The Journal of Historical Review is published quarterly by the Institute for Historical Review, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505. Subscriptions include the IHR Newsletter, containing news of interest to academic and lay Historical Revisionists, which is issued eight times per year in months The Journal of Historical Review is not issued. Combined subscription price is $40 per year, $65 for two years and $90 for three years. Add $10 per year for foreign subscriptions. Add $20 per year for overseas airmail delivery. Remittances for subscriptions must be payable in U.S. dollars drawable on a U.S. bank. Quantity subscription and bulk issue rates are available on request. Appropriate, double-spaced manuscripts are welcomed by the editor, and must be accompanied by return postage.

Listed:

Library of Congress
British Library
PTLA Catalog
EBSCO Librarians Handbook
Ulrich's International Periodical Directory
Turner Periodical Catalog

ISSN: 0195-6752

Institute for Historical Review
P.O. Box 1306
Torrance, California 90505

Permission is hereby granted for reprints of any article contained herein, providing that no changes or alterations are made prior to printing, and also providing that the following attribution appears with the article:

Reprinted by permission of The Journal of Historical Review, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, CA 90505, United States of America. Domestic subscription rate: $40 per year, foreign rate: $50 per year.

Two copies of each reprint should be submitted to the publisher of The Journal of Historical Review.
# Table of Contents

**Volume Nine, No. 2**

**Summer, 1989**

## Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Leuchter Report: The How and the Why</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred A. Leuchter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran: Some Angles on the Islamic Revolution</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivor Benson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoughts on the Military History of the Occupation of Japan</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hideo Miki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Gassing at Auschwitz: Genesis of a Myth</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Mattogno</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livia Rokach, <em>Israel’s Sacred Terrorism</em></td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Grimstad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Curtis, <em>Antisemitism in the Contemporary World</em></td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Grubach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neal Gabler, <em>An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood</em></td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Wikoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Historical News and Comment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Morgenstern, 1906-1988</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## About the Contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the Editor

When Harry Elmer Barnes defined Historical Revisionism as "bringing history into accord with the facts," he stated not merely the essence of Revisionism but its entire program as well. One might think that righting errors and false conceptions about the past were program enough, but there remain those among the unenlightened (and even a few misguided friends) who still imagine that IHR's work of bringing truth to history is only a front for some sinister purpose, such as, say, bringing back the Third Reich (or ushering in the Fourth).

We're not at all sorry to disappoint such folks, and banish fears and fantasies alike by letting them know that IHR's purpose is historical, educational, and as American as the mainly Midwestern populists who pioneered Historical Revisionism. We don't have the Boys from Brazil or the Spear of Destiny stashed away in some dark corner of our warehouse (and wouldn't know what to do with them if we had).

We at the IHR know one thing, however, and we know it in common with our enemies: historical fact is a mighty weapon, and a powerful solvent against ignorance, prejudice, and hatred. In this issue of The Journal of Historical Review researchers and analysts from four continents bring truth to bear on several different lies that have served the obfuscators in the academy and politics well in deluding the majority of our fellow Americans.

First, there's the granddaddy of all historical hate whoppers, the Auschwitz lie. Two men with very different training, American gas-chamber expert Fred Leuchter and Italian textual critic Carlo Mattogno, take the trouble to look carefully at the evidence advanced for mass murder by gassing at the one-time German concentration camp, where, according to a Soviet "investigative commission" and a flock of popes, presidents, and Exterminationist scholars, four million or so human beings were murdered and then vanished into thin air. Leuchter's dry wit and his hands-on Yankee practicality are complemented by the cold eye of the classically trained humanist, Mattogno. There's not much of the Auschwitz myth left after these two specialists have had their say.

Japanese scholar and retired officer Hideo Miki deals with the military strategy, such as it was, that America developed for its occupation of Japan. Professor Miki's additional remarks, which followed the formal paper he presented to IHR's Ninth Conference, are so informative that we have included them here. He demonstrates rather convincingly that informed Japanese refuse to credit the historical lie that Japan was the only guilty party in the Pacific War, and reminds us that the disastrous peace which American leaders imposed in East Asia has resulted in decades of suffering, in China, Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere.

(continued on page 254)
The Leuchter Report:  
The How and the Why

FRED A. LEUCHTER  
(Paper Presented to the Ninth International Revisionist Conference)

Introduction

1988 was a very informative and likewise disturbing year. I was appalled to learn that much of what I was taught in school about twentieth-century history and World War II was a myth, if not a lie. I was first amazed; then annoyed; then aware: the myth of the Holocaust was dead.

Like all American children born during and after World War II, I was taught about the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis on the Jews. By the time I had reached college, I had no reason to disbelieve any of my education, except that I had some problems swallowing the numbers of decedents, said to total better than six million persons. But there it stopped. I believed in the Nazi genocide. I had no reason to disbelieve.

Some twenty-four years later, a very believing engineer sat at his desk working one snowy January afternoon in 1988, when the telephone rang. This very believing engineer was about to receive a very shocking history lesson, one which would cause him to question that fifty-year-old Holocaust lie and the application of that lie to generations of children. "Hello, this is Robert Faurisson"—and that very believing engineer would believe no more.

Background

I have for the past nine years worked with most, if not all, of the states in the United States having capital punishment. I design and manufacture execution equipment of all types, including electrocution systems, lethal injection equipment, gallows and gas chamber hardware. I have consulted for, or supplied equipment to, most of the applicable states and the federal government.
Because of my association with the states in this capacity, I was recommended to the Zündel defense as a consultant on gas chambers by Warden Bill Armontrout of the Missouri State Penitentiary.

After answering my telephone on that cold January afternoon, I met with Dr. Robert Faurisson twice in Boston and, as a result of these meetings, I was summoned to Toronto to meet with Ernst Zündel, attorney Douglas Christie and the rest of Zündel's very able staff.

Dr. Robert Faurisson had postulated thirteen years ago that a gas-chamber specialist should be sought who could evaluate the alleged gas chambers in Poland and report on their efficacy for execution purposes, something the Revisionists already knew was impossible.

Valentine's Day weekend found myself and Carolyn, my wife of two weeks, in Toronto. Two days of lengthy meetings followed, during which I was shown photos of the alleged German gas chambers in Poland, German documents and Allied aerial photographs. My examination of this material led me to question whether these alleged gas chambers were, in fact, execution facilities. I was asked if I would go to Poland and undertake a physical inspection and forensic analysis resulting in a written evaluation of these alleged execution gas chambers, some at places I had never even heard of.

After due consideration, I agreed, and made plans to leave for Poland, awaiting a time of minimal snow covering. I also stated that although the photos and documents seemed to support the view that these places were, indeed, not execution facilities, I would reserve final judgement until after my examination and, if I determined that these facilities were, in fact, or could have been, execution gas chambers, I would state this in my report. The final report was to be utilized as evidence in Ernst Zündel's defense in his pending criminal trial at Toronto, and I had to be prepared to testify under oath.

Preparations for the trip required me to take sample bags, documentation journals and tools. Because we were in a Communist country I would have to be careful with the tools. Very few tourists carry hammers, chisels, star drills and tape measures while travelling. I hid them in the lining of my valise and hoped for the best. Further, I had maps of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria, in the event that we might have to make a hasty and unscheduled exit. And finally, the gifts with which we bribed the museum people to supply us with copies of documents from the Museum Archives.
Our Staff

I was fortunate to have a competent and dependable party of professionals: my wife Carolyn, my general assistant; Mr. Howard Miller, draftsman; Mr. Jürgen Neumann, cinematographer; Mr. Tijudar Rudolf, interpreter. All knew that, if caught, the Polish government would take a dim view of our activities and purpose, let alone my removal of forensic samples from national shrines and monuments.

And the two ex officio members of our party, Mr. Ernst Zündel and Dr. Robert Faurisson, who for obvious reasons could not accompany us in person, but who nevertheless were with us every step of the way in spirit.

The Trip

On February 25, 1988 we left for Poland. Neumann and Rudolf, the Canadian contingent, joined me and the remainder of our team in Frankfurt. We returned home on March 3, 1988.

We arrived at Cracow in the late afternoon and spent our first night at the Hotel Orbis. We consumed the first of our three decent meals while in Poland. The following day we drove to Auschwitz. We arrived at the Auschwitz Hotel and were greeted by the smell of sulphur napthal disinfectant, a smell I had not encountered for many years. The hotel is apparently the old officers' quarters for the camp. We ate lunch at the hotel dining room, a cafeteria style facility. This was our first unidentifiable meal, starch soup and sundries.

We made a reconnaissance tour of the camp, lasting into the dim light of the Polish afternoon and several snow squalls, a common occurrence. We ate no supper, in that we found no place to eat in Auschwitz after sundown our first evening.

Auschwitz and Birkenau

The following day we began our work in the alleged gas chamber at the Auschwitz facility. Unfortunately, we were unable to accomplish much due to constant interruptions by both official and unofficial Sunday tours. Carolyn stood guard at one entrance and Tijudar at the other, advising myself, Jürgen and Howard of their arrival. It was too dangerous to take forensic samples and tape, so we left for Birkenau about noon.

At Birkenau we began a four-hour walk into the damp Polish cold and through snow squalls so dense we could not see each other at a distance of a few feet. Unfortunately, we did not
expect to spend that much time walking through the camp and, since vehicles are not permitted within the camp, we left Carolyn behind in the car. Since we forgot to leave her the keys, she nearly froze in the cold Polish afternoon. We visited the barracks, Krematorien II, III, IV and V, the sauna and the alleged burning pits. We took samples, documented our activities on video tape and in still photos, and made scale drawings of these facilities, carefully documenting the removal locations of all the forensic samples. We had to break into the sauna building, since it was locked.

At Krema II, I descended into the depths of the alleged gas chamber, a wet, dank subterranean place not visited by man in almost fifty years, since the building had been reduced to rubble, probably by a German military demolition team. Fortunately, there were fewer guards and less pedestrian traffic, making working conditions considerably better than they had been earlier, at Auschwitz.

Having been instructed by our empty stomachs of the evening before, we found and ate at the restaurant at the bus station, the only legitimate restaurant in Auschwitz. We returned to the Auschwitz Hotel for the night.

The following day, Monday, we again began our work at Auschwitz, the Sunday tours having subsided. We were able to get our samples, tapes and documentation. We had, by this time, obtained blueprints of the alleged gas-chamber facility and were able to follow the structural changes back to the dates in question. We also verified the existence of the floor drain for the periods of alleged gas chamber usage. Upon completion at Auschwitz, we drove again to Birkenau to take our control sample at delousing facility #1. Unfortunately, the building was locked and again we had to break and enter in order to access the delousing chamber. Again we ate at the bus station, and retired early to the Auschwitz Hotel.

Tuesday morning, while awaiting Tijudar's unsuccessful attempt to obtain a can of Zyklon B, Jürgen and I made video tapes of locations within the camp. We moved from the Auschwitz Hotel to a hostel nearby, obtaining newly vacated rooms. We ate at the bus station and retired early.

On Wednesday morning we ate a very enjoyable breakfast of ham, cheese and bread (our second decent meal in Poland) and began our trip to Lublin to see Majdanek. After one final look in at Auschwitz, we set off by car for Majdanek.
Lublin (Majdanek)

Several hours later, we arrived at Majdanek, visited the museum, the reconstructed alleged gas chamber and crematory. We finally arrived at disinfection 1 and 2 and examined the facilities. It was extremely difficult to work here, in that a guard made rounds every ten or fifteen minutes. The alleged gas chambers were blocked by gates and not accessible for a detailed inspection by the general public. It was necessary for me to trespass beyond these gates in forbidden areas. Again Carolyn and Tijudar stood watch while I made measurements and did a detailed examination in these areas. Once we were caught short: I was forced to hurdle the gate, and was still in the air and in mid-jump when the guard entered. Fortunately, he was more interested in Jürgen and his camera to see me before I touched ground.

Return

The camp closed in early afternoon and the guard rather nastily told us to leave. By three o'clock we were en route to Warsaw, a trip which would take five hours through rain and snow. Our hotel reservation had been fouled up but fortunately, with the help of an embassy attache, we were able to secure rooms at another hotel.

We had our third edible meal in Poland that evening and went to bed in preparation for our trip home on Thursday. The following morning we had breakfast and proceeded to the airport for our return trip.

We boarded the Polish airlines plane after clearing customs—my suitcase containing twenty pounds of the forbidden samples, fortunately none of which were found. I did not breathe easy until we cleared the passport checkpoint at Frankfurt. Our team split at Frankfurt, for the return trips to the United States and Canada, respectively. Upon our return, I delivered the forensic samples to the test laboratory in Massachusetts. Upon receipt of the test results, I prepared my report, combining my knowledge of gas execution facilities and procedures with the research I had completed at crematories and with retort manufacturers in the United States. With the results of my research I believe you are all familiar.

Upon completion of my report I testified at Toronto—but that is another story, for another time.
The Findings

1. Gas Chambers

The results published in the Leuchter Report are the important thing. Categorically, none of the facilities examined at Auschwitz, Birkenau or Lublin could have supported, or in fact did support, multiple executions utilizing hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide or any other allegedly or factually lethal gas. Based upon very generous maximum usage rates for all the alleged gas chambers, totalling 1,693 persons per week, and assuming these facilities could support gas executions, it would have required sixty-eight (68) years to execute the alleged number of six millions of persons. This must mean the Third Reich was in existence for some seventy-five (75) years. Promoting these facilities as being capable of effecting mass, multiple or even singular executions is both ludicrous and insulting to every individual on this planet. Further, those who do promote this mistruth are negligent and irresponsible for not investigating these facilities earlier and ascertaining the truth before indoctrinating the world with what may have become the greatest propaganda ploy in history.

2. Crematories

Of equal importance are Exterminationist errors relating to the crematories. If these crematories, operated at a theoretical rate of maximum output per day, without any down time and at a constant pace (an impossible situation), and we accept the figure of at least six millions executed, the Third Reich lasted for at least forty-two (42) years, since it would take thirty-five (35) years at an impossible minimum to cremate these six millions of souls.

No one by any stretch of the imagination would allege (or even believe) that the Third Reich ever lasted for seventy-five (75) or even forty-two (42) years, yet they would have us believe that six millions of souls were executed with equipment which could not possibly have functioned, in less than one-seventh of the absolute minimum time it could possibly have taken.

3. Forensics

Forensic samples were taken from the visited sites. A control sample was removed from delousing facility #1 at Birkenau. It was postulated that because of the high iron content of the building materials at these camps the presence of hydrogen cyanide gas would result in a ferric-ferro-cyanide
compound being formed, as evidenced by the Prussian blue staining on the walls in the delousing facilities. A detailed analysis of the thirty-two samples taken at the Auschwitz-Birkenau complexes showed 1,050 mg/kg of cyanide and 6,170 mg/kg of iron. Higher iron results were found at all of the alleged gas chambers but no significant cyanide traces. This would be impossible if these sites were exposed to hydrogen cyanide gas, since the alleged gas chambers supposedly were exposed to much greater quantities of gas than the delousing facility. Thus, chemical analysis further supports the fact that these facilities were never utilized as gas execution facilities.

4. Construction

Construction of these facilities further shows that they were never used as gas chambers. None of these facilities were sealed or gasketed. No provision was ever made to prevent condensation of gas on the walls, floor or ceiling. No provision ever existed to exhaust the air-gas mixture from these buildings. No provision ever existed to introduce or distribute the gas throughout the chamber. No explosion-proof lighting existed and no attempt was ever made to prevent gas from entering the crematories, even though the gas is highly explosive. No attempt was made to protect operating personnel from exposure to the gas or to protect other non-participating persons from exposure. Specifically, at Auschwitz, a floor drain in the alleged gas chamber was connected directly to the camp's storm drain system. At Majdanek a depressed walkway around the alleged gas chambers would have collected gas seepage and resulted in a death trap for camp personnel. No exhaust stacks ever existed. Hydrogen cyanide gas is an extremely dangerous and lethal gas and nowhere were there any provisions to effect any amount of safe handling. The chambers were too small to accommodate more than a small fraction of the alleged numbers. Plain and simple, these facilities could not have operated as execution gas chambers.

5. Conclusion

After a thorough examination of the alleged execution facilities in Poland and their associated crematories, the only conclusion that can be arrived at by a rational, responsible person is the absurdity of the notion that any of these facilities were ever capable of, or were utilized as, execution gas chambers.
Iran: Some Angles on the Islamic Revolution

IVOR BENSON

An exploration of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its meaning for the rest of the world can begin with three wide-ranging generalizations:

1. The Iranian Revolution showed that religion can still be a more potent mobilizer of mass political action than can secular ideologies;
2. The revolution challenges the cultural hegemony of Western ideas, not only as a religion but as an alternative social model and way of life;
3. The Iranian Revolution thus can be regarded as one of the most important happenings in modern history, comparable to the French Revolution in the 18th century and the Russian Revolution in this century.

In the wake of the Salman Rushdie affair, and ongoing terrorism threats against aviation and other vulnerable points, Iran and its farflung adherents remain persistently in the world's eye. An exploration of the Islamic Revolution in Iran conveys two great truths with vast implications: religion can still be a more potent mobilizer of mass political action than can secular ideologies, and the longtime hegemony of Western social models has ended. The Iranian Revolution

Author's Note: In the preparation of this paper, I have drawn on a number of works, some of which are listed at the end of the paper, others mentioned in text references; among the most significant of these are the works of Dr. Ali Shariati, a Persian scholar largely educated in the West.

I would especially acknowledge my indebtedness to the books by Professor Hamid Algar and Amir Taheri, and that of J.A. Hobson.
thus emerges as one of the most important events in modern history, on a par with the watershed French and Russian revolutions.

There are innumerable reasons for believing that the emergence of highly dynamic Islamic fundamentalism in Iran is a development of incalculable worldwide consequence. The Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had this comment:

The Iranian Revolution has highlighted one of the principal religious and political developments of our time: the revival of Islamic fundamentalism from Indonesia to Morocco and from Turkey to Central Africa.¹

Dr. Algar, professor of Persian and Islamic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, observes:

The subject of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is one whose importance hardly needs underlining. With the passage of time, its importance will become even clearer, as being the most significant and profound event in the entirety of contemporary Islamic history. Already we see the impact of the Islamic Revolution manifested in different ways across the length and breadth of the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia, from Bosnia to the heart of Europe down to Africa.²

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui, director of the Muslim Institute, London, offers this assessment:

Since the revolution in Iran I have been moving around some of the Sunni countries, some of the most reactionary if I might put it that way; I can assure you that the people in those countries have been absolutely galvanized and their imaginations have been captured . . . Some of them take the precaution of locking their doors before they talk about it. If national boundaries were taken away, probably Ayatollah Khomeini would be elected by acclamation by the Ummah as a whole as the leader of the Muslim world today.³

In 1979 the mullahs in Iran overthrew the Persian monarchy, one of the oldest in the world, while at the height of its power, replacing it with an Islamic republic dedicated to the implementation of the Sharia, a law of private and public conduct prescribed in the Koran.

Since then no day has passed without news involving Islam: an ongoing revolution in Afghanistan, troubles in several Soviet republics with Islamic majorities or minorities, endless conflict in Kashmir, terrorism all over Europe traced to Islamic sources in Algeria, to name a few.
Writes Amir Taheri, a former newspaper editor in Teheran:

No one knows which Muslim state might fall to the fundamentalists next, or when. What is certain, however, is that fundamentalist activities have been able to mobilize substantial forces in some of the key Muslim states, notably Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. Islam also is the dominant political force in Afghanistan and has exacted numerous concessions from governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Somalia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan.4

**Imperialism and Colonialism**

In Iran, more clearly perhaps than elsewhere, it has been possible for the observer to isolate and study separately the major influences which have been at work in dramatically awakening an Eastern religion which long was thought to be in slow decay. In particular, we can see, step by step, how a purely religious set of ideas and values was able to inspire enough public support to topple a powerful regime backed by a great army and with virtually unlimited foreign support.

Three major factors need to be explored:

1) Islam in general as a faith;
2) Hostile influences which in Iran threatened the survival of Islam;
3) The hardened form of the Shi'ite sect of Islam with which the challenge was met.

About the broad outlines of the history of Iran during the last 150 years there can be no doubt. Foreign powers have heavily influenced the country's international affairs to suit their own economic and strategic interests, with scant regard for the opinions and interests of the citizenry. Until 1945 the foreign powers dominating Iran were mainly Russia and Britain. Russia was interested in territorial expansion, Britain in cornering the Iranian market for British trade, in securing the continental land bridge to India and later, of course, in controlling Iran's oil resources.

The Iranians continued throughout this period to demonstrate their hostility to foreign intrusion, with the clergy (ulama) invariably playing a leading role.

From 1952 the British were replaced by the Americans working in close alliance with the Israelis, drawing the Shah and the masses mobilized by the ulama into the final bitter and violent struggle. This culminated in the 1979 overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza, last of the Pahlavi dynasty which had
been installed by the British shortly after the end of World War I.

Since what looked like a combination of America and Israel was actually something very much bigger and more complex, it is the motives and actions of the intrusive foreign powers that we need to examine before we can hope to understand what happened in Iran. Indeed, we find that what these powers had been doing in Iran was only another example of what they and other European interests had been up to during the same period in many other parts of the world, all manifestations of the phenomena known as imperialism and colonialism.

The subject was explored at depth and most comprehensively at the turn of the century by a prominent British journalist and author, J.A. Hobson, whose book *Imperialism: A Study* deserves new attention. A book that was meant to be a warning to the British people was turned to good account by Lenin in 1916, when he was preparing his own thesis on capitalism: “I made use of the principal English work on imperialism, J.A. Hobson’s book, with all the care that, in my opinion, this work deserves.”

Writes Hobson in a prefatory note:

Those readers who hold that a well-balanced judgment consists in always finding as much in favor of any political course as against it will be discontented with the treatment given here. For the study is distinctly one of social pathology, and no endeavor is made to disguise the nature of the disease.

The social pathology of which Hobson writes is the debasement of politics, especially the politics of nationalism, by what he calls “special interests,” financial in character, which promote policies inconsistent with the interests of the community. In other words, the peoples of the colonizing and imperialist countries of Europe were the victims rather than the beneficiaries of aggressively acquisitive policies conducted all over the world in their name.

For a definition of nation, Hobson quotes the philosopher John Stuart Mill:

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nation if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various courses. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographic limits are one of the causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the
possession of a national history and consequent community of recollections, collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.\textsuperscript{7}

It is a debasement of this genuine nationalism by attempts to overflow its natural banks and absorb the near or distant territory of reluctant and unassimilable people, says Hobson, that marks the passage from nationalism to a spurious colonialism on the one hand and imperialism on the other.

Hobson pinpoints the factor of illegitimacy in politics which was to prove so destructive of the interests of the British people and cause so much conflict and dislocation around the world; he asks:

How is the British nation induced to embark upon such unsound business? The only possible answer is that the business interests of the nation as a whole are subordinated to those of certain sectional interests that usurp control of the national resources and use them for their private gain. This is no strange or monstrous charge to bring; it is the commonest disease of all forms of government.

He quotes Sir Thomas More: “Everywhere do I perceive a certain conspiracy of rich men seeking their own advantage under the name and pretext of commonwealth.”

Conspiracies of “the few” seeking their advantage at the expense of the community as a whole have always, of course, been endemic in human society; but very different were the usurpations of “the few” in the last century, which drew many of the nations of Europe into an insane rivalry for conquest and possession in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Sectional interests in society—in this case big business and high finance—like a cancer in the human body, prosper while society as a whole suffers.

This was something Hobson could see with perfect clarity at the turn of the century:

Although the new imperialism has been bad business for the nation, it has been good business for certain classes and certain trades within the nation . . .

It is idle to meddle with politics unless we clearly recognise this central fact and understand what these sectional interests are which are the enemies of national safety and the common weal. We must put aside the merely sentimental diagnosis which explains wars or other national blunders by outbursts of patriotic animosity or errors of statecraft . . . There is, it may be safely asserted, no war within memory, however nakedly aggressive it may seem to the dispassionate historian, which
has not been presented to the people who were called upon to fight, as a necessary defensive policy in which the honor, perhaps the very existence, of the state was involved.8

Hobson exposes as almost wholly illusory the notion that the driving force of the new imperialism was an eagerness to find new markets for the products of Europe’s burgeoning industries. In Britain, he remarks, the manufacturing and trading classes made little out of the new markets, paying, if they only knew it, in taxation more than they got out of them in trade, but it was quite otherwise with the investor.

In other words, the driving force of the new imperialism was primarily financial and not broadly economic. Here is how Hobson saw it all before the turn of the century, while Britain was involved in a war in South Africa that was to signalize the beginning of the end of the British Empire:

It is not too much to say that the modern foreign policy of Great Britain is primarily a struggle for profitable markets of investment. To a larger extent every year Great Britain is becoming a nation living upon tribute from abroad, and the classes who enjoy this tribute have an ever-increasing incentive to employ the public policy, the public purse, and the public force to extend the field of their private investments and to safeguard and improve their existing investments. This is perhaps the most important fact in modern politics, and the obscurity in which it is wrapped constitutes the gravest danger to our state.

What is true of Great Britain is true likewise of France, Germany and the United States and of all countries in which modern capitalism has placed large surplus savings in the hands of a plutocracy . . .9

What happened to any country which contracted a debt and was unable to guarantee payment of the interest was demonstrated again and again in many parts of the so-called undeveloped world—for what other reason did France invade and attempt to conquer Mexico? More frequently the insufficient guarantee of an international loan gave rise to some other form of interference in the internal affairs of the debtor nation. We see an example of this in Egypt, which became for all practical purposes a province of Britain and where a bloody suppression of popular revolt had the support of enormous British national fervor.

Tunis likewise became a dependency of France for no other reason than the securing of loans granted to that country. Perhaps the greatest sufferer of all was China, where all the
imperialist nations established footholds, complete with extraterritorial rights which they were ready at all times to defend with armed might.

But how could the people of Europe, especially their educated classes, including even their churchmen, allow all this to happen? How did this imperialism escape general recognition for the narrow and sordid thing it was? Each nation would accuse its rivals of hypocrisy in masking greedy, aggressive and destructive behavior with pretensions of altruism, but all were permitted by these educated classes to be equally guilty.

**Church and Big Business**

There always existed in all the countries of Europe a proportion of people with a genuine desire to spread Christianity among the heathen and to diminish the cruelty and suffering thought to prevail among them. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the greedy and aggressive forces that directed imperialism would make good use of such disinterested movements, some of which had worked abroad—the Catholics in China and Ethiopia, for example—long before the birth of imperialism.

Writes Hobson:

They [the imperialists] simply and instinctively attach to themselves any strong elevated feeling which is of service, fan it and feed it until it assumes fervor, and utilize it for their ends.¹⁰

So, too, Leopold, King of the Belgians, when taking possession of the Congo with all its natural resources, was able to proclaim: “Our only program is that of the moral and material regeneration of the country.”

Since most of the educated classes in Europe who allied themselves with imperialism were nominally Christian, and since the church itself was an imperial component of the alliance, there can be no disguising the fact that imperialism, which helped to precipitate an age of conflict unprecedented in recorded history, was as much nominally Christian in character as it was financial. The use of the word Christian in this context, however, must be qualified with the reminder that the missionizing impulse was animated by the dynamic of an essentially power-oriented church, an institution with a strong appetite for expansion and growth, both in terms of adherents and of material advantage.

The dual character of the church nowhere was more clearly epitomized than in Winston Churchill’s account of the
religious service at Khartoum immediately after the defeat of the Mahdi's forces, which had sought to overthrow British hegemony in Sudan:

... And the solemn words of the English Prayer Book were read in that distant garden... the bands played their dirge and Gordon's favorite hymn "Abide with Me"... A gunboat on the river crashed out a salute... Nine thousand who would have prevented it lay dead on the plain of Omdurman... Other thousands were scattered in the wilderness, or crawled to the river for water.\(^\text{11}\)

Churchill omitted the final touch: the deliberate shooting of the wounded crawlers.

Hobson saw this Janus-headed imperialism as "seeking to float Christianity upon an ocean of profitable business," a process which excited in the baffled Chinese a fanatical detestation of the "foreign devils." Wrote an educated Chinese:

> It must be very difficult for the mandarins to dissociate the missionaries from the secular power whose gunboats seem ever ready to appear on behalf of their respective governments... The Chinese have watched with much concern the sequence of events—first the missionary, then the consul and at last the invading army.\(^\text{12}\)

The incongruity of so vast an exercise of cunning and force in the service of a cause "whose kingdom is not of this world" should need no emphasis. However, the hostile logic of a century and a half of imperialism is self-evident: those who offered any obstruction to what in the West was generally regarded as progress were held to "fully deserve" the punishment they got, however severe.

Since it is supposedly one of the main purposes of religion to help people distinguish between right and wrong, or good and evil; since a century and a half of aggressive imperialism would have been impossible without the compliance and complicity of the Christian churches; since it has always been one of the functions of the intelligence, informed by religious insights, to restrain and regulate the appetite for acquisition and power—it would seem that there was something radically faulty about Christianity as preached and practised during those decades of rampaging rival national imperialisms.
Iran’s Mullahs Show Their Power

Foreign intrusion and interference during the century and a half before the revolution were experienced by the Iranians as a continuous unfolding process. But, for the purpose of in depth analysis, this needs to be considered under two headings representing the periods before and after World War II. On the one side of this divide, we find separate national imperialisms, mainly British and Russian, and on the other a consolidated global imperialism wearing the outward appearance of an alliance of America and Israel.

However, the pattern for both periods—that of mounting conflict between the foreign interest and Iran’s religious class as mobilizer of mass political action—was set quite clearly in 1892. This was a confrontation triggered by the action of the shah in selling to a British company a monopoly for the cultivation and marketing of tobacco. The leading mullah of the day, Mirza Hassan Shirazi, promptly issued an order prohibiting the use of tobacco. Not only was this order instantly obeyed—even, it is said, by the ladies of the royal household—but angry crowds took to the streets. Appalled by this show of strength, the shah backed down, cancelled the contract and paid compensation to the British company.

The message was clear: there could be no security for the foreign interests and no “progress” of the kind they offered unless the power of the religious class could be broken. It was, therefore, with the tacit approval of the British and the Russians that the shah in 1905 yielded to revolutionary demands for representative government of the kind recently introduced in Russia, hoping no doubt that party politics could be used to undermine the power of the mullahs. A parliament (Majlis) was set up, and in 1906 Shah Musal Firudin became, nominally at least, a constitutional monarch. However, he died the same year.

The mullahs who had given their support to the demands for constitutional reform were not deceived by the rubber-stamp Majlis that emerged, and the agitation continued, involving both religious and secular elements.

At the height of this trouble, the British and Russians, without consulting the Persian government, announced that they had divided the country into two spheres of influence so as to counter any possible German threat to their interests. The Russians helped the new shah, Mohammad Ali, to suppress the revolution, occupying Tabriz in the process. A number of mullahs were hanged and the shrine of Imam Reza
at Mashad, one of Iran’s most famous places of pilgrimage, was shelled. Mohammad Ali was then deposed by the majlis and replaced by a regency which continued until Ali’s son Sultan Achmad reached the age of 18 and was crowned in 1914—marking the commencement of a period of almost total national disintegration, as the whole country became a stamping-ground for foreign powers.

The British Install a New Dynasty

Brushing aside the young shah’s declaration of neutrality at the outbreak of the 1914-18 war, British, Russian and Turkish forces invaded the country, but the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 eliminated the main patron of the Qajar dynasty. By 1919 Persia had no effective central government and separatist movements were in power in the provinces of Khuzistan, Gilan and Khorasan.

Eventually the only coherent force in the country was a Persian Cossack division which, after fighting against the Bolsheviks, had retreated through the British lines. Its leader, Brigadier Reza Khan, restored some semblance of order in Teheran and became the strongman in national politics. After the Persian government signed a treaty with the Soviet government, restoring relations with Russia, Reza Khan was encouraged by the British to stage a putsch. Shah Sultan Achmad was deposed and by 1925 the Cossack officer had been raised to the throne as shahanshah (king of kings), assuming the dynastic name Pahlavi.

In fairness to Shah Reza Khan, it should be noted that, unlike many of his predecessors, it was not in his nature to be a mere puppet of the foreign powers. On the contrary, he imagined himself destined to be the savior of his country and defender of its national independence, and he therefore patiently cultivated the fiction that he was an actual descendant of Iran’s ancient kings.

With Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s great modernizer, as his model, he was convinced that the religious classes were the only real obstacle to progress; and he proceeded with the ruthlessness of a Cossack soldier to try to destroy their power. It was, therefore, mainly for the purpose of strengthening his own position against the mullahs that he sought and used the support of the foreign powers, playing one off against the others wherever possible.

The effect was a transformation of the traditional monarchy, always tyrannical but inefficient, into a modern dictatorship
armed with all the expertise and appurtenances of modern totalitarianism, including a ubiquitous secret police.

Writes Professor Hamid Algar:

In so far as the word "modernization" has had any meaning in the Iranian context, what was modernized by the Pahlavi dynasty was the apparatus of repression . . . Among the few individuals to resist the imposition of the Pahlavi dictatorship in an open fashion was again one of the ulama, Sayyid Hasan Mudharris. He spoke up in the Majlis . . . went into exile and was murdered in exile by agents of Reza Khan.13

Early in the 1930s the shah sought to protect Iran from both the British and the Soviet Union by entering into an alliance with Germany; and by 1940 thousands of Germans were working in Iran and hundreds of Iranians were studying in German universities and technical colleges. This short-lived alliance was to prove the shah's undoing. In 1941, as the German forces were advancing deep into Russia, the British and their Soviet allies called on him to expel all the Germans and to permit the transit of supplies and reinforcements to the Russian front. When he refused to comply, the Allied forces invaded Iran and the shah's 120,000-strong army vanished "like snow in summer."

Britain carried out a surprise attack on the Iranian navy at Khorramshahr, destroying all the ships and killing many of those on board. Iran was divided into two zones of military occupation and the British, who had appointed Reza Khan as shah, now sent him into exile in South Africa, where he died three years later. As his son, Mohammad Reza, was to remark later in his memoirs: "It was deemed appropriate by the Allies that I should succeed my father."

"Although Iran was quickly declared one of the Allies," writes Amir Taheri, "her treatment by the British and Soviet forces of occupation could not have been harsher. Worse still, they made it abundantly clear that they had no intention of leaving Iran after the war had come to an end."14

Any expectations which the British and the Soviets may have had about their future role in Iran were to be disappointed, for in power-political terms World War II was to inaugurate an entirely new game in which the aims and ambitions of separate nations, like Britain and the Soviet Union, were to be of diminishing consequence.

Unnoticed, except by a few perceptive observers, a new global imperium had come into existence, geographically centered in the United States, but not specifically American.
The different nations would maintain their embassies and continue to be involved in many ways, but their separate power to influence events in Iran would henceforth be only marginal.

While World War II was still in progress, the Soviets worked quite openly for the creation of independent republics in the northern province of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, hoping to be able to incorporate these later into the USSR. The British also were frantically busy trying to create conditions favorable to their future interests; they set up and financed the Khuzistan Wellbeing Party in the hope of being able to detach this oil-rich region when Iran fell apart, as expected, after the war. The Soviets organized the Communist Tudeh Party, and the British set about securing the allegiance of various dissident groups like the Bakhtiari chiefs and certain Anglophile mullahs and powerful families.

But no resistance could be offered to the United States, now by far the world's most powerful nation—even without the atom bomb. Quietly, under pressure from Washington, London and Moscow signed a treaty with Iran under which all their forces would be withdrawn within six months of the war. In 1943 the United States set up its Persian Gulf Command and the American presence became increasingly conspicuous.

British and Soviets duly withdrew their forces in 1946, the nascent republics in the north were crushed, and the Tudeh Party was pushed into the background of public affairs. Developments continued according to program, but it was a program that remained for most people a great mystery.

The New Imperialism

It is the revolutionary change in the nature and character of imperialism which now calls for a more detailed explanation.

It rather looked as if a British imperialism which had prevailed in Iran without interruption since the end of World War I was supplanted after the end of World War II by an American one—or, rather, by one consisting of an alliance of America and Israel. Indeed, from quite early in the 1950s an American-Israeli presence was the dominating foreign influence in Iran; and it was almost exclusively against the Americans that the hostility of the mullahs and the masses was directed, culminating in the invasion of the US embassy and the subsequent hostage drama.
The reality, however, was very different, for what looked so like an America-Israeli alliance was in fact only the picture presented by an altogether different imperialism which had come into existence, displacing and replacing all the separate national imperialisms. What began quite early in the present century, and proceeded at a much accelerated pace after the end of World War II, was the progressive dismantling of all the separate national imperialisms, including the American, and their absorption into something unprecedented in recorded history—a global financial imperialism.

Instead of the moral illegitimacy, or political pathology, of parasitical conspiracies of "special interests" inside the different Western societies, now a vast cosmopolitan parasitism of "special interests" operated on a global basis and with ends far more ambitious: nothing less than a world economic and political imperium.

Nationalist imperialisms were thus subsumed in a single international imperialism in the same way as we have seen very large commercial, industrial and financial enterprises swallowed and ingested into the concentrated ownership and control of vastly bigger, mainly financial conglomerates.

The overthrow of the tsarist regime in Russia in 1917, the dispossession of all the European powers of their colonial empires, the setting up of the United Nations as a world government-in-waiting, and much else, were all part of a power-concentrating process which began last century and continues to this day.

This change in the character of imperialism was one of the consequences of a radical change in the realm of high finance, which can briefly be explained as follows. For a long time after the beginning of the modern industrial era, finance-capital (not to be confused with private enterprise capital) existed almost entirely in national concentrations: there was a British finance-capitalism, nominally answerable to a British government, which was in turn nominally answerable to an electorate; a German finance-capitalism, a French one, a Dutch, and so on, each joined to a national government and each government nominally answerable to a national electorate.

These nations were, in fact, plutocracies—each one an instance of what Hobson calls "social pathology," capable of maintaining themselves in power with a public opinion not sought and consulted, as before, but created as required, by news-media propaganda, patronage and other rewards of the
business world. Money had become the measure of all things, with a ruling elite drawn less from the land and more and more from the factory and the counting-house.

Last century and well into the 20th, these national concentrations of financial power were in vigorous competition, a major example of this being the scramble for colonies and markets in the so-called underdeveloped world. What then happened was that the many national vortices of financial power were drawn into a global vortex of financial power.

There can be no doubt that a major factor in bringing about this change in the realm of high finance was the long-continued existence within the different nations of Europe of Jewish banking families or dynasties which had always specialized in transnational operations. The story of how these financial dynasties consolidated their power on an international basis is explained at some length by Prof. Carroll Quigley in his 1300-page “History of the World in Our Time,” Tragedy and Hope.

It all began with what Quigley called “the third stage in the development of capitalism . . . of overwhelming significance in the history of the 20th century, and its ramifications and influences subterranean and even occult.” He adds: “Essentially what it did was to take the old disorganized and localized methods of handling money and credit and organize them on an international basis.”

The truly revolutionary change was to occur in the 1930s, when the control of this international financial system passed out of the hands of those who had created it—the likes of J.P. Morgan in America and Montagu Norman in Britain—into the hands of a cosmopolitan elite no longer “high Episcopalian, Anglophile, and European-culture-conscious.” The shift occurred at all levels, says Dr. Quigley, and was evident in the decline of J.P. Morgan, which had hitherto dominated Wall Street.

Thus it can be said that much of what was to happen in Iran and in many other parts of the world after the end of World War II had its parallel in the United States, where the great American pioneering families found themselves without the power to control their own universities, and where their national newspaper, the New York Herald-Tribune, fell into irreversible decline and died, like a ring-barked forest giant. The use of words like America and American in any discussion of world politics can thus be grossly misleading.
unless it is clearly understood that “American power” has ceased to be essentially American.

The dismantling of an essentially British oil empire in Iran and its reorganization on an international basis (as was done with Belgium’s copper empire in the Congo in 1960) was, therefore, to be expected—having much the same effect as that produced by “decolonization” in so many other parts of the world.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) had been exploiting the oil fields in Khuzistan since 1901, and the demarcation of those fields, covering an area of 15,000 square miles, has been laid down in a 1933 agreement. This giant company, writes Vincent Monteil, trained British subjects to take an interest in Iran’s internal affairs, and “took pleasure in appointing the number of votes in the ‘free’ elections.” In return—to take only one year as an example—AIOC paid Iran royalties or rent of £10 million in 1949, compared with £28 million paid in tax on profit alone to the British treasury.18

In 1950, shortly after the shah’s visit to the United States, where he had talks with President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Americans began to show great interest in the Iranian oil industry. A number of oil experts, businessmen and technicians visited Iran, and began to lay the powder-train for a political explosion which was to take place less than 12 months later; they did this by explaining how much more generously they treated their partners in Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and elsewhere.

A fiery atmosphere was thus created as AIOC began negotiating for a further renewal of its contract. In the wildly confusing situation that ensued, the weight of probability suggests that it was the British who were instrumental in persuading the shah to appoint the army chief-of-staff, Ali Razmara, as prime minister, charged with the task of handling these negotiations. However, the British were soon conducting a furious campaign of character-assassination against Razmara, while the Americans sought to bolster his regime with aid and by upgrading their embassy to first class. This little drama within a drama ended suddenly, when Razmara was assassinated, supposedly as a warning to any politician who might frustrate the growing demand for nationalization of the oil industry.

The killing was done by the Fedayen of Islam (Martyrs for Islam), but is was generally believed at the time that orders for it had come from the British by way of one of their former
employees. But why? A draft bill for a renewal of the agreement with AIOC, introduced by Gen. Razmara, was defeated and a few weeks later another bill introduced by Dr. Mohammad Mussadeq, nationalizing the oil industry, was passed. Mussadeq was appointed prime minister and Iran became involved in a great struggle with the British at the World Court and also at the United Nations. A great British company with many years of experience in Iran evidently had no intention of surrendering without a struggle.

Writes Amir Taheri: “That the United States wanted Mussadeq to succeed was demonstrated by the increase in American aid from $500,000 in 1950 to nearly $24 million two years later.” If, however, the Iranians expected the Americans to help them to re-establish the oil industry on a national basis they were soon to be disappointed, for American policy was to be dictated by considerations of a kind wholly inaccessible to the scrutiny of ordinary politicians and journalists.

Whether, therefore, it was the British or the Americans who were responsible for the small army revolt which dislodged Mussadeq has continued to this day to be a debatable question in Iran.

As a sincere nationalist politician enjoying much support from the religious class, himself being a practising Muslim, Mussadeq had performed the task required of him and had now to be removed. The Americans, therefore, joined willingly enough in the world-wide campaign, engineered by the British, to make it impossible for the Iranians to make a go of their nationalized oil industry. In the ensuing turmoil the shah hurriedly left the country, and as quickly returned after order had been established by the army.

**President Truman’s “Point 4” Plan**

The Iranians may find a key to the riddle of one of the most baffling periods in their much-troubled history in something that had happened in Washington a couple of years earlier (1949). This was a speech by Mr. Truman in Congress inaugurating his first full term as President, in which he unveiled a grandiose plan to “save the world from Communism” (so soon after America had saved the Soviet Union from Hitler!).

This plan proclaimed a “bold new program for underdeveloped areas,” a program “to greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations” and “to raise substantially
their standards of living.” The executors and agents of this plan, which came to be known as “Point 4” and “Agency for International Development” or AID, were soon afterwards pressing American assistance and advice on all the so-called “underdeveloped” countries, including Iran.

What President Truman had presented, as we now can see more clearly, was the prefiguration of a new global financial imperialism whose main purpose it would be to dismantle and dislodge all the national economic imperialisms of the preceding century and a half.

A Washington report at the time said that American officials “concerned with President Truman’s Point 4” were working to the principle of “a new type of benevolent imperialism designed to spread prosperity without exacerbating political nationalism.” In other words, if the undertaking went through, “American nationals will serve on the governmental as well as the technical level in the politically independent countries concerned.” Although “a startling innovation” in Asia and Africa, this was to be regarded “only as an extension of a system already in operation in Latin America.”

That all sounded benevolent enough, but how was it to be prevented from becoming a form of American political hegemony?

After former London Times foreign correspondent Douglas Reed had carefully digested President Truman’s speech and the explanatory literature that accompanied it, he had a strong feeling that he had read it all before somewhere. And so he had: as he turned over the pages of a book he had read a couple of years earlier, there it was. The book was Teheran, Our Path in War and Peace. Its author: Earl Browder, leader of the Communist Party in America.

Browder’s words:

Our government can create a series of giant industrial development corporations, each in partnership with some other government or group of governments, and set them to work upon large-scale plans of railroad and highway building, agricultural and industrial development, and all-round modernization in all the devastated and undeveloped areas of the world.

The Communist leader was referring to Africa in particular, but he went on:

Closely related socially, economically and politically with Africa are the Near Eastern countries of Arabia, Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Here also a broad program of economic development is called for.

Significantly, it was a capitalist America and not a Communist Soviet Union which the Communist Party boss called on to undertake this ambitious program of financial and economic imperialism. Douglas Reed could only marvel:

There must be in America under President Truman, as under President Roosevelt, some group or force strong or persuasive enough to sell Communist aims to political leaders and simultaneously to convince them that these will stop Communism.21

Indeed. And to the same hidden source must be traced the reality of American state policy during and after the last war, as distinct from policy as publicly stated, the promotion of two causes that were never declared but simply came to pass: the advance of the Red Army to the center of Europe and to the Pacific coast of Asia, and the continuous pouring of billions of financial aid every year into the then-new state of Israel.

That should help to explain a phenomenon which seems to have baffled Amir Taheri and other observers. Writes Taheri:

What could be described as the Kissinger style of diplomacy led, over a period of eight years, to a sharp reduction in the contributions of American missions abroad to the making of foreign policy. Kissinger clearly believed that diplomacy was too important a matter to be left to diplomats . . . he saw it [the bureaucracy] as no more than an instrument for implementing decisions made by a very restricted circle.22

Grand Design and Counter-Revolution

The Ayatollah Khomeini's angry young men who seized the American embassy after the revolution did not fail to notice that many of the most telling policy directives from the State Department in Washington were wholly out of register with reports and interpretations from the men on the spot, the poor wretches who afterwards had to bear the full brunt of passionate Iranian animosity. Members of the American embassy in Teheran, says Taheri, were gradually led to understand that they should not report what they saw but, rather, should see what Washington wanted them to report.

What this meant was that a grand strategy and system of tactics were being implemented to which only a tiny minority of policy-makers at the top were privy, creating an environment in which deeply clandestine purposes were
heavily masked with an ostentation of innocent and benevolent intentions. The effect was an utterly baffling melange of contradictory utterances and actions.

As Taheri put it:

The behind-the-scenes drama enacted over more than eight years in Teheran, Washington, Jerusalem, London, Cairo and a dozen other cities reflected the realities of a secret world which obeyed few rules either of international conduct or of individual morality. It is in this broader context that the Irangate fiasco might be properly understood.23

This hell's kitchen of secrecy and intrigue outside Iran had its equivalent inside the country. In the aftermath of the revolution all the Freemasonry lodges in Iran were closed and their archives seized, confirming what many had suspected. Many of them were controlled by Jews or Bahais of Jewish origin, providing another channel of secret communication with Israel and Zionism in general.

So, how did the American Communist Party leader come to present in broad outline an ambitious program for Third World development, to be undertaken later at great cost by the United States and a wide network of international agencies? Another question: How did it happen, and how was it possible, for Armand Hammer, son of Julius Hammer, one of the founders of the American Communist Party, to proceed to Russia immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution and begin at once to organize a massive transfer of finance, industrial equipment and technology from the capitalist West to its supposed enemy, the Communist East?24

The short answer to both questions will be found in what the German historian Oswald Spengler wrote immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution:

There is no proletarian movement, not even a Communist one, which does not operate in the interest of money, in the direction indicated by money and for the period permitted by money, and all this without the idealist in its ranks having the slightest suspicion of the fact.25

Those who have penetrated the mystery of the weirdly ambivalent relationship of high finance and Communism will not be surprised to learn that the Soviet Union supported the shah to the end, and that articles in Pravda about events in Iran were almost exactly the same in tone and content as those in the New York Times.

If the unfolding history of our century can be said to be the
product of an alliance of money and intellect (what else could it be?), it was the role of Earl Browder and very many of his kind, only a few of them to be identified as Communists, to take care of the intellectual half of this alliance.

Wrote Professor Hamid Algar:

The return of the shah in 1953 inaugurated the intense period of a quarter of a century of unprecedented massacre and oppression, the intensive exploitation of the resources of the Iranian people by the imperialism of the East and West, the Western camp being headed then by the United States rather than Britain.26

This then was the new imperialism, American and Israeli in appearance but international and cosmopolitan in character, drawing into its orbit power-wielding elements from all the previous national imperialisms, financial, political and intellectual. The Iranian oil industry, hitherto a British monopoly, was “internationalized,” the nominal national ownership of it left intact but its management entrusted to a consortium owned by AIOC, renamed British Petroleum (40 per cent), eight United States oil trusts (40 per cent), Shell (14 per cent) and French Petroleum (6 per cent).

We must now try to make some sense out of the phantasmagoria of confused and seemingly contradictory facts which emerged in the struggle between the shah and his people that was to ensue.

The entire Iranian struggle after the end of World War II can be visualized in the broadest terms as a confrontation of mutually antagonistic hierarchies of ideas, values and vortices of power, actual or potential, the one belonging to the West and the other to the East, the one having modern America as its grand symbol of human progress and welfare, and the other regarding America as the arch-symbol of political illegitimacy, “The Great Satan.”27

And the shah, because he could imagine no future for Iran except one modeled on the industrialized West, and because he, too, regarded his country's religious class as the great obstacle to progress in that direction, allowed himself to become, in every way, the main instrument of the foreign power.

As Taheri reports, a great variety of ideological forces came into existence after 1953 to combat the dictatorship of the shah and his subservience to the foreign powers; but behind all of them religious influence was increasingly discernible; so much so that even socialism, a secular ideology borrowed
from the West, reappeared in Iran as "The Movement of God-fearing Socialists."

This increase in religious influence came to a climax in 1963 with the sudden emergence into prominence of the Ayatollah Rohallah Khomeini, who was to play a role in the revolution resembling in many ways that of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century, combining in a remarkable way the functions of a religious and secular leader.28

A maximization of the power of the shah to enforce his will on the population was being met with a corresponding increase in the power and influence of a religious class which symbolized the will and instinct of the mass of the people. They could all see what was being offered, and they did not want it.

There were two ways in which the shah's power to enforce his will was enormously increased: 1) an increase in the amount of money at his disposal as oil production was resumed, and again as the price of oil rocketed; and, 2) close cooperation with the external power, especially with its Israeli component, in the sophisticated use of secret police and prisons as instruments of terror and compulsion.

Even moderate opposition after 1963 was suppressed with exile, imprisonment, torture and murder, and the army was brought in to crush mass demonstrations mounted by the ulama in Teheran and other cities, when thousands of people were killed. In 1975 the director of Amnesty International's British section described Iran as "world leader" in torture, executions after sham trials, and widespread political imprisonment.

The sharp edge of the power which the shah was able to bring to bear on his internal opponents was almost wholly supplied by his two main foreign supporters, the United States and Israel; these were, however, never really separate but only two aspects of one and the same world-revolutionary force.

In fact, American and Israeli influence were at all times inseparable. Prof. Algar says that after the coup of 1953, which ousted Mussadeq, there was cooperation at all levels, especially in intelligence and security work. He adds:

After a certain point it appears that the task of staffing the Savak was taken over by Mossad, the Israeli security, from the CIA although the CIA always retained the right of supervision over the operations of Savak. I know of many people who report having been interrogated and tortured by Israelis while in the custody of Savak.29
Algar continues:

There was overwhelming similarity between the two of utter
dependence on the United States. Israel is hardly independent
of the United States—or, rather, the matters are the reverse,
Israel certainly commands more votes in the Senate than does
the White House. ₇₀

This Age of Conflict

The career of Shah Mohammad Reza illustrates to
perfection Lord Acton's maxim that "power corrupts and
absolute power corrupts absolutely." Through the process of
unrestrained personal ambition the shah became wholly
separated from his own people—the corruption of leadership
in its ultimate form. He believed in what he was doing,
enjoyed the support of the greatest concentration of power
outside his own country, and was able to draw from his oil
industry so much wealth that he needed nothing from his
people except their submission. From 1970 he was even able
to expand his power abroad by giving away vast quantities of
money, having raised his own country to a position of power
and influence unprecedented in centuries. Writes Taheri:

Between 1968 and 1978 Iran earned more than $100,000
million from oil exports. More than 10 percent of that was used
in the form of loans or outright gifts to friendly countries. The
United Kingdom received from $1,200 million in loans . . . In
West Germany Iran purchased substantial shares in Krupps
and Benz as a means of saving them from financial difficulties
. . . More than seven hundred "key personalitites" in some 30
countries were on the secret Iranian payroll from 1979
onwards . . . ₆₁

Iran’s galloping arms expenditure in the wake of the 1973-74
oil-price rise helped Western economies to avoid recession. At
the same time, under the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine, Iran was
seen as the regional power that would defend Western
interests and act as policeman in the Persian Gulf and Indian
Ocean.

The shah had assigned to himself a role in history
comparable, in his imagination, only with that of the founder
of the Persian Empire in 600 BC. Of this he informed the
world in October 1971 when, flanked by his generals, he
presented himself before the tomb of that great monarch, now
little more than a pile of stones in a vast arid plain, and
ceremoniously read a eulogy which began with the words:
"Lie in peace, Cyrus, for we are awake!"
This was followed by a party among the grandiose ruins at Persepolis attended by more than five hundred dignitaries, including kings, presidents and prime ministers from 60 countries. All this, as the shah remarked at the time, was intended to mark "the rebirth of the Persian Empire and Iran's return to the forefront of human experience."

Other products of the shah's megalomania were the proposed 1,200-acre Shahestan-e-Pahlavi architectural extravaganza at Teheran and 20 planned nuclear power plants. This kind of development favored Western economics and Western contractors who shared the pickings with a new class of Iranian monopolists and technocrats, but did little or nothing for the Iranian economy as a whole.

Carried away by this dream of national greatness, what the shah seemed unable to understand was that the role he had assigned to himself was wholly subordinate to another which had been assigned to him by those who were encouraging him in his ambitions. In other words, that the Iranian national drama, so impressive when viewed separately, was intended to be no more than an episode in a vastly bigger world-historical drama.

So, it is the motivational system of the likes of Henry Kissinger—during most of the 1970s the shah's warmest friend and most trusted adviser—that calls for some consideration. How and for what purpose were these powerful individuals trying to use the shah?

A short but inadequate answer is that the new international cosmopolitan imperialism, spearheaded by Israel, had come to regard the Arab world and its Islamic religions as being by far the greatest hindrance to the attainment of its great objective, a one-world government which it could control at all levels; and Iran, with its considerable non-Arabic population and huge oil wealth, was seen as a possible countervailing force which could be used against the Arab world.

The first step was to make Israel virtually synonymous with America in terms of foreign support in all fields, and then, by steady progression, provide the shah with a means of suppressing all internal opposition. In fact, the shah's security forces were virtually taken over by the Israelis and reinforced with non-Islamic personnel, largely recruited from non-Muslim population elements, especially the Bahais, largely people of Jewish descent no longer practicing the Jewish religion. This gave the shah an instrument which could be used with the utmost ruthlessness against the population and
against the religious class in particular. Prof. Algar states the position exactly:

We find . . . that immediately after the great massacre in Teheran on September 8, 1978, when an estimated 4000 people were killed, Carter left his humanitarian efforts on behalf of so-called peace at Camp David to send a personal message of support to the shah. It is noteworthy that Sadat and Begin and the other participants in these humanitarian efforts at Camp David also took time off to telephone their best wishes to the shah in the aftermath of the massacre. Given this timing of Carter's expression of support for the shah, we can do no other than regard his visit to Teheran and his proclamation of support . . . at the beginning of 1978 as an implicit statement of support of the shah and of all the acts of massacre and repression that he undertook in the year of the revolution. It was not only . . . an uprising designed to shake and destroy the tyrannical rule of the monarch, it was at the same time, in a real sense, a war of independence waged against a power which had successfully turned Iran into a military base and which had incorporated the military repressive apparatus of that other country into its own strategic system.32

The commanding importance attached to Iran as a piece on the checkerboard of global power politics was emphasized shortly after the fall of the shah when support from both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain was given to Iraq, and when the most flagrant violations of international law by Iraq, including the first attacks on neutral shipping, and even the use of poison gas, were disregarded or excused. The external powers, the USSR included, also doggedly refused to name Iraq as the aggressor.

Then when it had become clear that Iraq could not win, the combined efforts of the external powers had to be used to prevent an Iranian victory—an exercise which eventually called for direct American military action in the Persian gulf.

**The Battleground of the Mind**

The Iranian struggle was won and lost on the battleground of the mind.

All the ideas which the shah could muster in favor of the visible benefits of the Western social model, supported with a maximum application of force and terror, proved to be no match for a system of ideas, promoted by the mullahs, which united the people as never before and infused them with death-defying courage.
This was something the shah could never understand: an invincible unity of the people which embraced old and young, uneducated and educated, including even those who had received their schooling in the West. Thus, we learn that the shah's last visit to Washington at the invitation of President Carter in November 1977, was marred by unprecedented demonstrations by Iranian students, and that the teargas used by the police drifted across the White House lawns and caused the shah to shed a few tears.

For the purpose of study and discussion, this victorious system of ideas can be considered under two headings: populism and religion. The use of the word populism, however, calls for an explanatory note: it means what democracy used to mean and is still assumed to mean—namely, government by the people, direct or representative. However, since the word democracy is now almost universally applied to states which are not democracies as defined in the dictionaries, it can only be said to have ceased to be "lawful tender."

The nations of the West are, in fact, plutocracies, or special-interest oligarchies, wearing many of the trappings of democracy—political parties, the ballot box, all the rest.

The word populist is now used in all the English-speaking countries to designate popular movements offering opposition to the bogus democracies. The concept of populism thus establishes common ground between political activists persecuted by the shah and those in the West now being persecuted and execrated as "rightwing extremists," "neo-Nazis," or "Fascists," any debate with them being totally proscribed.33

All these populist movements have their origin in a deeply rooted instinct, a social or political instinct, which prompts people to react negatively to any rule which, judged by the results produced, they do not feel to be truly their own. Primitive societies which have endured down the ages can be regarded as models of legitimate rule and an example to the huge sophisticated societies of the modern world, in which the factor of legitimacy is increasingly elusive, if not wholly absent.

The actual system matters very little: it could be a monarchy, or a dictatorship, or an oligarchy or a conventional democracy; there is no system of rule which has not been known to work to the satisfaction of those ruled; any system acceptable provided that it is implemented by those who can
be regarded as the legitimate nominees of those ruled, leaders who are sensitive to the feelings, values, beliefs and group memories of the ruled.

Amir Taheri, a West-oriented Iranian journalist and no friend of the mullahs, says of the shah in 1976:

He did not need the people for their votes in a general election. He was there by divine right, and parliamentary elections, organized every four years, were little more than ritualistic exercises in futility.\textsuperscript{34}

And the shah had long since abandoned the practice of travelling around the country to make direct contact with his people.

Other populist resistance movements in Iran since before the turn of the century, some of them modeled on similar movements in the West, were all influenced in some degree by the religious class, but the one that finally triumphed was religious through and through, inspired by a great religious leader and organized and managed throughout by the ulama.

From all of which it would seem to follow that for the West, with all its bogus democracies and its Christian church falling into disarray and demoralization, there should be much to learn from the role of religion as a mobilizer of mass political action, and about politics in general.

However, any consideration of the role of religion in Iran—a role unthinkable today in the West—needs to be preceded by a few thoughts about religion in general, not this or that manifestation of it but religion as a factor of commanding importance in human affairs everywhere and at all times of which we have any record.

Religion can be said to have two main aspects: \textit{personal} and \textit{social}. Religion can be a strictly personal phenomenon, joined to or wholly independent of any prevailing orthodoxy or doctrine. A sound attitude towards the totality of existence, a submission of the will to a system of cosmic law external to and superior to the intellect, no matter how such an attitude may have been acquired, is all that is needed for what C.G. Jung describes as “a religious attitude to life,” or state of psychic well-being. For most people at all times a taught religion has provided the easiest access to such an attitude, for which the only proof needed is that it works.

Religion can, therefore, also be a social phenomenon, a system of consensus belief having its origin in some prophet and offering psychic security and some measure of creative release to an entire community, even to an epoch. Consensus
religions, like all other human artifacts, are exposed to the vicissitudes of time and change and thus are liable to lose some of their pristine efficacy, their power to fulfil the purpose for which they came into existence.

So, what is the purpose of a consensus religion, if any, apart from that of helping the individual to find psychic orientation?

One simple but of course insufficient answer is that a consensus religion serves as a repository of values and a system of tested knowledge in respect of what is "right" and "wrong" in human relations. This implies that certain cosmic laws relative to what people do, or what is done to them, are encoded in human nature, not as ready-made ideas but only as instinctual intimations which must then be conceptualized and verbalized as ideas capable of being communicated and discussed.

These laws we categorize as "moral" or "metaphysical," laws of a most volatile and elusive kind which are easily lost and are continually having to be rediscovered and verbalized in a new way. And it is these laws which, if observed and applied in whatever form, keep a society as it were "on course," preserving it against disintegration and disorder.

**Islam and Christianity**

Only blind prejudice can prevent anyone who has gone to the trouble of studying even a summary of the contents of the Koran from realizing that Muhammad the Prophet was a moral genius, a person who, under pressure of a personal crisis of the mind, gained a quite extraordinary insight into those metaphysical laws, so hard to grasp, which prevail inexorably inside the human mind and in human relations.

And it was the circumstances then prevailing that made it possible, even inevitable, that one man's breakthrough to a rare state of enlightenment would expand quickly into a consensus religion destined to spread very quickly over most of the then known world.

Muhammad, like Jesus Christ about 600 years earlier, was living in what can be described as "end times"—much like conditions in the Western world today—when societies, no longer sufficiently in register with the unalterable realities of human nature, have begun to disintegrate. Social existence degenerates into a frantic scramble for personal survival and advantage as people cease to find in their social group a sense of shared security and mutual obligation and duty, and many begin to suffer in their minds.

What is most significant is that the Church in the West is
disintegrating along with everything else, compounding rather than counteracting the process of decline in the West.

Here a clear distinction must be drawn between two aspects of Christianity as a consensus religion: the Church Extant and the Church Invisible; the church as a great property-owning and power-oriented institution and the church in its nascent form as a message of personal deliverance. Both Christianity and Islam spring from the same insights and share with the earlier Judaism the same even more ancient monotheistic symbolism. The Koran says: "Jesus the Messiah, the son of Mary, was a Messenger of God, His word which He placed in Mary, and His spirit" (IV.171). There was, thus, no fundamental antagonism between Islam and Christianity.

The big difference between the two religions is that Islam did not create a church or its equivalent, and that the Christian Church, obedient to the laws of worldly growth, was everywhere inclined to make common cause with centers of worldly power.

The failure of the church in the West is summed up in Balzac's trenchant remark that "there can be no universal application of Christianity until the money problem has been solved." Alas, the church has never been at odds for long with "Caesar" in the ultimate form as concentrated financial power.

It is mainly for this reason that Islam, with its unflinching prohibition of usury, now is seen as a major threat to a vast structure of power in the West, challenging the moral foundations on which it has been reared.

The code of conduct, both for rulers and ruled, explicit in Islam's Sharia, was largely implicit in Christianity's basic teaching ("Do unto others as you would be done by."). The main difference between the two faiths arose out of the fact that Muhammad was compelled by the circumstances of his time to become a political leader, administrator and soldier, as well as religious leader. The meanings belonging to "a kingdom not of this world" were thus brought into close relationship with meanings more directly relevant to the unavoidable actualities of "this world."

Perhaps the most important fact of all in the context of the present world situation is that Islam presents in clear outline the moral configuration of Economic Man: worker, owner, dealer in the products of labor, his duties, obligations and rights. The injunction on the subject of usury may not have seemed all that important at the time when few, if any, of the Prophet's followers might have been interested in the lending of money.
But, today, usury is the linchpin without which the greatest concentration of worldly power ever would fall apart.

Centuries of antagonism between the Christian and Muslim worlds can be traced to a great variety of causes, but one of its main effects, as we can now see more plainly, was that of preventing the people of the West from recognizing and getting to grips with a corrupting principle which had been planted in their midst.

**Shi’ism: Religion of the Revolution**

For an explanation of the Iranian Revolution, it is not Islam in general but a particular version of it called Shi’ism that needs to be more closely examined, a kind of fundamentalism which, besides setting Iran fiercely at odds with the Western world, has had the effect of driving Iran into isolation, separated also from the rest of the Islamic world.

Writes Professor Algar:

The revolution in Iran and the foundation of the Islamic Republic is the culmination of a series of events that began in the sixteenth century of the Christian era with the adherence of the majority of the Iranian people to the Shi’i school of thought in Islam. Indeed, one of the important factors that sets the Iranian Revolution apart from all the other revolutionary upheavals of the present century is its deep roots in the historical past.35

There is no need, however, to explore the difference between Shi’ism and other schools of Islamic thought, because this difference fades into relative insignificance when compared with the change which occurred in Shi’ism itself after its introduction by the Turkish conqueror and the inauguration of the Safavid dynasty in 1502. So, it is what the Persians made of Shi’ism, rather than what they received, that now sharply distinguishes it from other schools of Islamic thought.

What has happened can be stated in a few words: Shi’ism has presented in sharper and clearer outline of the religious configurations of what we might call Political Man. This has entailed the politicization of the ulama and its involvement in public affairs to a degree unequalled anywhere outside Iran. The leaders of the other Islamic states, while sharing with Iran deep concern about policies being implemented by the Western powers in the Middle East, see what has happened in Iran as a usurpation by the religious class that could place their own regimes in danger.
This involvement in politics by the religious class has deep roots in history and is supported with considerable scholarship. Writes Prof. Algar:

With the hindsight provided by the Islamic Revolution, it will be more appropriate to write the Iranian history of the past three or four centuries not so much in terms of dynasties as in terms of the development of the class of Iranian ulama. Dynasties have come and gone, leaving in many cases little more than a few artifacts behind to account for their existence. but there has been a continuing development of the class of Shi'i ulama in Iran which has been totally without parallel elsewhere in the Islamic world.

Prof. Algar explains briefly how the burdens of state came to be placed on the shoulders of the religious scholars and how they learned to cope:

With the decline of the Safavid dynasty in 1724, a period of anarchy began in Iran. At one point within the 18th century we find no fewer than 13 different contestants for the throne doing battle with each other. The total disintegration of the political authority accelerated the process of divorce between the religious institution and the monarchy. We can say that in the absence of an effective centralized monarchy throughout the 18th century the ulama came in a practical fashion . . . to assume the role of local governors, arbitrators of disputes, executors at law and so forth.38

This experience over an extended period produced a change in Shi'ism, for there had to be some change in theory and scholarship to accommodate an expanded range of duty and mental activity. And so there arose a great debate about the duties of the religious scholar, whether he should confine himself to the sifting of the teachings of the Prophet and its interpretations, or whether it was permissible for him to engage in independent reasoning in respect of legal questions. The first position acquired the Arabic name akhbari and the other the usuli.

It would be hard to exaggerate the profundity and far-ranging implication of this debate; the question at issue is whether a consensus religion can be a “total way of life” for any society unless its scholars and teachers are also experts in jurisprudence and other affairs of state and have been trained to exercise their intellects in secular as well as religious matters, thereby acquiring competence to monitor the performance of the rulers.
Were it not for the triumph of the usuli position in the 18th century, the religious scholars would have been reduced to an extremely marginal position in society and the Iranian Revolution of 1978 would have been impossible. The whole significance of the Ayatollah Khomeini arises from the fact that he was the living embodiment of this activist tradition, the fruition of long years of political, spiritual and intellectual development.

As the mass of the Iranian population was instinctively repelled by the conditions of existence created in the name of Westernization and progress, and after the failure of many attempts by various popular movements, like Mussadeq's National Front, to place some curbs on the shah's dictatorial power, all turned to the ulama and accepted it unreservedly as the sole legitimate authority and thereafter responded automatically to its commands. Khomeini could, therefore, feel secure in the knowledge that he had the mass of the population behind him when early in 1963 he virtually launched the revolution with a series of public declarations at Qum.

In these he accused the shah of having violated the constitution and the oath he took when enthroned that he would protect Islam. He also attacked the shah for his subordination to foreign powers, naming the United States and Israel. The secret police Savak had permitted some qualified criticism of America but had always rigorously enforced the rule that not even the name of Israel must ever be mentioned in public discussion.

After one of these addresses, Khomeini's center at Qum was stormed by paratroopers and Savak members, a number of people were killed and the ayatollah arrested. Released a few days later, the ayatollah continued to attack the shah, with the result that there followed on June 5 a vast uprising in many Iranian cities.

This was repressed with great force and it was estimated that within a few days at least 15,000 people were killed in the shooting ordered by the shah. Khomeini was arrested again and sent into exile in Turkey, whence he moved later to Iraq and then to Paris.

Two features of the ensuing revolution which culminated in the final explosion of public anger towards the end of 1978 call for special notice. The more important of these was the factor of martyrdom, that is resistance of a kind undeterred by the fear of death. The other was the communications factor,
the seeming magic with which the leader of the revolution, even from distant Paris, could reach a widely distributed population with information and instruction.

The communications factor is more easily explained: the ulama represented a nationwide communications network, with its mosques and madrassas, its mullahs and its students, vastly expanded and expedited by two products of modern technology, the telephone and the tape-recorder. A declaration by the ayatollah, spoken into a telephone in Paris, would be recorded in Teheran or some other Iranian city, copied and transcribed and retransmitted to other parts of the country, where the process would be repeated until within a few hours it would have reached even small and widely separated villages.

All this was possible, however, only by reason of the accumulated learning and preparatory work of four centuries which had equipped the ulama for such a role, so that all knew exactly what they were expected to do and why, a rare condition in any society. This communications system, wholly dependent on the zealous participation of thousands of individuals, proved in the end to be more than a match for a powerful press, radio and television, all vehemently supportive of the shah's regime.

All that needs to be said about the highly abstruse martyrdom factor is that in Shi'ism the concept has been more thoroughly elaborated as a main component of the Islamic faith. It is something ever present in the consciousness of the Iranians. Hence the Shi'i maxim: "Every day is Ashura and every place is Karbala"—referring to the martyrdom of the Imam Hussain.

It was this factor that gave to mass political action in Iran, especially throughout 1978, a diamond-hardness that was proof against all the ruthless and sophisticated physical force which the shah and his close Israeli ally could mount against it. During the first days of December 1978, a large number of people appeared in the streets of Teheran and other cities wearing their shrouds, prepared for martyrdom and advancing unarmed on the rows of machine guns ready to be used to deadly effect.

By no other means could the people of Iran have overthrown one of the 20th century's most powerful and ruthless tyrants.
Notes

4. Taheri, Amir Nest of Spies: America's Journey to Disaster in Iran (Hutchinson, 1988).
19. Taheri, op. cit., p. 27.
23. Taheri, op. cit., p. 5.
27. For a particularly forceful exposition of this viewpoint, see Fall of a Center of Deceit, Islamic Propagation Organization, Teheran.
Appendix I: Islam and Economic Man

If a single all-embracing reason is to be sought for the dread of a resurgent Islam now prevailing in the highest centers of worldly power, it may be found in the Islamic moral delineation of Economic Man, a system of ideas which challenges the entire foundation of great power in the West.

Monetary reform campaigners in the West, especially in the United States, might be astonished by the quantity and quality of thinking which Muslim scholars have put into the subject of banking and of economics generally, all of it constellated by the Prophet Muhammad’s simple utterances. Here are some of the key elements of the Islamic economic philosophy:*

Individual rights: These are a consequence of the fulfillment of duties and obligations, not antecedent to them. In other words, first comes the duty, then the right.

Property: Ownership is never absolute, conferring on us the right to do with our property wholly as we please. As the Sharia puts it, all property belongs to God: we are only its temporary incumbents and trustees; there are duties and responsibilities inseparably attached to the ownership of property.

Work and wealth: Islam exalts work as an inseparable dimension of faith itself and reprehends idleness. We do not need work only in order to earn a livelihood; we need work to preserve our psychic health; we need to exercise creative skills and to spend energy in work.

Usury: The Koran forcefully prohibits the payment and receipt of interest, or riba as it is called. Interest on a loan is

regarded as a creation of instantaneous property rights outside the legitimate framework of existing property rights.

The evil inherent in usury, however, is more recondite and elusive than that. The lending of money at interest can in many instances be advantageous to borrower as well as lender; fortunes have been made with borrowed money. It is only in the contest of a total way of life of a community that the evil nature of usury becomes more clearly visible to the moral imagination.

The principle of usury, once accepted, gives rise to the regular practice of it, requiring or making possible the emergence of a class of moneylender; human nature being as it is, and taking into account the circumstances in which money most often needs to be borrowed, the practice of usury is seen as conferring a compounding advantage on the moneylender class.
Thoughts on the Military History of the Occupation of Japan

HIDEO MIKI
(Paper Presented to the Ninth International Revisionist Conference)

I. Introduction

We are now on the crest of a wave of interest in America's post-war occupation of Japan; many studies of the occupation have recently appeared, both in Japan and the United States.\(^1\)

Most of these works, however, are diplomatically, economically, or sociologically oriented. Studies undertaken primarily from a military viewpoint are comparatively few. That being the case, we must ask: Why study the history of the occupation of Japan from a military perspective?

—First of all, to examine how the victors attained their war objectives through the military occupation of the enemy's country;
—Second, to study how the vanquished—in this case the Japanese—attained their national objective in accomplishing Japan's reconstruction under the occupation forces;
—Third, to study the kind of relationship which developed between the victor and the vanquished after the war;
—and finally, to examine in principle how, in present or future wars or armed conflicts, a country should successfully attain her long-term national objectives.

Since ancient times the subject of war and peace has been an extremely philosophical and most difficult theme. I claim no deep insight into this subject but in the first half of my life I experienced war, and during the second half peace and prosperity. Most of my life, however, has been devoted to military service and study. Even now, through my academic courses for young military students, I continue to study war
and peace. I welcome your assistance in the form of a solid critique of my ideas.

Today we are able to see the victors, on the one hand, and the defeated, on the other, studying together their own and each other's policies during and after the war. I am certain that this is tremendously important both in drawing lessons for the future and in maintaining the peace—and in that spirit I present this commentary.

II. Strategies During the Final Phase of WW II

Strategy of the United States

The U.S. conducted its war against Japan in the Pacific area while simultaneously fighting Germany and Italy in the European theater. In June 1945, following the occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. prepared military plans to invade the island of Kyushu and the Kanto Plain (Tokyo and its hinterland). Furthermore, the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan had been agreed upon at the secret meeting at Yalta in February 1945. On the other hand, the U.S. was also studying the problems of the military occupation of Japan in the event that Japan suddenly surrendered or collapsed. This has already been made clear in many studies on this subject, especially since 1976, when the U.S. declassified and released many secret documents.

Additional light has been shed on the particulars of the U.S. failure to oppose the USSR's entry into the war against Japan—ultimately unnecessary because the U.S. succeeded in testing the atomic bomb in July 1945. The key factor in allowing Soviet intervention was that America's strategy for concluding the war was not merely to defeat its enemy militarily but to force Japan into an unconditional surrender. In principle this was the same as the strategy against Germany but in the case of Japan the American people were concerned about prospective U.S. military casualties in the invasion of mainland Japan. Therefore, in the Potsdam declaration of July 1945 the United States changed its strategy from "unconditional surrender" to "unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Japan." Japan was later able to accept these terms because the Japanese government, recognizing this subtle U.S. change, felt the U.S. would not fundamentally alter the structure of the nation should Japan surrender.

Dr. D. Clayton James described the American strategy in the Pacific War as follows:
By the early autumn of 1944, Nimitz, MacArthur, and their planning staffs, together with the Joint Chiefs and their planners, were generally agreed that aerial bombing and naval blockade would not suffice to force Japan's surrender and that immense invasions of Kyushu and Honshu would be needed. Tentatively setting the first operation for November 1945 and the second for early 1946, the Pentagon and the field commanders envisaged those assaults as difficult and likely to produce high American casualties.

Nevertheless, the Roosevelt government decided to invite the USSR into the war against Japan, three months after Germany was defeated. Dr. James also writes:

In retrospect, it seems that once the Kyushu assault plan was drafted military strategy essentially became dominant, with American national strategy bound inflexibly to it in its acceptance of Soviet intervention.\(^4\)

According to Dr. James the policy of unconditional surrender proclaimed by FDR at Casablanca in early 1943 was viewed by most of the Washington planners working on occupation guidelines as far more flexible than the Japanese imagined. The Japanese interpretations ranged from annihilation of their people to abolition of the imperial system and punishment of the emperor as a war criminal.\(^5\) For not only in my opinion, but in that of many Japanese scholars, FDR's unconditional-surrender strategy was not as flexible as in Dr. James's opinion. It included provisions for the occupation of Japan by four powers—the U.S., USSR, UK and China—after Japanese surrender, and the punishment of the emperor as a war criminal.\(^6\)

As James writes:

President Truman missed an opportunity to send a favorable signal to Japan when, on poor counsel from his close advisors, he omitted from the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945 any reference to the American government's intention to retain and use the emperor during the occupation. Since early 1943 American propaganda had portrayed the United States as irrevocably bound to the unconditional surrender of Japan, a development that, in fact, was not anticipated in the Coordinating Committee's deliberations and did not take place. But the continuing lip service paid to the policy by top American officials and propagandists was influential in keeping both sides from direct bilateral communications that might have terminated the war well before mid-August 1945.\(^7\)
2. Strategy of the Soviet Union

After Germany was defeated in May 1945, the Soviet Union prepared to participate in the war against Japan in accordance with the secret Yalta agreement. At Yalta in February 1945, FDR, with his military advisors' backing, agreed to Stalin's price for Soviet intervention: the Kuriles, South Sakhalin, Outer Mongolia, Dairen, Port Arthur, and Manchuria's main railways.

To this day we Japanese are very sorry that the American forces didn't occupy Japan's northern territories of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and we wonder why.

3. Japan's Strategy

No later than the defeat at Midway in 1942, but with increasing seriousness after the 1944 loss at Saipan, the Japanese government and the military command at General Headquarters considered possibilities as to how to conclude peace with the Allied powers. In June 1945, after Okinawa was occupied, General Headquarters decided to concede the loss of Okinawa and fight a decisive battle on the mainland. After Japan had inflicted a serious blow on the U.S. forces, Japan would make a peace proposal. The Japanese leaders hoped that an armistice or peace with the U.S. would follow the Battle of the Homeland.

On the other hand, there were elements in Japan which sought to conclude the war as soon as possible. The government's decision to end the war came only after the atomic bombings of 6 and 9 August and Russia's declaration of war on 9 August. Until the Emperor's decision, however, the Japanese Army insisted on a strategy of "peace after the decisive battle." The background to the Army's insistence was this:

— First, the Japanese Army, unlike the Navy, was not yet completely defeated;
— Second, by accepting the American strategy of "unconditional surrender," it was believed Japan could not maintain its national polity.

In other words, the Emperor's position would not be safe. The change to acceptance of the Potsdam declaration was at the decision of the Emperor.

Up to this point we have looked at the strategies of the United States, Soviet Russia and Japan for concluding the war. From today's postwar vantage point, we can see that the
Japanese decision to surrender spared her, in comparison to Germany, much woe.

Here I would like to examine, from a military perspective, the U.S. occupation policy as well as the policies Japan adopted.

III. The Occupation of Japan

1. The Issue of Unconditional Surrender

Why did the United States demand Japan's unconditional surrender? There is no doubt that Japan declared war against the United States and launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the Japanese armed forces occupied the Philippines after defeating the American forces under General MacArthur. But in what way did Japan ever attack the U.S. homeland?

Although it hasn't been given very serious examination, I believe that America's strategy of demanding unconditional surrender stems from the American Civil War of the 1860's. According to General Carl von Clausewitz in his treatise "On War," war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit.

But in reality, does this hold good for grand strategy? FDR's strategy against Japan in 1945 was overly harsh and I believe it should be soundly criticized from the standpoint of the proportion of violence inflicted in relation to the strategic objective. As we have already seen, however, the demand for unconditional surrender changed to one for the unconditional surrender of Japan's military forces. This change contributed to the Japanese government's decision to accept the enemy's demand.

2. Demilitarization and Disbanding of the Armed Forces

Past wars supply examples of a victor limiting the armaments of the loser after the war. How many instances have there been in which the armed forces of the vanquished power are completely abolished? One example that comes to mind is Japan's disbanding of the armed forces of the Korean Empire in 1907. The demilitarization of Japan carried out by the U.S. from August, 1945 was rivaled the disbanding of the military of the Korean Empire. For a sovereign nation an imposed disarmament is unbearable. The same may be said for the indignity of an occupier-imposed Japanese constitu-
tion. On exactly what authority can this kind of thing be forced on another country?

3. The Subject of War Crimes Trials

The U.S. and other Allied powers conducted postwar trials against Japan and Germany. This, too, was a part of their occupation strategy, and is a significant issue which deserves further study as a very important theme for peace in the future. (Recently in Japan there has been criticism, from both the left and right, of the Far East trials.)

4. The Issue of the Emperor

According to the “Military Government Annex of the Black List Operations, dated 6 August 1945”:

The Emperor and his wife and children will be placed under protective custody and removed from the Imperial Palace in Tokyo to another suitable residence where they will be kept in seclusion. There will be no public expression of opinion concerning the future status of the Emperor or of the institution of the Emperor...¹⁷

From this it is very clear that the Emperor was to be removed from Tokyo. I would like to know how the plan came to be changed and who ordered the change.¹⁸

It is well known that as a result of the First World War, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires were replaced by republics and the Emperors exiled or killed. Fortunately, in Japan the Emperor remains the symbol of the Japanese people even forty-four years after the end of the war. The high command of the Self-Defense Forces visits the Imperial Palace every year to be received in audience by His Majesty. Moreover, almost a million Japanese citizens visit the palace each year to celebrate the Emperor's birthday on New Year's Day. When one considers these facts it can be said that the American military's continuation of the Emperor system was a historic decision and a major contribution to postwar Japanese stability.

What were the military consequences of the American strategy regarding the Emperor? It must be recognized that the Emperor was the Generalissimo, or the supreme commander, of the Japanese armed forces. The Emperor was the only authority empowered to command both the Japanese Army and Navy. Of course there was an Imperial General Headquarters in Japan consisting of the Army and the Navy, but in fact there was nothing resembling a joint headquarters.
This was the fundamental and critical origin of Japan's defeat.19

General MacArthur said of this in his report shortly after the occupation as follows:

Illustrating this concept, General Yamashita recently stated in an interview, explaining reasons for his defeat, that "diversity of the Japanese command resulted in complete lack of cooperation and coordination between the services." He complained that he was not in supreme command, that the air forces were run by Field Marshal Terauchi at Saigon and the fleet run directly from Tokyo, that he only knew of the intended naval strike at Leyte Gulf five days before it got under way and professed ignorance of its details. The great lesson for the future is that success in the Art of War depends upon a complete integration of the services. In unity will lie military strength. We cannot win with only backs and ends; and no line, however strong, can go alone. "Victory will rest with the team."20

As mentioned above, no one general or admiral was empowered to integrate under a single command the Japanese armed forces; only the Emperor was authorized by the Constitution to command both Army and Navy. Only one time, however, did the Emperor exercise this authority, with his decision to accept the Potsdam declaration.21 The government of the U.S. saved the Emperor because it was the only way to make Japanese armed forces surrender completely. The Japanese armed forces surrendered and allowed themselves to be disarmed only by order of the Emperor.

According to General MacArthur's report on the Japanese armed forces' surrender and disarmament, dated 15 October 1945:

Today the Japanese armed forces throughout Japan completed their demobilization and ceased to exist as such. These forces are now completely abolished. I know of no demobilization in history, either in war or peace, by our own or any other country, that has been accomplished so rapidly or so frictionlessly. Everything military, naval or air is forbidden to Japan . . .

Approximately seven million armed men, including those in the outlying theaters, have laid down their weapons. In the accomplishment of the extraordinarily difficult and dangerous surrender in Japan, unique in the annals of history, not a shot was necessary, not a drop of Allied blood was shed. The
vindication of the great decision of Potsdam is complete. Nothing could exceed the abjectness, the humiliation and the finality of this surrender. It is not only physically thorough, but has been equally destructive of the Japanese spirit...\textsuperscript{22}

Here we can appreciate the Emperor's contribution to the accomplishment of American strategy and occupation policy at the end of the war. There were, of course, minor troubles for the American armed forces to surmount after the war's end, but their effects on occupation policy were nil.

\textbf{IV. For Perpetual Peace}

In his famous book of 1795 Immanuel Kant advocated these three things:

i. Standing armies must be totally abolished in due course;

ii. A country must not intervene with force to change another country's structure or government;

iii. During war a country must not act so that it becomes impossible to be trusted during a future period of peace.\textsuperscript{23}

1. \textbf{A Change in National Structure and Government}

The U.S. did not force Japan to abandon the imperial system, i.e., the Emperor continued as the total head of Japanese state. In other words, America's rulers did not demand a change in Japan's basic national policy. In reality, however, the most important element of the Emperor's prerogatives—his function as commander-in-chief of the armed forces—was completely abolished by the reform of the constitution. This was a revolutionary upheaval within the military system and, one must say, it was an interference with the government of Japan.

What of the application of Kant's second principle here? Kant's first principle on the abolition of standing armies could only be achieved by thorough violation of his second principle, by American intervention into Japanese internal affairs.

2. \textbf{Demilitarization}

The U.S. disarmed Japan to guarantee its war objective: that Japan never again become a threat to the U.S. In everyday language we can say that this was natural, as long as we consider lessons learned from previous wars. But insofar as we look at the changes in the state of affairs in postwar Asia, it was a big blunder. In a speech in Tokyo on 19 November 1953 Vice-President Nixon said:
“Re-armament of Japan”... Now if disarmament was right in 1946, why is it wrong in 1953? And if it was right in 1946 and wrong in 1953, why doesn't the United States admit for once that it made a mistake? And I'm going to say something that I think perhaps ought to be done more by people in public life. I'm going to admit right here that the United States did make a mistake in 1946. We made a mistake because we misjudged the intention of the Soviet leaders...24

Present-day Japan's central defense problem, in reality, springs from this mistake.

3. The Purpose of War

In accordance with Kant's third principle, we must not apply limitless violence in war, and we must think about the period after the restoration of peace. In this respect, along with considering America's atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki an attempt at an early conclusion of the war, wouldn't we also say that it fits the definition of war-time conduct which makes trust impossible after the restoration of peace?

However, why is it that since the turnaround in U.S. strategy toward Japan—especially now—the U.S.-Japanese relationship has been so remarkably close and stable? Did the U.S. attain its war objective by rendering Japan powerless? It is necessary to re-examine this matter from a military perspective.

We Japanese people must not forget the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, and Iwo Jima in 1968, without bloodshed. It was a very positive contribution to U.S.-Japanese relationships, in contrast to Russia's refusal to return the Northern Territory (South Sakhalin and the Kuriles).

In 1987 and 1988, the Emperor had surgery. At that time the whole nation became worried about his health. For the first time we came to realize that there was no one who could take the place of the Emperor except his successor, the Crown Prince.

On January 7, 1989, the news of the Emperor's demise was received with a sense of the deepest regret. For the first time since the end of war the Japanese nation gave serious thought to the institution of the Emperor. This institution remains an integral part of the fabric of our society.

V. Conclusion

In this paper I have examined some points of American occupation strategy for Japan from the military aspect,
including unconditional surrender, the demilitarization and disbanding of the armed forces, and the issues of war trials and the Emperor. I have considered the American occupation strategy in relation to Kant's principles for world peace.

Finally, I would like to conclude that America's strategy and policy in regard to the Emperor was a brilliant contribution to the history of mankind, not only politically but also from the military point of view.

Both the U.S. and Japan contribute to the peace and security of the world as allied powers, regardless of bad feelings during and after the war.

Overall, it can be said that both the U.S. and Japan's occupation strategies have been successful. On the other hand, I have yet to establish why Japan declared war against the U.S. and why we lost the war. It will be my continuing job to study and teach the war's history.

**Additional Remarks**

I'd like first of all to explain why I embarked on the study of history. It is because historical education in Japan is extremely distorted. As a matter of fact, the percentage of Japanese citizens who consider their nation to be a "good" nation is quite small. In nations like the United States, the United Kingdom, or Korea, as many as 80 or 90 per cent of children and mothers think that their own nation is a good nation. In Japan the percentage is as low as 45 per cent.

Fifty years ago, the situation was precisely the opposite. At that time, Japan was a very poor nation, but 90 per cent of Japanese considered it to be a great and good one. Now we are a very rich nation, but less than half of Japanese consider Japan to be a good nation.

One of the reasons for this, it seems to me, is historical instruction, particularly that pertaining to the current interpretation of the Far East war crimes trials. At the war crimes trials, the conclusion arrived at was that Japan was the sole aggressor nation, that the other nations were all good, peace-loving nations. Furthermore, it was Prime Minister Tojo who was the criminal in this historical drama. I consider this to be the war-crimes-trial point of view of history, and it to be the purpose and endeavor of historians today to correct that view.

Secondly, I would like to explain why I came to this IHR conference. Five years ago in Tokyo, Mr. Bissel explained to me about the IHR, and at that time I was very surprised to
hear from him that Japan's attack at Pearl Harbor was a trick perpetrated by FDR. Last summer, by telephone, I was asked by Mr. Bissel to participate in this 1989 IHR conference.

However, my friends in Japan told me: "Be careful," and in consequence I drafted this very careful paper. However, last night, upon hearing the speakers at this conference, I was quite moved. As is well known, and is often said, in battle the first casualty is truth, so today I would like to speak the truth. Now we will switch to the unvarnished truth!

First, the original American occupation strategy in Japan was mistaken. The occupation plan was to divide Japan into four zones: one for the U.S., one for the U.K., one for the Soviet Union and another for China. If that had happened then Tokyo might very well be in a state similar to that of Berlin today.

The second point is regarding the division and occupation of Korea. As you all know this occupation strategy was the reason for the outbreak of the Korean war, and is the cause of current north-south tension in Korea. What should have happened is that just as the American forces occupied Okinawa rather than the Soviets, they should also have occupied the northern part of Korea.

Third has to do with Manchuria, chiefly the fact that Manchuria was handed over to the Soviets. At Yalta Stalin had been promised that he would be given Dairen, Port Arthur and the Southern Manchuria Railroad. What should have happened is that these be occupied by the United States and then returned to China. If that had happened we might imagine that current-day China might be a very different place from the one we find it today.

My fourth point has to do with the Kurile Islands. It is due to the fact of the continued occupation of these northern territories by the Soviet Union that there is not a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan today, and technically Japan and the Soviet Union remain in a state of war. The Kurile Islands were not occupied during the war, they were occupied by the Soviets after the surrender of the Japanese forces in the period between 18 August and September 2, 1945. In fact, according to international law, since 1855 this had been exclusively Japanese territory.

However, if we examine this from another point of view, it may be that the fact that the Kurile Islands were not returned to Japan, is in some respects, a good thing for the United States. That is because if the Kurile Islands were returned to
Japan, this might result in great friendship between the Japanese and the Soviets, possibly creating a serious obstacle to Japan-U.S. relations. However, that is only my personal view and the Japanese government persists in saying: "Hand them back, hand them back."

This very day, there are in Tokyo probably as many as 50 Japanese children, left behind in Manchuria by their families, who are searching for relatives and parents. These are people whose parents were often, in fact, killed by the Soviets in Manchuria. Orphaned, reared by Chinese families, now, aged 40 and 50, they seek their blood kinsmen in Japan.

Their personal tragedies are a result of the United States decision that the Soviet participation in the Far Eastern War was necessary, whereas, in fact, that participation was not necessary in the slightest.

Next I would like to talk about the question of the war crimes trials. According to the international law of the time, war was perfectly legal. And, consequently, the fact that Japan started the war was not a crime. Therefore, the fact that the leaders of only the defeated countries were put to death was in fact illegal. If in fact we are to execute the leaders of aggressive nations, how are we to consider the invasion by the Soviet Union of Finland, of Poland, of Manchuria and the Kurile Islands.

This is something that is difficult for me to say... but the fact of the matter is that the seven "Class A war criminals," including Tojo—after they were hanged—it is my understanding that the bodies were thrown away in the Pacific. We don't know the actual facts on this but that their remains were discarded in that way seems to me to run counter to the traditions to what I take to be a Christian nation.

I was only a child at the time. However, I knew General Tojo. General Tojo's second son was my classmate at the military academy, and I can tell you that neither of these men were evil men.

There's also another fact, namely that there are no final testaments or final documents written by General Tojo and the other six "Class A war criminals." It is rumored, however, that there was a final testament by General Tojo in which he feared the communization of both China and Japan and the resulting difficulties for the United States. It is my personal wish that the remains of these "Class A criminals" and whatever may still exist of their final testaments and their
documents be returned to Japan. However, this is something that the current Japanese government does not dare bring up.

It is also important to note that war trials did not take place only in Tokyo, they took place in Manila, in Hong Kong, in Singapore, and in China. As a consequence of these drum-head trials more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, many of them innocent, were put to death.

The records of these trials, as a consequence of the research of people as yourselves, are finally coming to light. This is something that I feel strongly about making a request to the IHR about. I'm sure that you are all familiar with the question of the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. However, the reason it is a problem has to do with how one interprets these Far Eastern military trials I referred to.25

Since we don't have much time I shall have to hurry along here, but one last point I'd would like to make is that the accepted view of historians is that the reason Japan is at peace and prosperous today has to do with the efforts of the peace groups within Japan since the war. I do not think that is the case. I think that it has to do with the fact that the Japanese army was determined to struggle on until the end. And as a consequence of that struggle the war ended after the death of President Franklin Roosevelt on April 12. If the war had ended while FDR was still alive, it is my belief that his occupational plan for a divided Japan would have been put into effect and Tokyo would today be in a position similar to that of Berlin. It was the decision of General Anami, a man I know well, that caused Japan to struggle valiantly until the end.

Finally, I would like to talk about some of Japan's reasons for entering the war. The reason why Japan made war against the United States and the United Kingdom was for reasons of survival and self-defense. Japan had no desire whatsoever to capture Hawaii, for example, or to occupy San Francisco or Los Angeles. Since, after all, Japan was "Country Orange" it had no need for an "Orange County."26

The main reason that there was a war between the United States and Japan was the China problem. In 1937 Japan did start a war with China. However, it was Japan's intention to achieve a cease-fire promptly and quickly. The nations that were obstacles to, and prevented, that cease-fire, were the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. This is somewhat similar to the reasons why the Vietnam war and the Afghanistan war lasted as long as they did. And the reason
why Japan made its final decision to go to war was that the United States had erected an economic blockade against Japan.

I've read a number of IHR publications and I'm not quite at this point prepared to believe that Japan was tricked into attacking Pearl Harbor by FDR. However, I myself happen to have a small piece of evidence on this matter that I would like to make public today.

This has to do with a diary of a major in the Marine Corps. He was on Wake Island around November 30, 1941. Wake Island was one of the islands which was bombarded by the Japanese on the opening day of the war. However, in his personal diary, Major Putnam, in his entry of November 30th, said that he had already received orders that American craft were to attack and destroy any surface air or submarine craft of the Japanese forces. This diary was captured later when the Japanese forces occupied that island. The fact that it is one major's diary, of course, makes this less than conclusive evidence.

Nevertheless, it does lead me to believe that, as IHR publications have argued, it is perfectly possible that Franklin D. Roosevelt did know about the Pearl Harbor attack in advance. In some respects I've had a difficult time making these points before an American audience. I appreciate your patience and understanding.

Notes


7. James, op. cit., p. 725.
10. Imoto, op. cit., p. 608.
17. Blacklist, op. cit.
25. The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is dedicated to the souls of Japan's war dead. The fact that General Tojo and other "war criminals" are commemorated there has provided leftist elements in Japan, and well as Japan's critics in East Asia and elsewhere, with fodder for periodic outbursts, usually occasioned by the visit of some prominent Japanese to the shrine—Ed.
26. Japan was designated “Country Orange” in pre-war U.S. military planning—Ed.
The First Gassing at Auschwitz: Genesis of a Myth

CARLO MATTOGNO
(Paper Presented to the Ninth International Revisionist Conference)

Introduction

The story of the Auschwitz gas chambers begins, notoriously, with the experimental gassing of approximately 850 individuals, which supposedly took place in the underground cells of Block 11 within the main camp on September 3, 1941.

Danuta Czech in Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau (Calendar of Events in the Concentration Camp Auschwitz-Birkenau), describes it in the following way:

3.9. [September 3] For the first time, experiments in mass murder through the use of Cyclon B [sic] gas were conducted in the concentration camp of Auschwitz.

By order of the SS, the hospital attendants brought approximately 250 sick inmates from the prison hospital to the underground cells of Block 11. Approximately 600 Russian prisoners of war were also brought there (officers and political commissars were selected from the prisoner of war camps according to the operating order [Einsatzbefehl] n. 8 of 17.7.41). After they were placed in the cells of the bunker, the underground vents were covered with earth, some SS poured the Cyclon B gas and the doors were closed.

4.9.[September 4] Rapportführer Palitzsch, equipped with a gas mask, opened the cell doors of the Bunker and noticed that a few prisoners were still alive. He therefore poured an additional amount of Cyclon B gas and closed the doors.

5.9.[September 5] During the evening 20 prisoners from the punishment company (Block 5a) and hospital attendants from the prisoners' hospital were brought to the courtyard of Block
11. First they were told that they had been called for a special assignment, and that no one was to discuss what they would see under pain of death. Then they were promised that after the assignment they would receive a substantially larger food ration. In the courtyard of Block 11, there were the officers: Fritzsch, Mayer, Palitzsch, the Lagerarzt Entressel and others. Gas masks were given to the prisoners, and they were ordered to go to the underground cells and to bring the cadavers that had been gassed out to the courtyard.

There, the uniforms were taken off the Russian prisoners of war and the cadavers were thrown onto motor carts. The cadavers of the gassed inmates wore prisoner's clothing. The transportation of the cadavers to the crematorium lasted until late night. Among those that had been gassed were 10 prisoners who had been shut up in the Bunker because of the escape of prisoner Nowaczyk.

This account, in support of which Danuta Czech gives no documentary proof, is nonetheless accepted with an exemplary lack of criticism by all Exterminationist historians. This is even more surprising in that the alleged gassing in Block 11 of Auschwitz would constitute the very beginning of the process that would subsequently lead to the gas chambers of the crematoria of Birkenau. The intermediate steps of that process were the mortuary chambers of Crematorium I of the Main Camp and the so-called “Bunkers” 1 and 2 of Birkenau. The Block II “gassing,” then, by the canons of Exterminationism, initiated the greatest murder operation of all times.

In this necessarily brief presentation, we will examine the beginning of the myth of the gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau by critically analyzing the few available sources about the history of the first gassing. At the same time, we will offer a significant example of the historiographic methodology used by the compiler of the Kalenderium of Auschwitz.

We will begin with the exposition of these sources.

I. The Sources

1. The Sources from the War Period (1941-1942)

The first reference to the initial gassing at Auschwitz is found in a note of October 24, 1941:

At Oświęcim (Auschwitz), at the beginning of October, 850 Russian officers and non-commisioned officers (prisoners of war) who were brought there have been subjected to die by gas in order to experiment with a new type of war gas that is to be
used on the Eastern Front (jako probe nowego typu gazu bojowego, który ma być użyty na froncie wschodnim).³

Until the middle of 1942, in the sources, the account of the first gassing does not appear to fall under a systematic extermination plan, but constitutes a simple scientific experiment among many others.

In one account compiled by a Czech teacher fleeing the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in May of 1942, one reads:

The worst reputation is enjoyed by the concentration camp at Oświęcim near Cracow. Not only are the victims of German cruelty tortured and mishandled in the usual German fashion, but the efficacy of German poison gases is even tried on them and other experiments are made with them.⁴

On July 1, the Polish Fortnightly Review published a more detailed account of the first gassing, with not insignificant discrepancies in detail when compared to the note of October 24, 1941, but always in accordance with the theme of experimentation with toxic gases on the prisoners:

Among the other experiments being tried on the prisoners is the use of poison gas. It is generally known that during the night of September 5th to 6th last year about a thousand people were driven down to the underground shelter in Oświęcim, among them seven hundred Bolshevik prisoners of war and three hundred Poles. As the shelter was too small to hold this large number, the living bodies were simply forced in, regardless of broken bones. When the shelter was full, gas was injected into it, and the prisoners died during the night. All night the rest of the camp was kept awake by the groans and howls coming from the shelter. Next day other prisoners had to carry out the bodies, a task which took all day. One hand-cart on which the bodies were being removed broke down under the weight.⁵

2. The Sources from the Postwar Period

Four witnesses, as far as we can determine, have confirmed the reality of the first gassing by giving specific descriptions: Josef Vacek, eye-witness; Rudolf Höss, indirect witness; Zenon Rozanski, eye-witness; Wojciech Barcz, eye-witness. To these is added the report of inquiry by the Polish Commission of Investigation on German crimes at Auschwitz.

A. The witness Josef Vacek

On the 8th of May, 1945, the former Auschwitz inmate Josef
Vacek (detention number 15514) declared at Buchenwald the following:

At the beginning of September, Russian prisoners of war were brought to the camp. There were more than 500. In addition to them were 196 sick inmates selected by the SS Doctor Jungen, who were gassed along with the Russian prisoners of war in the gas chambers of Block 11.

We hospital attendants who brought them there were told that they were going to be taken away by transport and that they were going to be brought there only momentarily until the train would leave. The following night, when everyone already was sleeping and no one was allowed to leave the Block area, I was called, along with 30 hospital attendants, and for 3 nights we transported the bodies to the crematorium.

B. The witness Rudolf Höss.

While he remained under British arrest, Rudolf Höss ignored the first gassing. In his sworn testimony of March 14, 1946, the most detailed of this period, although he mentions the gassing in the old crematorium as relating to the Soviet war prisoners, he says only:

At the same time transports of Russian POWs arrived from the area of the Gestapo Leitstellen Breslau, Troppau and Kattowitz, who, by Himmler's written order to the local Gestapo leaders, had to be exterminated.

Only after his extradition to Poland did he speak about the first gassing. In fact, in the "Autobiographical Notes" of Cracow, Rudolf Höss wrote in this regard:

Even before the mass extermination of Jews began, the Russian politruks and political commissars were liquidated in almost all of the concentration camps, in the years 1941 and 1942. According to a secret order by the Führer, in all the prisoners of war camps, special Gestapo units selected the Russian politruks and political commissars, who were sent to the nearest concentration camp to be liquidated. This measure was explained by saying that the Russians immediately killed every German soldier who belonged to the Party or was a member of a Party organization, particularly the SS, and that the political functionaries of the Red Army had the duty, in the event of being taken prisoners of war, to create disorders in the prisoner of war camps, and other places of work, in any possible way, and to sabotage even work itself.

At Auschwitz too, these Red Army political functionaries arrived destined for extermination. The first groups, if not too large, were killed by firing squads.
But during one of my absences, my deputy, Schutzhaftlagerführer Fritzsch, used a gas for this purpose, and to be precise, a mixture of prussic acid, Cyclon B, which was currently being used in the camp for the disinfection of parasites and which was available there in large quantities. When I returned, Fritzsch related to me what he had done, and the gas was utilized also for the subsequent convoys of prisoners.

The gassing took place within the detention cells of Block 11. I myself, protecting my face with a gas mask, observed the killing. Death would take place in the overloaded cells, immediately after the emission of the gas. A brief scream, soon suffocating, and everything was finished.10

In his written account, "The final solution to the Jewish question in Auschwitz," Rudolf Höss returned to the first gassing and gave a fuller description of its background and execution. Because his account has been elevated to the status of historical truth about Auschwitz, we will cite it at length:

"During the summer of 1941—at the moment I cannot cite the exact date—I was suddenly called to Berlin by the Reichsführer, through his assistant. Contrary to the usual, Himmler received me without any assistants being present, and, in substance, told me the following: the Führer has ordered the final solution of the Jewish question, and we of the SS must follow these orders. The extermination centers currently in the East are absolutely not in any condition to deal with this grand projected task. I have therefore selected Auschwitz because its position is excellent from the point of view of communications, and because its area can be easily isolated and camouflaged. To this end, I had thought of appointing a high SS official; but in order to avoid difficulties due to incompetence from the very beginning, I have abandoned the idea. The task will, therefore, be assigned to you. It is a hard and difficult task requiring total personal commitment, whatever future difficulties there might be. You will receive further details from Sturmbannführer Eichmann of the RSHA, whom I will send to you shortly—all officers who in one way or another will participate in this task will be informed by me in due time. You have the duty to maintain the most absolute secrecy regarding this order, even from your superiors. After your meeting with Eichmann, send the plans for all required installations to me immediately.

"The Jews are the eternal enemies of the German people, and must be exterminated. All Jews on whom we can put our
hands during this war must be killed, without exception. If we are not be able to destroy the biological basis for Jewry now, one day the Jews will destroy the German people. Immediately after receiving so ominous an order, I returned to Auschwitz, without even bothering to report to my superiors in Oranienburg. Soon Eichmann came to see me at Auschwitz. He laid out for me the plans for the various countries. I cannot any longer remember the sequence exactly.

"In any case, Auschwitz was going to be responsible above all for Eastern Upper Silesia and for the other areas bordering and part of the Government General. At the same time, and then subsequently, depending on the possibilities, it would be the turn of the German Jews and those from Slovakia; finally the Jews from the West, from France, Belgium and Holland. He also gave me the approximate number of transports that would arrive, but these too I am unable to recall.

"We therefore began discussing the procedures necessary to carry out the extermination plan. The method would have to be the use of gas, since it surely would be impossible to eliminate the masses that would be arriving by shooting them; and, besides that, it would be above all a very difficult and arduous task for the SS soldiers to follow through the assignment since even women and children would be present.

"Eichmann spoke to me about executing by means of vehicle exhaust, which was, until then, the method used in the East. But it was a method not suitable in Auschwitz, considering the large number of people anticipated. Killing through the use of carbon monoxide gas filtered through the showers in the bathrooms (i.e., the method to exterminate the mentally sick in certain institutions of the Reich) required an excessive number of buildings; besides, obtaining such quantities of gas, sufficient for such large numbers of people, was very problematic. On this issue, it was, therefore, not possible to arrive at a decision. Eichmann promised to inquire as to the existence of a gas which could be easily produced and did not require special installation of equipment, and that he would relate this information to me. We went to inspect the camp to identify the most suitable location and concluded that the most appropriate for this use would be the building located on the northwest corner of the future 3rd sector of buildings, Birkenau [the sector BIII of Birkenau camp—C.M.]. It was a location not easily accessible, protected from the curious by trees and hedges, and still not too far from the railroad. The cadavers could be buried in long and deep ditches on the adjacent meadow.

"At that particular moment we had not yet thought of
cremation. We calculated that the large existing rooms, once modified for gassing purposes, could be used to kill up to 800 individuals at the same time, by using appropriate gas. These estimates were later confirmed by actual practice. Eichmann could not yet tell me when we could begin with this assignment in as much as everything was in the planning phase, and Himmler had not yet given the order to begin. Eichmann, therefore, returned to Berlin to refer the substance of our discussion to Himmler. A few days later, by means of a courier, I sent Himmler a detailed plan on the situation, as well as an accurate description of the installations to be used. Regarding this matter, I have never received an answer or a decision from him. Later, Eichmann told me once that he [Himmler] agreed to everything. At the end of November, a meeting of the entire Jewish affairs section was held in Eichmann's office in Berlin, at which I had been invited to participate. There Eichmann's representatives from individual countries discussed the current status of the various operations and the difficulties being encountered, such as housing for the prisoners, the allocation of transports and trains, the determination of dates, etc. When we were to begin operations was not communicated to me, nor had Eichmann yet found the appropriate gas.

"In the fall of 1941, through a secret order issued to all prisoner of war camps, the Gestapo separated all the Russian politruks, the commissars and certain other political functionaries, and sent them to the nearest concentration camp to be liquidated. Small transports of these people continually arrived at Auschwitz, then were shot in the gravel quarry near the Monopol building, or in the courtyard of Block 11.

"Due to an official absence of mine, my deputy Hauptsturmführer Fritzsch, on his own initiative, used the gas in order to kill these prisoners of war; he filled the underground cells full of Russians, and, protected with gas masks, ordered the Cyclon B gas to enter the cells, which caused the immediate death of the victims. The Cyclon B gas was currently being used in Auschwitz by the firm Tesch & Stabenow for disinfection, and therefore the administration kept enough on hand. At the beginning, this poisonous gas, a prussic acid compound, was used only by Tesch & Stabenow technicians, and with strict precautions, but later, certain personnel attached to the sanitary services were instructed in its use by the same firm, so it was they who used the gas for disinfection purposes."
“On the next visit of Eichmann, I mentioned to him the use of Cyclon B and we decided that it would be the gas that we would use in the imminent mass slaughter.

“The killing of the Russian prisoners of war with Cyclon B, which I have already mentioned, continued, but no longer in Block 11 because, after the gassing, the entire building required aeration for at least two full days. The mortuary chamber of the crematorium next to the hospital was used as a gas chamber soon as the doors were made gas-tight, and a number of openings were made on the roof to allow the gas in.”

C. The witness Zenon Rozanski

In a book published in 1948, the former prisoner of Auschwitz, Zenon Rozanski, described the first gassing in detail, as follows:

“On a September day, after we had finished work, they didn’t bring us back to our Block 11; instead they brought us to the unfinished pavement of Block 5. To excuse the incomprehensible change, the Blockälteste explained it in terms of the other Block being disinfested. Since the fifth Block was in the area where the common camp was located, this change was received with general enthusiasm. Here we were safe from the appearances of the Kapos during roll-call, and besides, the lack of dividing walls allowed our comrades of the common camp to give us a little food. After a very uneventful roll-call, the Kapos, the Stubenaltesten and the squad leaders formed a cordon that separated our Block from the rest of the camp; nonetheless many comrades received conspicuous amounts of ‘left-over food.’

“The day after, we received the news that an entire transport of Russian prisoners of war had been brought to Block 11. This event was interpreted in various ways. Some said that the ‘Punishment Company’ would be disbanded, others knew from ‘knowledgeable sources’ that the Russians would be assigned to our Block, and still others put on a mysterious expression which conveyed the impression that they knew much but couldn’t say anything. However, one thing was sure: that day too, we would not return to the ‘11.’

“The morning of the third day, Wacek, the Stubendienst, before leaving for work, with an expression of somebody who was putting on airs, ordered those prisoners who were well-built and still appeared healthy, to fall out of the ranks. I, too, found myself among the twenty that had been selected. The
company went to work, but we remained in the Block. None of us knew what it was all about. After about half an hour, Wacek caught up with us.

"You'd better watch out. You have been left in the camp and will receive another "blow" [that is, another surprise—C.M.] at dinner. But you will immediately go to do a "special job." This will give you the chance to arrange something, but you have to keep your mouth shut. Understand?"

"No one, without doubt, had understood him; however, we all answered in unison: 'Yes, certainly!'

"We waited in line for another fifteen minutes, until Gerlach came up. This one inspected us very carefully, nodded his head and addressed himself to us as obscurely as Wacek: 'In a few minutes you will be attending to a confidential assignment. If any of you utter even one word of what you see,'—at this point Gerlach made a very expressive movement with his hand around the neck—'Kaputt! . . . only a little pile of ashes at the crematorium! You will receive more food than you need . . . Understand?"

"We continued not to understand. Only one thing seemed clear: the assignment given us could cost our lives. This was understood by everyone. However, the promise that we would receive additional food kept reassuring us. That was important.

"After some minutes we crossed, in double file, the door to main Block 11. In the courtyard there were Deputy Camp Commander Fritzsch; SS-Obersturmführer Mayer; Camp Rapportführer; SS-Hauptscharführer Palitzsch; the Lagerarzt, SS-Obersturmführer Entress; SS-Oberscharführer Clair; SS-Unterscharführer Stark; the Kriminalassistent of the local political section, Woznica; and our two Blockführer Gerlach and Edelhardt.

"Wacek gave the prescribed order: 'Off with your hats!' and reported to Mayer: 'Twenty prisoners assembled for work detail!' He exchanged some words with the Rapportführer, and then said something to Wacek. The Stubenalteste yelled: 'Yes, sir,' and turned to address us: 'Each of you will receive a gas mask. Make sure to wear it properly and don't make it necessary for others to be called to pull you out. Understand?'—'Yes, sir.'

"Near the wall there was a large crate with gas masks. These were distributed very quickly. After three minutes, we were ready with gas masks on. The SS-Oberscharführer Clair again made sure that everyone was wearing his gas mask properly.
Everything took place so quickly that we didn't even have time to think. We only kept looking at each other, dumbfounded, totally ignorant of what was happening. Our men in uniform were also wearing gas masks. Wacek and Bunkerkapo Pennewitz were running very nervously back and forth several times to the Block, where they were talking with Palitzsch, who kept shaking his head irritatedly; the two would come back running and in this way they kept going back and forth.

"Finally, all of the SS drew their pistols out. The barrel of an automatic pistol glinted in Palitzsch's hands. 'They want to shoot us,' was our first thought.

"We felt a knot in the throat, and our eyelids began burning. The air inside the gas mask began getting heavy, allowing you to breath only with much effort. Instinctively we all pushed toward each other. One began taking the mask off. For this, he is pistol whipped and falls on the ground. Time moves terribly slowly.

"They are not shooting us! Not yet . . . maybe they won't shoot us at all? This thought reassures me; I look around. The SS are still holding their pistols ready to shoot, but they are not shooting. Palitzsch gives a hand sign to Wacek. 'Let's go! Let's do it!' The Stubenalteste comes up to us on the run.

"Have no fear, follow me!' He is going toward the Block. I find myself almost at the very rear of our group. The barrel of a 'firing instrument' belonging to the man behind me touches my back. I quickly step forward and walk just behind Wacek. He goes down to the stairs. For one moment we stop . . . everyone . . . Bunker! But the SS don't allow us time to think. At the rear of the group someone is already down on the ground.

'Hurry! Hurry!'

"Wacek stays in front of the door to the Bunker. He has an ax in his right hand: he grabs it with his left hand and with his right pulls a key from his pocket. He seems to be having difficulty finding the keyhole, because he is taking so long. From the rear of the group Palitzsch yells: 'Faster!' Finally he does it. The key is inserted.

"Wacek grabs the door handle. Instinctively I hold my breath. I wet my lips, which in the meantime have become totally dry. What will happen now? Wacek goes back. He again moves the ax to his right hand. What does all this mean? What is the purpose of the ax here? Why is he fearful? For the second time he grabs the door handle now with his left hand.
He brings his right hand up while he is holding the ax as if he is about to give a stunning blow. I am cold and suddenly I am overtaken by fear. But this fear is something different than the one before. Now it's not fear for myself, no, now it is an uncontrollable fear of being in front of the door. My heart beats faster and faster, under the elastic band of the gas mask I feel each heart beat distinctly. Wacek pushes on the door handle, goes back a couple of feet and forcefully opens the door. The door is open and this very moment I feel my hair standing straight up. About three feet away from me there are men on top of each other, I don't know how, in a terrible state, with eyes sticking out of their sockets, scratched, stained with blood, motionless... Those leaning toward the door, bent in a singularly stiff manner, fall toward us and pile up very heavily, their faces on the cement floor, right in front of our feet. Bodies... bodies that stand up, completely stiff. They fill the entire hallway of the Bunker. They are stacked in such a manner that they cannot fall. For a moment I don't feel well. But Wacek's voice brings me back. 'Done!' he yells through the gas mask to Palitzsch, and lets the ax fall on the floor. 'Very well! Let's take them out!'"

"Now I can think clearly once more, and understand everything. The bodies are wearing Red Army uniforms. Must be that load of prisoners that had been spoken about yesterday at work. They have all been pushed inside the Bunker and gassed. It is because of this that we have had to use gas masks. The mystery is now clear! Wacek grabs the first body under his arms and passes it to us.

"So! This is it!,' it dawns on me now, 'Our work is then the removal of those who have been gassed from the Bunker.' "

"'Fall in line!,' yells Wacek again, 'Form a chain!' The 'chain' was normally a method by which one could quickly pass bricks being unloaded from a freight car from person to person. But while I had loaded bricks, it had never dawned on me that I could load bodies in the same fashion.

"We worked until late night. After emptying the Bunker, we were ordered to completely undress the bodies and place their clothing in designated piles. The next day the clothing ended up stored in the clothing storeroom and there the quantity of clothing increased significantly. We counted 1,473 Russian uniforms and more than 190 camp uniforms. These had belonged to the patients of the Camp Hospital that had been selected by Dr. Entress as being 'unable to work' and on that 'occasion' were gassed together with the Russian prisoners..."
"After completing the ‘work,’ the twenty of us were brought a huge cauldron containing 50 liters of soup, and at the same time each of us received half a loaf of bread. The cauldron was returned to the Block almost full. "At Auschwitz this was the first time that gas was used to liquidate prisoners."13

D. The witness Wojciech Barcz

The testimony that follows was given by Wojciech Barcz, internee at Auschwitz from June 16, 1940 (I.D. number 754), during a West German radio transmission on Auschwitz presumably broadcast during 1963:

The first gassing took place during the fall of 1941, a few months after hostilities [began] against the Soviet Union.

One day we hospital attendants from the infirmary received orders to transport the very sick to the cells of the Bunker of Block 11. They were locked up in these cells. Around 10 p.m. we heard a large group being pushed by the SS toward the Bunker. We heard yelling in Russian, orders from the SS, and heavy blows.

Three days later, we hospital attendants received, in the middle of the night, the order to go to Block 11. There, we evacuated the bodies from the cells of the Bunker. Thus, we were able to see that, in these cells a large number of Russian war prisoners, along with the very sick whom we had transported, had been simply gassed. The spectacle offered to us when we opened the doors of the cells was similar to that experienced when one opens an overstuffed suitcase. The bodies fell all over us. I estimate that in a small cell there were at least 60 bodies, so crowded that, even though dead, they couldn't fall and kept standing up. One could see that they had tried to reach the exhaust vent, through which, after all, the toxic gas had been poured. One could see all the signs of a horrendous agony.

We hospital attendants had to place the bodies on trucks, by which they were removed outside the camp, and then buried. Those of us involved in this work were absolutely convinced that we would be massacred right next to the ditches or would be killed later as witnesses to the secret, as was normally the case at Auschwitz. Instead, nothing happened.

Later on I learned that among the SS there were continuous surprises and incongruities.14

E. The Report of the Polish Investigation Commission

In a publication issued in 1946, the Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland presented the
following account of the first gassing:

All of these methods used in killing were not enough to absorb all superfluous prisoners, and, above all, they could not resolve the problem of freeing themselves of hundreds of thousands of Jews.

This method was tried out in the summer of 1941 in the coal-cellars of Block XI on about 250 patients from the hospital blocks and about 600 prisoners of war. After the victims had been put there, the windows of the cellars were covered with earth, and afterwards an SS man in a gas-mask poured the contents of a can of cyclon on the floor and locked the door. Next afternoon Palitzsch, wearing a gas-mask, opened the door and found that some of the prisoners were still alive. More cyclon was accordingly poured out, and the doors locked again, to be reopened next evening, when all the prisoners were dead.\(^15\)

* * * *

We now proceed to the critical analysis of all the sources so far mentioned, examining all that they claim concerning the date, the place, the time required, the number of victims, the evacuation of the bodies, and the technical procedures followed during the first gassing.

II. Critical Analysis of the Sources

1. The date of the first gassing.

According to the Kalenderium of Auschwitz, the first gassing was carried out on September 3, 1941. This date is not only unsupported by a single document, it is categorically contradictory to all the available sources—which are additionally in total contradiction to each other—and in particular to the testimony of Rudolf Höss, considered fundamental by the Auschwitz Museum and by the entire Exterminationist historiography.

An annotation of July 2, 1942 traces back the first gassing as having occurred in June 1941:

The first (pierwsze) utilization of gas chambers took place in June 1941 (w VI. 1941 r.). A transport of 1,700 “incurably sick” was formed and sent (ostensibly) to the sanatorium of Dresda, but in reality to a building transformed into a gas chamber (do budynku przebudowanego na komore gazowa).\(^16\)

Witness Michal Kula declared that the first gassing took place on August 15.\(^17\) According to an article in the Polish Fortnightly Review, it took place “during the night of
September 5th to 6th”; according to witness Vacek, “beginning of September” (Anfang September); and witness Rozanski testifies that it was “on a day in September (an einem Septembertage).”

The historian Filip Friedman inclines to September 15: “The first victims were gassed on September 15, 1941 in Block II [sic], in a former munition store building. A number of Russian prisoners, 600 to 700, and several hundred Polish prisoners were used for this first experiment.”

According to the annotation of October 24, 1941, the first gassing occurred “on the beginning of October” (w poczatkach października).

The Polish Investigation Commission generically suggests the summer, while the witness Barcz inclines toward autumn (im Herbst) 1941.

Lastly, the testimony of Rudolf Höss implies that the first gassing did not take place before the end of November of 1941. In effect, “at the end of November,” when the conference was held in Eichmann’s office in Berlin, he had not yet been successful in finding “suitable gas.” Only after this conference did the Lagerführer Fritzsch, on his own initiative, carry out the first gassing. It wasn’t until Eichmann’s later visit to Auschwitz that Höss reported to him on the experiment, and the two decided to use the Zyklon B for the projected mass slaughter.

Therefore, the date of the first gassing is absolutely indeterminate and fluctuates over a span of six months between July and December of 1941.

2. The Location of the Gassing

The Kalendarium entry for July 1942 declares that the first gassing occurred “in a building (do budynku) transformed (przebudowanego) into a gas chamber,” therefore not in the basement of Block 11, which had not undergone any architectural modification (this is the significance of the verb “przebudowywać”) into a gas chamber, and which, besides, according to the Auschwitz Museum, was used as such only one single time.

The article in the Polish Fortnightly Review mentions the “underground shelter” of Auschwitz, while the Polish Investigation Commission speaks of the “coal cellars” of Block 11.

The witnesses Rozanski and Barcz both locate the first gassing in the Bunker of Block 11, but for the one, the victims
were gassed in the corridors, for the other, in the cells.

Therefore, the sources examined are in reciprocal contradiction concerning the location of the first gassing; moreover, those sources which agree on the basement of Block 11, are also in reciprocal contradiction as to exactly which part of it.

3. The Duration of the Gassing

Rudolf Höss declared that, on the occasion of the first gassing accomplished by his deputy Fritzsch, the Zyklon B "provoked the immediate death" (den sofortigen Tod) of the victims.20

The article in the Polish Fortnightly Review reports instead that "all the prisoners died during the night. All night the rest of the camp was kept awake by the moans and screams originating from the shelter."

Finally, the Polish Investigation Commission asserts that "next afternoon" some prisoners were still alive, "therefore further cyclon was poured out and the doors again tightly closed, to be reopened the next evening, when all the prisoners were dead."

Therefore, all the victims died immediately, or during the night, or two days later.

4. The Victims of the Gassing

The Kalendarium entry of October 24, 1941 asserts that the victims of the first gassing were "850 Russian officers and non-commissioned officers." Rudolf Höss, too, mentions exclusively Russian prisoners of war, stating that Fritzsch "had the cells located in the cellar [of Block 11] filled with Russians." The article in the Polish Fortnightly Review speaks of 700 Russian prisoners of war and 300 Poles.

Some sources agree about the fact that the victims were a mixture of Russian prisoners of war and sick inmates, but are in reciprocal contradiction as to their numbers and totals which are: for witness Vacek, approximately 500 Russian prisoners of war and 196 sick inmates, totaling 696 victims; for witness Rozanski, 1,473 Russian prisoners of war and 190 sick inmates, totaling 1,663 victims; for the Polish Investigation Commission, 600 Russian prisoners of war and 250 sick inmates, totaling 850 victims.

Finally, the Kalendarium entry for July 2, 1942 maintains that the victims were drawn exclusively from sick inmates, and precisely "1,700 'incurably sick.'"
Therefore, the sources examined are in contradiction as to the total numbers of victims (from 696 to 1,700) and regarding their categories (only Russian prisoners of war, only sick inmates, Russian prisoners of war and sick inmates together).

5. The Selection of the Sick Inmates for Gassing

The sources which include the sick inmates among the victims are in contradiction also as to the SS doctor who ordered their selection from the hospital blocks for gassing. This doctor is Doctor Schwela, according to Danuta Czech; Doctor Jungen, according to witness Vacek; and Doctor Entress, according to witness Rozanski.

6. The Evacuation of the Gassed Cadavers

A. The performers of the evacuation

Witness Vacek swears to have carried out the removal of the gassed cadavers “together with 30 male hospital attendants” (mit 30 Krankenpflegern); witness Rozanski declares instead to have evacuated the cadavers with a group of “20 people” (zwanzig Mann) of the penal company.

B. The Beginning of the Removal

The removal of the cadavers of the gassed started “the next day” according to the article in the Polish Fortnightly Review; “the next night (nächste Nacht) according to witness Vacek; “on the morning of the third day“ (am Morgen des dritten Tages), which is at most two days after the gassing, according to witness Rozanski; and finally “three days later . . . in the middle of the night” (drei Tage später . . . mitten in der Nacht) from witness Barcz.

C. The Duration of the Removal

Removing the cadavers of the gassed took “all day” according to the Polish Fortnightly Review article; “three nights" (drei Nächte lang) according to witness Vacek, and “until late in the night” (bis spät in der Nacht) according to witness Rozanski.

D. The Fate of the Cadavers After Removal

While witness Vacek declared that the cadavers of the gassed were brought “to the crematory” (ins Krematorium) to be burned, witness Barcz asserts that they were brought “out of the camp” (aus dem Lager), where they were “buried” (vergraben).
In conclusion, the examined sources are in reciprocal contradiction as to the numbers and the category of the performers of the corpse removal (20 persons, 30 persons; hospital attendants, inmates of punishment company); as to the start of the removal (the day after, two days after, three days after the gassing); as to the duration of the removal (an entire day, three nights); as to the fate of the cadavers (burned in the crematory, buried outside the camp).

Even more serious, these sources are based essentially on the eyewitness testimonies of three former inmates who pretend to describe the same incident, in which each claims to have participated personally!

7. The Gassing Procedure

There exist neither eye-witness testimony nor documents on the actual gassing process. The description furnished by the Polish Investigation Commission is therefore false, for this reason alone. The Commission's description is also contradicted on a point by witness Barcz, who affirms that the Zyklon B was thrown into the cells of the Bunker, not from the door, but from the small windows. Finally, the description is technically absurd.

In this context, we limit ourselves to pointing out that the survival of some victims after a whole day of gassing, as asserted by the Polish Commission, is an impossibility. In fact, a concentration of 0.3 mg of cyanide to a liter of air—which is 0.3 grams per cubic meter—is fatal in a few minutes for a human being. Regarding this concentration, the lethal dose would be 8 mg, according to Haber's formula. This means that for a hypothetical gassing of 60 people—the number indicated by Wojciech Barcz—in one of the cells of the Bunker of Block 11 of Auschwitz, considering that the volume of air actually available was approximately 11 cubic meters, a little more than three grams of cyanide would have been sufficient to kill all the victims in a few minutes. In several minutes the heat from the bodies of the victims themselves would have enabled the liquid cyanide found in Zyklon B to vaporize to a gaseous state.

It is clear, however, that during a hypothetical experimental gassing, necessarily performed in an awkward manner, it would have been practically impossible to administer such a meager dosage of hydrocyanic acid. It is also clear that a larger amount, which would have been easier to handle, would have had lethal results even sooner.
The gas concentration normally used for disinfesting a room is 10 grams per cubic meter. This is the only actual benchmark available to the hypothetical perpetrators of the gassing. It turns out that this concentration, corresponding to a total dosage of about 110 grams in a cell of the Bunker, would mean virtually instant death for a human being.

Therefore, the Polish Investigation Commission report is technically absurd. This is also admitted by the Auschwitz Museum itself, which maintains that victims' deaths occurred only 15 to 20 minutes after the emission of the Zyklon B in the gas chambers—underground, like the cells of the Bunker—of the crematoriums II and III of Birkenau.

In summation, the story of the first gassing is neither supported by documents nor by direct testimony; the sources are indirect, contradictory and absurd. The only eyewitness testimonies available refer exclusively to the evacuation of the corpses, and are in contradiction as well.

In conclusion, the story of the first gassing at Auschwitz is historically groundless. This is further corroborated by the sworn testimony of a primary eyewitness, of importance both because of the position he held at Auschwitz in the second half of 1941, and because of the authority he currently possesses as director of the Auschwitz Museum: Kazimierz Smolerń.

Smolerń was deported to Auschwitz on July 6, 1940 (am 6.Juli 1940) and in July 1941 was employed as “recorder” (Schreiber) at the “Political Section” (Politische Abteilung) which is near the Gestapo office of the camp. In this position he was one of the better informed prisoners as to what was happening at Auschwitz. This is what he affirmed in sworn testimony which he gave in Cracow on 15 December 1947, regarding the fate of the Russian prisoners of war:

At the beginning of October 1941 (anfangs Oktober 1941) the first (die ersten) transports of Russians arrived at Auschwitz. Because I was already at that time employed at the Political Section as a recorder, I had to handle, together with my companions, the admission of the new arrivals. In the course of a week there arrived 10,000 Russian prisoners of war from “Stalag” VIII/B/Lamsdorf, and a number which I don't remember anymore from another “Stalag,” Neuhammer near Quais.

The prisoners of war arrived in camp in terrible physical condition, were half dead with hunger, full of lice, and had to undress naked outside of the camp. Although it was already
very cold, the prisoners had to take a cold disinfecting bath and were then conducted into the camp wet and naked.

In the camp of Auschwitz there were 9 Blocks separated from the rest of the camp by an electrified fence and at the entrance door was posted the sign “Labor Camp for Prisoners of War.” The camp for Russian prisoners of war consisted of the following Blocks: Block 1, Block 2, Block 3, Block 12, Block 13, Block 14, Block 22, Block 23, Block 24. The Blocks 3, 23, 24 had the first floor. These were designated 3a, 23.

SS-Oberscharführer Hans Stark directed the admission of prisoners of war, and I, as a recorder of prisoners, participated in that task with several inmates.

After having minutely described the procedures of incorporation, Smoleń continues:

The admission of the 10,000 prisoners of war went on for about three weeks. In the meanwhile, about 1,500 had died, and we forwarded their green cards to Berlin together with their identification badges.

In November 1941 (im November 1941) a special committee of the Gestapo came. They were from the main office of the State Police of Kattowitz and were led by Doctor Mildner. This committee was composed of the chief of the main office of the State Police, Doctor Mildner, and of three men of the Secret Services who knew Russian perfectly. The directorate of the camps assigned several inmates to interpret for the three men from the Secret Service. Another inmate and I were assigned to the Gestapo special committee by the Political Section. Consequently I had the opportunity to observe all the activity of the Special Committee.

So far Smoleń.

The Gestapo special committee was in charge of interrogating, one by one, all the Russian prisoners of war and of classifying them into three groups:

1) “politically intolerable,” a group including the subdivision “fanatical Communist”;

2) “politically not suspicious”;

3) “fit for reconstruction” (Wiederaufbau).

Smoleń goes on:

300 prisoners of war were selected as particularly important commissars and political functionaries and received the notation “fanatical communist.” These prisoners were taken immediately to the interrogation room of Block 24a, which had been converted to a Bunker. In the Bunker they were received
by Oberscharführer Stark, who removed their old prisoners' numbers, substituting new numbers for the old ones. These new numbers ranged from "Au1" to "Au300." The prisoners with "Au" numbers got their numbers tattooed on the left side of the chest and were kept completely isolated from the other prisoners of the Russian camp.

The activity of the special committee finished after one month (nach einem Monat), and as far as I remember, the distribution of the prisoners among the above-mentioned groups was the following:

- Group Au: 300 prisoners
- Category A: 700 prisoners
- Category B: 8,000 prisoners
- Category C: 30 prisoners

By virtue of my activity at the Political Section, I know that the 300 prisoners labeled "Au" were executed (exekutiert wurden) in quite small groups (in kleineren Gruppen).

The conditions of the Russian camp were so bad that on the average 250 prisoners died each day. About 8,000 had perished or had been executed (exekutiert) up to February 1942. The rest, 1,500 prisoners of war, were transferred to the camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau. Thus, an external camp rose at the camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau; this external camp was enlarged by small transports which, however, altogether did not add up to more than 2,000 prisoners. In the middle of 1942, all of the Russian prisoners of war, except 150, had died or had been executed.

At the end of his sworn statement, Kazimierz Smoleń summarizes the crimes perpetrated by the Nazis in Auschwitz against the Russian prisoners of war:

Recapitulating, I declare: the conditions of life in the camp were, for the Russian prisoners of war at Auschwitz, substantially worse than the conditions in the concentration camps. The Russian prisoners of war received less and worse food, above all less bread, and they could neither write nor use the room with wash boards [sic]. It is therefore understandable that in less than two months the camp was deserted. In addition to this, there is the fact that often selections were carried out in which those unable to work were executed in groups of hundreds. Both the inmates classified as "Au" and the others who were to be put to death were either killed with a shot in the neck, or gassed (vergast) in Block 11 (im Block 11)."25

This is the only allusion by Kazimierz Smoleń to the gassing
in Block 11, which allusion, among other things extremely vague and laconic, clearly betrays its character: rumor reported by the witness only because of an obligation to report the latest gossip.

In fact, two points in Smoleń's testimony demonstrate incontestably the historical groundlessness of the report of the first gassing set forth by Danuta Czech in the Kalendarium of Auschwitz.

First of all, if the gassing in question had really happened, Kazimierz Smoleń could not have been in the dark about it, because of the duty in the political section of Auschwitz with which he had been charged at the time, and in particular owing to his assignment to the special committee presided over by Mildner. Smoleń, on the contrary, could have talked about it with a wealth of details, in view of the fact that he devoted a whole page of his sworn statement to such an irrelevant subject as the formalities of matriculation of Russian prisoners of war.

This witness's ignorance appears even more incredible considering that, according to the Polish examining magistrate Jan Sehn, the first gassing was performed only in accord with the decisions of the special committee:

In November 1941, a special committee composed of three Gestapo officiers arrived at Oswiecim [Auschwitz] from Kattowitz. This committee interrogated the prisoners and divided them into four groups in compliance with an order from the chief of the RSHA (Central Security Office of the Reich) dated July 17, 1941. They were classified according to the secret files containing information about Soviet militants in administration and the [Communist] party. This committee itself decided as to the classification. We add that the fact of being recorded in the first two groups meant a death sentence. The first group—about 300 prisoners—were all shot either in the gravel pits or in the courtyard of Block 11. The order of execution was given by the second Lagerführer at the time, SS-Obersturmführer Seidler.

On the initiative of the first Lagerführer, SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl Fritzsch, the prisoners assigned to the second group (about 900) and those who were chosen from the subsequent convoys were killed with the gas Zyklon B. Fritzsch filled the underground of Block 11 with prisoners, and then, after having put on a gas mask, threw the poison inside. The Block then had to be aired for two days.²⁴

The fact that Kazimierz Smoleń, even at the end of 1947
knew nothing about the gassing in the Bunker of Block 11, demonstrates, therefore, that this gassing never happened.

Questioned by this writer about this point, Kazimierz Smoleń, through a spokesman, declared:

As regards the testimony given by the former inmate of the KL Auschwitz Kazimierz Smoleń at the Nuremberg trial, as you certainly know, he answered the concrete questions asked by the Tribunal (odpowiadal On na konkretne, przez Sad postawione pytania), so he could not report in detail and exhaustively all the events that he had observed.²⁷

This justification is definitely unsustainable. In fact, in the above-mentioned sworn statement, Smoleń did not answer “concrete questions,” as is usual during an interrogation, but freely expatiated on the theme of the fate of the Russian prisoners of war in Auschwitz in the years 1941-1942, dwelling, in particular, upon the crimes committed against them. His claim not to have described the first gassing because he had not been asked that specific question is, therefore, clearly captious, as confirmed by his fleeting mention of the prisoners “gassed in Block 11.” With regard to this, either he did answer a concrete question, and thus did not know anything about the first gassing, or he did not answer a concrete question, and thus his answer is false.

In the second place, because the “first transports of Russians” arrived at Auschwitz at the beginning of October 1941 [emphasis added], it is false that 600 Russian prisoners of war could have been gassed there on September 3.

Moreover, the first gassing was an execution of men condemned to death selected by the committee presided by Mildner, which arrived at Auschwitz “in November 1941” and concluded its work “after one month.” Consequently, the first gassing could in no way have occurred before December.

Furthermore, since the number of prisoners of war selected by this committee and, until December 1941, assigned to the “Au” group of the condemned was 300, it is therefore a fortiori false that 600 were gassed on September 3.

Finally, the historical absurdity of the first gassing in Block 11 is indirectly confirmed by three researchers of the Auschwitz Museum, in their long study devoted to the register of the Bunker of Block 11, which appeared in Number one of the Hefte von Auschwitz (1959). This register, the Bunkerbuch, contains the names of all of the inmates imprisoned in the Bunker between January 9, 1941 and February 1, 1944. It is clear that if the first gassing had actually happened, the
register should have preserved some trace of it. Now, these three scholars limit themselves to a fleeting two-line allusion to the alleged gassing (p.10), and, while publishing fifty-one pages from the Bunkerbuch, on pages 46-68, they in fact refrain from reproducing the page regarding the records of the beginning of September. This fact demonstrates that that page—requested in vain from the Auschwitz Museum by this writer—either contains no trace of the first gassing, or even contains elements that contradict it, such as, for instance, records of admissions of inmates to the Bunker between September 3 and September 7, that is, between the beginning of the gassing and the end of the ventilation of the Bunker.

The historical absurdity of the first gassing has been established; the various versions of that gassing, have been shown to be not merely groundless, but mutually contradictory. The way remains to be examined, in which Danuta Czech elaborated those versions in her own version, which is supposedly definitive. In other words, it is the historiographic methodology of the compiler of the Kalendarium that remains to be examined in order to show, among other things, what methodological criteria have been employed for the compiling, and what scientific value is to be ascribed to this essential source of the Exterminationist historiography.

The account of the first gassing presented by Danuta Czech in the Kalendarium of Auschwitz is the result of the extrapolation and of the indiscriminate fusion of sources which are all in total reciprocal contradiction.

Danuta Czech derived the number and category of the victims, as well as the description of the gassing, from the report of the Polish Investigation Commission; on the other hand, she deduced the account of the evacuation of the bodies from the testimony of Zenon Rozanski, adding elements derived from other sources.

Besides, in the description of the gassing, she arbitrarily modified the text of the Polish report, changing the “coal cellars” to “underground cells” (Kellerzellen) and “an SS-man” into “SS-men” (SS-Männer).

In the description of the evacuation of the gassed corpses, Danuta Czech substituted “the evening” (am Abend) for “the morning” (am Morgen) of Rozanski’s version, extrapolating that information from the report of the Polish Investigation Commission which says “next evening.” The evacuators of the corpses, who according to Rozanski were only 20 inmates of
the punishment company, became, in the report of Danuta Czech, 20 inmates of the punishment company "and hospital attendants" (Pfleger). This information was derived from the testimony of Josef Vacek, who however declared that the 30 evacuators were all hospital attendants.

Finally, Danuta Czech derived the presence of Doctor Entress at the evacuation of the bodies from the testimony of Zenon Rozanski, while in fact this officer was not yet in Auschwitz at the beginning of September.28

From the "Annotations" of Rudolf Höss Danuta Czech derived only the duration of the airing of the Bunker: two days. As a matter of fact, the Kalendarium reports that the punishment company returned to Block 11 on September the 8th after it had been cleaned and aired. In other words, the punishment company returned just after two days of airing, September 6 and 7. Thus, considering that Danuta Czech said that the gassing ended on September 5, the victims' agony consequently lasted two days, while according to Rudolf Höss they died immediately.

It is not possible to specify the sources of the report of the Polish Investigation Committee upon which is founded the description of the gassing presented by Danuta Czech. The only certain thing is that the number of the victims—850 people, of whom 600 were Russian prisoners of war and 250 sick inmates—originated from the note dated October 24, 1941, in which they are, however, only "Russian commissioned and non-commissioned officers," without sick inmates.

The Polish Investigation Committee did not know the "Annotations" of Rudolf Höss, dated November 1946. This fact is understandable because that committee made the inquiry in 1945 and published the results the following year, presumably before Höss was extradited to Poland on May 25, 1946.

Indeed, Danuta Czech, who conducted her researches in the late fifties, did not mention the "Autobiographical Notes." This also is comprehensible, because the testimony of Höss about the first gassing strikingly contradicts the report of the Polish Investigation Committee.

The source for the date of the gassing proposed by Danuta Czech—September 3, 1941—does not appear in any of the documents examined. The closest date is that in the article of the Polish Fortnightly Review: the night of 5-6 September.

Besides being arbitrary, the date proposed by Danuta Czech is also contradictory. The following record appears in the
Kalendarium of Auschwitz a few pages after the account of the gassing; the month is November and there is no indication of the day:

A special committee of the Gestapo of Kattowitz arrived at Auschwitz. It was composed of three persons and presided by the chief of the Gestapo of Kattowitz, Doctor Rudolf Mildner. This committee, which was operating in compliance with Einsatzbefehl no.8 of 17 July 1941, carried out a selection of the Russian prisoners of war according to the following groups:

1. Fanatic Communist about 300
2. Group A: Politically intolerable 700
3. Group B: Politically not suspicious about 8,000
4. Group C: Fit for reconstruction about 30

The inmates belonging to the groups “Fanatic Communist” or “A” were doomed to extermination. The activity of this committee went on for at least one month.”

The registration just mentioned is entirely derived from the sworn statement of Kazimierz Smoler previously cited. It will be remembered that in that statement Smoler maintained that “the first transports” of Russian prisoners of war arrived at Auschwitz “at the beginning of October,” and that Mildner's committee arrived “in November” 1941 and concluded its work “after one month,” thus in December. The victims of the first gassing can therefore be no one other than the Russian prisoners of war condemned to death by the above-mentioned committee—to be exact, according to Jan Sehn, those assigned to Group “B.” Consequently, that gassing could not be happening on September 3.

Here is one more example, therefore, of indiscriminate fusion of contradictory sources and previous elimination of the contradictions in order to create among such sources an agreement completely fictitious.

One last observation. In order to be able to affirm that the first gassing took place on September 3, Danuta Czech arbitrarily anticipated the arrival at Auschwitz of the first Russian prisoners of war. In fact, the first registration of the Kalendarium that concerns them dates back to July and mentions the arrival of “a few hundred Soviet prisoners,” who subsequently were all murdered with small-caliber guns, with shovels, and with picks. Danuta Czech did not indicate either the day of arrival, or the source of the information.

The second registration is dated September 3, and is relative to the 600 Russian prisoners gassed. Danuta Czech did not
indicate the source of the information in this case either. Seven registrations follow between October 7 and November 15. The one of November 15 is the last transport in 1941. The total of the Russian prisoners of war transferred to Auschwitz in that period is 9,983 people. This figure is practically identical to that indicated by Kazimierz Smoleń. Also the date of the first transport coincides with that indicated by this witness, i.e. the beginning of October. Therefore, Russian prisoners of war did not arrive at Auschwitz before that date.

This is also confirmed by the fact that Danuta Czech reported the source regarding the transports made since October 7. That source is the file (Kartochek) of the Russian prisoners of war which, as a matter of fact, was initiated on October 7. However, the compiler of the Kalendarium was not able to indicate any source for the two previous transports, and this fact is very meaningful. Besides, considering that the first page of the "book of deaths" (Totenbuch), that is the death register of the Russian prisoners of war, recorded the first deaths under the date October 7, it is necessary to conclude, until one has proof to the contrary, that the first two transports recorded by Danuta Czech before October 7 are invented.

This is a meaningful example of the historiographic methodology with which the Kalendarium of Auschwitz has been compiled.

By now, nothing remains but to draw the conclusions.

The story of the first gassing in the cells of the Bunker of Block 11 of Auschwitz is historically groundless. It is supported neither by documents nor by eyewitness testimonies. The few eyewitness testimonies available all refer exclusively to the evacuation of the corpses from the Bunker and are all in reciprocal contradiction concerning all the essential points.

The first gassing is therefore not history, but myth. This myth was shaped by the Polish war propaganda in October 1941.

The first version of the myth, which predominated until the middle of 1942, did not yet include the first gassing in the extermination process which would bring about the creation of the gas chambers of Birkenau. Instead, according to the first version, the first gassing is still a simple scientific experiment to verify the effectiveness of a gas for future wartime use.

The essential elements of this first version are contradictory. The note of 24 October 1941 speaks of 850 Russian prisoners of war gassed in Auschwitz, without specifying where, "at the
beginning of October.” The article of the Polish Fortnightly Review corrected the number of the victims and the date of the execution: approximately 1,000 persons, “among whom 700 Bolshevik prisoners of war and 300 Poles” gassed “the night of 5-6 September.” The location is still unspecified: the “underground shelter” of Auschwitz.

The note of 2 July 1942 situated the history of the first gassing within a general extermination process by means of gas chambers, which involved the Jews deported to the camp. The first gassing was presented as a starting point of this process, but was described in an even more contradictory fashion: the date was moved back to June, the number of the victims was increased to 1,700; all sick inmates; without Russian prisoners of war; and finally the place of the execution became, anachronistically, an actual gas chamber. In this way, after having given life to the legend of the gas chamber, the myth disappeared.

The anonymous “Polish Major” is the author of one of the reports on Auschwitz published in November 1944 by the War Refugee Board. In his detailed report about the facts of 1941, while devoting a special paragraph to the Bunker of Block 11, he completely ignored the matter of the first gassing. It was moreover ignored both by the witness Stanislaw Jankowski in his deposition of 13 April 1945, and by the Soviet Commission of Investigation in its report of May 7. As late as the end of 1947, one of the more informed witnesses, Kazimierz Smolen, did not say anything about it.

The myth reappeared suddenly on the 8th of May in the testimony of Josef Vacek. The myth was still in full literary evolution, but finally acquired a conclusive element: the location of the execution, which became Block 11. Now nothing remained but to determine the other elements, starting with the location of the gassing. At first the version prevailed that the gassing was performed in a single room, which Josef Vacek anachronistically called the gas chamber of Block 11. Some months later, on July 13, Perry Broad introduced another definitive element: the cells of the Bunker. To be exact, he spoke of a single cell, in which forty Russians were gassed on an unspecified day; he did not even indicate the year. From his comment, it appears that he incontestably was talking about the first gassing: “It was the complete success of the first test for the most hateful crime planned by Hitler and his confidants, and partly carried out in a terrifying and irrevocable fashion. From that moment, the atrocious
tragedy began, which victimized millions of human beings who until then had lived happily and innocently."\(^{35}\) In 1959, Hans Stark, direct superior of Smolen in Auschwitz, inspired by that version, declared he had heard from the SS of Auschwitz that the first gassing of prisoners had been experimented with for the first time "in the fall of 1941 in a cell (in einer Zelle) of Block 11."\(^{36}\)

The report of the Polish Investigation Commission which carried out its inquiry in 1945, is the first attempt at historiographical systematization of the myth, which was raised by that committee to the rank of historical antecedent and necessary presupposition of the extermination process by means of gas chambers. That Commission inserted two other definitive elements: the number of the victims—850—evidently inferred from the note of 24 October; and the description of the gassing, evidently invented because it is both technically absurd and not founded on any eyewitness testimony. The date instead remained still indeterminate: the summer of 1941.

In 1946, Rudolf Höss completely ignored the first gassing for as long as he was in the hands of the English. Only after his extradition to Poland did he speak about it, in the so-called "Annotations" of Cracow of November 1946 and February 1947. The version that appears in them is in total contradiction to the version proposed by the Polish Investigation Commission; however, the myth acquired one more of the missing elements: the cells of the Bunker.

In 1948, Zenon Rozanski furnished the final version of the myth with the description of the evacuation of the corpses, but this description is in total contradiction to the declaration of Vacek and Barcz.

In 1959, Jan Sehn, basing himself on the "Autobiographical Notes" of Rudolf Höss and on the sworn statement of Kazimierz Smolen, related the first gassing to the activity of the special commission presided over by Rudolf Mildner and, as a result, moved the first gassing to December 1941.

In the same year, the conclusive version of the myth appeared in the Kalendorium of Auschwitz; by cleverly manipulating the sources, Danuta Czech extrapolated from and indiscriminately blended testimonies in total reciprocal contradiction. Besides, Czech arbitrarily added the date September 3, careless of the contrary testimony of Kazimierz Smolen, which was otherwise utilized with abandon.
By then the myth had been concocted and was ready to be served to the Exterminationist historians, who are easily satisfied and favorably disposed to swallow, in an uncritical way, all that is offered them in the Kalendarium of Auschwitz, which is celebrated as the quintessence of factuality on that concentration camp!

Notes

1. According to another publication of the Auschwitz Museum, Hauptsturmführer Friedrich Karl Hermann Entress filled the position of camp physician (Lagerarzt) at Gross-Rosen from January 3 to December 10, 1941. On December 11 he was transferred to Auschwitz with the same office, which he held until October 20, 1943. Therefore, on September 5, 1941 he was not yet at Auschwitz. Auschwitz vu par les SS. Edition du Musée d'État à Oswiecim, 1974, p. 318.


6. According to Danuta Czech, the order to select the sick inmates was not given by Doctor Jüngen, but by the SS-Hauptsturmführer Doctor Siegfried Schwela: "Schwela had probably been appointed Standortarzt after August 1941 because it is by exercising that office that I gave the order, on September 3, 1941, of selecting from the Blockhospitals n. 21 and 28 all the very sick inmates and of transferring them to the Bunkers of Block 11" (Contribution à l’histoire du KL Auschwitz, Edition du Musée d’Etat à Oswiecim, 1978, note 10, p. 9).

7. The gas chamber of Block 11 never existed. The underground of this building was provided with 28 larger cells and 4 smaller ones, none of which has been declared by the Auschwitz Museum to be the gas chamber of the Block.


12. See note 1.
18. Filip Friedman, This Was Oswiecim: The Story of a Murder Camp, London, 1946, p. 18
23. NI-9098, p. 31.
25. NO-5849.
28. See note 1.
31. Hefte von Auschwitz, 2, pp. 111-114.
34. URSS-8.

Reviewed by William Grimstad

"Terrorism . . . terrorists." Most people who read the ugly words in the newspapers probably take them for granted, not noticing their oddly increasing frequency. After all, what else could you call people who would, say, plant a bomb on a large airliner and kill hundreds? The only thing remaining is to skim the article and see what kind they were this time: PLO, PLO faction, Iranian? Or, maybe, IRA? Anything but the real originators, it seems.

Even those cynical of mass media foibles, who might ridicule the spread of a veritable terrorist chic among the newsies, probably will not smell a rat and suddenly realize that we now have yet another word in a very special and potent vocabulary. Terrorism has joined such formidable swear/smear words as Holocaust, anti-Semitism, racism. These fearsome epithets pack a big wallop. Just as voodoo and black magic make use of verbal mumbo-jumbo in (claiming to) conjure up varied occult powers, so have these imprecations been used for generations in the control of untold millions, perhaps billions, of people. One might call them weasel-words. They are a "psy-war" expert's dream: they don't cost anything and nobody notices them at work.

When Washington recently began prodding the Jerusalem government for discussions with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the response was a loud protest that Israel "does not talk with terrorists." Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (Yezernitsky) is less voluble, however—in fact, he has refused all comment—at recently revealed documents proving that he was directly involved in the 1948 assassination of the United Nations peacemaker, Count Bernadotte.
This certainly was one of the more heinous of the acts of murder and mayhem committed by Zionist squads during Israel’s “war of independence.” That many of these gang leaders and assassins have risen to the top of a government which now spends most of its time denouncing “Palestinian terrorism” must be grounds for the gravest reflection.

'Holocaust' Impact in the United States

To understand how and why the new “terrorism” weasel-word is being built up, we must observe one of the earlier but immensely successful terms. Those of us who have pondered the stupendous clout of “Holocaust” ought to study further the exact relationship between that horrific tableau vivant of the Forties, seen through a (television) glass darkly, and the Zionist enclave which continues to dominate the crossroads of the Mideast.

The “Six Million” legend has been a stunning tour de force of raw mass-persuasive power, ringing seemingly endless changes upon a rather modest body of lies and distortions cobbled together ad hoc at the finale of World War Two. It is clear that the major area of incidence is the United States: without this country, it is unlikely that the tale would have got far in the world's estimation, or would survive long in future.

Now, a striking analog exists with the Zionist entity itself. No one denies that Israel endures only because of its “special relationship” with the U.S., demanding vast flows of our capital and armaments, and endless political intercession by Washington in world forums. Beyond this, it is an insufficiently appreciated fact that the Zionist state is a highly artificial, even illusionistic phenomenon. It is based upon one part brutal subjugation of increasingly restive non-Jews at home, to three parts misdirection and deception in the outer world, particularly in this country.

Myth Cover for Zionist Onslaught

One sees, then, that Israel and the Holocaust myth are mutually indispensable, bound up together as complementary aspects of the same political thrust, rather like the familiar Oriental yang-yin symbol. Ultimately, if the Holocaust legend falls or fades too badly, Israel will effectively be delegitimized. This is exactly the dilemma facing the Zionists: years, decades, generations are slipping away and the hoax is simply growing old, now in an increasingly hectic era living more and more on the instant. Add in the relentless chipping away at the
confabulation by Historical Revisionism, and the long-range implications become clear, a lesson we can be sure has not been lost upon the proprietors.

Israel's carefully cultivated propaganda "image" is that of a heroic little American-style democracy besieged on all fronts by medieval "Arab" tyrannies. Although there never has been much patience with this idea in the Third World, and even in parts of Europe, it has continued to "play in Peoria" among the U.S. intelligentsia, from academe down through the dreariest drudges of the mass media. However, there are unmistakable signs that even this cushy situation is finally deteriorating.

Conclusion: it's time for new weasel-words.

International Zionism's astounding ability to prop up the "brave little Israel" facade year after year depends upon continued concealment of the real, blatantly terroristic character of its initial seizure and subsequent expansion of territory, right up to the present. For not overly scrupulous historians and pundits, this remained a workable fantasy until the Moshe Sharett exposés. Now they must risk not only lying to themselves, but to their public—and being called to account for it.

At a time when timidly increasing numbers of inquiries into Zionist doings are beginning to be seen, we can only praise Ms. Rokach's as one of the most unique. Those of us who have spent much of our adult lives probing one aspect or another of the worldwide Zionist enterprise will recognize immediately what an utter rarity it is to be able to listen in on deliberations among the actual high command.

While there is probably little going on in the inner councils of major nations that is not monitored by the Zionists, who are legendary for the power of their espionage, these people are just as abnormally preoccupied with secrecy concerning their own affairs. That is why this study is such a revelation, based as it is on the private journals of Moshe Sharrett, one of the true founding fathers of the state of Israel. No doubt the Israel Cabinet is, along with the Chinese Politburo or the consiglieri of the Jersey City mafia, among the world's most impenetrable executive bodies. Yet, for a brief period, we now have a glimpse of its inner workings.

**Diary of Israel's Early Era**

Sharett was there, in the secret planning sessions, when some of the most momentous actions and policies in the terror-ridden era that is constantly trumpeted as the "heroic"
early period of Israel were planned out. Among these were:
the pointless 1953 attack on the defenseless West Bank village
of Kibya, led by present-day Israeli “hawk” Ariel Sharon, in
which 69 Palestinians were killed; the 1954 hijacking of a
Syrian airliner to Israel in the wake of Syria’s arrest of five
Israeli spies, admitted as such by Sharett, which was the
world’s first case of air piracy; the savage 1954 attack on the
village of Nahlin, near Bethlehem, with dozens of Palestinian
civilians killed.

The real reasons for these and others similar, routinely
called “reprisals” for “Arab terrorism” by Israel, are here
explained, from the inside and from the top, as cynical and
carefully calculated provocations. The goal was twofold: first,
the ongoing intimidation and demoralization of the non-
Jewish subject population; but second, and equally important,
the creation of a desired climate of fury and amoral
adventurism within the Jewish citizenry. Sharett reports that
this psychological manipulation via murderous reactions to
trumped-up incidents of “anti-Semitism” was justified by Chief
of Staff Moshe Dayan as “our vital lymph. They . . . help us
maintain a high tension among our population and in the
Army . . . In order to have young men go to the Negev we have
to cry out that it is in danger.”

This, then, is the gruesome process from which Rokach’s
title derives. Sharett confesses that, while early Zionists
supposedly curbed “emotions of revenge,” those of his era had
eliminated the “mental and moral brake” on this impulse and
had come to “uphold revenge as a moral value . . . a sacred
principle.”

**Sharett’s Authority**

Like so many Zionist pioneers, Moshe Sharett (Shertok) was
born a very long way from the land he later helped seize,
immigrating to Palestine from Russia in the early 1900s. He
early showed political skills and advanced quickly in the
Mapai (Labor) Party and in the Jewish Agency, where he
became a close associate of the Agency’s rambunctious head,
David Ben Gurion (Gruen). After independence, he became
the first foreign minister of the new state, for a time even
replacing Ben Gurion as prime minister during the latter’s
much-ballyhooed “retirement to the desert.”

It is Sharett’s participation in Israeli Cabinet sessions that
the diary records, and which Livia Rokach quotes. Although
the period covered, fall 1953 through fall 1956, is relatively
short, Sharett's notations run to 2,400 pages in eight volumes. Something of the candor with which he documents highly sensitive Cabinet discussions, many of them still potentially embarrassing to the government today, may be gauged from the intensity with which the Israeli establishment attempted to prevent publication of the diary when Sharett's son announced his plan to do so.

That, however, was the original version, in Hebrew and limited to a small edition within Israel. A surprisingly different suppressive effort ensued when the publishers readied the present study by Rokach, this time from the Sharett family itself, and a bevy of New York Zionist lawyers. So, clearly the original publication must have been intended solely for internal Zionist edification. The effort ran aground, however, when the Israeli Foreign Ministry dropped out of the dispute, no doubt reckoning that a squabble probably would only end up promoting the book.

Confessions Damaging to Zionism

It is easy to understand the concern. Second only to the steady erosion of the "Holocaust" legend, which of course formed the propagandistic plinth of "sympathy" and moral legitimacy for the original incursion into Palestine, this testimony by a former prime minister and lifelong operative at the pinnacle of the Zionist movement seems the most damaging.

Sharett's motives in compiling the diary can only be guessed, although assuaging of a troubled conscience may well have been a factor. He does seem to have been something of a Zionist Hamlet: a man torn by self-doubt, although conscience certainly did not make a coward of him in his spirited public defenses of Israeli excesses that he privately execrates. Most importantly, however, he clearly did not contemplate publication, and that adds greatly to the journal's credibility.

The value of Sharett's mea culpa is on two levels: he shows us the early planning stages of some of Israel's most odious planned terrorism incidents, and he gives us his remorseful evaluations of what this atrocious record says of his own people. Coming from an "anti-Semite," the latter observations would count for nothing; from this source, they are extraordinarily telling:

I condemned the Kibya affair that exposed us in front of the whole world as a gang of blood-suckers, capable of mass
massacres regardless, it seems, of whether their actions may lead to war. (October 1953)

I meditated on the substance and destiny of this People, who is capable of such honest aspiration for beauty and nobility, and at the same time cultivates among its best youth youngsters capable of calculated, coldblooded murder, by knifing the bodies of defenseless Beduin. Which of these two biblical souls will win over the other in the People? (March 1955)

I have been meditating on the long chain of false incidents and hostilities we have invented . . . (June 1955)

Real Holocaust Victims

One cannot condone the undeniable excesses and atrocities committed by desperate anti-Israel partisans in the typhoon of terror and retaliation that has arisen over the Zionist seizure of Palestine. However, we are at least entitled to a balanced perspective on the matter, and this will not be forthcoming from mainstream news and opinion media in most Western countries.

This is the great value of Blaming the Victims. Editors Said and Hitchens and nine other experts offer a masterly critique of the avalanche of spurious reportage on the Mideast disaster to which we've so long been subjected. Its overall impact left this writer thunderstruck.

What finally dawns on one, after years of mulling over these problems, is the stupendous irony of the situation. Revisionist scholarship has established beyond doubt that Jews underwent no “genocide” during World War Two, and in fact suffered proportionately far smaller losses than did the Germans and Russians. Yet, here we have it staring us in the face that these very same people—or as least their Zionist heroes—have been carrying out a sort of gasless holocaust of the Palestinian people ever since the war!

Peters Book Deflated

This begins on the ideological level, if that is the right word, with the proposition “There are no Palestinians.” After all, if you employ your not inconsiderable money- and media-power to deny that a stateless, defenseless people even exists, how much attention will the military mopping-up operations attract later on? One of the major documents in this campaign is the 1984 tome, From Time Immemorial, by Joan Peters. Although derided in the British press, and even in Israel, where a distinguished professor, Avishai Margalit, denounced it as a “web of deceit,” the Peters volume has been welcomed
with dithyrambs of praise by our savants, including, not insignificantly, the “Holocaust” experts, Elie Wiesel and Lucy Dawidowicz.

Peters’s contention is that the territory was “empty” when the Zionists moved in after World War One, whereupon the so-called Palestinians began sneaking in from surrounding Arab lands to find work as the Jews “made the desert bloom.” This, of course, is one of the oldest staples of Israeli propaganda, and indeed has largely been abandoned there; but Peters resuscitates the story with a great flurry of ostensible research, references to Ottoman Empire population statistics, and the like.

Unfortunately for her, she reckoned without Norman G. Finkelstein, a Jewish anti-Zionist historian who has become her book’s untiring nemesis. In separate essays, he and editor Said surgically deflate the vast farrago of errors, misinterpretations, half-truths and outright lies that characterize the Peters volume. Finkelstein uses a particularly effective technique of parallel columns, giving the actual original citation (which obviously cost him an enormous research effort) next to what Peters says it says. The effect is devastating. One can only agree with Finkelstein’s assessment that Peters’s book, which, in America at least, has become the “Bible” of the trendier Holocaustarians and pro-Israel blowhards, is “among the most spectacular frauds ever published on the Arab-Israeli conflict.”

Chomsky’s Valuable Insights

Blaming the Victims contains many other essays of similar Revisionist import unraveling the compounded falsification that has been visited nonstop upon the Palestinians, who share with the Germans the dubious distinction of being perhaps the most lied-about people on earth. Among these, the superb extended piece, “Middle East Terrorism and the American Ideological System,” by the noted Jewish linguist, Noam Chomsky, returns us full circle to our original forbidding subject.

Chomsky starts with the bedrock axiom of Israeli policy, voiced often through the years, but never more sanctimoniously than by future president Chaim Herzog in 1972: the Palestinians can never be “partners in any way in a land that has been holy to our people for thousands of years.” Ergo: the flat ban on (a) independent political organization in the occupied territories, and (b) discussions with Palestinian
representatives, regardless of whether they agree to recognize Israel and to eschew violence. Chomsky shows what a stumbling block this incredible disenfranchisement has been, right up to the moment. As this is written, Israel's leaders continue to tough it out against tepid U.S. urgings that they reach at least some accommodation with legitimate Palestinian spokesmen.

**Israel's Expansionism**

Arguably the most valuable of Moshe Sharett's diaristic revelations are what he tells us of Israel's long-range planning, in particular its goal of a much larger territory than it currently holds and its implacable determination to become the regional superpower. It is these ambitions that have laid groundwork for the largest-scale devastation yet unleashed by the Zionist state: the ghastly evisceration of the once flourishing land of Lebanon.

What was called "Israel's Grand Design" in an important essay by the late pioneering Revisionist writer, John M. Henshaw, is a large subject unto itself. It would include such seemingly fantastic goals as controlling everything eastward to the site of ancient Babylon, in the Tigris-Euphrates area of Iraq. However, more realistic objectives lie closer to home, and in an arid region, Zionist chieftains long ago set their sights on control of key waterways to the north.

As far back as the Paris peace conference of 1919, they proposed a northern boundary for the Jewish "national home" mandated in the British Balfour Declaration that would have seized much of Lebanon up to the Litani River. At the same time, Ben Gurion and others tried to inveigle Patriarch Hayak with financial aid promises to abandon South Lebanon for Jewish settlement and set up a Christian state in the Muslim north. The patriarch indignantly refused, but that was by no means the end of the matter.

This Lebanon objective, pursued like an *idée fixe* through the decades, has formed the pivot point in one way or another for much of Israeli history. Zionist armed bands that took over Palestine in 1948 occupied much of South Lebanon, nearing the Litani River, but were forced to withdraw by international opposition. However, the military campaigns of 1967, 1978 and 1982 once again saw efforts to implement the policy, and these were successful to the point that Israel now effectively controls the Jordan, Banias, Wazzani, Hasbani and Litani rivers, an enormous geopolitical advantage.
Anti-Lebanese Plotting

In his February 1954 diary entries, Sharett details the strategy sessions where a beginning was made to draft plans that have only come to their full, dire fruition now, many decades later, with Lebanon in its death agonies. The overall framework for the plan was creation of a Lebanese Christian state. This was done chiefly to drive a wedge into the largely Muslim Arab League. Sharett writes:

Then he [Ben Gurion] passed on to another issue. This is the time, he said, to push Lebanon, that is the Maronites in that country, to proclaim a Christian State... It is clear that Lebanon is the weakest link in the Arab League... Now is the time to bring about the creation of a Christian state in our neighborhood... This means that time, energy and means ought to be invested in it and that we must act in all possible ways to bring about a radical change in Lebanon. Sasson... and our other Arabists must be mobilized. If money is necessary, no amount of dollars should be spared... This is a historical opportunity.

For various reasons, it proved unfeasible to activate this grand scheme for the dismemberment of a harmless neighbor until 1968, when Dayan was appointed defense minister. For twenty years the Lebanese border had been utterly tranquil and certainly no Palestinian guerrillas were anywhere on the horizon. Virtually overnight the situation changed, with mysterious border assaults against Israelis which were instantly avenged with savage military reprisals, escalating eventually to aerial bombing in South Lebanon. Finally, by April, 1975, the conflagration was ignited and Lebanon's civil war rages on to this day, with incalculable losses and suffering.

Chomsky on Media Liars

Yet, incredibly enough, informed opinion here has dismissed this tragedy as a happenstance that was probably inevitable, given Lebanon's "sectarian" diversity. Meanwhile, first things first, and "Israel's security" must be vigilantly looked after, with its occasional understandable excesses explained and quickly forgotten. This is the ideational framework within which the entire sorry history of Israeli destabilization and destruction has been vended to propaganda consumers in this and other "First World" countries. Looking out on especially the American intellectual class, from the philo-Zionist to the opportunistic, as they
preside over “news” and other mind-molding, one thinks irresistibly of “the dull, the proud, the wicked and the mad” deplored by Alexander Pope. Nevertheless, these people and their dirtywork are still with us, and cry out to be dealt with.

It is here that Blaming the Victims genuinely excels, in particular the Chomsky essay on the new hullaballoo over “terrorism” as a catchall for militant anti-Zionist resistance. This exhaustively documented, trip-hammer analysis ranges, case by case, atrocity by atrocity, over the violent highlights of the past decades—particularly in southern Lebanon—as they have been served up to us, and as the full facts suggest they more likely occurred. It is hard to believe, but Chomsky’s modest fifty pages seriously damage this old, vast, grotesque tissue of distortions and lies that has relentlessly screened Israeli doings, chiefly the ill-starred but indescribably brutal Lebanon invasion of 1982.

Summing up the whole sordid but still rather amazing process, Chomsky can only marvel: “Meanwhile the media are regularly condemned as overly critical of Israel and even ‘pro PLO,’ a propaganda coup of quite monumental proportions.”

Still Revering ‘Holocaust’

There the matter rests. Having noted the encouraging development that these books seem to portend, I am not sure what next to expect. These authors, and at least the Verso press, are all from the “hard Left” side of the spectrum, which of course entails a quite different set of assumptions from those of a “Holocaust” Revisionist. Marxian notions have almost no broad appeal among Middle Eastern people, but leftist partisan discipline apparently still is effective among writers who aspire to represent them.

That is the only way that I can account for the peculiar fact that the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic activists of the world, otherwise so brave in face of Israeli napalm and torturemasters, still are no less cowed than the rest of the world’s “masses,” and fearful of taking the first step to ridicule the strangely sanctified “Holocaust” and “anti-Semitism” shibboleths.

We shall not be rid of the word weasels who are now trying to diabolize “terrorism” as a cover for their own secret sacred mayhem until this gap can be bridged.

[Israel’s Sacred Terrorism ($6) and Blaming the Victims ($15) may be ordered from IHR, 1822½ Newport Blvd., Suite 191, Costa Mesa, CA 92627.]

Reviewed by Paul Grubach

In November 1983, a conference—"Antisemitism in the Contemporary World"—was held at Rutgers University. This book, a collection of papers which were presented by renowned scholars attending the conference, deals with what its authors perceive as current expressions of anti-Semitism. According to a paragraph on the dust jacket, the volume addresses "the questions of whether there are new forms of anti-semitism [sic—hereafter anti-Semitism], whether there has been a resurgence of anti-Semitism in the current age." Alleged anti-Semitism in the following entities—the Soviet Bloc nations, the Arab world, the Islamic and Christian religions, American blacks, Western leftist and religious groups, opponents of political Zionism, and the Holocaust Revisionist movement—are some of the more prominent subjects dealt with in the book.

Unluckily, if the reader is looking for fair and objective analyses of the causes and effects of anti-Jewish feeling, he certainly will not find it here. Instead, the analyses of alleged anti-Semitism are quite flagrantly constructed to satisfy two objectives. First, all blame (the burden of guilt) for the avowedly ubiquitous phenomenon of anti-Jewish antipathy is shifted onto gentile groups, while, simultaneously, Jewish groups are exonerated. The substantial evidence which shows that certain powerful segments of world Jewry (organized Zionism, the State of Israel, Jewish Marxists) are to a significant extent responsible for many outbreaks of anti-Semitism is totally ignored.¹

Secondly, nearly all of the writers of the essays quite recklessly attempt to include most intellectual, social and political criticism of organized Jewry and its power and influence under the rather melodramatic rubric of anti-Semitism. This attempt would seem to reveal more about the motives of the assembled experts than about the criticism in question. For although the word "anti-Semitism" is alleged to have been coined by an "anti-Semite," the term, with its pseudo-scientific veneer of objectivity and its shift in emphasis from Jewry (not Semitism) to its critics, has been eagerly embraced by Jews eager to stifle any challenge to their interests.
In a word, what one finds in this volume is not objective analysis, but rather, what political scientists would call "ideology; that is, a body of distorted ideas and interpretations of reality which are continually promoted—not because of their inherent truthfulness—but rather, because they serve the sociopolitical, economic, and psychological needs of a power elite.² Not surprisingly, the ideology of anti-anti-Semitism as presented here reflects the values and interests of the major sponsors and organizers of the conference. Among these were the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the Bronfman Foundation, and numerous individual Zionists. (p. xi)

It would be impossible here to discuss all of the 24 different essays, the range of topics covered, and the numerous distortions and fallacies which this volume contains. However, three examples will be offered to illustrate my point.

The late Terence Prittie, British author and journalist, contributed a paper which discusses economic boycotts and discrimination directed against Jewish people. (pp. 206-213) Prittie gives one the distorted impression that, in the ongoing economic boycott wars between Jews and Arabs, the Jews are totally blameless and innocent, and the Arabs totally guilty. Jews are never aggressors, only quite saintly victims defending themselves against "Arab racists." And why are the Arabs guilty of racism? Because, Prittie claims, when they utilize the boycott weapon, all Jews are targeted: the Arabs never differentiate between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews.

An ideological distortion such as this may gratify the ethnocentrism of many Zionist Jews, but it certainly does not serve the interests of truth. One is left with the false impression that only Arabs have used economic boycotts against Jews. Prittie never informs the reader that Zionist Jews, in their takeover of Palestine, utilized the economic boycott as a major weapon against the native Palestinians.³ The economic warfare historically waged by Arabs against Zionism and Israel (e.g., Arab trade boycotts of Jewish goods or refusals to do business with firms which have Zionist Jews in management positions) is a reaction to the challenge of repeated Jewish-Zionist aggression against the Arab world and racial discrimination directed against the Arab people in Israel.⁴ This is not to justify indiscriminate economic measures against all Jews, even those unsympathetic to political Zionism.
Historically, just as political Zionism never differentiated between Arabs who oppose Zionism and those who do not oppose it, neither have the Arabs differentiated between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews in carrying out economic reprisals. In order to evaluate fairly Arab economic warfare against Jewish Zionism, one must acknowledge the Jewish-Zionist political, economic, and military warfare which has been and is being waged against the Arab world.

Professor Michael Curtis, the editor of this collection, defines anti-Semitism as "hostility toward Jews." (p. 1) This alleged hostility, however, is often gauged by what must appear to impartial observers as highly subjective sensors. It is not only difficult to measure, weigh, or otherwise quantify: even such manifestations as the (blissfully rare) pogrom or the occasional scurrilous graffito may have been evoked by some perceived offense tendered by corporate Jewry. (Students of anti-Semitism will note additionally the disturbing tendency of the anti-anti-Semites to draw a discreet veil, at least for the multitudes, over truly hair-raising expressions of anti-Semitism emanating from such modern luminaries as Voltaire, Byron, Goethe, Carlyle, Dostoyevsky, Henry James, Henry Adams, and others too numerous to be named.)

In this volume, the criteria put forth to determine the existence of anti-Jewish hostility are nebulous and so broad and general that the charge of anti-Semitism can be utilized as the need arises. When the criticism in question is either psychologically threatening (that is, irritating to a righteous and benign collective Jewish identity), or is politically threatening (i.e., negative criticism which may give rise to demands that the power of organized Jewry be reduced), then the authors apply the "anti-Semitism" label to the critic and his criticism, regardless of whether the criticism may be justified. Observe how Curtis's mind works. He writes:

What distinguishes anti-Semitism from the ever-present prejudice or hostility directed against other [non-Jewish] people and groups is not so much the strength and passion of this hatred as its many-faceted character and the range of arguments and doctrines that see Jews as best as peripheral (or as pariahs, to use Max Weber's term) in society and at worst as destructive monsters and forces of evil. In its lowest form, . . ., anti-Semitism takes the form of pornography . . . Elsewhere, arguments—whether of a political, economic, social, religious, or psychological nature—make a greater claim to rationality. Always the claim is that Jews, because of their religious
customs or insistence on monotheism or dietary habits or tribal exclusiveness, were alien to the traditions and ways of life of the societies in which they lived or tried to subvert those societies or were able to control both these societies and other diabolical forces in the world. (p.3)

The implication here is obvious. Those who claim that certain powerful segments of organized Jewry are culturally alien to Western society and that they attempt to subvert Western culture supposedly harbor a hatred of all Jews. And, of course, it is reflexively assumed that the claim is a false, anti-Jewish slander.

All Jews are not cultural aliens to Western society, nor do all Jews attempt to subvert Western society. Yet there certainly exist powerful and influential segments of Jewry which do fit this category. A small portion of the evidence, culled from Jewish sources, illustrates the point.

Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter are two political scientists who studied the relationship between left-wing radical politics and psychological development. They gathered evidence which supports the claim that the Jews of the New Left student movement of the 1960s were motivated by a hatred of European-Christian culture, and that this hostility induced them to identify with leftist movements which undermine Western society's social order. Rothman and Lichter point out that Jews, occupying a marginal-alienated position in Western societies, are more prone to identify with political movements which subvert the dominant Gentile culture. In their own words:

Political radicalism . . . is but one form of the attack leveled by the marginal person upon the larger society. The basic thrust is to undermine all aspects of the culture which contribute to his or her marginality. Thus Jews in the United States and Europe have been in the forefront of not only political radicalism but also various forms of cultural "subversion."

Concerning the motivations of these left-wing Jews, Rothman and Lichter write:

In sum, the aim of the Jewish radical is to estrange the Christian from society, as he feels estranged from it. The fact that the United States is no longer "Christian" in any real sense, or that Jews have moved to positions of considerable power and influence, is of little import. Its Christian base is still unconsciously identified as the decisive oppressive element . . .
thus many radical Jews, even when they do not identify with Judaism, unconsciously retain a generalized hostility to Christian culture.9

The prominent Jewish-Zionist author, Maurice Samuel, writing for a Gentile audience, accurately epitomized the feelings of these segments of alienated Jewry:

I do not believe that this primal difference between Gentile and Jews is reconcilable. We [Jews and Gentiles] may come to an understanding, never to a reconciliation. There will be irritation between us as long as we are in intimate contact. For nature and constitution and vision divide us [Jews] from all of you [Gentiles] forever . . . 10

Later in the same essay, Samuel admitted that these alienated Jews do attempt to subvert the Gentile social order:

The Jew, whose lack of contact with your [Gentile] world had made him ineffective, becomes effective. The vial is uncorked, the genius is out. His [Jewish] enmity to your [Gentile] ways of life was tacit before. Today it is manifest and active.11

We Jews, we, the destroyers, will remain the destroyers forever. Nothing that you will do will meet our needs and demands. We will forever destroy because we need a world of our own . . . 12

If it is true, then, that certain segments of Jewry regard themselves as cultural aliens and gleefully subvert Western culture, pointing this out does not necessarily indicate broad anti-Jewish hostility.13 Even if the “anti-Semitic” accuser does dislike Jews, that is not sufficient to disprove his charge of deliberate cultural subversion by Jews.

In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize, the Jewish author, Elie Wiesel, stated: “It would be unnatural for me not to make Jewish priorities my own: Israel, Soviet Jewry, Jews in Arab lands.”14 Can it be entirely different for Gentile intellectuals of European descent? It would be unnatural for at least a few of them not to be concerned about the forces which are undermining their society and promoting what political scientist James Burnham called “The Suicide of the West.” That which Professor Curtis would label “anti-Semitism” is in many instances only a thoughtful concern with the welfare of Western culture and a healthy vigilance in relation to those alienated segments of Jewry which attempt to undermine it. One need think only of the writings of such humane, tolerant, but culturally engaged Christian gentlemen as Hilaire Belloc, G.K. Chesterton, and T.S. Eliot.
Stephen J. Roth, director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs (London), provides the reader of *Antisemitism in the Contemporary World* with a short discussion of Holocaust Revisionism and the legal attempts to proscribe it. His short dissertation contains many of the distorted views which the Holocaust lobby continually promotes about Revisionism.

Mr. Roth writes:

One of the most pernicious new forms of anti-Semitism is the denial of the facts of the Holocaust by so-called Revisionist historians and neo-Nazis (the two are often identical). Their allegations that no systematic extermination of Jews occurred, that there were no gas chambers, and that 6 million Jews did not perish, propagated in an atmosphere of increased anti-Jewish activity, has become one of the most significant weapons in the neo-Nazi arsenal. (p. 222)

In other words, according to Roth’s line of thought, Holocaust orthodoxy is definitely, positively true, and thus, Revisionist viewpoints must of necessity be irrational and confused falsities. Because this is so, he concludes that every Revisionist must harbor a hatred of all Jews and be furthermore of an irrational, unbalanced state of mind. The Revisionist refuses to accept the Holocaust orthodoxy, and thus employ the Freudian defense mechanism of “denial.”

Unfortunately, however, one cannot empirically observe psychological defense mechanisms of denial as biologist empirically observes microorganisms under a microscope. One infers that another individual is subjectively employing denial mechanisms. Failing a set of objective criteria by which it can be inferred that, if the individual in question is employing a mechanism of denial, he refuses to accept reality, the notion of “denial” is of little scientific use.

In the case of “Holocaust” Revisionist academics, if it could be demonstrated objectively that their reservations about a German attempt to exterminate Europe’s Jews are utterly false, one might be justified in hypothesizing that they are employing some such mechanism of denial. Basic to that inference, however, would be evidence which demonstrates that Exterminationism is true. Roth is obligated, by the canons of scholarly ethics, to give the Revisionist school a fair hearing, and show that its arguments are irrational and unfounded. Only after so doing would he be justified in claiming that Revisionist historians are irrational reality deniers who deny the facts because they hate Jews.
Roth, however, cites no studies which demonstrate that Holocaust orthodoxy is true, or demonstrate the absurdity of Revisionist arguments. He doesn't because he can't. After nearly a two-year search, this reviewer has been able to find no Exterminationist study which gives an accurate and honest presentation of Revisionist arguments, and then refutes them. By contrast the Revisionist writings are filled with studies which, in a rational, logical, and scientific manner, confront and strive to refute the major contentions of Exterminationism.  

Since Mr. Roth's judgment has apparently not been informed by the rational procedures of modern historiography, would we not be justified in asking what irrational psychological forces shaped his thinking? One can infer the psychological process at work here. Convinced Exterminationists such as Roth can say "Revisionists are irrational, unbalanced, and neurotic Jew-haters with a need to deny the reality of the Holocaust. Revisionism, therefore, need not be analyzed, except as the logical product of such an unfounded body of mentality. As such, it is not even worthy of our consideration." By such formulations can a convinced Exterminationist avoid the painful experience of having his deeply cherished beliefs about the Holocaust challenged, or, God forbid, disproven, thereby freeing him from the responsibility of critically examining the whole Holocaust dogma, as well as obviating the discovery of facts about the Holocaust which would be too psychologically painful to confront consciously.

Mr. Roth next proceeds to explain why he believes that Revisionism is the most effective weapon in the "neo-Nazi" arsenal:

If the crimes of the Nazis can be wiped off the record of history, if the Nazi regime can be whitewashed and made to appear as admittedly somewhat disciplinarian and tough on law and order but basically harmless and more efficient than our allegedly lax Western democracies with their growing disorder, their crimes, violence, and riots, then the neo-Nazis would have won a great victory. The system advocated by them would also look harmless and acceptable, and the ideological resistance to it, largely based on awareness of the horrors of the past, would be undermined—particularly among younger people who have no personal experience of Nazi rule. (p. 222)
Roth has fled to what in contemporary America has become the last refuge of the academic and political scoundrel: the imputation of a National Socialist agenda, a covert desire to restore the Third Reich, or bring on the Fourth, to scoffers at the regnant historical or political orthodoxy.

Should the Revisionists succeed in convincing the peoples of Western democracies that the "gas chambers" never existed, however, these would still harbor considerable resistance to the philosophy, political system, and policies implemented during the Third Reich. The National Socialists advocated a command state, with one-party control of society and censorship of the press. By contrast, inherent in the modern political culture of the West is acceptance of a multiparty state, independence of the press from overt political control, and a disdain for open regimentation.16

One thing the acceptance of the nonexistence of the "Hitler gas chambers" does threaten is the belief that National Socialism was a greater menace to humanity than Stalinist Marxism, and that the Western democracies had to ally with the Soviet in the Second World War. Yet the realization that National Socialism was not the unrelenting evil that it is portrayed to be, and that Stalin's system inflicted far more human misery, is a very far cry from urging the National Socialist political model be adopted throughout the West. One can be a Holocaust Revisionist, and simultaneously, be anti-National Socialist.

In a word, Roth's claim—that mass acceptance of Revisionism will bring about mass acceptance of National Socialism—is absurd. His argument scants the ethic of self-interested individualism prevalent in today's West, even among self-professed "nationalists" and "racialists." Furthermore, the populations of the democracies, particularly America, seem fixed in the belief that a certain quota of disorder and dishonor—from riots and street crime to political and economic corruption—is an acceptable price to pay for the maintenance of the democratic society. Even with mass acceptance of Holocaust Revisionism in the democratic West, resistance to National Socialism still would be strong.

On ideology, the political scientist James B. Whisker has written:

Ideologies are seen by neutral commentators as illusions about real concrete experiences. The ideology does not develop as a result of the experiences themselves; rather, the ideology is
born out of unusual or bizarre interpretations given to the concrete experiences. The ideology is fabricated in order to cover up distorted knowledge or interpretations of real factual situations and it acts compulsively on its true believers so that no other interpretation can be fitted to the situation.17

The ideology of anti-anti-Semitism as expressed in this book is an excellent example of what Dr. Whisker writes of. As long as intellectuals and politicians are mesmerized and intimidated by this veil of illusions there will never be an open and honest discussion concerning the undeniable problems which burden Jewish-Gentile relations. Nor will we be able to resolve those problems in a manner which is rational, humane, and acceptable to both Jews and Gentiles.

Notes


4. Ibid., passim.


8. Ibid., p. 120.

9. Ibid., p. 125.


11. Ibid., p. 145.

12. Ibid., p. 155
13. To this writer's knowledge, it was Revisionist writer L.A. Rollins who was the first to establish this point in a convincing manner. In reference to those particular Jews who are dual-loyalists or racialists, he wrote: "But inasmuch as it is true that some Jews who live in 'non-Jewish' societies do have dual loyalties, and some Jews who live in the Jewish state are racists, saying so does not necessarily indicate Jew-hatred." See his review Why the Jews? The Reason for Anti-Semitism, by Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin, in The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 5, nos. 2, 3, 4, (Winter 1984), p. 377.


16. The historian Francis R. Nicosia, considers this an important factor in England's refusal to ally with National Socialist Germany during the 1930's. He points out that there was a fundamental irreconcilability between the National Socialist and the English political philosophies and systems. See The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), p. 77.


Reviewed by Jack Wikoff

Much of An Empire of Their Own reads like a press agent release for the stereotypical Hollywood movie producer. Having originally subtitled his book How Zukor, Laemmle, Fox, Cohn and the Warner Brothers Invented Hollywood, author Neal Gabler provides valuable information about those Jews who came to dominate the film industry during the nineteen-twenties, thirties and forties.

Undoubtedly the subtitle was changed to How the Jews Invented Hollywood to promote more effectively the myth that Jews singlehandedly created the film industry. Reading An Empire of Their Own may cause one to be ultra-conscious of whether a film producer, director, actor or technician is Jewish or not. One reviewer has written that "if misread, the book could provide fuel for anti-Semitism." This may or may not be true. What is certain is that the history of cinema is now old enough for us to see the extraordinary power this medium has had upon the political and moral values of the masses. Many Jews have persistently sought, and gained, this power throughout the twentieth century.

In concentrating upon the lives and personalities of these Jewish producers, mostly of Eastern European birth, the author glosses over or completely ignores the achievements of gentile, Christian pioneers of the film industry. It can safely be said that the earliest cameras, projectors, sound and lighting equipment, and raw film stock were developed primarily by gentile inventors. The same can be said of those artists who were the first to create artistic movies with true narrative content, creative lighting and special effects, panoramic scenic settings and fast-paced editing. Certainly Jews made many valuable contributions to early film, but Gabler vastly exaggerates their innovation.

Creative individuals such as W.K.L. Dickson, William Friese-Greene, Thomas Armat, Georges Méliès, Louis and Auguste Lumière, and Charles Pathé are not even mentioned. Edwin S. Porter, the director of the early narrative film and first western, The Great Train Robbery (1903), was also an engineer who developed cameras, projectors and special
effects devices. In *An Empire of Their Own*, Porter is dismissed as a “projectionist-turned-director.” Thomas Edison is portrayed as a villain for his great power in the early industry. Edison and his partners created the Motion Picture Patents Company in 1908, which until 1918 held an almost complete monopoly in camera and projection equipment licensing.

What these Jewish producers did achieve was to move very quickly from owning a few nickelodeons to controlling complete monopolies consisting of production, distribution and exhibition facilities. These men acquired this control because of an excellent sense of what the public would buy, intense personal drive, group solidarity as Jews, a willingness for hard work—and—a lot of shady dealing. Gabler describes how Adolf Zukor and Carl Laemmle illegally used Edison cameras without paying the royalties and how Louis B. Mayer cheated the producers of *Birth of a Nation* by falsifying his bookkeeping, thereby making as much as $500,000 on the exhibition of that one film in 1915.

These Jewish producers moved to Hollywood from the East Coast in the teens and twenties because of the abundant sunlight, cheap non-union labor and distance from the enforcers of the Edison Patents Company. Zukor and his associates arrived relatively late in Hollywood. A woman from Illinois had given Hollywood its name in remembrance of her native state’s holly bushes; several Englishmen, the Horsley brothers and Charles Rosher, created the first film factory in Hollywood, the Nestor Studio, in 1910. The Jews did not invent Hollywood, but they certainly did come to dominate it.

Throughout *An Empire of Their Own* Neal Gabler contends that Hollywood “was founded and for more than thirty years operated by Eastern European Jews who themselves seemed to be anything but the quintessence of America” and that “above all things, they wanted to be regarded as Americans, not Jews; they wanted to reinvent themselves here as new men.”

For Gabler *The Jazz Singer* (1927), starring Al Jolson, epitomizes in cinematic terms the conflict of the Jew in America. The elderly cantor of a synagogue on the Lower East Side of New York City assumes that his only son will follow in his footsteps and retain the orthodox traditions. But the son would prefer to be an entertainer and goes against his father’s wishes. Years pass and Jakie Rabinowitz, the cantor’s son, has become Jack Robin, a nightclub singer. The crisis comes when
the elder Rabinowitz cannot sing the “Kol Nidre” on Yom Kippur and the congregation pressures the young jazz singer to fill in for his father. But Jack’s Broadway opening happens to be the same night.

As Gabler describes this situation: “Jack’s quandary is that he can bring Judaism to show business, but he cannot bring show business to Judaism—which is to say that Judaism cannot be reinvigorated or revitalized in America or by America. It is alien to it.”

The Jazz Singer has a happy ending. Jack’s producers allow his Broadway premier to be postponed a night so he can sing the “Kol Nidre” in the synagogue. Then, in his show business triumph, the young Jewish entertainer appears in blackface, “one minority disguised within another,” singing “Mammy” to his mother seated in the enthusiastic audience. The son of the immigrant gets the best of two worlds.

Viewed from outside the Jewish subculture, the anxiety and conflict that “assimilation” produced in these men does not seem as extreme as Gabler would have us believe. Although the Jewish movie moguls rarely kept kosher and seldom went to synagogue, it does not mean that they ever really stopped being Jews. Assimilation often simply meant acquiring ostentatious symbols of wealth and success such as country club membership, the breeding of thoroughbred racehorses, compulsive gambling and sexual highjinks in Las Vegas and Havana, season tickets at the opera and palatial mansions on both coasts. Many of these “role models” dumped their old Jewish wives and married younger gentile women. In retrospect these Jewish men never truly wanted to join the culture of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite. What they sought was entrée into those domains of power and influence which had once been exclusively gentile.

The most important question in historical and political terms is to what extent the Jewishness of these movie executives affected the content of motion pictures. An Empire of Their Own provides a number of valuable answers to this question. Gabler also reveals inside information on the East Coast boards of directors and stockholders who were the true powers behind the movie producers. A number of passages cite the various Jewish lobbying groups which also influenced film content. Several chapters are devoted to the Hollywood executives’ response to the investigations of congressional committees into Jewish and Communist influence in motion pictures in the 1940’s and 1950’s.
In spite of Neal Gabler's ethnocentric prejudices (and partly because of them!) *An Empire of Their Own* will be a valuable addition to any collection of books about the political and cultural history of the twentieth century.
George Morgenstern, 1906-1988

JAMES J. MARTIN

George Morgenstern, the author of the first Revisionist book about the December 7, 1941 Pearl Harbor attack and the complex history which preceded and followed it, died in Denver, Colorado on July 23, 1988, in his 83rd year. Morgenstern's book, titled Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War, published by Devin A. Garrity in New York in January, 1947, is in this writer's opinion also still the best, despite a formidable volume of subsequent writing by many others on the subject. A work of 425 pages in small type, it sparked a volcano of both criticism and praise, and is probably the most widely commented upon and discussed book ever produced by the World War Two Revisionist impulse in this country, which latter those newly upon the scene should understand covers many aspects of that war, its antecedents and its consequences. Everyone writing on the subject of Pearl Harbor has either consciously or unconsciously followed the "scenario" first laid down by George Morgenstern.

Morgenstern, christened George Edward, was born May 26, 1906 and spent almost all of his first 75 years, excepting war service time, in the Chicago area. He began his career in journalism as a sports reporter with his older brother William, covering basketball and track while attending suburban Oak Park High School. He subsequently enrolled at the University of Chicago, and continued his sports reportage, covering Big Ten football and other sports for the Chicago Herald-Examiner. A member of Alpha Delta Phi fraternity, he graduated with highest honors from Chicago in 1930, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. As an undergraduate he also served as editor of the UC campus magazine, The Phoenix. Actually he was not in continuous residence at Chicago, suspending studies for a time to take full time employment as a re-write editor on the Herald-Examiner and studying part time. He also
took on other work with the paper, covering among other things the federal income tax evasion trial of the notorious Chicago area gangster Alphonse "Scarface Al" Capone.

In 1939 Morgenstern switched newspapers, going to work in the same capacities as had engaged him previously, this time on Col. Robert R. McCormick's Tribune, one of the world's most famed and influential daily journals. After two years of this he joined the Tribune's editorial page staff in 1941, and except for his absence during American involvement in World War Two, served in this department for 30 years, retiring in 1971. In the period through the late 1960s the editorial pages of the Tribune became the joy of Revisionists and the despair of Revisionism's adversaries, the most prominent and wide-reaching forum the former enterprise has ever known, although matched in part by the Tribune's sister papers in New York and Washington, the Daily News and the Times-Herald, respectively, with interlocking reportage and personnel on some assignments. From the outbreak of the Second World War onward the three papers were the most persistent and bothersome burr under the saddle of the war-bound Roosevelt regime, and brought the latter's protagonists to impressive heights of fury on many occasions. But during the war Morgenstern was not part of the apparatus of any of these newspapers. He served as captain and later lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps, as a director of the work of Marine combat correspondents.

Morgenstern never discussed just when he started writing Pearl Harbor, but it must have been very soon after returning to civilian life and editorial duties at the Tribune in 1945, because the work was already printed at the end of 1946, a substantial opus going on to a quarter of a million words. He commented substantially on it prior to its review in a communication to the New York Times on January 15, 1947, anticipating that it would raise a howling storm of abuse, though his main purpose was to explain why he had written it. Pearl Harbor was not just a disaster, he declared; it was what got the U.S.A. into the Second World War. And it was not satisfactory or sufficient to explain it away as a result of "Japanese perfidy," which has dominated all discussion of it since Dec. 7, 1941. It has permitted the Roosevelt administration to "manage national policy as if it were a private show," from that time on. As a war correspondent in a strategic spot he knew that "wartime censors closed in even more tightly about the field of public policy," and FDR's
“decisions” “were announced to the people after the event” routinely from entry into the war ever after. And, Morgenstern pointed out, increasing secrecy led to the invention of “a new category of hush-hush information which could only be described in the phrase ‘Top Secret.’” “The conclusions stated in Pearl Harbor are those to which the author was led by the record,” Morgenstern insisted, going on the say:

Those who object to historical skepticism may complain that my book is no contribution to the political canonization of its central figure. That is no concern of mine. As to the purpose my book is intended to serve, some observations from the minority report of the Joint Congressional Committee which investigated the Pearl Harbor attack are pertinent: “In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check in advance if imprudent and support its position if sound . . . How to avoid war and how to turn war—if it finally comes—to serve the cause of human progress is the challenge to diplomacy today as yesterday.”

The first reviews of Pearl Harbor followed just a few days after publication, the featured ones being blockbuster attacks in the two New York flag-ship newspapers of the deep-foundation Establishment, which had already co-opted both liberals and conservatives. The assignments went to an ex-Revisionist, the expert and veteran writer Walter Millis, in the New York Herald-Tribune, and in the New York Times to a relatively unknown young academic, Gordon Craig of Princeton University’s history department. The latter was not known for any expertise whatever on the subject of Pearl Harbor, but later was to become deeply entrenched in the academic groves for his critical tomes on modern Germany, noted for their polish and sophistication. Appearing simultaneously in the issues of the two papers for February 9, 1947, they gave the impression of being a coordinated offensive.

Neither contested a single fact presented by Morgenstern, but filled the function of what this writer calls the “how-dare-you?” challenge, the traditional initial affronted bellow of wounded Establishment paladins. It is not intended to undermine the author of their discomfort by demonstrating his perpetration of falsehoods, but to set the tone and stack the playing field for the future, trying to establish an out-of-bounds territory for such productions, and seeking to entrench the
line that this form of approach is simply beyond the grounds of sustained civilized debate or intellectual intercourse; in Roman phraseology, *infra dignitatem*. Revisionists have encountered such ploys over and over in their tangles with Establishments in many fields. In the main this strategy is a failure, as it tends to stimulate rather than to suffocate curiosity. Repeated endeavors and adventures of the kind that stimulated the original Establishment retaliatory salvo, the latter essentially an *ad hominem* barrage intended to intimidate readers, investigators, the curious, and possible future involvees, invariably follow. It is a rare Establishment that does not suffer eventual defeat in this kind of confrontation, regardless of how long it takes (this writer has never forgotten the story of Lorenzo Valla, first encountered reading Harry Elmer Barnes's *History of Western Civilization* in 1938.)

Prof. Craig mourned the effect Morgenstern’s book might have on the reputation of his hero, the deceased President Roosevelt, but could establish no cogent reason why any reader might not profit vastly from reading this substantial book. The review by Millis was more scurrilous, and sounded loudly on the horn of “respectability,” suggesting it was on to low a plane for the refined and aristocratic upholders of the wartime regime’s already deeply implanted legend on which to conduct future intellectual combat. Millis even had the brass to scold so eminent a figure in contemporary American historical scholarship as Charles A. Beard for his spirited endorsement of Morgenstern’s book, though Beard had obviously read immensely more about the subject than had Millis, including more than 10,000 pages of sworn testimony and official papers relating to the Pearl affair, which Beard had read even before he had seen the galley proof sheets of Morgenstern’s book.

*Pearl Harbor*, though pilloried by these two reviewers and by several others as some kind of partisan broadside, actually was warmly received across the ideological spectrum, from Norman Thomas, many-times candidate for the presidency of the U.S.A. of the Socialist Party, through famed pre-war and anti-war liberals such as Profs. Beard and Barnes, on through others of many views, from liberal to conservative. It was received favorably in the religious press from the *Catholic World* to the Protestant journal of major status, the *Christian Century*, in which latter the reviewer concluded that it was “an orderly and carefully documented record of the events” of the
Pearl Harbor incident, and that it left "no manner of doubt that the Administration was preparing for war when the public thought it was preparing for peace."

It might be noted that the first wave of critics was appalled by what they interpreted as a grave slander of FDR for describing how he talked peace while steadily and forcefully leading the march to war, but the following cohort of defenders not only admitted this but frankly suggested that all should have been edified by the President's skill at deceiving everyone, since it had been done for their own good.

Before moving on from this necessarily abbreviated look back at the early reviews, mention should be made of at least one reaction from the nation's armed forces the leaders of the enthusiastic reception of Pearl Harbor by Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (1875-1959), active in the U.S. Navy service for many years, Commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet (1936-1939) and perhaps the inspiration for the Japanese attack of Dec. 7, 1941 on Oahu. In the Hawaii war games in 1932 Adm. Yarnell took on the role of chief of the attacking forces. A great exponent of air warfare waged from ships, still a "radical" stance among naval thinkers, Adm. Yarnell set all the fleet earmarked for participation aside except for two aircraft carriers and three destroyers. Moving his force to within 60 miles northeast of the island, on Sunday, Feb. 7, 1932, half an hour before sunrise, Adm. Yarnell launched 153 fighters, bombers and torpedo-bomber planes, which proceeded to Pearl Harbor, catching everyone by surprise, and in the opinion of the referees, theoretically destroyed both the Pearl Harbor land-based planes and installations and also "sank" every ship in the harbor. The sensational success of all this certainly impressed Japanese observers. Adm. Yarnell, repelled and gravely angered by the Administration's tactic after the Pearl Harbor disaster nine years later of scapegoating the military and especially the naval commander for it all, had denounced this action as "a blot on our national history." Writing of Morgenstern's book in Far Eastern Survey, he forthrightly declared, "Mr. Morgenstern is to be congratulated on marshaling the available facts of this tragedy in such a manner as to make it clear to every reader where lies the responsibility."

The immediate postwar years between "victory" in 1945 and the start of the doleful fiasco in Korea five years later saw the vast weight and impetus of the New Dispensation steadily block or wear down Revisionism in the mass public mind,
despite a rising curve of critical literature. Establishment momentum nevertheless steadily mobilized hostility toward such efforts as were mounted by the growing body of critics. It was the combination of abuse and the silent treatment of Pearl Harbor, and in the following year, of Beard's *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (Yale Univ. Press, 1948), among other things, that played so large a part in Barnes deciding to produce his famed essay *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, a work which went into nine editions (each larger than the previous one) between 1949 and 1961 and saw other service in various re-writes in a succession of periodical appearances. In the midst of this there appeared the hefty symposium edited by Barnes, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, in 1953, to which Morgenstern contributed a massive chapter of over 90 pages, and in which he further elaborated on his celebrated book of five years earlier. One could know of and use both *seriatim* to understand what he had to say of the Pearl Harbor attack and its consequences, though this may now be difficult in view of the situation. When the Institute for Historical Review reprinted *Perpetual War* in 1982 in an edition which included a previously-suppressed chapter by Barnes, this writer, reviewing it in the Spring 1983 issue of *The Journal of Historical Review*, in an effort aimed mainly at an audience born after 1941, declared that *Pearl Harbor* should never have been allowed to go out of print. Unfortunately this remarkable new and unexpurgated edition of *Perpetual War* was subjected to a new suppression in the form of the malicious arson fire which swept the IHR premises early on July 4, 1984, a great testimonial to the sanctimonious super-hypocrites who sit around sniveling and tearing their garments over the horrid crime of book-burning, but only when it involves things they approve of. (This writer lost his set of the original galleys of the suppressed chapter in this blaze, though it is now part of the published record in such copies of the new edition as were already distributed.)

In his capacity on the Tribune's editorial board, which eventually led to his appointment as editor of the editorial page, George Morgenstern lent his energies and influence to many other appearances of material of important Revisionist substance, though maybe favoring the Pearl Harbor theme more than others. Another Tribune outlet for Revisionist material of great value was its remarkable book review section, edited by Frederic Babcock. It took care to report in
kindly and sympathetic ways Revisionist books of several kinds which were beginning to get, elsewhere, not malicious and venomous reviews, but, in the new "blackout" strategy, no reviews at all, the Establishment's approach to smothering the whole subject, when it could not be met very effectively.

Morgenstern won two coveted internal Tribune prizes, the Edward Scott Beck Awards, for two of his feature pieces on the Pearl Harbor subject in 1956 and 1966, the latter a stunning special section of 12 full newspaper pages. But he should have received a third one for his efforts the following year (1967), also published on the Dec. 7 anniversary. This was the sensational almost-fifteen column essay by Barnes titled "U.S. Entered World War II 4 Days Prior to Dec. 7." It was based on the work of Navy Commander (ret.) Charles C. Hiles, on what we have come to refer to as the "Merle-Smith Message." The gist of this was that the USA was already in the war in the Pacific as of Dec. 2, 1941 East Asian time, as a result of the invoking by the Dutch of part of the secret diplomatic agreement made in Singapore early in 1941. This committed those involved, which included the U.S.A., to come to the aid of any participant subjected to a Japanese attack or invasion (the signatories all had colonial possessions in the Pacific). This occurred Dec. 2, 1941, when Japanese planes started landing in Holland's Dutch East Indies.

Commander Hiles's remarkable and still unpublished work on this subject; the furor and commotion it caused in Australia, where the American liaison chief, Col. Van S. Merle-Smith, engaged for four days in talks with Australian and Dutch leaders over it all, and the suppression of his report, which allegedly took four days to reach Washington, and according to conventional claims surfaced a convenient almost seven hours after the attack on Hawaii had begun, were all treated by Barnes in his long piece. It was given front-page placement by Morgenstern, and obviously enjoyed wide circulation among the many hundreds of thousands of Tribune readers and subscribers. It is a testament to our short memories that this has almost entirely disappeared from the record. And, in view of what has happened to Tribune ownership, management and editorial policy changes in recent years, it is almost impossible to imagine it would ever be recalled again, or even mentioned.

George Morgenstern was a dynamo in his thirty years on the editorial staff of the Chicago Tribune. He wrote almost daily, and sometimes prepared five different editorials on five
different subjects for the same issue of the paper. On the occasion of political conventions he was known to “write the whole editorial page,” according to his admiring superior, Clayton Kirkpatrick, the president and editor-in-chief of the Tribune in that time, virtually “a whole editorial staff in himself.” Kirkpatrick hailed him as “a superb craftsman” in the writing of the English language, able to write with “considerable force” and who “could handle any subject.”

Upon retirement in 1971, Morgenstern remained at the long-time family home in Lake Forest (his wife, Marcia Winn, a formidable Tribune columnist in her own right, had died at age 50 on August 15, 1961), and in 1981 moved to Denver to live with one of his two daughters, Nora, a medical doctor.

What has happened to the Tribune, the one-time chief journalistic standard-bearer of Revisionism in the entire land (veteran Revisionists know of what it did in this sphere through the work of many other writers, including Walter Trohan and Donald Day, as well as featuring the output of many other writers not in its employ) is perhaps best understood by contemplating what has happened to Chicago, and perhaps the whole country for that matter. But it may be said in closing that George Morgenstern, whom this writer has always considered a vastly skilled journalist and historian, and a great man, might be memorialized some day by a scholar who could assemble a generous-sized tome incorporating his superb talents as displayed in a generation of published production in the pages of what was once a formidable newspaper.

(continued from page 132)

South African Ivor Benson will both surprise and inform Revisionists with his survey of the historical background to Iran’s Islamic Revolution, and his sensitive evaluation of the challenge and the opportunity which the rise of Muslim nationalism offers the peoples of the West. We Americans can’t be reminded too often of just how much foreigners from Mexico to Vietnam to the Persian Gulf resent the meddling our leaders have indulged in for decades now, and just how harmful such interventions have proved, in the long run, for America and other imperialist powers.

Veteran journalist William Grimstad introduces Journal readers to two important contributions by honest Jewish historians. That there are men and women such as Noam Chomsky, Livia Rokach, and Palestinian-American Edward Said offers at least the hope that Arab and Jew, inspired by facts, not myths or lies, about the past, may work out some just and humane solution to the problems created by the Zionist colonization of Palestine.
Paul Grubach skewers a familiar but tiresome bit of Zionist hokum, the canard that anyone who criticizes the collective entity of Jewry for anything at all thereby stamps himself an "anti-Semite." Young Mr. Grubach further wins our thanks for having plodded through a particularly deadly-sounding collection of tracts put together by professional anti-anti-Semites, sparing other Revisionists that task. Then Jack Wikoff informs on a particularly informative book about Hollywood (times have changed—just mentioning the sort of thought embodied in Neal Gabler’s book’s title would have caused one to be labeled—you guessed it—an “anti-Semite” a few years ago).

And finally, it gives us great pride to announce the return of the dean of Revisionist historians, James J. Martin, to the Editorial Advisory Committee of The Journal, in the same issue in which he pays tribute to the late George Morgenstern, whose challenge to the Pearl Harbor cover-up over forty years ago may soon be vindicated once and for all. But we save that for the next issue of The Journal.

Who ever said bringing history into accord with the facts had to be dull?

—Theodore J. O’Keefe

About the Contributors

IVOR BENSON is a South African journalist and political analyst. He wrote for the Daily Express and Daily Telegraph in London, and later was chief assistant editor of the Rand Daily Mail. From 1964 to 1966 he served as Information Adviser to Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Mr. Benson has lectured on four continents; he produces a monthly newsletter, Behind the News (P.O. Box 1564, Krugersdorp, 1740 South Africa).

WILLIAM GRIMSTAD, a professional journalist, has written for four major American newspapers, and been editor of Georgetown Today, the official magazine of Georgetown University. Grimstad is a long-time student of international Zionism and its far-flung operations. His two books, Anti-Zion and Six Million Reconsidered, often regarded as classics in the field, are available from IHR.

PAUL GRUBACH graduated from John Carroll University in Cleveland with honors in Physics (B.S.). He is currently doing graduate work in sociobiology.

FRED A. LEUCHTER is America’s leading expert on the design and fabrication of homicidal gas chambers. After receiving a B.A. from Boston University in 1964, Leuchter did postgraduate work at the Harvard Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He holds patents for the design of sextants, surveying instruments, and optical encoding equipment. He is an accomplished pianist and an NRA-qualified small-arms instructor.
JAMES J. MARTIN graduated from the University of New Hampshire in 1942 and received his M.A. (1945) and Ph.D. (1949) degrees in History from the University of Michigan. His teaching career has spanned twenty-five years and involved residence at educational institutions from coast to coast. Dr. Martin has contributed some of the outstanding books of Revisionism related to the Second World War: the two-volume classic American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941, Beyond Pearl Harbor, and collected essays Revisionist Viewpoints and The Saga of Hog Island and Other Essays in Inconvenient History, and his most recent work, The Man Who Invented 'Genocide': The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin. He is a three-time contributor to the Dictionary of American Biography and has as well contributed to recent editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Dr. Martin's latest book, An American Adventure in Bookburning in the Style of 1918, will soon be available through IHR.

CARLO MATTOGNO was born in Orvieto, Italy in 1951. He has done advanced linguistic and exegetical studies in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and Sanskrit. Mr. Mattogno is a specialist in textual criticism, and has published a number of Revisionist studies in Italian, including Il rapporto Gerstein: anatomia di un falso and Auschwitz: due false testimonianze.

HIDEO MIKI is a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy, and of the Command and General Staff College of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. In 1982 Lieutenant General Miki retired after a thirty-year career in the Self-Defense Forces. Since 1985 he has been a professor at Japan's National Defense Academy, specializing in the history of the Great Pacific War, including Japan's campaigns in China and against the Soviet Union, and the Korean War. Professor Miki is an expert at kendo, traditional Japanese swordmanship.

JACK WIKOFF is a writer and researcher living in central New York State.
SUPER HIGH-CLARITY AUDIOTAPES
BROADCAST-QUALITY VIDEOTAPES

of the complete
NINTH INTERNATIONAL REVISIONIST CONFERENCE

"... truly the best conference yet . . . splendidly done!" —Carl C. Hatterer
"Dynamic, concise, innovative, informative . . . excellent as always." —Dr. A.E. Fucidi
"Significant historical revelations affecting the world to this day . . . Just plain INSPIRING!" —T.J. Constable
"Exact, deep information. What evidence!" —Jennifer S. Scheib

PROF. ROBERT FAURISSON: "Holocaust Revisionism in France." The growing interest in, and violent reaction to, Holocaust Revisionism in France has made the "gas chamber" issue "the litmus test of French culture." JEROME BRENTAR: "Demjanjuk Case Update." Brentar, who has dedicated his life and resources to defending Demjanjuk, tells of his ongoing fight against the OSI, and gives highlights of the Israeli "War Crimes" show trial.

Video (V046) includes Faurisson & Brentar
Faurisson Audio (A091) / Brentar Audio (A092).

DAVID IRVING: "Churchill and U.S. Entry Into WWII." Astounding revelations and hilarious anecdotes concerning Churchill's real character and underhanded efforts to maneuver the U.S. into his war against Germany. FRED LEUCHTER: "The Making of The Leuchter Report." America's leading technical gas chamber expert discusses his dramatic forensic trip to Auschwitz, Birkenau and Majdanek, and the meaning of his startling findings.

Irving Video (V043) / Leuchter Video (V042)
Irving Audio (A088) / Leuchter Audio (A087).


Video (V047) includes Keegstra & Miki
Keegstra Audio (A089) / Miki Audio (A085).


Video (V045) includes Otten & Kubek
Otten Audio (A090) / Kubek Audio (A083).

VICTOR MARCHETTI: "The CIA and the 'Making' of History." Former senior CIA official reveals how intelligence agencies manufacture "history." CARLO MATTOGNO: "The First Gassing at Auschwitz: Genesis of a Myth." A critical analysis of the "eyewitness" testimony and documents relating to the very first alleged gassings.

Video (V044) includes Marchetti & Mattogno
Marchetti Audio (A086) / Mattogno Audio (A084).

AUDIOTAPES, $9.75 each / $89.00 for the set of 12
VIDEOTAPES, $49.00 each / $299.00 for the set of 7

INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW
1822½ Newport Blvd. • Suite 191 • Costa Mesa, CA 92627