Germany, Bastion of Europe: Stalin’s War of Conquest
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Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 is widely presented by historians as an unprovoked act of aggression by Germany. Adolf Hitler is typically described as an untrustworthy liar who maliciously abrogated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact he had signed with the Soviet Union. Historians usually depict Joseph Stalin as a hapless victim of Hitler’s aggression who was foolish to have trusted Hitler. Many historians think the Soviet Union was lucky to have survived Germany’s attack.
This standard version of history does not incorporate information obtained from the Soviet archives by Soviet intelligence agent Viktor Suvorov. The Soviet archives show that the Soviet Union had amassed the largest and most-powerful army in history. Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union was a desperate preemptive attack to prevent the Soviet Union from conquering all of Europe.
Soviet Preparations for Offensive War
In the years 1937-1941, the Soviet Army grew five-fold, from 1.1 million to 5.5 million. An additional 5.3 million people joined the ranks of the Red Army within one week of the beginning of the war. A minimum of 34.5 million people were used by the Red Army during the war. This huge increase in the size of the Soviet Army was accomplished primarily by ratification of the universal military draft in the Soviet Union on September 1, 1939. According to this new law, the draft age was reduced from 21 to 19, and in some categories to 18. This new law also allowed for the training of 18 million reservists, so that the Soviet Union continued to fill the ranks of the Red Army with many millions of soldiers as the war progressed.
Three age groups (cohorts aged 18 to 20) were all drafted into the Red Army at the same time; in essence, all of the young men in the country. The duration of army service for the majority of the draftees was two years, so the Soviet Union had to enter a major war within two years. If war did not start by then, all of the young people would have to go home on September 1, 1941, and then there would be almost nobody left to draft. It is extremely difficult to maintain an army of this size without a war; the army does not produce anything and consumes everything produced by the country. Stalin knew when he established the draft that by two years’ time, in the summer of 1941, the Soviet Union must enter into a major war.
On January 11, 1939, in preparation for war, the Soviet Union created four new People’s Commissariats: one for the shipbuilding industry, one for weapons, one for the aviation industry, and one for ammunition. The Shipbuilding Commissariat undertook strictly military projects from the moment of its founding. On May 25, 1940, the following numbers of civilian ships were handed over to the military: 74 to the Baltic fleet, 76 to the Black Sea fleet, 65 to the North fleet, and 101 to the Pacific fleet. By June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union also possessed 218 submarines in its ranks and 91 more in shipyards, all of which matched up to the best world standards.
Stalin’s more than 200 submarines and the rest of his navy were ineffective at the start of the war because it was an attack fleet. Stalin’s navy was built for aggressive war and could not be used effectively in a defensive war. Entirely different ships with entirely different characteristics are needed for defense: submarine hunters, picket boats, minesweepers and net-layers. The armament of the Soviet ships was also designed exclusively for participation in a war of aggression. While armed with powerful artillery, mine and torpedo equipment, Soviet ships had quite weak anti-aircraft armament and defenses.
Soviet generals had planned to begin the war with a crushing surprise attack against the enemy’s air bases that would annihilate its aviation. When Germany attacked first, the Soviet navy’s lack of anti-aircraft defenses was a major liability. The Soviet war effort was also hurt by the fact that all of the navy’s reserves of shells, mines, torpedoes and ship fuel had been transported to the German frontier and were quickly seized by the Germans when they invaded the Soviet Union.
The Ammunition Commissariat was created as a separate ministry to take care exclusively of the production of ammunition. This ministry had to determine where to locate all of the new factories that would be producing shells, gunpowder, cartridges, missiles and other weapons. If Stalin had planned to conduct a defensive war, the new ammunition factories would have been built either east of the Volga River or even farther inland in the Ural Mountains. But no defensive options were ever considered. Since Stalin planned to conduct an offensive operation into a war-devastated and -weakened Europe, all of the new ammunition factories were built near the western border regions of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union lost almost all industry capable of producing munitions at the beginning of the war. From August to November 1941, German troops took over 303 Soviet munitions factories as well as mobilization reserves of critical raw materials stored in those factories. These factories produced 85% of all output from the Ammunition Commissariat. All of these resources went to Germany and were converted for use against the Red Army. The Red Army also lost an unthinkable amount of artillery shells in the frontier regions of the Soviet Union at the start of the war. However, Stalin’s prewar potential was so great that he was able to build new munitions factories beyond the Volga River and in the Urals, and produce much of the munitions needed to defeat the German invasion.
Seizing Stalin’s supplies was a tremendous benefit for Germany, but Hitler needed to shift Germany’s own industry to a wartime footing. Hitler waited until January 1942 before he made the decision to gradually shift industry from a peacetime to a wartime stance. Stalin, on the other hand, had begun setting Soviet industry on a wartime regime back in January 1939. Despite losing 85% of the munitions of the Ammunition Commissariat, the Red Army expended 427 million shells and artillery mines and 17 billion cartridges during the war. To this one can add innumerable hand grenades, land mines and aerial bombs. Imagine what the outcome of World War II would have been if Stalin had been able to use 100% of his munitions arsenal.
In the summer of 1940, Stalin forced Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, and concentrated forces in that region on the border of East Prussia (then part of Germany). The occupation of these Baltic countries by the Red Army was impelled by plans for an aggressive war against Germany. The Red Army established air bases at the very front edge of the German border. From the air bases in Lithuania the Soviet air force could support the advance of Soviet troops to Berlin. The Soviet navy also transferred primary forces and reserves to naval bases established in Tallinn, Riga and Liepāja. Since it was a short distance from Liepāja to the routes taken by German vessels carrying ore, nickel, and wood to Germany, a strike from this area could be sudden and devastating.
The Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940. From Bessarabia the Soviet air force could keep the Romanian oil industry, which was the main supplier of oil to Germany, under constant threat. Northern Bukovina was needed because it had a railroad of strategic importance that had a narrow-gauge track which enabled it to be used by railroad cars from all over Europe. The Soviet Union used a broad-gauge track. Soviet locomotives and trains could therefore not be used on the narrow-gauge tracks of Central and Western Europe. In a Soviet invasion of Europe, Stalin would need many locomotives and trains with a narrow gauge to supply his troops that were quickly moving westward.
During the course of the Bessarabia campaign, the Soviet Union captured 141 locomotives, 1,866 covered train cars, 325 half-covered train cars, 45 platforms, 19 cisterns, 31 passenger cars, and two luggage cars. But this was not enough for Stalin. At the Soviet-Romanian talks in July 1940, Soviet representatives demanded that Romania return all captured mobile railroad units. On July 31, 1940, Romania agreed to transfer 175 locomotives and 4,375 cars to the Soviet Union by August 25, 1940. None of these trains would have been of any use in a defensive war. Stalin needed these trains seized in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina for an offensive war designed to take over all of Europe.
In the summer of 1941, the Red Army began using the new multiple-launcher rocket weapons BM-8 and BM-13. These unusual weapons were called “Stalin’s Pipe Organs” or “Katyusha.” In August 1941, the Red Army added the BM-8-36 multiple-launcher rocket-artillery system, and in the summer of 1942, the BM-8-48 rocket-artillery system was added. A salvo from one BM-13 was 16 rocket-propelled rounds of 132-mm caliber, while a salvo from the BM-8 was 36 rocket-propelled rounds of 82-mm caliber. One battery consisted of four to six BM-8s or BM-13s. Usually one target was fired upon by a group of batteries or regiments. Hundreds or even thousands of missiles could blanket a huge area almost simultaneously, creating an avalanche of fire accompanied by a wild roar and noise. The devastating psychological impact of these terrible weapons was a highly unpleasant memory for any German soldier who was on the Eastern Front.
Despite losses sustained in the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army continued to expand its use of the multiple-launcher rocket weapons BM-8 and BM-13 during the war. On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had seven BM-13 rocket-launcher vehicles. By September 1, 1941, the Red Army had 49 of these weapons. By October 1, 1941, the Red Army had 406 BM-8s and BM-13s. The count would eventually mount into the thousands, and this weapon became a true weapon of mass destruction. The Soviet Union managed to quickly supply its army with the new system of multiple-launcher rocket weapons despite heavy losses in its industrial and raw-materials bases.
The Soviet Union in 1941 was preparing for an offensive war against Europe. In the first half of June 1941, the Soviet 9th Army was the most-powerful army in the world. The 9th Army appeared on the Romanian border on June 14, 1941, in the exact place where a year ago it had “liberated” Bessarabia. If the Soviet 9th Army had attacked Romania, Germany’s main source of oil would have been lost and Germany would have been defeated. Hitler’s attack of the Soviet Union prevented this from happening. The otherwise-unjustified concentration of Soviet troops on Romanian borders presented a clear danger to Germany, and was a major reason for the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
On May 5, 1941, Stalin made it clear to his generals that the Soviet Union would be the aggressor in a war with Germany. At a banquet a Soviet general toasted Stalin’s peaceful foreign policy. Stalin intervened:
Allow me to make a correction. A peaceful foreign policy secured peace in our country. A peaceful foreign policy is a good thing. For a while, we drew a line of defenses until we rearmed our army [and] supplied it with modern means of combat. Now, when our army has been rebuilt, our technology modernized, [now that we are] strong [enough] for combat, now we must shift from defense to offense. In conducting the defense of our country, we are compelled to act in an aggressive manner. From defense we have to shift to a military policy of offense. It is indispensable that we reform our training, our propaganda, our press to a mindset of offense. The Red Army is a modern army, and the modern army is an army of offense.
The general who had made the toast to Stalin’s peaceful foreign policy was discharged a few days after the banquet.
On June 13, 1941, TASS broadcast that “Germany was following the conditions of the Soviet-German pact as flawlessly as the Soviet Union,” and that rumors of an impending German attack on the USSR “were clumsily fabricated propaganda by the enemies of Germany and the USSR, interested in broadening and prolonging the war.” The TASS announcement also stated, “Rumors that the USSR is preparing for war against Germany are false and provocative.…” However, the reality is that Soviet troops were already traveling to the western border. June 13, 1941, marked the beginning of the biggest organized movement of troops, arms, ammunition and other military supplies in history.
For example, the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army had 170 tank, motorized, cavalry, and rifle divisions. Fifty-six of them were already located right on the border and could not move any farther ahead. All of the remaining 114 divisions began to move toward the border in the wake of the reassuring TASS announcement on June 13, 1941.
This massive troop movement could not have been defensive. Troops preparing for defense dig themselves into the ground, close off roads, establish barbed-wire barriers, dig anti-tank trenches, and prepare cover behind the barricades. The Red Army did none of these things. Instead, the additional Soviet divisions began to hide in the border forests just like the German troops across the border preparing to invade. The TASS announcement was made solely in an attempt to falsely allay German fears of a pending Soviet invasion of Europe.
Suvorov also dismisses claims that the Soviet Union did not have enough qualified military leaders in 1941. Stalin did conduct a purge of the military from 1937-1938, but reports that 40,000 military commanders were executed is an exaggeration. Soviet documents show that 1,654 military commanders were either executed or died in prison while awaiting trial during 1937-1938. Since the officer corps of the Red Army in February 1937 numbered 206,000, less than 1% of the Soviet Union’s officers were eliminated in Stalin’s purge. Soviet military commanders in 1941 were quite numerous enough to lead Stalin’s war of aggression against Europe.
Suvorov also mentions that Soviet soldiers and officers were issued Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books as part of their preparations for an invasion of Europe. Thousands of Soviet troops did not dispose of this compromising evidence when they were captured in the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Russian-German phrase books were composed very simply: a question in Russian, followed by the same question in German written in Russian letters, then in German in Latin letters. If the Soviet soldier did not know how to pronounce the needed German phrase, he could point to the corresponding lines in the book and the Germans could read the lines themselves.
The phrases indicated that the Soviets were planning to conduct an offensive war in Europe. For example, some phrases asked: “Where is the Bürgerermeister? Is there an observation point on the steeple?” There were no Bügerermeisters or steeples in the Soviet Union. These questions are relevant only if the Soviet soldiers were in Germany. Here are other examples: “Where is the fuel? Where is the garage? Where are the stores? Where is the water? Gather and bring here [so many] horses [farm animals], we will pay!” These questions and phrases would not be relevant on Soviet soil. Other revealing phrases are the following: “You do not need to be afraid. The Red Army will come soon!” These phrases are also not relevant for a war conducted on Soviet soil.
Soviet Military Prowess Prior to Germany’s Invasion
The Soviet Union engaged in a number of military operations prior to Germany’s invasion on June 22, 1941. All of these operations showed substantial military strength that the Soviet Union managed to conceal from most of the world.
In the beginning of May 1939, an armed conflict occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops on the border between Mongolia and China near the River Khalkhin-Gol. The Soviet Union controlled Mongolia. Japan occupied the adjoining Chinese territory. Nobody declared war, but the conflict escalated into battles fought with the use of aircraft, artillery and tanks. On June 1, 1939, the Soviet Union officially declared, “We will defend the borders of the Mongolian People’s Republic as we defend our own.” The next day Gen. Zhukov flew from Moscow to Mongolia to take command of the Soviet and Mongolian troops.
Stalin armed Soviet troops in Mongolia with the most-modern weapons, including the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, all armed with the most-powerful tank cannon of that time. Soviet armored cars were also armed with the same powerful cannon. Some of the best Soviet pilots were sent to Mongolia and established air superiority above the theater of operations. The Red Army used long-range bombers, and for the first time I-16 fighters successfully used air-to-air RS-82 rocket missiles. The Red Army also had the newest and best artillery, howitzers and mortars in the world.
During the course of many inconclusive battles, Zhukov decided to end the conflict with a sudden and crushing defeat of the Japanese army. On August 20, 1939, at 5:45 AM, 153 Soviet bombers escorted by a corresponding number of fighters carried out a surprise raid over Japanese air bases and command posts. An extremely intense and powerful artillery barrage joined in immediately and lasted almost three hours. Soviet aircraft carried out a second raid during the course of the artillery action, and at 9:00 AM Soviet tank units broke through Japanese defenses. Zhukov had conducted a classic encirclement operation. On the fourth day of the attack, the circle drawn around Japanese troops was tightened and the rout of the Japanese army began. There had never been such a crushing defeat in all of Japanese military history.
The Soviet operation at Khalkhin-Gol, which is sometimes referred to as the Nomonhan Incident, was brilliant in its planning and execution. It totally surprised the Japanese—during the first hour-and-a-half of the attack, the Japanese artillery did not fire a single shot and not a single Japanese plane rose into the air. Khalkhin-Gol was the first Blitzkrieg of history. It was the first time in history that large masses of tanks were used effectively to strike in depth, and it was a prime example of the use of concealed concentration of artillery in tight areas of the front. The defeat of the Japanese Army on the Khalkhin-Gol checked Japanese aggression in the direction of Mongolia and the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1941, during months critical for the Soviet Union, the Japanese remembered Khalkhin-Gol and did not hazard to attack the Soviet Union.
For obvious reasons, the Japanese did not report their defeat in Mongolia to the world. Since there were no international observers nor journalists in Mongolia, few knew about the operation at the time. Stalin also ordered silence concerning the impressive Soviet defeat of the Japanese army. Stalin ordered silence because he was preparing the same sort of defeat on a much grander scale for all of Europe. Stalin’s interest lay in concealing the might of the Red Army, and letting the world believe that the Soviet Army was not able to conduct technologically advanced warfare. Stalin wanted to catch Hitler and the rest of Europe off-guard and not alert them.
On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression agreement called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This agreement guaranteed that Hitler would not have to fight the Soviet Union if Germany invaded Poland. A secret codicil also stipulated the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union in the event of war.
Hitler attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, and Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. The Soviet Union waited until September 17, 1939 to attack Poland from their side (the east). Stalin’s troops committed similar or worse atrocities in Poland than Germany, but Great Britain and France never declared war on the Soviet Union for invading their guarantee, Poland. The fault for beginning the war was laid upon Germany, and world opinion supposed the Soviet Union to be innocent in instigating the war.
Suvorov states that even the German Blitzkrieg in Poland faltered. On September 15, 1939, two weeks after the German attack, the activity level of the Luftwaffe fell substantially, and the German army was almost completely out of fuel. The Soviet Army invaded Poland on September 17, 1939 to rescue the German Blitzkrieg and enable the partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Another reason the Soviets waited until September 17, 1939 to invade Poland is that the ceasefire with Japan ending the Nomonhan Incident was not signed until September 15, 1939. The Soviets wanted to ensure that they were no longer at war with Japan before they invaded Poland.
In October 1939, Stalin’s diplomats continued the Soviet Union’s territorial aggrandizement by demanding the cession of the Karelian Isthmus from Finland in exchange for a territory elsewhere that happened to be twice the size of the isthmus. Finland rejected Stalin’s demands because the Karelian Isthmus is the direct gateway to the capital of Finland. The geographical disposition of Finland is such that any aggression against Finland from the Soviet Union could come only through the Karelian Isthmus. For this reason, starting in 1918, Finland began an extensive buildup of defensive fortifications and obstructions on the Karelian Isthmus known as the Mannerheim Line. Finland spent practically all of her military budget for the 10 years preceding the war on the construction of the Mannerheim Line. Stalin’s diplomats in essence had demanded that Finland hand over to the Red Army all of her heavily fortified defenses in exchange for swampland and marshy woods which no one needed or wanted.
Stalin issued the order to crush Finland when Stalin’s demands were rejected. After a brief but intense artillery softening-up, the Red Army crossed the Finnish border on November 30, 1939. The Red Army first encountered a security pale full of traps, barricades, obstacles and minefields. The entire space was filled with granite boulders, concrete blocks, forest blockages, scarps and counterscarps, anti-tank trenches, and bridges wired with explosives ready to be blown up by the Finnish border patrol. Finnish snipers and light mobile squads were highly active and operating at full capacity. The Red Army took two weeks and suffered heavy casualties before it passed through the security pale.
After overcoming the security pale, the Red Army reached Finland’s main line of defense—the Mannerheim Line. The line was a brilliantly camouflaged defense structure, well integrated into the surroundings, and stretching up to 30 kilometers in depth. In addition to innumerable minefields and anti-tank trenches, the Mannerheim Line contained 2,311 concrete, ironclad, and timber defense structures, as well as granite boulders and hundreds of rows of thick barbed wire on metal stakes connected to mines. The fighting on the Mannerheim Line was especially tenacious. The Red Army finally broke through the Mannerheim Line on March 12, 1940 after suffering colossal casualties: 126,875 soldiers and officers killed, 188,671 wounded, 58,370 ill, and 17,867 frostbitten.
All military experts prior to Finland’s defense against the Soviet Union had declared that breaking through the Mannerheim Line could not be done by any army. The Red Army had done the impossible. Furthermore, the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line impromptu in winter without any preparation for such limiting conditions. The military experts of the West should have recognized the powerful offensive capabilities of the Red Army. If the Red Army could break through the Mannerheim Line in winter, then it was capable of crushing Europe and whoever else got in its way. Instead, the military experts of the West declared the Red Army to be unfit and unprepared for war.
Only three months after the Soviet Union concluded military operations in Finland, the three Baltic nations, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, surrendered to Stalin and became Soviet Republics of the Soviet Union. The governments and military leadership of these three Baltic countries had carefully watched the war in Finland. They correctly concluded that the Red Army could not be stopped by any number of casualties, and that resistance to the Soviet Union was futile. Therefore, the three Baltic nations surrendered without firing a shot. With the addition of these three neutral countries, the Soviet Union advanced its borders to the west, which made it easier for the Soviet Union to invade Europe.
Stalin also issued an ultimatum to the government of Romania to cede Bessarabia. Realizing that resistance was futile, Romania handed over both Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union without even organizing lengthy talks. Thus, within less than a year, the Soviet Union had destroyed a Japanese army in Mongolia, taken over the eastern part of Poland by military force, conducted an extremely difficult but successful invasion of Finland, forced the Baltic nations of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia to join the Soviet Union against their will, and taken over possession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania.
These Soviet conquests and ultimata expanded the Soviet Union’s territory by 426,000 square kilometers, an area approximately equal to the surface area of the German Reich in 1919. These Soviet military operations prove that the Soviet Union was extremely powerful and aggressive. The Soviet Union was well-positioned after these conquests to launch a massive offensive against the rest of Europe.
Confirmation from Hitler
Suvorov’s book The Chief Culprit fails to mention Adolf Hitler’s speech on December 11, 1941 declaring war on the United States. This speech provides important corroborating evidence why Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Hitler stated in this speech:
When I became aware of the possibility of a threat to the east of the Reich in 1940 through reports from the British House of Commons and by observations of Soviet Russian troop movements on our frontiers, I immediately ordered the formation of many new armored, motorized and infantry divisions. The human and material resources for them were abundantly available….
We realized very clearly that under no circumstances could we allow the enemy the opportunity to strike first into our heart. Nevertheless, the decision in this case was a very difficult one. When the writers for the democratic newspapers now declare that I would have thought twice before attacking if I had known the strength of the Bolshevik adversaries, they show that they do not understand either the situation or me.
I have not sought war. To the contrary, I have done everything to avoid conflict. But I would forget my duty and my conscience if I were to do nothing in spite of the realization that a conflict had become unavoidable. Because I regarded Soviet Russia as a danger not only for the German Reich but for all of Europe, I decided, if possible, to give the order myself to attack a few days before the outbreak of this conflict.
A truly impressive amount of authentic material is now available which confirms that a Soviet Russian attack was intended. We are also sure about when this attack was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are perhaps only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that He enlightened me in time and has given me the strength to do what must be done. Millions of German soldiers may thank Him for their lives, and all of Europe for its existence.
I may say this today: If this wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, Europe would have been lost.
Several nations have been destined to prevent or parry this blow through the sacrifice of their blood. If Finland had not immediately decided, for the second time, to take up weapons, then the comfortable bourgeois life of the other Nordic countries would have been quickly ended.
If the German Reich, with its soldiers and weapons, had not stood against this opponent, a storm would have burned over Europe which would have eliminated once and for all time the laughable British idea of the European balance of power in all its intellectual paucity and traditional stupidity.
If the Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanians had not also acted to defend this European world, then the Bolshevik hordes would have poured over the Danube countries as did once the swarms of Attila’s Huns, and [Soviet] Tatars and Mongols would [then] force a revision of the Treaty of Montreux on the open country by the Ionian Sea.
If Italy, Spain and Croatia had not sent their divisions, then a European defense front would not have arisen which proclaims the concept of a new Europe and thereby effectively inspires all other nations as well. Because of this awareness of danger, volunteers have come from northern and western Europe: Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Flemish, Belgians and even French. They have all given the struggle of the allied forces of the Axis the character of a European crusade, in the truest sense of the word.
Hitler’s speech confirms Suvorov’s thesis that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was for preemptive purposes. Hitler’s attack was not for Lebensraum or any other ambitious reason.
Hitler’s speech also mentions an important point not discussed in The Chief Culprit: numerous brave men from northern and western Europe volunteered to join Germany in its fight against the Soviet Union. Volunteers from 30 nations enlisted to fight in the German armed forces during World War II. These volunteers felt that the Soviet Union, which Suvorov calls “the most criminal and most bloody empire in human history,” must not be allowed to conquer all of Europe.
Viktor Suvorov in his book The Chief Culprit makes it clear that Hitler’s preemptive attack on the Soviet Union prevented Stalin from conquering all of Europe. Suvorov also clearly shows that it was Stalin and not Hitler who abrogated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement. As Frederick the Great of Prussia stated, “The attacker is the one who forces his adversary to attack.”
Stalin’s plans for offensive war are also confirmed through his son. During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Yakov Iosifovich Dzhugashvili, the son of Stalin, was taken prisoner by the Germans. Stalin’s son was searched and questioned. A letter from another officer dated June 11, 1941 was found in his pockets stating: “I am at the training camps. I would like to be home by fall, but the planned walk to Berlin might hinder this.” German intelligence officers asked Dzhugashvili to clarify the statement about the “planned walk to Berlin.” Stalin’s son read the letter and quietly muttered: “Damn it!” Obviously, the letter indicates that Soviet forces were planning to invade Germany later that year.
German intelligence officers also asked Stalin’s son why the Soviet artillery, which had the best cannon and howitzers in the world, aimed so inaccurately. Stalin’s son truthfully answered: “The maps let the Red Army down, because the action, contrary to expectations, unfolded to the east of the state border.” The Soviet maps were of areas the Red Army planned to invade, but were useless for defending their own country. In 1941, the Red Army fought without (the relevant) maps, and so the Soviet artillery couldn’t find its targets.
 Suvorov, Viktor, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008, p. 94.
 Ibid., p. 239.
 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
 Ibid., pp. 123-126.
 Ibid., pp. 127-128.
 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
 Ibid., pp. 131-132.
 Ibid., pp. 133-135.
 Ibid., pp. 150-152.
 Ibid., pp. 156-157.
 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
 Ibid., p. 59.
 Ibid., pp. 196-197.
 Ibid., p. 205.
 Ibid., pp. 207-217.
 Ibid., pp. 92-97.
 Ibid., pp. 257-258.
 Ibid., p. 105.
 Ibid., pp. 105, 116-117.
 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
 Ibid., p. 116.
 Ibid., pp. 282-284.
 Ibid., p. 118.
 Koster, John, Operation Snow, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2012, pp. 34-35.
 Suvorov, Viktor, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2008, pp. 136-137.
 Ibid., pp. 137-140.
 Ibid., p. 144.
 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
 Ibid., p. 145.
 Hoffmann, Joachim, Stalin’s War of Extermination, 1941-1945: Planning, Realization, and Documentation, Capshaw, Ala.: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001, p. 31.
 Weber, Mark, “The Reichstag Speech of 11 December 1941: Hitler’s Declaration of War against the United States,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1988-1989, pp. 395-396.
 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, p. 7.
 Suvorov, Viktor, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008, p. 58.
 Ibid., p. 159.
 Franz-Willing, Georg, “The Origins of the Second World War,” The Journal of Historical Review, Torrance, Cal.: Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1986, p. 108.
 Suvorov, Viktor, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2008, p. 258.
 Ibid., pp. 258-259.
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|Title:||Germany, Bastion of Europe: Stalin’s War of Conquest|
|First posted on CODOH:||Oct. 26, 2019, 11:49 a.m.|