be noted that Crematorium III's remains are similarly equipped.

There is also oral testimony, as well as other records. Numerous testimonies describe air raids at the Auschwitz complex, including testimonies concerning seeking shelter in below ground spaces. Danuta Czech's Auschwitz Chronicle enumerates several raids on the Auschwitz complex, including a raid that ended up dropping bombs on Birkenau by mistake (this destroyed a “dugout” in Czech's words, clearly a reference to a trench shelter). The testimony of Dr. Nyiszli specifically describes the use of Morgue 1 of Crematorium II as a bomb shelter, although he also claims the same space was used for a gas chamber. Other testimonies from Buchenwald, for example, describe trench shelters, while some subcamps of Buchenwald (i.e., Nordhausen) clearly describe Stollen.

To sum up, we can reconstruct the existence of bomb shelter facilities from a number of different sources. The two most prominent are language that correspond to the civil defense literature, and photographs or drawings that depict ordinary civil defense features, such as gastight doors, shutters, wire screens or other protected apertures, emergency exits, ventilation ducts, camouflage, bricked in windows, ventilation chimneys, and cellar spaces that suggest adaptations or are equipped with the characteristic zigzag construction of emergency exits.

It should be stressed that the identification of features in photographs does not prove bomb shelter use. However, the photographic evidence, supplemented by the documentary evidence and drawings, seems fairly conclusive — the crematoria at Birkenau were adapted for bomb shelter use at a time when several other locations in that camp were also being adapted for that purpose. Keeping in mind the stipulations of the LS-Führerprogramm, which mandated that all buildings old and new should provide bomb and gas protection, the claim that the Birkenau crematoria contained gastight bomb shelters should arouse no further controversy. The question “Why would there be bomb shelters in crematoria?” is incorrectly framed: the crematoria were buildings, buildings were supposed to have bomb shelters, and therefore they had them. The real question is that, given that the crematoria served as bomb shelters, why has this fact never been recognized?

Conclusions

The primary impetus for this article arose out of the desire to explore the claim that the Birkenau crematoria were equipped with gastight bomb shelters. But in the course of exploring this issue we found out much about the experience of the German people in the air war. Therefore it seems fitting that our conclusions begin and end with remarks on the bombing campaign, and the defense against it, among the civilian population.

We have found that the civil defense establishment in Germany was huge. With a 1939 enrollment in the RLB of twelve million, we are describing a body that embraced about one seventh of the population: it seems likely that there were as many people involved in civil air defense, at least part-time, as in all three branches of the Wehrmacht.

At a cost that would project to billions of marks, we have found that tremendous sums were expended on shelters of all types, including what we would conservatively estimate to be hundreds of above and below ground public shelters of reinforced concrete, thousands of public access shelters (ÖLSR), and tens of thousands of air raid cellars (LS-Keller) and home shelters. The regulations stipulated that all of these shelters were to be equipped for chemical warfare defense, and the references to gas- or airtight steel doors in the literature and testimony are so frequent as to scarcely deserve further comment.

Supporting these structures were the clearly articulated supporting staffs of the SHD, numbering thousands, which included decontamination crews especially equipped for chemical warfare, and specially designated locations (laundries, public baths) that in the event of gas attack would have their normal function subordinated to the role of chemical warfare
decontamination. The decontamination crews, in addition, were specially trained and equipped, which soon led to their involvement in corpse handling and other sanitation procedures. The sanitation service was in turn engaged in all kinds of sanitation prophylaxis including disinfection, pest control, and delousing of citizens to prevent the spread of infectious diseases including typhus. The fundamental identity of the decontamination, disinfection, and delousing paradigms could hardly be more clear.

Running throughout this service and its wartime operation was an intense awareness of the possibilities of gas warfare. Not merely the decontamination squads are evidence of this, but also the gas testing centers, the locations earmarked for decontaminating belongings, the special trucks loaded with decontamination equipment, the twelve million gas masks issued, the demands for gastight doors, and the ventilation systems that could filter poison gas. And, as we have seen, the fear of poison gas even entered the popular mind, such that the grotesque appearance of the victims would lead many to rashly assume that the enemy had decided to use this terrible weapon.

It would take a philosopher or a psychologist to appreciate what happened subsequently. For the documentary, forensic, and photographic evidence clearly shows that the majority of the hundreds of thousands of German men, women, and children indiscriminately killed in the air war perished from the inhalation of poisonous carbon monoxide gas and in many cases were at least partially cremated. Yet their plight was totally submerged in the postwar period by even more horrifying claims of gassing and burning made against Germans. One begins to wonder whether the suffering of the German people was forgotten, or whether it was simply inverted.

Contrasting the situation among the civilian population with that in the concentration camps, we find ample reason to expect analogous levels of bomb and gas protection. The camps were important to the war effort. Himmler expressed concerns about prisoners escaping from the system, including Auschwitz Birkenau, during air raids at precisely the time when Auschwitz Birkenau began to make numerous requests for gastight doors and other gastight fixtures such as were common for civil defense in other parts of Germany.

In addition to the morgues in the crematoria, which show evidence of having been converted from morgues to serve also as anti-gas shelters and decontamination centers in the event of gas attack, we find that the dormant morgue in Crematorium I in Auschwitz was in fact converted to a bomb shelter. And, given what we have found out about the need for cleanliness in the handling of corpses when discussing the bombing victims, the original presence of showers for corpse handlers in any crematoria should not surprise us.

The blueprints for the Birkenau Central Sauna also show evidence of dual purpose, and the characteristic aperture of an emergency exit can be clearly seen in its cellar. The disinfection blocks BW 5A and BW 5B, which were no longer used for that purpose after late 1943, are equipped with gas locks and thus could have been easily converted, if indeed they were not built with a dual purpose in mind. Block 1 at Auschwitz provides visual evidence of having been converted to a bomb shelter in late 1943. The commandant's house was clearly converted for bomb shelter use. Finally, it appears that the prisoners themselves were provided splinter trenches in front of every barrack. Apparently there were dozens, if not hundreds, of air raid shelters at Auschwitz Birkenau; and again, bomb protection in the German scheme of things also meant gas protection.
This fiberglass casting of a gastight door at Majdanek, currently on display at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum as evidence of a homicidal gas chamber, is indistinguishable from hundreds of thousands of other such doors manufactured to protect civilians, above all women and children, from the effects of aerial bombardment.

Turning now to Majdanek, we find that the Bath and Disinfection Complex II was equipped with a gas lock at one end of the building as well as standard steel bomb shelter doors with peepholes. In addition, the interior rooms had added wooden strutting for reinforcing the roof, and at least one wooden emergency exit. In the context of the documents, the contemporary civil defense literature, and the photographic evidence, it should be obvious that the Bath and Disinfection complex at Majdanek was adapted at some point in its existence to provide bomb and gas protection, and that its showers were meant to serve as a decontamination center for gassing victims.

We should note here that this same complex was claimed by the Soviets in a Special Commission report from 1944 to have been a site where 1.5 million people were gassed with Zyklon B. Yet, while no one claims more than a tenth of that number of victims for Majdanek today [Z 277, n129 surveys contemporary downward revisions], neither has anyone explained how these manifest bomb shelter features could have been misunderstood or misinterpreted for so many years.

The nature of the German people's plight in the air war has also been misunderstood. Although doubtless thousands perished in utter helplessness, hundreds of thousands more survived, thanks to the skillful preparations of the people and the RLB, and due to the courage and resourcefulness of the sergeant majors, fire wardens, and countless others. We recall that the twin objectives of the air war were the destruction of German industry and the breaking of German morale. But neither of these twin objectives was achieved, and in this light it is doubly tragic that more than fifty thousand brave British airmen perished in a fruitless venture that left a blot on Britain's conduct of the war. Far from being mere passive martyrs, the German people won the air war because they, too, did not “flag or fail.” Even so, their sacrifice remains unmourned and unremembered.

Unremembered and unmourned: except for a curious and ironic artifact. If you travel to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, you will find many reminders of the terrible ordeal of the Jewish people in the course of their persecution by the German National Socialists. These objects serve as memorials to the many Jews who suffered, died, and were killed in what has come to be known as the Holocaust. But in another part of the building, alone, and dimly lit, we find a silent sentinel, which, by its presence, serves as an admonishment to those who insist on the most narrow interpretation of history, an almost Till Eulenspiegel-like reminder that remembrance is irrepressible, and a memorial to those German women and children who perished in the gas and flames of the air war holocaust: a steel door, with handles, a peephole, with a perforated steel cover — a German bomb shelter door.
Key to Sources Used

U.S. = United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany* (Washington, DC: 1945)
V = Johannes Steinhoff, et al., *Voices from the Third Reich* (NY: 1994)
Z = Ernst Gauss [Germar Rudolf], *Grundlagen zur Zeitgeschichte* (Tübingen: 1994)

Notes

1. “Vergasungskeller” was first published on August 6, 1996; revised on November 7, 1996, in which form it was published by the Adelaide Institute in January, 1997; and revised again on January 7, 1997 and June 26, 1997. The article may be found on Dr. Butz’ web site at: http://pubweb.acns.nwu.edu/~abutz/di/dau/vk.html
3. Pressac’s magnum opus, *Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers*, is hard to find. His *The Cre matoria of Auschwitz* (NY:1993) is more accessible. Beginning with an article in *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp* (Bloomington, IN: 1994), Gutman, Berenbaum, and Gutman, eds., he has been assisted by Robert Jan van Pelt, who has also written, with Deborah Dwork, *Auschwitz: 1270 to Present* (NY:1996). The general thrust of all of these interpretations is consistent.
5. The Reichsluftschutzbu nd is usually rendered ARP or A.R.P. by British historians, apparently on the analogy with their own Air Raid Protective services. Its members would extend all the way down to the operation of each shelter: the SHD, on the other hand, worked from centralized locations.
6. On municipal disinfection centers in Germany, see “Die Umgestaltung und Vergrößerung der Desinfektion an stalt der Stadt Dortmund” in *Gesundheits-Ingenieur*, September 27, 1941, p. 523ff.
9. See the extensive discussion of the “Criminal Traces” in “Technique and Operation of German Anti-Gas Shelters.”
10. Ibid.
13. It should be stressed that the arguments set forth here in 1997 have undergone significant elaboration. Part of this has been due to strong critiques from both Carlo Mattogno and Robert Jan van Pelt, and part is due to a number of documents obtained in 2000 and published in “Bomb Shelters in Birkenau” (www.codoh.com/incon/inconsinbir.html). The documents in that article prove that civil defense concerns, and thus gastight fixtures, were common at Auschwitz Birkenau, but, at the same time, there are ongoing disputes concerning the appropriateness of the Bomb Shelter Thesis in explaining such gastight fixtures for the crematoria.
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An Unsettled Legacy


Reviewed by Mark Weber

It has been fourteen years since the publication of the first volume of David Irving’s three-part biography of Britain’s legendary wartime leader. This second volume, subtitled “Triumph in Adversity,” traces Winston Churchill’s career from June 1941 through July 1943, the pivotal period when, after calamitous setbacks, the tide of the war turned decisively in favor of the Allies.

With this handsome, meticulously referenced and generously illustrated work (including many color photographs), Britain’s best-known and most controversial historian once again displays his extraordinary knack for extracting information from overlooked diaries and suppressed records, and his gift for turning mountains of data into well-crafted prose. This measured, masterful examination of Britain’s towering twenty-first-century premier is Irving at his best.

It is difficult to avoid being impressed, even dazzled, by Churchill’s colorful personality, in comparison with which most political leaders of the past fifty years seem pale midgets. From the pages of this book emerges a vivid portrait of an often exasperating and sometimes callous man of quick wit, myriad prejudices, puckish humor, arresting eloquence, and enormous energy.

As with Irving’s other biographical works, this book’s strength is also its weakness. While it is packed with day-to-day and even hour-to-hour detail, Irving sometimes, and perhaps unavoidably, neglects context and the larger picture. He sheds new light on Churchill’s relations with major and minor figures of the fragile Allied wartime coalition, including, for example, his deep, abiding loathing of “Free French” leader Charles De Gaulle. Irving traces Churchill’s wartime hypocrisy and treachery — most tragically toward the Poles, on whose behalf Britain had declared war against Germany in 1939. Excessive space is devoted to speculation about the July 1943 death of Władysław Sikorski, prime minister of Poland’s London-based government in exile. Irving musters evidence to suggest that Sikorski’s death in a freakish airplane crash at Gibraltar was not an accident, as officially announced, but instead may have been secretly arranged by British authorities, perhaps on Churchill’s order.

As Irving notes, Churchill and other British officials received reports — from Jewish agencies, from intercepted and decrypted secret German dispatches, and from other sources — of killings of Jews in the lands under Axis rule. And yet, in his own six-volume history of the great conflict, The Second World War, some 4,448 pages altogether, he made only passing references to wartime Germany’s harshly anti-Jewish policies (what is now called “the Holocaust”), and no mention whatsoever of “gas chambers” or “gassing.”

Adding significantly to the work of such skeptical historians as John Charmley (notably in his 1993 work, Churchill: The End of Glory), Irving delivers here another powerful blow to Churchill’s well-manicured image as the heroic figure who “saved” Britain and “Western civilization.” Churchill, writes Irving in the introduction, “won the war in spite of himself... Britain, in short, surrendered her own empire to defeat a chimera conjured up by Winston Churchill, a putative danger from Nazi Germany — a threat which never existed except when Churchill needed to call upon it. He sacrificed the substance to defeat the myth.”

During our own cynical era, when the reputations of once-towering figures are routinely debunked and discredited, Winston Churchill is still held in high regard. Churchill, says British-American writer Christopher Hitchens, has become a “totem” of the Establishment. “His titanic standing depends principally on a set of rotundly defiant speeches made in the years 1940 and 1941, when he staked everything on resistance to Hitler,” writes Hitchens. “... For innumerable readers and reviewers on both sides of the Atlantic (Arthur Schlesinger prominent among them) the iconic status of Churchill is an indispensable ‘fact’ of life. If it can be shown that he was a vain old fool, then their world would turn upside down.”

In the view of the influential Jewish writer Charles Krauthammer — a Washington Post columnist (and fervent apologist for Israel) — Churchill is “the only possible” individual to be regarded as “Person of the Century.” Krauthammer explains: “Take away Churchill in 1940... and Britain would have settled with Hitler —
in the great conflict: "I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons." In keeping with that aim, Churchill refused even to consider Hitler's repeated offers of peace, thereby condemning the people of Britain, and Europe, to years of horrific warfare.

In the early 1950s, historian Francis Neilson produced a stern portrait of the British leader, The Churchill Legend, which remains worth reading despite the passage of years:

Churchill had but one aim; only one desire. In The Grand Alliance he states, "I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby." It is his life that is to be satisfied. England? Europe? Are they merely the arenas that provide the accessories of the conflict? His life is to be "simplified" by throwing the world into chaos again. His purpose is the destruction of one man; and the last chance to maintain the culture of a thousand years must be abandoned because a politician's life is to be "simplified."  

Alan Clark — historian and one-time British defense minister — more recently handed down a similarly harsh verdict of Churchill's war policy:

There were several occasions when a rational leader could have got, first reasonable, then excellent, terms from Germany ... The war went on far too long, and when Britain emerged the country was bust. Nothing remained of assets overseas. Without immense and punitive borrowings from the U.S. we would have starved. The old social order had gone forever. The empire was terminally damaged. The Commonwealth countries had seen their trust betrayed and their soldiers wasted ... "Victory at all cost" also meant accepting the Allied "United Nations" principles of egalitarianism and liberal democracy, which laid the groundwork for the dismantling of empire and for a massive influx of former imperial subjects, ushering in drastic changes in every area of life in Britain (and the rest of Europe) in recent decades.

In 1945, at the end of the terrible five-and-a-half-year conflict, Britain did not "win" — it merely emerged on the victorious side, together with the two great powers that really did "win" the war: Soviet Russia and the United States.

British writer Peter Millar echoed this assessment a few years ago:

... The accepted view that his [Churchill's] "bulldog breed" stubbornness led Britain through its "finest hour" to a glorious victory is sadly superficial ... In no sense, other than the moral one, can Britain be said to have won. She merely survived. Britain went to war ostensibly to honour an alliance with Poland. Yet the war ended with Poland redesignated at a dictator's whim, albeit Stalin's rather than Hitler's, and occupied, albeit by Russians rather than Germans. In reality Britain went to war to maintain the balance of power. But the European continent in 1945 was dominated by a single overbearing power hostile to everything Britain stood for. Britain, hopelessly in hock to the United States, had neither the power nor the face to hold on to her empire.

... The "evil genius bent on world conquest" that most Americans believe Hitler to have been, is a myth. The evil genius had more precise aims in eastern Europe. A Britain that would have withdrawn from the fray and from all influence in Europe to concentrate on her far-flung empire would have suited him admirably.

It is to his credit that Churchill acknowledged, on at least one or two occasions, the tragedy of his own life's work. During a dinner with close associates in early 1945 — as his private secretary confided to his diary — a "rather depressed" Churchill was "saying that Chamberlain had trusted Hitler as he was now trusting Stalin (though he thought in different circumstances) ..." Three years after the end of the war, Churchill wrote: "The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace or Security, and that we lie in the grip of even worse perils than those we have surmounted." Later, reflecting wistfully on his legacy as wartime leader, Churchill mused: "Historians are apt to judge war ministers less by the victories achieved under their direction than by the political results which flowed from them. Judged by that standard, I am not sure that I shall be held to have done very well." No man did more to bring about that "human tragedy" than Churchill himself, who had devoted so much energy and effort to crafting the wartime alliance that so greatly aided Stalin and the Soviet Union, the source of the "worse perils." And, as David Irving painstakingly lays out in this outstanding, unsparing work, no
man among the Allied wartime leaders better deserves to be judged by the results that flowed from his victories than Britain's legendary wartime premier.

Notes
6. For example, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt in August 1942: "I am strongly wedded to the Zionist policy, of which I am one of the authors." F. L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975), p. 234.
17. Examples or citations can be found in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Road to Victory, vol. VII (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), pp. 1031, 1035, 1066, 1173-1174, 1186, 1194, 1229, 1320. During the Feb. 1945 Yalta conference, for example, Churchill declared: "It is no exaggeration or compliment of a florid kind when I say that we regard Marshal Stalin's life as most precious to the hopes and hearts of all of us ... I walk through this world with greater courage and hope when I find myself in a relation of friendship and intimacy with this great man, whose name has gone out not only over all Russia but the world." (p. 1194).

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Unanswered Challenge

Phil Eversoul, in a letter to the editor that appeared in vol. 20, no.2 of the *Journal*, citing my article "The Rudolf Case, Irving's Lost Libel Suit and the Future of Revisionism" (JHR 19, no. 5, pp. 26-61), asks "... why did Zaverdinos allow Irving's statements to go unchallenged?" The *Journal*'s editor wrote in reply that "the ... focus of [my] article precluded [my] criticizing Irving's trial positions at every instance," and then mentioned that I did indeed challenge Irving on some issues. The fact is that from the very first paragraph, in which I express the view that Irving lost his case mainly on account of ignorance of the scientific work done by Germar Rudolf, and throughout the section and notes on the lost libel suit against Deborah Lipstadt, I made criticism of Irving's position an integral part of the essay. Thus I can only conclude that Eversoul did not actually read what I wrote. Sections such as the one he cites are there only to show that Irving through his concessions and twistings and turnings exposed himself at every turn as ignorant of revisionist arguments on a subject which anyway "bores him endlessly." I challenged Irving not only for his ignorance, but for his arrogance as well, namely his implicit assumption that if something does not emanate from Irving himself it cannot be worth very much. For example, he would not have been tripped up so easily on crematory capacities had he been familiar with Carlo Mattogno's work.

Apart from the revisionist sources cited by the editor, I cite from many more and I believe that I do challenge Irving at almost every instance of his trial positions, if not every single one.

Recently I repeated my views on Irving in a private letter that found its way to him without my authorization. This prompted him to write: "You should remind Z[averdinos] that it was my head on the chopping block, not his. He has not fought a case in a British court of law. I have no respect for Monday morning quarterbacks."

Mentioning that I had been an admirer of his writing for twenty-five years, I replied that even a "Monday morning quarterback" could see that he was hopelessly unprepared for his trial and referred him to my article for details. Finally, I asked Irving how it was possible that he still got standing ovations seeing that so much of what he used to tell admiring audiences was retracted during the trial.

No reply has been received to this challenge.

C. Zaverdinos
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

[Editor: Dr. Zaverdinos reports elsewhere that he recently received cordial replies from South Africa's Minister in the Presidency, Dr. E. G. Pahad, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, after sending each a copy of Roger Garaudy's Founding Myths of Modern Israel. He also notes that "the walkout of the U.S. hand in hand with Israel from the recent Durban conference has not gone unnoticed" in South Africa.]

Quest for Truth

My husband, a retired pathologist, is eighty and I am seventy-nine. My ancestry goes back, purely, all the way to the Vikings; he is Portuguese-English. Like a true Viking, I have roamed far and wide, visiting Norway (several times), the Faeroe Islands, Estonia, and also Sikkim, Isfahan (I visited the bazaar there in 1971), Shiraz (to see Persepolis), Burma, Darjeeling, as well as better-known spots like Dinkelsbühl.

Wherever I went I looked for the truth. Here at home I can find it in the *Journal of Historical Review*. This is rather a roundabout way of saying "Thank you for being" but — from the bottom of my heart — I do. I only wish I could show my thanks in a practical way but as I am unable to do that I will continue to subscribe to your Journal, buy books now and then and assure you, you are in my thoughts and prayers.

L. P.
Jackson, CA
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F. J. P. Veale

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