The “Miracle of Dunkirk”
The Battle of Dunkirk occurred from May 26, 1940 to June 4, 1940. Approximately 338,000 British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and other Allied troops were evacuated from Dunkirk, France to England as German forces closed in on them. This massive military operation, which involved hundreds of naval and civilian vessels, became known as the “Miracle of Dunkirk.” This largely successful evacuation of most of Britain’s trained troops proved to be a key moment in the victorious Allied war effort.[1]
Germany’s offensive against Dunkirk was halted by Adolf Hitler’s order on May 24, 1940. A controversy has developed as to why Hitler issued this order which enabled so many British troops to escape to England. Many historians claim that Hitler issued this order solely because of his military incompetence. Other historians state that Hitler halted his troops as a peace offering to prevent an irreparable breach between Britain and Germany.
This article discusses the evidence as to why Hitler ordered the German offensive at Dunkirk stopped, thereby allowing hundreds of thousands of British troops to be evacuated from Dunkirk.
Hitler’s Alleged Military Incompetence
Most mainstream historians state that military incompetence was the reason Hitler ordered his troops to halt before reaching Dunkirk. For example, German historian Volker Ullrich writes about Hitler’s decision:[2]
“What is certain is that his order to halt the advance was not his decision alone, but rather came after an intensive discussion with Colonel-General von Rundstedt. During the morning of 24 May, the dictator met with the commander of Army Group A in his headquarters in Charleville to discuss how to proceed. There, he learned that Rundstedt had already ordered German troops to halt so that motorized units and infantry divisions could catch up with the battle-worn tank groups.
Hitler agreed with Rundstedt about the situation. The dictator was already looking ahead to the next phase of the campaign and wanted to conserve his tank force for coming operations. To this end, he explicitly left it up to Rundstedt when the advance would continue. Thus, Hitler’s actions were guided by military considerations. A few days later, however, when it became clear that he had made a serious error, he cited an ex post facto political reason, claiming that he had purposely let the British expeditionary corps escape so as to preserve the possibility of a peace settlement with Britain.”
Ullrich writes that there is no truth in the idea that Hitler wanted to take it easy on the British. On the contrary, Ullrich writes that Hitler trusted Göring’s assurances that the Luftwaffe would easily be able to stop an evacuation of the BEF by sea.[3]
British historian Ian Kershaw writes:[4]
“Post-war suggestions that Hitler was deliberately allowing the British troops to get away as an act of generosity to encourage Britain to come to the peace table with its armies intact are far-fetched. Hitler himself was alleged to have told his entourage a fortnight or so later that ‘the army is the backbone of England and the Empire. If we smash the invasion corps, the Empire is doomed. Since we neither want to nor can inherit it, we must leave it the chance. My generals haven’t grasped that.’ Such sentiments, if they were indeed expressed in those terms, were no more than a self-justification for a military mistake. For the decision not to move on Dunkirk was taken for military reasons, and on military advice.”
German Gen. Heinz Guderian wrote about Dunkirk:[5]
“Winston Churchill, in his memoirs of the Second World War, says that some of the German generals suggested that by holding up his tanks outside Dunkirk Hitler was hoping either to give the English an opportunity to sue for peace or to increase Germany’s chances of negotiating a settlement. Neither then nor at any later period did I ever hear anything to substantiate this suggestion. Churchill’s guess that Rundstedt may have himself decided to hold up the armor is also wide of the mark. As the commander on the spot, I am able, moreover, definitely to state that the heroic defense of Calais, although worthy of the highest praise, yet had no influence on the development of events outside Dunkirk. Churchill assumes, quite correctly, that Hitler and above all Goering believed German air supremacy to be strong enough to prevent the evacuation of the British forces by sea. This belief was a mistake pregnant with consequence, for only the capture of the British Expeditionary Force could have influenced the English towards making peace with Hitler or could have created the conditions necessary for a successful German invasion of Great Britain.”
Hitler explained his Dunkirk decision at Brussels, where Gen. Fedor von Bock had assembled his senior generals:[6]
“Gentlemen, you will have wondered why I stopped the armored divisions outside Dunkirk. The fact was I could not afford to waste military effort. I was anxious lest the enemy launch an offensive from the Somme and wipe out the Fourth Army’s weak armored force, perhaps even going so far as Dunkirk. Such a military rebuff might have had intolerable effects in foreign policy.”
After Hitler ordered his tank forces to hold back on May 24, 1940, Hermann Göring announced that his Luftwaffe would take care of the British: “Our air force is to mop up the British. I’ve persuaded the Führer to hold the army back.” Göring stated to German Gen. Erhard Milch, “The Führer wants us to give them a lesson they’ll never forget.”[7]
Historian Hans-Adolf Jacobsen writes about Dunkirk:[8]
“Frequently in the earlier literature one finds the idea put forward that Hitler issued the ‘Halt-Order’ intentionally to give Britain ‘a golden bridge’ so that parts of the British army could escape. A ‘chivalrous’ gesture of that kind would contribute to a quicker peaceable understanding with Churchill. This contention belongs in the realm of numerous untrue postwar legends.”
Hitler’s Alleged Desire for Peace
Hitler had never wanted war with Great Britain. To Hitler, Great Britain was the natural ally of Germany and the nation he admired most. Hitler had no ambitions against Britain or her Empire, and all of the captured records solidly bear this out.[9]
After Germany’s conquest of Poland, Hitler made a peace offer to Britain and France that was quickly rejected. Included in Hitler’s peace offer was the evacuation of Poland by the Wehrmacht, except for Danzig and the “Corridor.”[10]
Hitler’s desire to make peace with Great Britain continued throughout the war. Numerous sources state that Hitler’s desire to make peace with Great Britain was the reason Hitler ordered his troops to halt before reaching Dunkirk.
For example, Gerard Menuhin in his book Tell the Truth and Shame the Devil states that he asked Dr. Gerhard Frey why Hitler had allowed the evacuation of the British army at Dunkirk, when Hitler had the opportunity of capturing the entire British army. Dr. Frey replied:[11]
“It had been a last gambit to gain some understanding with Britain…In fact, Hitler had been duped since the Munich Agreement in September 1938 into believing that there existed in Britain a strong movement for appeasement and against war with Germany, a movement led by Chamberlain, which would outweigh in importance and effect Churchill’s warmongering faction. This illusion had been fostered by banker Kurt von Schroder, who backed the ‘Anglo-American Fellowship’ (an organization to which many leading British industrialists and companies belonged). Hence, Hitler’s reluctance to attack the British Expeditionary Force in its hopeless position on the beaches.”
German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt insisted that his hands were tied by Hitler’s instructions to halt the offensive against Dunkirk. Hitler talked to Rundstedt and two key men of his staff, Gen. Georg von Sodenstern and Gen. Günther Blumentritt. As Gen. Blumentritt tells the story:[12]
“He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. […] He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere. He [Hitler] concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honor to accept.”
Blumentritt often thought about this conversation in his subsequent reflections on the course of events at Dunkirk. Blumentritt felt that Hitler had ordered the halt for more than military reasons, and that it was part of his political plan to make peace easier to reach. If the BEF had been captured at Dunkirk, Hitler thought the British might have felt that their honor had suffered a stain that must be eliminated. Hitler had hoped to conciliate the British by letting the BEF escape.[13]
There is also evidence that the Luftwaffe was not used as fully or as vigorously as it could have been. Some of the German air chiefs say that Hitler put the brake on here as well.[14]
British historian F.J.P. Veale wrote about the evacuation of British troops at Dunkirk:[15]
“That the bulk of the troops succeeded in escaping at all was due entirely to Hitler’s delusion that the dark menace of Asia overshadowing Europe would induce Great Britain to come to an understanding with Germany in self-protection.”
Hitler told his friend Frau Troost:[16]
“The blood of every single Englishman is too valuable to be shed. Our two people belong together, racially, and traditionally—this is and always has been my aim even if our generals can’t grasp it.”
Hitler stated in his Testament on February 26, 1945:[17]
“Churchill was quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had given proof by refraining from creating an irreparable breach between the British and ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunkirk. We ought to have been able to make them realize that the acceptance by them of the German hegemony established in Europe, a state of affairs to the implementation of which they had always been opposed, but which I had implemented without any trouble, would bring them inestimable advantages.”
Having been given the gift of Dunkirk by Hitler, Churchill refused to acknowledge it. Churchill instead described the evacuation of British troops off the beaches of Dunkirk as a heroic miracle accomplished by the British navy. Churchill became even more bellicose in his determination to continue the war.[18]
What is the Truth?
There is little question that Hitler’s order to halt the offensive against Dunkirk allowed the British troops to escape. In an interview after the war, German Gen. Ewald von Kleist stated:[19]
“We could have wiped out the British army completely or taken the whole army as captive if it weren’t for the stupid order of Hitler.”
It is also generally recognized that Hitler’s order to halt his troops before reaching Dunkirk hurt the German war effort. German Gen. Erich von Manstein wrote:[20]
“Dunkirk was one of Hitler’s most devastating mistakes. It hampered him in attempting the invasion of Britain and subsequently enabled the British to fight in Africa and Italy.”
So, why did Hitler order his troops to halt before reaching Dunkirk?
In this author’s opinion, Hitler had hoped to make peace with the British and preserve the British Empire. Hitler’s desire to preserve the British Empire was expressed on another occasion when the military fortunes of the Allies were at their lowest ebb. When France appealed for an armistice, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop gave the following summary of Hitler’s attitude toward Great Britain in a strictly private talk with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano:[21]
“He [Ribbentrop] said that in the Führer’s opinion the existence of the British Empire as an element of stability and social order in the world is very useful. In the present state of affairs, it would be impossible to replace it with another, similar organization. Therefore, the Führer—as he has also recently stated in public—does not desire the destruction of the British Empire. He asks that England renounce some of its possessions and recognize the fait accompli. On these conditions Hitler would be prepared to come to an agreement.”
After Dunkirk, Ribbentrop wrote that Hitler was enthused with making a quick peace with England. Hitler outlined the peace terms he was prepared to offer the British:[22]
“It will only be a few points, and the first point is that nothing must be done between England and Germany which would in any way violate the prestige of Great Britain. Secondly, Great Britain must give us back one or two of our old colonies. That is the only thing we want.”
Ribbentrop told Rep. Hamilton Fish that cooperation between England and Germany was essential for the maintenance of peace. Hitler had even “offered to place 15 German army divisions and the entire fleet at the disposal of the British government to support her empire in case of war anywhere in the world.” Fish did not believe this statement from Ribbentrop at the time, but it was substantiated years later.[23]
On June 25, 1940, Hitler telephoned Joseph Goebbels to lay out the terms of an agreement with Great Britain. Goebbels wrote in his diary:[24]
“The Führer […] believes that the [British Empire] must be preserved if at all possible. For if it collapses, then we shall not inherit it, but foreign and even hostile powers take it over. But if England will have it no other way, then she must be beaten to her knees. The Führer, however, would be agreeable to peace on the following basis: England out of Europe, colonies and mandates returned. Reparations for what was stolen from us after [World War I].”
Hitler took the initiative to end the war after the fall of France in June 1940. In a victory speech on July 19, 1940, Hitler declared that it had never been his intention to destroy or even harm the British Empire. Hitler made a general peace offer in the following words:[25]
“In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my conscience to appeal once more to reason and commonsense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor, speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on.”
This speech was followed by private diplomatic overtures to Great Britain through Sweden, the United States, and the Vatican. There is no question that Hitler was eager to end the war. But Churchill was in the war with the objective of destroying Germany. Churchill was not concerned with saving the British Empire from destruction. British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax also wanted the war to continue, and brushed aside what he called Hitler’s “summons to capitulate at his will.”[26] Hitler’s peace offer was officially rejected on July 22, 1940.[27]
Hitler’s desire to preserve the British Empire was expressed on numerous other occasions. For example, on August 14, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, Hitler called his field marshals into the Reich Chancellery to impress upon them that victory over Britain must not lead to the collapse of the British Empire:[28]
“Germany is not striving to smash Britain because the beneficiaries will not be Germany, but Japan in the east, Russia in India, Italy in the Mediterranean, and America in world trade. This is why peace is possible with Britain—but not so long as Churchill is prime minister. Thus, we must see what the Luftwaffe can do, and wait a possible general election.”
Conclusion
For the Allies, Hitler’s order to halt his troops before reaching Dunkirk was an astonishingly well-timed mercy. German generals such as Heinz Guderian, Franz Halder and many others were furious with Hitler for preventing them from capturing the British soldiers at Dunkirk.[29]
However, Hitler’s order to halt his troops before reaching Dunkirk was not made primarily for military reasons. Hitler’s mistake was to assume that Churchill would ever enter into a peace agreement with Germany. On January 20, 1943, Joseph E. Davies disclosed that Hitler offered to retire from office if by doing so Great Britain would make peace with Germany. Churchill and other British leaders refused Hitler’s offer.[30]
Churchill never once attempted to make peace with Germany. In a January 1, 1944, letter to Stalin, Churchill said:[31]
“We never thought of peace, not even in that year when we were completely isolated and could have made peace without serious detriment to the British Empire, and extensively at your cost. Why should we think of it now, when victory approaches for the three of us?”
Endnotes
A version of this article was originally published in the July/August 2026 issue of The Barnes Review.
| [1] | Miracle of Dunkirk History.com https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/dunkirk. |
| [2] | Ullrich, Volker, Hitler: Downfall 1939-1945, New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 2020, pp. 103f. |
| [3] | Ibid., p. 104. |
| [4] | Kershaw, Ian, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, p. 295. |
| [5] | Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1952, p. 120. |
| [6] | Irving, David, Hitler’s War, New York: The Viking Press, 1977, p. 125. |
| [7] | Irving, David, Göring: A Biography, Hammersmith, London: Grafton Books, 1991, p. 290. |
| [8] | Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, Dunkirk: German Operations in France 1940, Havertown, Penn.: Casemate Publishers, 2019, p. 194. |
| [9] | Irving, David, Hitler’s War, op. cit., p. 3. |
| [10] | Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, 1939—The War that Had Many Fathers: The Long Run-Up to the Second World War, 6th edition, München, Germany: Olzog Verlag GmbH, 2011, p. 667. |
| [11] | Menuhin, Gerard, Tell the Truth and Shame the Devil, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2015, p. 296. |
| [12] | Hart, B. H. Liddell, The Other Side of the Hill, London: Papermac, 1970, pp. 200f.; Hart, B. H. Liddell, History of the Second World War, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970, p. 83; see also Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 76. |
| [13] | Hart, B. H. Liddell, History of the Second World War, op. cit., p. 83. |
| [14] | Ibid., p. 82. |
| [15] | Veale, Frederick J. P., Advance to Barbarism, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 332. |
| [16] | Hart, B. H. Liddell, The Other Side of the Hill, op. cit., pp. 200f. |
| [17] | Fraser, L. Craig, The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, pp. 72f. |
| [18] | Bradberry, Benton L., The Myth of German Villainy, Bloomington, Ind.: AuthorHouse, 2012, p. 369. |
| [19] | Goldensohn, Leon, (Robert Gellately editor), The Nuremberg Interviews, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p. 342. |
| [20] | Von Manstein, Erich, Lost Victories, Novato, Cal.: Presidio Press, 1994, p. 124. |
| [21] | Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, London: Odhams Press, 1948, p. 373. |
| [22] | Hinsley, F. H., Hitler’s Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 81. |
| [23] | Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, p. 87. |
| [24] | Ferguson, Niall, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Power Order and the Lessons of Global Power, New York: Basic, 2003, pp. 330f. |
| [25] | Hitler, Adolf, My New Order, Edited with commentary by Raoul de Roussy de Sales, New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941, p. 837. |
| [26] | Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 84. |
| [27] | Hinsley, F. H., Hitler’s Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 82. |
| [28] | Denman, Roy, Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Indigo, 1997, p. 130. |
| [29] | Gelb, Norman, Dunkirk: The Complete Story of the First Step in the Defeat of Hitler, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989, pp. 129, 131. |
| [30] | Walsh, Michael, The Battle for Europe: Hidden Truths About the Second World War, United Kingdom: The Historical Review Press, 2012, p. 15. |
| [31] | Walendy, Udo, The Methods of Reeducation, Vlotho/Weser, Germany: Verlag für Volkstum und Zeitgeschichtsforschung, 1979, p. 3. |
Bibliographic information about this document: Inconvenient History, 2026, Vol. 18, No. 3; a version of this article was originally published in the July/August 2026 issue of The Barnes Review.
Other contributors to this document:
Editor’s comments:
